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Title: The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 3
Creator(s): Arminius, James (1560-1609)
Rights: Public Domain
CCEL Subjects: All; Theology;
LC Call no: BX6195 .A65 1956
LC Subjects:
Christian Denominations
Protestantism
Post-Reformation
Other Protestant denominations
Arminians. Remonstrants
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THE WORKS OF JAMES ARMINIUS VOL. 3
A Friendly Discussion Between James Arminius & Francis Junius, Concerning
Predestination, Conducted By Means Of Letters
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Discussion Between Arminius & Junius, Topic - Predestination
* Arminius And Junius’ First Correspondence
* First Proposition Of Arminius
* Second Proposition Of Arminius
* Third Proposition Of Arminius
* Forth Proposition Of Arminius
* Fifth Proposition Of Arminius
* Sixth Proposition Of Arminius
* Seventh Proposition Of Arminius
* Eighth Proposition Of Arminius
* Ninth Proposition Of Arminius
* Tenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Eleventh Proposition Of Arminius
* Twelth Proposition Of Arminius
* Thirteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Fourteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Fifteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Sixteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Seventeenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Eighteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Ninteenth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyfirst Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentysecond Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentythird Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyfourth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyfifth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentysixth Proposition Of Arminius
* Twentyseventh Proposition Of Arminius
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The origin of this discussion is thus stated by the elder Brandt: "On the
subject of Predestination, he [Junius] endeavoured to defend the opinion of
Calvin, by rendering it a little more palatable. For he did not maintain
that the divine predestination had respect to mankind either ANTECEDENT TO
THE DECREE OF THEIR CREATION, or SUBSEQUENT TO THEIR CREATION, ON A
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THEIR FALL, but that it had respect only to MAN ALREADY
CREATED, so far as BEING ENDOWED BY GOD WITH NATURAL GIFTS, HE WAS CALLED TO
A SUPERNATURAL GOOD. On that account James Arminius, then one of the
ministers of the church at Amsterdam, entered into an epistolary conference
with him, and tried to prove that the opinion of Junius, as well as that of
Calvin, inferred the NECESSITY OF SIN, and that he must therefore, have
recourse to a third opinion, which supposed man, not only AS CREATED but AS
FALLEN, to have been the object of predestination. Junius answered his first
letter with that good temper, which was peculiar to him, but seemed to
fabricate out of the various opinions concerning predestination one of his
own, which, Arminius thought contradicted all those which it was his
endeavour to defend. Arminius was induced to compose a rejoinder to the
answer of Junius, which he transmitted to the Professor, who retained it
full six years, to the time of his death, without attempting to reply."
The letter of Arminius was divided by Junius into twenty-seven propositions
in answering it, and each of them is here presented, with the answer of
Junius, and the reply of Arminius, corresponding to it.
To The Most Distinguished Man, Francis Junius, D.D., A Brother In Christ,
Worthy Of My Most Profound Regard, James Arminius Wishes You Health.
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MOST DISTINGUISHED AND VENERATED SIR:
They who do not give their assent to the sentiments of others, seem to
themselves, and wish to seem to others, to be, in this, under the influence
of sound judgment; but sometimes, ignorance of the sentiments of others is
the cause of this, which, nevertheless, they by no means acknowledge. I have
not hitherto been able to agree, in the full persuasion of my mind, with the
views of some learned men, both of our own and of former ages, concerning
the decrees of predestination and of reprobation.
Consciousness of my own lack of talents does not permit me to ascribe the
cause of this disagreement to sound judgment: that I should ascribe it to
ignorance is hardly allowed by my own opinion, which seems to me to be based
on an adequate knowledge of their sentiments. On this account I have been
till this time in doubt; fearing to assent to an opinion of another, without
a full persuasion in my own mind; and not daring to affirm that which I
consider more true, but not in accordance with the sentiments of most
learned men. I have, therefore, thought it necessary for the tranquillity of
my mind, to confer with learned men concerning that decree, that I might try
whether their erudite labours might be able to remove my doubt and
ignorance, and produce in my mind knowledge and certainty. I have already
done this with some of my brethren; and with others, whose opinions have
authority, but thus far, (to confess the truth,) with a result useless, or
even injurious to me. I thought that I must have recourse to you, who,
partly from your published works, and partly from the statements of others,
I know to be a person such that I may, without fear, be permitted to hope
from you some certain result.
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REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE MOST LEARNED MAN, AND MY VERY
DEAR BROTHER, JAMES ARMINIUS GREETING:
TERTULLIAN, On whose works, as you know, I have now been long engaged, has
been the cause of my long silence, respected brother. In the mean time, I
placed your letter on a shelf plainly in my view, that I might be reminded
of my obligation to you, and might attend, at the earliest possible
opportunity, to your request. You desire from me an explication of a
question of a truly grave character, in which the truth is fully known to
God: that which is sufficient He had expressed in His written word, which we
both consult with the divine help. You may set forth openly what you think
and do not think. You desire that I should present my views, that from this
mutual interchange and communication of sentiments, we may illustrate the
truth of divine grace. I will do what I can according to the measure, which
the Lord has admeasured to me; and whatever I may perceive of this most
august mystery, I will indicate it, whether I regard it as truth or as a
merely speculative opinion, that you with me may hold that which belongs to
the Deity. Whatever pertains to my opinion, if you have a more correct
sentiment, you may, in a kind and brotherly manner, unfold it, and by a
salutary admonition recall me into the way of truth. I will here say nothing
by way of introduction, because I prefer to pass at once to the subject
itself, which may rather be "good to the use of edifying," as the apostle
teaches. I judge that all desire the truth in righteousness: but all do not
therefore see the truth in righteousness. "We know in part, and we prophesy
in part," (1 Cor. xiii. 9,) and "when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he
will guide you into all truth." (John xvi. 13.) We perceive a part of the
truth: and present a part; the rest will be given in his own time, by the
Spirit of truth to those who seek. May he therefore grant to both of us that
we may receive and may present the truth.
That we may both realize greater advantage from this brotherly discussion,
and that nothing may carelessly fall from me, I will follow the path marked
out in your letters, writing word for word, and distinguishing the topics of
your discussion into propositions; and will subjoin to them, in the same
order, my own opinion concerning each point, that in reference to all things
you may be able to see clearly, and according to the Divine will, determine
from the mode of my answer, what I think and what I do not think. The
following is your first proposition, in which you may recognize yourself as
speaking.
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FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I see, then, most renowned sir, that there are three views in reference to
that subject, [predestination] which have their defenders among the doctors
of our church. The first is that of Calvin to Beza; the second that of
Thomas Aquinas and his followers; the third that of Augustine and those who
agree with him. They all agree in this, that they alike hold that God, by an
eternal and immutable decree, determined to bestow upon certain men, the
rest being passed by, supernatural and eternal life, and those means which
are the necessary and efficacious preparation for the attainment of that
life.
THE REPLY OF FRANCIS JUNIUS TO THE FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
If one should wish to accumulate a variety of opinions, he would in
appearance have a large number of them; but let these be the views of men to
whom will readily be assigned the first place in relation to this doctrine.
But in reference to the points of agreement among them all, of which you
speak, there are, unless I am deceived, two things most worthy of
explanation and notice. First, that what you say is indeed true, that "God,
by an eternal and immutable decree, determined to give eternal, supernatural
life to certain men;" but that eternal life is not here primarily, or per se
the work of that divine predestination, but rather in a secondary manner,
and dependent, by consequence, on adoption th~v uiJoqesiav The apostle
demonstrates this in Ephes. i. 5.
"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to
himself, according to the good pleasure of his will." And in verse 11,
"which He hath purposed in Himself; that in the dispensation of the fullness
of time, He might gather together in one all things in Christ," &c.
Also, Romans viii. 17, "if children, then heirs; heirs of God, and
joint-heirs with Christ," &c. We must not, however, forget that if an effect
is substituted for the distinguishing part of the essence the definition of
the thing is defective. Predestination, if we regard its peculiar and
distinguishing quality, is, according to the testimony of the Scripture, to
filiation, (so to speak,) or the adoption of children, the effect and
sequence of which is eternal life. It is thus true that we are predestinated
to life, but, accurately speaking, we are predestinated to adoption by the
special grace of our heavenly Father. He who proposes one, supposes the
other; but it is necessary that the former should be always set forth
distinctly in the general discussion. Hence it seems that the arrangement of
this whole argument will be less encumbered, if we consider that saving
decree of the divine predestination in this order; that God has
predestinated us to the adoption of children of God in Christ "to himself,"
and that he has pre-arranged by his own eternal decree the way and the end
of that adoption; the way of that grace, leading us in the discharge of
duty, by our vocation and justification, but its end, that of life, which we
shall obtain when our glorification is perfected, (Rom. 8,) which are the
effects of that grace, and the most certain consequences of our adoption.
The statement that God has predestinated certain persons to life, is a
general one; but it is not sufficiently clear or convenient for the purpose
of instruction, unless gratuitous adoption in Christ is supposed, prior to
justification and life and glory.
There is still another statement, made by you, which seems to me to need
consideration, that "God has bestowed on certain men those means which are
the necessary and efficacious preparation for the attainment of that life."
For though that assertion is true, yet it must be received with cautious
discrimination and religious scrupulousness. Our filiation is (so to speak)
the work of the divine predestination, because God is our father, and by His
grace unites us to himself as sons. But whatever God has ordained for the
consummation of this adoption in us, it is, in respect to that adoption, not
a means but a necessary adjunct or consectary. That eternal life, bestowed
on us, is a consectary of our adoption "to himself." But in respect to the
adjuncts and consequence, they may be called mutually, the means one of
another; as calling is said to be the means of justification, and
justification of glorification, (Rom. 8.) Yet though they are means, most of
them are necessary and efficacious in certain respects, not per se and
absolutely. For if they were, per se and absolutely necessary and
efficacious, they would be equally necessary and efficacious in all the
pious and elect. Yet most of them are not of this character; since even
infants and they who come in their last hours, being called by the Lord,
will obtain eternal life without those means. These things have been said,
the opportunity being presented.
We agree generally in reference to the other matters.
THE REPLY OF JAMES ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF FRANCIS JUNIUS
To that most distinguished person, Doctor Francis Junius, and my brother in
Christ, to be regarded with due veneration.
REVEREND SIR:
I have read and reviewed your reply, and used all the diligence of which I
was capable, considering it according to the measure of my strength, that I
might be able to judge with greater certainty concerning the truth of the
matter which is under discussion between us. But while I consider everything
in the light of my judgment, it seems to me that most of my propositions and
arguments are not answered in your reply. I venture, therefore, to take my
pen and to make some comments in order to show wherein I perceive a
deficiency in your answer, and to defend my own arguments. I am fully
persuaded that you will receive it with as much kindness as you received the
liberty used in my former letter, and if any thing shall seem to need
correction and to be worthy of refutation, you will indicate it to me with
the same charity; that, by your faithful assistance, may be able to
understand the truth which I seek with simplicity of heart, and explain it
to others to the glory of God and their salvation, as occasion shall demand.
May that Spirit of truth be present with me, and so direct my mind and hand,
that it may in no respect err from the truth. If however any thing should
fall from me not in harmony with its meaning, I shall wish that it had been
unsaid, unwritten.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS FIRST PROPOSITION
In my former letter I laid down three views held by our doctors in reference
to the decree of Predestination and Reprobation, diverse, not contrary.
Others might perhaps have been adduced, but not equally diverse among
themselves or from others. For each of these are distinguished by marks
which are manifest and have reference to the essence and nature of the
subject itself, which is under discussion.
First, they give the object of the decree (man) a different mode or form,
since the first presents him to the Deity as an object to be created, the
second as created, the third as fallen.
Secondly, they adapt to that decree attributes of the Deity, either
different or considered in a different relation. For the first presents
mercy and justice as preparing an object for themselves; the third
introduces the same attributes as finding their object prepared; the second
places grace, which holds the relation of genus to mercy, over
predestination; and liberty of grace over non-election or the preparation of
preterition, and justice over punishment.
Thirdly, they differ in certain acts. The first view attributes the act of
creation to that decree, and makes the fall of man subordinate to the same
decree; the second and the third premises creation; the third also supposes
the fall of man to be antecedent in the order of nature to the decree,
regarding the decree of election which flows from mercy and that of
reprobation which is administered by justice, as having no possible place
except in reference to man considered as a sinner, and on that account
meriting misery.
It is hence apparent that I have not improperly separated those views which
are themselves separated and discriminated by some marked distinction. But
you will perhaps persuade me that our doctors differ only in their mode of
presenting the same truth, more easily than you will persuade them or their
adherents. For Beza in many places sharply contends that God, when
predestinating and reprobating man, considers him, not as created, not as
fallen, but as to be created, and he claims that this is indicated by the
term "lump," used in Rom. ix. 21, and he charges great absurdities on those
who hold different views. For example, he says that they "who present man as
created to God decreeing, consider the Deity as imprudent, creating man
before he had his own mind arranged any thing in reference to his final
condition. He accuses those who present man as fallen, of denying, divine
providence, without the decree or arrangement of which sin entered into the
world, according to their view. But I can readily endure, indeed I can
praise any one who may desire to harmonize the views of the doctors, rather
than to separate them more widely, only let this be done by a suitable
explanation of views, apparently diverse, not by change in statement, or by
any addition, differing from the views themselves. He, who acts otherwise,
does not obtain the desired fruit of reconciliation, and he gains the
emolument of an erroneously stated sentiment, the displeasure of its
authors.
As to those two respects in which you think that my explanation of the
agreement of those views needs animadversion, in the former I agree, in the
latter I do not much disagree with you. For Predestination is, immediately,
to adoption, and, through it, to life; but when I propose the sentiments of
others, I do not think that they should be corrected by me. Yet I cheerfully
receive the correction; though I consider that it has little or nothing to
do with this controversy. Indeed I think that it tends to confirm my view.
For adoption in Christ not only requires the supposition of sin as a
condition requisite in the object, but of a certain other thing also, of
which I did not in my former letter think it best to treat. That thing is
faith in Jesus Christ, without which adoption is in fact bestowed on no man,
and, apart from the consideration of which, adoption is prepared for no one
by the divine predestination. (John i. 12.) For they who believe are
adopted, not they who are adopted receive the gift of faith: adoption is
prepared for those who shall believe, not faith is prepared for those who
are to be adopted, just as justification is prepared for believers, not
faith is prepared for the justified. The Scripture demonstrates that this is
the order in innumerable passages. But I do not fully understand in what
sense you style vocation and justification the way of adoption. That may be
called the way of adoption which will lead to adoption, and that also by
which adoption tends to its own end. You seem to me to understand the term
way in the latter sense, from the fact that you make justification
subsequent to adoption, and you speak of the way of grace leading us in the
discharge of duty, by our vocation and justification. Here are two things
not unworthy of notice. The first is that you connect vocation with adoption
as antecedent to it, which I think can scarcely be said of vocation as a
whole. For the vocation of sinners and unbelievers is to faith in Christ;
the vocation of believers is to conformity to Christ and to communion with
him. The Scripture makes the former antecedent to adoption. The latter is to
adoption itself, which is included in conformity and communion with Christ.
The second is that you made adoption prior to justification; both of which I
regard as bestowed on believers at the same time, while in the order of
nature, justification is prior to adoption. For the justified person is
adopted, not the adopted person is justified. This is proved by the order
both of the attainment of those blessings made by Christ, and that of the
imputation of the same blessings made by God in Christ. For Christ obtained
the remission of sins, before he obtained adoption, before in the order of
nature: and righteousness is imputed before sonship. For "when we were
enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son," (Rev. v. 10,)
but being reconciled, we are adopted as sons.
Let us consider also what are opposed to these, namely, imputation of sins
and non-adoption. From these it is clearly seen that such is the order. Sin
is the cause of exclusion from filiation by the mode of demerit. Imputation
of sin is the cause of the same exclusion by the mode of justice, punishing
sin according to its demerit. In reference to your remarks concerning means,
I observe that this term is applied by the authors to whose sentiments I
refer, to those things which God makes subordinate to the decree of
Predestination, but antecedent to the execution of that decree, not those by
which or in respect to which Predestination itself is made, whether to
adoption or to life. But I think it may be most useful to consider whether
these, either as adjuncts, or consectaries, or means, or by whatever other
name they may be called, are only effective to consummate the adoption
already ordained for certain individuals, or whether they were considered by
the Deity in the very act of predestination to sonship, as necessary
adjuncts of those to be predestinated.
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SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
They differ in this, that the first presents men as not yet created, but to
be created, to God, electing and predestinating, also passing by and
reprobating, (though, in the latter case, it does not so clearly make the
distinction): the second presents them created, but considered in a natural
state, to God electing and predestinating, "to be raised from that natural
state above it; it presents them to Him in the act of preterition, as
considered in the same natural state, and to Him in that of reprobation, as
involved in sin by their own fault: the third presents them to Him both
electing and predestinating, and passing by and reprobating as fallen in
Adam, and as lying in the mass of corruption and perdition.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
That, in this statement of views (which are apparently, not really,
contradictory) you have, in some manner, fallen into error, we shall, in its
own place, demonstrate. I could wish that in this case an ambiguity, in the
verb reprobate, and the verbal reprobation, had been avoided. This word is
used in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use is when
non-election, or preterition and damnation, is comprehended in the word, in
which way Calvin and Beza frequently understood it, yet so as to make some
distinction. A particular mode or signification is when it is opposed to
election, and designates non-election or preterition (a Latin phrase derived
from forensic use) in which sense the fathers used it according to the
common use of the Latins. There is also a particular use of the word, when
reprobation is taken for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in
this whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second common, the
third metonymical; I add that the third might properly be called
catachrestic if we attend to the just distinction of these members. I wholly
approve the second meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND PROPOSITION
I have made a difference, not a contrariety between those views, and have
already explained that difference according to my judgment. I do not,
however, wish to be tedious in the proof of this point. For, in this matter,
it is my aim that of a number of positions, any one being established,
others, perhaps before unsettled, may be demonstrated.
The word reprobation may be sometimes used ambiguously, but it was not so
used by me: and, if it had been, blame for that thing ought not to be laid
on me, who have used that word in the sense and according to the use of
those, whose views I presented, but especially according to the sense in
which it has been used by yourself, with whom I have begun this discussion.
For I had examined various passages in your writings, and in them I found
that the word was used by you in the last sense, which you here call
catachrestic. I will adduce some of those passages, from which you will see
that I have used the word in accordance with your perpetual usage. In your
Notes on Jude, (fol 27-6,) "The proper cause of reprobation is man himself;
of his own sin, dying in sins." So in your Sacred Axioms concerning Nature
and Grace, prefaced to the Refutation of the Pamphlet of Puccius, Axioms
xliv, xlv, xlvi, xlvii, xlviii, and especially xlix and l, the words of
which I here quote. Axiom xlix, "Nor is preterition indeed the cause of
reprobation or damnation, but only its antecedent. But the peculiar and
internal efficient cause of this is the sin of the creature, while the
accidental and external cause is the justice of God." Axiom i, "Therefore
Reprobation (that we may clearly distinguish the matter) is understood
either in a wider sense, or in one which is more narrow and peculiar to
itself. In a wider sense, if you consider the whole subject of the divine
counsel from preterition, as the antecedent and commencement, to damnation,
as the end and consequent, with the intervention of the peculiar cause of
damnation, namely, sin; in a more narrow and appropriate sense, if you
consider only the effects of sin." We might add, also, what is said in the
51st axiom. Of the theses concerning Predestination, discussed by Coddaeus
under you, the 14th has this remark:
"Preterition is the opposite of preparation of grace and reprobation or
preparation of punishment is the opposite of preparation of glory. But
preparation of punishment is the act in which God determines to punish his
creatures, &c." In theses 17 and 18, "reprobate on account of sins, from the
necessity of justice." Here you seem to have wished to use those words
properly: which you also signify more plainly in the Theses concerning
election discussed by the younger Trelcatius under your direction. Thesis
xii, "But if reprobation is made the opposite of election, (as it really
is,) it is a figurative expression, that is either by synecdoche, or by
catachresis. By synecdoche, if it refers to the whole series of acts opposed
to Predestination; by catachresis, if it refers to non-election. For
non-election is the first limit of the divine purpose, dependent on his will
alone. Reprobation is the ultimate limit, next to the execution, dependent
on the supposition of antecedent causes." Hence it is apparent that I have
used that word in the sense which you have styled "appropriate." I will
state, in a few words, what I think in reference to the same word, and its
use. I am wholly of the opinion that the word reprobation, according to the
use of the Latin language, properly signifies non-election, if election does
not consist without reprobation. But I think that it is never used in the
Scripture for an act which is merely negative, and never for an act which
has reference to those who are not sinners. If at any time Augustine and
others of the fathers use it for preterition, non-election, or any negative
act, they consider it as having reference to a reelection in sin, and in the
mass of corruption, or for a purpose to withhold mercy, the latter term
being used for a deliverance from sin and actual misery. Calvin and Beza use
it in almost every case, for the mere preparation of punishment, or for both
acts.
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THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The first theory is this, that God determined from eternity to illustrate
his own glory by mercy and justice: and as these could be exercised in fact
only in reference to sinners, that he decreed to make man holy and innocent,
that is, after his own images yet, good in such a sense as to be liable to a
change in this condition, and able to fall and to commit sin: that he
ordained also that man should fall and become depraved, that He might thus
prepare the way for the fulfillment of his own eternal counsels, that he
might be able mercifully to save some and justly to condemn others,
according to his own eternal purpose, to the declaration of his mercy in the
former, and of his justice in the latter.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRD PROPOSITION
This view seems to have been stated not with sufficient fullness; for Calvin
in his Institutes, (lib. 3,) eloquently refers to the words of Paul in
Ephes. i, "He predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ
to himself, &c.," and explains them, preserving the order which we noticed
under Proposition I. God therefore from eternity determined to illustrate
most wisely his own glory by the adoption of these and the preterition or
non-adoption of those with the introduction also of mercy and justice. This
being settled, that statement may be very well conceded, that "God
determined to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice, if it is
rightly understood. But this will be hereafter explained in a summary
manner. But it cannot be conceded, nor can I think that Calvin or Beza would
have said simply that "mercy and justice cannot in fact be exercised except
in reference to sinners. For in the first place (that we may sooner or later
explain these things), sinners are such in act, in habit, or in capability.
We are sinners in act when the depravity of our nature has carried out its
own operations; we were sinners in habit in the womb and from the womb,
before we wrought the works of the flesh. Adam was such in capability in
some sense before the fall, when he had the power to lay aside his holy
habits of life, and make himself the bond-slave of sin. So also they are
miserable, in act, in habit, or in capability, who now endure miseries or
have put on the habit of them, are capable of falling into them. The latter,
however, are sinners and miserable, not absolutely but relatively; not fully
but in a certain sense (kata ti) and only in a comparative mode of speaking
as Job iv. 18, "Behold He put no trust in his servants; and his angels he
charged with folly." Augustine refers to this (Lib. contra. Priscill et
Origen, cap 10) concluding his remarks with this most elegant sentence: "for
by participation in whom they are righteous, by comparison with Him they are
unrighteous."
But in the second place it is not true that "mercy cannot be exercised
except in reference to sinners," for all creatures, even the angels from
heaven, when compared, according to their own nature, with the Deity, are
wretched, since in comparison with Him they are not righteous, and because,
by their own nature, they can sink into misery, (which is certainly the
capability of misery; as, on the contrary, not to be capable of misery, is
the highest happiness), they are miserable by capability. Therefore, He who
has freed them from possible misery by His own election, has bestowed mercy
on them; in reference to which they are called "elect angels" by Paul. (1
Tim. v. 21.) We may here merely refer to the fact that the word mercy (the
Latin term misericordia being used in a more contracted sense) does not
necessarily suppose misery, as will be seen by a reference to the original
languages, the Hebrew and Greek, in which the men of God wrote. The Hebrews
expressed that idea by two words dsj and symjr neither of which had
reference properly and necessarily to misery e]leov of the Greeks does not
necessarily suppose misery, if we regard the common usage of the Scriptures;
for parents exercise it towards their children, though happy and free from
misery. In the third place, it is by no means more true that "he can
exercise justice only in reference to sinners." For he who renders to each
his due, exercises justice: but God would clearly not be just if he did not
render their due to the righteous as well as to the unrighteous. For even
towards Adam, if he had remained righteous, God would have exercised justice
both by the bestowment of his own reward upon him, analogous to his
righteousness, and by that supernatural gift, analogous to his own power and
grace, which He adumbrated to man by the symbol of the tree of life. It was
possible that God should exercise justice in reference even to those who
were not sinners. But concerning judgment to death, the case is different.
From what has already been said, we readily conclude in reference to the
rest. In reference to the word ordain, we shall speak under the sixth
proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO HIS THIRD PROPOSITION
I might show that the sentiments of Calvin and Beza were well and fully set
forth by me in those words, by many passages selected from their writings.
For though sometimes, when they make mention of adoption, and non-adoption,
which is its contrary by logical division and opposition, yet they do not
set forth their views, as it was explained by you in answer to my first
proposition, and as you have just explained it in these words: "God,
therefore, from eternity, determined to illustrate most wisely his own glory
by the adoption of these, and the preterition or non-adoption of those, with
the introduction of mercy and justice." For in two respects there is a
departure in those words from their sentiment.
In the first place, because they do not consider that the illustration of
the glory of God is effected immediately by the adoption of these and the
non-adoption or preterition of those, but by a declaration of mercy and
justice, which are unfolded in the acts of adoption or election, and of
non-adoption or reprobation. It seems proper, according to the rule of
demonstration, that this order should be preserved; the glory of God
consists in the declaration of the attributes of God; the attributes of God
are illustrated by acts suitable to those attributes.
Secondly, mercy and justice are not said by them to be introduced into the
decree of predestination and reprobation. For those words signify that God,
according to other attributes of his nature, decreed the adoption of these
and the non-adoption of those, to the illustration of his own glory, in
which deed he used also mercy and justice for the execution of that decree,
and indeed with the condition of a change in the object. But this was not
their view, but it was as I have already set it forth, namely, "God
determined from eternity to illustrate his own glory by mercy and justice:
since the glory of God can be neither acknowledged nor celebrated, unless it
be declared by his mercy and his justice. But they consider mercy the
appropriate cause of adoption, but justice the cause of non-adoption or
reprobation, and they regard his purpose of illustrating both as the whole
cause of predestination, that is, of election and reprobation; for they
divide predestination into these parts or species. Therefore in my statement
less was ascribed to mercy and justice in that decree than those authors
think ought to be ascribed to those attributes, and than they do ascribe to
them in the explanation of their entire view. Nor is it with justice denied
that it is a part of their sentiment that mercy and justice can only be
exercised in fact in reference to actual sinners. For they assert this most
clearly, not indeed restricting the word justice to punitive justice, which,
indeed, is my view, as is evident from my sixth proposition, and I think
that this can be understood from them. I will adduce a few passages from
many.
Beza (adversus calumnias Nebulonis, ad art. 2) "God, having in view the
creation of man, to declare the glory both of his mercy and of his justice,
as the result showed, made Adam in his own image, that is, holy and
innocent; since as he is good, nothing depraved can be created by him. But
they must be depraved on whom he determines to have mercy, and they also
whom he justly determines to condemn." From this passage I quoted the words
in which I stated this view. The same Beza again says (lib. 1, quest. et
reap. fol. 126, in 8,) "Since God had decreed from eternity, as can be
learned from events, to manifest in the highest degree his own glory in the
human race, which manifestation might consist partly in the exercise of
mercy, partly in the demonstration of hatred against sin, he made a man
inwardly and outwardly pure, and endowed with right understanding and will,
but susceptible of change. He, as supremely good, could not and would not
indeed create any evil thing, and yet unless evil had entered into the
world, there would have been no place for mercy or judgment." He expresses
himself, in the plainest manner possible, in his conference with
Mombelgartes; "Let us," says Beza "lay down these principles. God, an
infinitely wise architect, and whose wisdom is unlimited, when He determined
to create the world, and especially the human race had a certain proposed
end, &c. For the eternal and immutable purpose of God was antecedent to all
causes, because He decreed in Himself from eternity to create all men for
His own glory. But the glory of God is neither acknowledged nor celebrated,
unless his mercy and justice is declared. Therefore, He made an eternal and
immutable decree by which He destined some particular individuals, of mere
grace, to eternal life, and some, by an act of judgment, to eternal
damnation, that He might declare His mercy in the former, but His justice in
the latter. Since God had proposed this end to Himself in the creation of
men, it was necessary that He should also devise the way and the means by
which He could attain that end, that His mercy and His justice might be
equally manifested. For since mercy presupposes misery, it can neither have
place nor be declared where misery does not exist, it was then necessary
that man should be created, that in him there might be a place for the mercy
of God. This could not be found without preceding misery. So also, since
justice presupposes crime, without which justice cannot be exercised, (for
where there is no crime, there justice has no place,) it was necessary that
man should be so created that, without the destruction of his nature, he
might be a fit subject, that in him God might declare His own justice. For
He could not declare His own justice in man unless He should have destined
him to eternal damnation. Therefore, God proposed, &c." These things were
published by James Andreas, but acknowledged by Beza, for in his answer to
that discussion he does not say that views, not his own, are attributed to
him. You see, therefore, that I have adapted the proper object to those
attributes according to their opinion, which sentiment they without doubt
think that they have derived from the Scripture; in which this is fixed that
God cannot justly punish one who is not a sinner; in which also the same
author will deny that the word mercy is so used that, when attributed to
God, it may signify salvation from possible misery; since, in their view, it
every where designates salvation from the misery which the sinner has
merited, and which either has been or can be justly inflicted by the Deity.
But I shall not wish to contend strenuously that it is not possible that
mercy should be exercised towards those not actually miserable, and I can
easily assent to those things which you have said concerning that subject,
if they may have the meaning which I will give in my own words, namely, that
all creatures, even angels and men, when compared with God, are miserable,
misery being here taken for non felicity, not for that which is opposed to
felicity in a privative sense, but for that which is opposed to it in a
contradictory sense; as nothing more is proved by the reason from analogy.
In comparison with God they are not just, therefore, in comparison with him
they are not happy. For there are three antecedents, each of which has its
consequent; just, unjust, not just; happy, unhappy or miserable, not happy.
From justice results happiness, from injustice misery, from non-justice
non-felicity.
But creatures as such can be compared with God, both in relation of the
limit whence they proceed, and in relation to the limit to which they
advanced by the Deity. In relation to the latter, angels and men exist, are
just, are happy; in relation to the former, they do not exist, are not just,
are not happy, since they come from nothing and can therefore be returned to
nothing. But in this relation they cannot be called unjust or unhappy, since
the limit, from which they were brought forward, is opposed, by
contradiction, not by privation, to the limit to which they are borne by the
divine goodness, or more briefly, since they are brought from possibility to
actuality, which possibility and actuality are contradictory not privative,
one of the other. Now, since they consist of possibility and actuality, it
is not possible that they, if deserted by divine support, should return to
nothing, but it is necessary that they, if thus deserted, should return to
nothing. It is moreover possible that, continuing to exist by the divine
power, yet being left to themselves and having power to decide their own
course, they should, in their second action, not live according to the
dictates of justice, by which they were governed in their first action, but
do something contrary to it, and by this act become unrighteous and sinners,
and, having become such, should put on the habit of unrighteousness, the
habit of righteousness having been removed, either as an effect or on the
ground of demerit, so that they would become miserable first by desert, next
by act, and finally by habit. But if God should hinder them from deserving
that misery that is from sinning and becoming actually miserable, I do not
see why that act may not be ascribed to mercy since it originates in the
desire to prevent misery, which desire pertains to mercy. I concede, indeed,
that this is so, and that it is not therefore absolutely true that mercy can
only be exercised towards actual sinners. But I wish that it should be
observed that mercy is not used, in that sense, by Calvin and Beza, and
indeed if mercy, thus understood, should be substituted for the same
affection, as it is used by Calvin and Beza, the whole relation and
description of the decree would be changed. I remark also that mercy,
understood as you present it, does not come under consideration when the
subject treated of is the predestination of men: for it is not exercised by
God towards man, as one who has not been saved from possible misery by the
divine predestination. Finally, it should also be considered that the
relation between mercy understood in the latter, and mercy understood in the
former sense is such that both cannot concur to the salvation of a man. For
if there be occasion for the mercy, which saves from possible misery, there
can be no place for that which delivers from actual misery, as the
opportunity for the exercise of its peculiar functions is taken away, or,
rather, precluded by the former; if on the contrary the mercy, which frees
from actual misery, is necessary, the other does not act, and so the former
excludes the latter in the relation of both cause and effect, and the latter
consequently excludes the former, not succeeding after the fulfillment of
its office, but existing by the necessity of its own action, as the man has
failed of the former.
We remark in reference to justice that it is indeed very true that it can
have place, and can be exercised towards those who are not sinners. For it
is the rewarder not only of sinful, but of righteous conduct. But why may it
not be deduced from these things, so considered by you, that the necessary
existence of sin cannot be inferred even from the necessary declaration of
the mercy and justice of God, since both, considered in a certain light, can
be exercised towards those who are not sinners. In this way the order of
predestination established by Calvin and Beza is wholly overthrown. But as
mercy, saving from possible misery, and justice, rewarding virtue do not
need the pre-existence of actual misery and sin, yet it is certain that
mercy, freeing from actual misery and justice, punishing sin, can only be
exercised towards the actually miserable and sinful. But Calvin and Beza
every where use the terms, mercy and justice, in this sense, when they
discuss the decree of predestination and probation. Since, also, mercy and
justice, understood in the former sense, have no place in the predestination
and reprobation of men, but only as they are received in the former
signification, mercy, saving from possible misery and justice, rewarding
good deeds, might be properly omitted in the discussion of the
predestination and reprobation of men, though I do not deny that such a
consideration may have its appropriate and by no means small advantages.
Since we have entered on the consideration of mercy and justice, we may, if
you have leisure and are so disposed, continue it for a short time,
comparing each with the other, for the illustration of the subject which we
now discuss, in reference first to the object of both, then to the order in
which each acts on its own object.
Mercy and justice, the former saving from possible misery, the latter
rewarding good conduct can be exercised towards one and the same object, as
is manifest in the case of the elect angels, who are saved from possible
misery, and have obtained from the divine goodness the reward of right
conduct. But that same mercy cannot be exercised in reference to the same
object with punitive justice. For whatever is worthy of the act of punitive
justice is not saved from possible misery. The mercy, also which saves from
actual misery is in this respect similar to the other kind of mercy, that it
cannot concur in respect to the same object with punitive justice; but it is
to be considered whether and how, like the other mercy, it can be exercised
at the same time with the justice which rewards goodness. We, indeed see,
that in the Scriptures the reward of a good deed is promised to those who
have obtained mercy in Christ, and is in fact bestowed upon them, but the
reward, though it may be of justice, is yet not of justice, understood in
that sense in which justice is regarded, when rewarding a good deed,
according to the promise of the law, and of debt; for the former
remuneration is the grace of God in Jesus Christ, who is made unto us of
God, righteousness, (justice) and sanctification. Justice, in one case
bestowing a remuneration of debt, may be called legal, but, in the other, of
grace, may not inappropriately be called evangelical, the union of which
with the mercy saving from actual misery has been effected in a wonderful
manner by God in Jesus Christ, our High Priest, and expiatory sacrifice. The
object, then, of punitive justice is essentially and materially different
from the object of mercy considered in either light, and of justice
remunerating right conduct.
But the object of mercy, saving from possible misery, is different in its
formal relation from the object of mercy, saving from actual misery, for the
former is a creature, righteous and considered in his state as it was by
creation, but the latter is a sinful creature, and fallen from his original
state into misery by transgression. Of those two classes both of mercy and
justice, the former in each case is to be excluded from the decree of the
predestination and reprobation of men, namely, mercy-saving from possible
misery and justice, rewarding goodness from a legal promise, but the latter,
preside over that decree, namely, mercy-saving from actual misery, over
predestination, and punitive justice over reprobation. Now let us examine
the order, according to which each, compared by themselves and among
themselves, tends to its own object. Mercy preventing misery and justice
rewarding goodness according to law, tending towards one subject, take this
order, that mercy should first perform its office, and then justice
discharge its functions. For the prevention of sin, and therefore of misery,
precedes any good deed, and therefore precedes the reward of that good deed,
therefore, also, the misery which saves from actual misery precedes the
justice which rewards a good deed, of grace. For that mercy not only takes
away the guilt and dominion of sin, but creates in the believer a habit of
righteousness, by which a good deed is produced, to be compensated of grace
by the reward. But concerning mercy-saving from actual misery, which is the
administration of predestination, and punitive justice which is the cause of
reprobation, what judgment shall we form? We will say that both tend, at the
same moment, to their own object, but we will [make] consider the former as
an antecedent in the order of nature. For though he, who elects, in the very
fact that he elects, reprobates also the non-elect, yet the act of election
is antecedent in the order of nature, just as an affirmative is in the order
of nature prior to negation. From which we infer (of this we will speak
hereafter) that the decree to leave man to the decision of his own destiny,
and to permit the fall, does not belong to the decree of reprobation, since
it is prior to and more ancient than the decree of predestination.
I wish that this order may be considered with somewhat more diligence and at
greater length, for it will open before us a way of knowing some other
things, different from and yet by no means wholly foreign to the subject now
under discussion. If the mercy, which bestows grace and life, holds the
prior relation to this decree, and the justice, which denies grace and
inflicts death, the posterior relation in the order of nature, though not of
time, then it is still more to be considered, whether the object of this
decree is adequately and with sufficient accuracy described by the term
sinner; or whether something else ought not also to be added, which may so
limit the object, that it may be made adequate to the decree which
originated in such mercy and justice, and may be in harmony with it, namely
the nature of the object thus made adequate, and, in its own capability,
tending to its own peculiar and appropriate object. If any one thinks that
the functions of justice towards sin and the sinner are prior to those of
mercy and that the rendering of it’s due punishment to sin is prior by
nature to the remission of the same to the sinner, I wish he would attend
diligently to two points.
First, that a two-fold action is attributed, by those who discuss this
matter, to justice, so far as it premises over the decree of reprobation, or
preterition and predamnation, and this in harmony with the nature of the
subject; the former is negative, the latter affirmative, and in this order
that the negative precedes the affirmative. From this it follows that if
that negative act is posterior, in the order of nature, to the affirmative
act of predestination, as is the case, then the functions of mercy must be
prior; for from mercy originates the affirmative act of predestination,
which is antecedent to the negative act of reprobation. SECONDLY, that the
punishment, due to sin, is by this decree destined for no one, unless so as
it is not removed by mercy; and in this respect, though justice may in its
own right claim the punishment of the sinner, yet it exacts that punishment,
according to the decree of predomination which is made by justice, in view
not of the fact that it is due to the sinner, but of the fact that it has
not been remitted to him of mercy; else all men universally would be
predamned, since they all have deserved punishment. Hence, this ought also
to be considered whether the justice, which is the administratrix of the
decree of reprobation or predamnation is revealed according to the Law or
the Gospel, of legal rigor or softened by some mercy and forbearance. If
mercy, the administratrix of predestination is revealed according to the
Gospel, as is true, it seems from what has already been said, that justice
the opposite of mercy, which is prior to it, in the order of nature, should
be also revealed according to the Gospel. If any one thinks that these views
are vain and useless, let him consider that what is said in the Scripture
concerning legal righteousness is not useless—
"The man which doeth those things shall live by them," (Rom. x. 5,) and
"cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in
the book of the law to do them." (Gal. iii. 10.)
Let him also consider what is said concerning Evangelical righteousness, "He
that believeth in the Son hath everlasting life, (John iii. 36,) and "He
that believeth not is condemned. (John iii. 18.) I wish that these things
may be considered thoroughly by the thoughtful, and I ask a suspension of
their decision until they have accurately weighed the matter.
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FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second theory is this—God, from eternity, considering men in their
original native condition determined to raise some to supernatural felicity
and ordained for the same persons supernatural means which are necessary,
sufficient and efficacious to secure that felicity to them, to the praise of
his glorious grace; and to pass by others, and to have them in their natural
state, and not to bestow on them those supernatural and efficacious means,
to declare the liberty of his own goodness; and that he reprobated the same
individuals, so passed by, whom he foresaw as not continuing in their
original condition, but falling from it of their own fault, that is, he
prepared punishment for them to the declaration of his own justice.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
This theory is stated, in these words, not more nearly in accordance with
the sentiment of its authors than the preceding. For in the first place, I
do not remember that I have read these words in Thomas Aquinas, or others:
in the second place, if any have used this phraseology, they have not used
it in that sense, as shall be proved under the sixth proposition. But in the
phrase supernatural felicity, understand th<n uiJoqesian, the adoption of
the sons of God with all its adjuncts and consectaries. After the words
"declare the liberty of his own goodness," add, if you please, "and the
perfection of his manifold wisdom." The word reprobation is to be taken
catachrestically, as we have before observed. I should prefer that words
should be variously distinguished in referring to matters which are
distinct.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FOURTH PROPOSITION
If I have stated this second theory as nearly in accordance with the
sentiments of its authors as in the preceding case, it is well; but I fear
on this point since I do not, with equal confidence claim a knowledge of the
second. Yet I think that I have derived the explanation of this from the
Theses discussed under your direction in which I recognize your style and
mode of discussion. Thus in Thesis 10 of those which were discussed,
Coddaeus being the respondent, is this statement. "Human beings" (that is,
one part of the material of predestination, as is stated in Thesis 7, of the
same disputation concerning predestination) "are creatures in a condition of
nature (which can effect nothing natural, nothing divine) to be exalted
above nature, and to be transmitted to a participation of divine things by
the supernatural energy of the Deity." The same assertion is found in the
Thesis 4 of your tenth theological disputation, in which the subject of the
predestination of human beings alone is discussed, as is the case with the
first Thesis, that no one may think that things, said in common concerning
the predestination of angels and of men, ought to be expressed in general
terms. which might afterwards be attributed specially to each of these
classes, according to their different condition to the elect angels, an
exaltation from that nature, in which they were created by the Deity, but to
elect human beings on elevation from their corrupt nature into which they
fell, of their own fault. If, however, this matter is thus understood, there
is now no discrepancy between us in this respect.
But I think that it is evident from those words of your Theses that human
beings, considered in their original condition are the material of
predestination, or its adequate object. Human beings I say in their original
condition, both in the fact that nothing supernatural or divine has been
bestowed upon them, and that they have not yet fallen into sin.
Considered in their original condition, I say again, in view of the fact
that even if they have either supernatural and divine gifts or sin, they are
not considered with reference to these by Him who determined to perform any
certain act concerning them, which is equivalent to an assertion that
neither supernatural or divine gifts, nor sin, held, in the mind of Him who
considered them the position of a formal cause in the object, From these
words I deduce this conclusion: Human beings, considered in their natural
state which can admit nothing supernatural or divine, are the object or
material of predestination;-But human beings, considered in their natural
condition, are here as beings considered in that natural state, which can do
nothing supernatural or divine, or rather they are the same in definition;-
Therefore, human beings in their natural state are the object and material
of predestination, that is, according to the views embraced in your Theses.
The Major Proposition is contained in the Thesis. For if the will or decree
of God in reference to the exaltation of men from such a state of nature to
a state above nature is predestination, then men, considered in that natural
state, are the true material of predestination; since the acts of God, both
the internal, which is the decree concerning the exaltation of certain human
beings, and the external, which is the exaltation itself, (as it ought to
be, if we wish to consider the mere object) leave to us man in his mere
natural state which can do nothing supernatural or divine.
If it is said that, in these words, the condition of sin is not excluded,
since even sinners may be raised from their corrupt nature, I reply, in the
first place, that this cannot be the meaning of those words, both because it
is not necessary that it should be said of such a nature that can do nothing
supernatural or divine, for this is understood from the qualifying term,
when it is spoken of as "corrupt," and because, in the definition of
preterition, Thesis 15, that act, by which the pure nature of some creatures
is not confirmed, is attributed to preterition, which preterition is the
leaving of some created beings in their natural condition. I reply, in the
second place, that there is here an equivocation in the definition, and that
the decree is equivocal and only true on the condition of its division, of
which I will say more hereafter. The Minor is true, for this is evident from
the reciprocal and equivalent relation of the antecedent and consequent to
each other. But what pertains to predestination is enunciated in these
words, "to be exalted above nature, and to be transferred to a participation
of divine things by the supernatural energy of the Deity, which divine
things pertain to grace and glory," as in your Thesis 9. It is not doubtful
that my words, in which I have described the second theory, are in harmony
with these statements, but if any one thinks that there is a discrepancy
because, in your Theses, grace and glory are united, and that it can be
understood from my words that I designed to indicate that glory first, and
grace afterwards, are prepared for men in predestination, I would inform him
that I did not wish to indicate such an idea, but that I wished to set
forth, in those words, what the predestinate obtain from predestination.
I come now to the second part, which refers to preterition, and in reference
to this, your Theses make this statement "Preterition is the act of the
divine will, by which God, from eternity, determined to leave some of his
creatures in their natural state, and not to communicate to them that
supernatural grace by which their nature might be preserved uncorrupt, or,
having become corrupt, might be restored to the declaration of the freedom
of his own goodness." Also in your theological axioms Concerning Nature and
Grace, axiom 44. "To this purpose of election in Christ is opposed the
eternal purpose of non-election or preterition, according to which some are
passed by as to be left in their own natural state." These are my words:
"but he determined to pass by some and to leave them in their natural state,
and not to impart to them those supernatural and especially those
efficacious means, to declare the freedom of his own goodness." He, who
compares our statements, will see that one and the same sentiment is
expressed in different words. For "supernatural grace" and "supernatural
means" signify the same thing, "the grace by which nature, when uncorrupt,
might be strengthened, and when corrupt, might be restored," is what I have
described in the phrase "efficacious means." For "efficacious means" either
confirm nature when uncorrupt or restore it when corrupt; as sufficient
means are those which have the power to confirm or restore. Moreover the
end, which I have proposed, is expressed in your second Thesis, "to the
praise of his glorious grace," and again, in the second Thesis of the tenth
disputation, "to the praise of his most glorious grace," and in Thesis 15 of
the disputation concerning predestination, in which Coddaeus is the
respondent, you have stated the end of preterition to be "the declaration of
the freedom of the divine goodness, with no additional remark; yet I do not
object to what you wish to add in this place, "the perfection of his
manifold wisdom." However, the freedom of goodness and the perfection of
wisdom cannot be at the same moment engaged in the acts of predestination
and preterition. For the office of wisdom takes precedence, in pointing out
all possible methods of illustrating the glory of God, and that which may
especially conduce to the glory of God. But the freedom of his goodness is
subsequent in its operation, in making choice of the mode of illustration,
and in carrying it out into the action, in the exercise (so to speak) of
power. In reference to the third part, I make the same remark, namely,
concerning reprobation, or the preparation of punishment, that I have also
explained it correctly according to your view, for thus is reprobation or
the preparation for punishment defined in Thesis seventeen. "It is the act
of the divine pleasure, by which God from eternity determined for the
declaration of his own justice to punish his creatures, who should not
continue in their original state, but should depart from God, the author of
their origin, by their own deed and depravity. But I have used the same
words with only this addition, "the same individuals, so passed by," by
which addition I have only done that which was made requisite by the
arrangement and distinction in character which I have adopted; for those,
for whom punishment is prepared, are not different from those who are passed
by, though punishment was prepared for them, not because they are included
in the latter class, the passed by, but because they were foreseen as those
who would be sinners.
I cannot, therefore, yet persuade myself that this sentiment has been
incorrectly set forth by me. If I shall see it hereafter, I will freely
acknowledge it, though this may not be of so much importance.
This indeed I desire, that whether the first view, or the second, or any
other view whatever be presented, it may be clearly and strongly proved from
the Scriptures, and be defended, with accuracy, from all objections. In
reference to the word "reprobate," I have spoken before in reply to your
second answer, and I am prepared to use it hereafter according to your later
explanation, as you have given it in your last answer. I should perhaps have
so used it, in my former letter, if I had found it so used by yourself in
your own writings, for I know that equivocal meaning has always been the
mother of error, and that it ought to be carefully avoided in all serious
discussions.
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FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The third theory is that God determined of his grace to free some of the
human race, fallen, and lying in the "lump" (Rom. ix. 21 ) of perdition and
corruption, to the declaration of his Mercy; but to leave in the same
"lump," or at least to damn, on account of final impenitence, others, to the
illustration both of the freedom of his gratuitous grace towards the vessels
of glory and mercy, and of his justice towards the vessels of dishonour and
wrath. I do not state these views, that I may instruct you in reference to
them, but that you may see whether I have correctly understood them, and may
direct and guide me, if I am, in any respect, in error.
THE REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
This theory agrees with the first and second in all respects, if you make
this one exception, that, in the latter case, the election and reprobation
of men is said to have been made after the condition of the fall and of our
sin, in the former case without reference to the fall, and to our sin. But
neither of them seems properly and absolutely to pertain altogether to the
relation of election and reprobation since all admit that the cause of
election and reprobation is placed in the consent only of the Being, who
alone predestinates. For, whether it is affirmed that election and
reprobation are made from among human beings in their original state, or
from those, who are fallen and sinful, there was not any cause in them, who,
in either state, were equal in all respects, according to nature, but only
in the will and liberty of God electing, who separated these from those, and
adopted them unto himself "of his own will" boulhqeiv as James says (ch. 1,
vers. 18,) or according to the counsel of his will. But yet this
circumstance is worthy of notice, and we will, hereafter in its own place,
give our opinion concerning it, according to the Scriptures, as there will
be an appropriate place for speaking of this subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTH PROPOSITION
The circumstance of sin and of the fall is of very great importance in this
whole subject, not indeed as a cause but as a quality, requisite in the
object, without a consideration of which I do not think that election or
reprobation was or could have been made by the Deity, which matter we will
hereafter more fully discuss. There are also many men learned, and not
unversed in the sacred Scriptures, who say that God could not be defended
from the charge of sin, if he had not in that decree, considered, man as a
sinful being. But I cannot, for a two-fold reason, assent to your denial
that the formal cause of the object properly pertains to the subject of that
decree, because all fully agree in admitting that the cause of the decree is
placed in Him, who predestinates. First, because the formal cause of the
object, and not the cause of the act only, is necessarily required for the
definition of that act. Secondly, because it is possible that the cause of
the act may be of such a nature, that, in its own act, it cannot exert
influence on the object which is presented to it, unless it be furnished
with that formal relation, which I think is the fact in this case, and will
prove it. Nor is there any reason why it should be said that the freedom of
God, in the act of predestination, is limited though the circumstance of sin
may be stated to be of necessity presupposed to that decree.
But since frequent mention has been made, in this whole discussion of divine
freedom, it will not be out of place to refer to it at somewhat greater
length, and to affix to it its limits from the Scripture, according to the
declaration of God himself. The subject of freedom is the will, its object
is an act. In respect to the former, it is an affection of the will,
according to which it freely tends towards its one object; in respect to the
latter, it is the power and authority over its own act. This freedom is, in
the first place and chiefly, in God, and it is in rational creatures by a
communication made by God. But freedom is limited, or, which is the same
thing, it is effected that any act should not be in the power of the agent
in three ways, by natural and internal necessity, by external force and
coaction, and by the interposition of law. God can be compelled by no one to
an act, he can be hindered by no one in an act, hence, this freedom is not
limited by that kind of restriction. Law also cannot be imposed on God, as
He is the highest, the Supreme Lawgiver. But He can limit Himself, by His
own act. There are, then, but two causes which effect that any act should
not be in the power of God; the former is the nature of God, and whatever is
repugnant to it is absolutely impossible; the latter is any previous act of
God, to which another act is opposed. Examples of the former are such as
these; God cannot lie, because He is, by nature, true. He cannot sin or
commit injustice, because he is justice itself. Examples of the latter are
these; God cannot effect that what has previously occurred may not have
occurred, for, by an antecedent act, he has effected that it should be; if
now can effect that it may not have been, He will destroy his own power and
will. God could not but grant to David that his seed should sit on his
throne, for this was promised to David, and confirmed by an oath. He cannot
forget the labour of love, performed by the saints, so as not to bestow upon
it a reward, for He has promised that reward. If, then, any one wishes to
inquire whether any act belongs to the free will and the power of God, he
must see whether the nature of God may restrict that act, and if it is not
so restricted, whether the freedom of God is limited by any antecedent act,
if he shall find that the act is not restricted in either mode, then he may
conclude that the act pertains to the divine power; but it is not to be
immediately inferred that it has been or will be performed by God, since any
act which depends on His free will, can be suspended by Him, so as not to be
performed. It is also to be observed here that many things are possible for
God, in respect to this absolute power, which are not possible in respect to
justice. It is possible in respect to His power that He should punish one
who has not sinned, for who could resist Him, but it is not possible, in
respect to justice, for it would be at variance with the Divine justice. God
can do whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with His own
that which he cannot do of right. For His will is restricted by the limits
of justice. Nor is the creature, in such a sense, in the power of God, the
Creator, that he can do, of right, in reference to it, whatever he might do
of His absolute power, for the power of God over the creature depends, not
on the infinity of the Divine essence, but on that communication by which he
has communicated to us our limited essence. This permits that God should
deprive us of that being which he has given us without merit on our part,
but does not permit that He should inflict misery upon us without our
demerit. For to be miserable is worse than not to be, as happiness is better
than mere existence. And, therefore, there is not the same liberty to
inflict misery on the creature without demerit, as to take away being
without previous sin. God takes away that which He gave, and He can do as He
wills, with His own, but He cannot inflict misery, because the creature does
not so far belong to God. The potter cannot, from the unformed lump, make a
man to dishonour and condemnation, unless the man has previously made
himself worthy of punishment and dishonour by his own transgression.
_________________________________________________________________
SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I am not pleased with the first theory because God could not, in his purpose
of illustrating his glory by mercy and punitive justice, have reference to
man as not yet made, nor indeed to man as made, and considered in his
natural condition. In which sentiment I think that I have yourself as my
precedent, for, in discussing predestination, you no where make mention of
mercy, but every where of grace, which transcends mercy, as exercised
towards creatures, continuing in their original, natural state, while it
coincides with mercy in being occupied with the sinner, but when you treat
of the passed by and the reprobate, you mention justice, and only in the
case of such. Besides, according to that opinion, God is, by necessary
consequence, made the author of the fall of Adam and of sin, from which
imputation he is not freed by the distinctions of the act and the evil in
the act, of necessity and coaction, of the decree and its execution, of
efficacious and permissive decree, as the latter is explained by the authors
of this view, in harmony with it, nor a different relation of the divine
decree and of human nature, nor by the addition of the proposed end, namely
that the whole might redound to the divine glory, &c.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
There are three things to be laid down in order, before I come to the
argumentation itself. First, in reference to the meaning of the first view;
secondly, in reference to its agreement with the second and third; thirdly,
in reference to a few fundamental principles necessary to the clearness of
this question. In the first place, then, if that view be fully examined, we
shall perceive with certainty that its authors did not regard man absolutely
and only before his creation, &c., but in a general view and with a
universal reference to that and to all times. For though they make the act
of election and predestination, (as one which exists in the Deity,) as from
eternity, in reference to the creation of man, yet they teach that its
object, namely mankind, was predestinated without discrimination, and in
common, and that God, in the act of predestination, considered the whole
human race as various parts inwrought by the eternal decree into its
execution. Thus Beza, very clearly on Ephes. i. 4, says, "Christ is
presented to us as mediator. Therefore, the fall must, in the order of
causes, necessarily precede in the purpose of God, but previous to the fall
there must be a creation in righteousness and holiness." So afterwards, on
ch. iv, 24, "As God has made for Himself a way both for saving, by his
mercy, those whom He had elected in Christ, and for justly punishing those
who, having been conceived in sin, should remain in their depravity," &c.
This view he also learnedly presents in a note on verses 4 and 5. Thus those
authors embrace the first, and, at the same time, the second and third
theories.
But this first theory has an agreement with the second and also with the
third, indeed it is altogether the stone, though in appearance it seems
otherwise, if you attend to the various objects of these theories. For while
the authors of the first regard man universally, in the argument of
predestination, election and reprobation, the authors of the second have
made a restriction to the case of man before transgression only, and this
with the design to show that, in predestination, the cause of election and
of reprobation was only in the being predestinating, which is very true.
When they assert, therefore, that the election of man was made before his
fall, they do not exclude the idea of the eternity of that decree, but
consider this to be sufficient if they may establish the fact that eternal
predestination, that is, election and reprobation, was made by God, without
reference to sin, which the apostle has demonstrated in the example, by no
means obscure, of Jacob and Esau. (Rom. 9) The first, therefore, differs
from the second less in substance than in the manner of speaking. But those,
who adhere to the third theory, have looked, properly speaking, not so much
to the cause of election and reprobation, as to the order of causes, of
which damnation is the consequence; which damnation, many in former times,
confounding with reprobation, that is, non-election or predestination,
exclaimed that the doctrine of predestination was impious, and accused the
servants of God, as is most clearly evident from the writings of Augustine
and Fulgentius. The little book of Augustine, which he wrote in answer to
the twelve articles falsely charged against him, most opportunely explains
the matter. Neither those who favour the second theory, therefore, nor those
who favour the third, have attacked the first, but have rather presented in
a different mode, parts of the same argument, distinct in certain respects.
It seems then that, as to the sum of the whole matter, they do not differ so
much as some suppose, but have attributed to parts of its execution, (to all
of which the decree has reference,) certain circumstances, not indeed
ineptly in respect to the decree.
Let us now come to certain fundamental principles necessary to this
doctrine, by the application of which its truth may be confirmed, and those
things which seem to operate against it, may be removed. These seem to me
capable of being included under four heads, the essence of God, His
knowledge, His actions, and their causes, to each of which we will here
briefly refer. We quote first from Mal. iii. 6, "I am the Lord, I change
not;" also from James i. 17, "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow
of turning," and many similar passages. The truth of this fundamental
principle is very certain; from it is deduced the inevitable necessity of
this conclusion, that in the Deity nothing is added, nothing is taken away,
nothing is changed in fact or relation; for such have philosophers
themselves decided to be the nature of eternity; but God is eternal. Also
that God is destitute of all movement in His essence, because He is
immortal; in His power because He is pure and simple action; and in
intellect, because "all things are naked and opened unto His eyes," and He
sees all and each of them eternally, by a single glance; in His will and
purpose, for He "is not a man that he should lie, neither the son of a man
that He should repent," (Num. xxiii. 19,) but He is always the same; and
lastly in operation, for the things which vary are created, while the Lord
remains without Variation, and has in Himself the form of immutable
conception of all those things which exist and are done mutably in time. The
second fundamental principle is that the knowledge of the eternal, immutable
and infinite mind is eternal, immutable and infinite and knows things to be
known as such, and those to be done as such, (gwstw~v) eternally, immutably
and infinitely. God has a knowledge practically (praktikw~v) of all evil as
a matter of mere knowledge and finally of all things of all classes, (which
consist of things the highest, the intermediate, and the lowest of things
good and evil,) energetically (ejnerghtikw~v) according to his own divine
mode. There is a three-fold relation in all science, if comparison is made
with the thing known according to the measure of the being who knows or
takes cognizance of it; inferior, equal, and superior, or supereminent,
which may be made clear by an illustration from sight. I see the sun, but
the light of my vision is inferior to its light; I take cognizance of
natural objects, but as owls do of the light of the sun, as Aristotle says.
Here is the inferior mode of knowledge, which never exists in God. In him
alone exists equal knowledge, and that knowledge which is supereminent after
the divine mode, for He has equal knowledge of Himself; He is that which He
knows Himself to be, and he knows adequately what He is. All other things He
knows in the supereminent mode, and has them present to himself from
eternity; if not, there would be two very grievous absurdities, not to
mention others; one, that something might be added to the Deity, but that
nothing can be added to eternity; the other, that knowledge could not belong
to God univocally as the source of all knowledge. But nature herself teaches
that in every class of objects there is some one thing which they call
univocal, from which are other things in an equivocal sense; as, for
example, things which are hot, are made so by fire. Here the fire is hot
univocally, other things equivocally. God has knowledge univocally, other
beings equivocally; unless perhaps some may be so foolish as to place a
possessor of knowledge above the Deity, which would be blasphemy. The third
point is that the actions of God in Himself are eternal, whether they
pertain to His knowledge or His essence, to His intellect, will or power,
and whatever else there may be of this nature; but from Himself they flow,
as it were, out of himself according to His own mode, or according to that
of the creature according to his eternal decree, yet in an order which is
his own, but adapted to time. According to the mode of the Deity, action is
three-fold; that of creation, that of providence, so far as it is immediate,
and that of saving grace.
For many things proceed from the Deity without the work of the creature, but
they are things which He condescends to accomplish mediately in nature and
in grace. He does, as a universal principle according to the mode of the
creature, and, as Augustine says, (lib. 7, de. civit. Dei. cap. 30) "He so
administers all things which He has created, as to permit them also to
exercise and to perform their own motions." But "their own motions" pertain,
some of them to nature and to natural instinct and are directed invariably
to one certain and destined end, and others to the will in the rational
nature, which are directed to various objects either good or evil, to those
which are good, by the influence of the Deity, to those which are evil by
His influence only so far as they are natural, and by his permission so far
as they are voluntary. From which it can be established in the best and most
sacred manner that all effects and defects in nature and in the will of all
kinds, depend on the providence of God; yet in such a manner that, as Plato
says, the creature is in fault as the proximate cause, and "God is wholly
without blame."
The fourth point is that the first and supreme cause is so far universal,
that nothing else can be supposed or devised to be its cause, since if it
should depend on any other cause, it could be neither the first nor the
supreme cause, but there must be another, either prior or superior, or equal
to it, so that neither would be absolutely first or supreme. In the next
place, all causes exist, either as principles or derived from a principle;
"as principles" nature and the will exist; "from a principle" are mediate
causes, from nature, natural causes, and from the will voluntary causes. The
mode of the latter has been made two-fold by the Deity, necessary and
contingent. The necessary mode is that which cannot be otherwise, and this
is always good, in that it is necessary; but the contingent is that which is
as it happens to be, whether good or bad. But here a three-fold caution is
to be carefully observed; first, that we hold these modes of the causes to
be from the things themselves and in themselves, according to the relation
of the principles from which they proceed, for we speak now not of the
immediate actions of God, which are above these principles, as we have
before noticed, the natural causes, naturally, and the voluntary causes,
voluntarily; secondly, that we make both these modes to be from God, but not
in God; for mode in God is only divine, that is, it surpasses the necessary
and contingent in all their modes; since there can occur to the Deity
neither necessity from any source, nor any contingency, but all things in
the Deity are essential, and in a divine mode; thirdly, that we should
consider those modes as flowing from God to created things, in such a manner
that none of them should be reciprocated, and, as it were, flow back to God.
For God is the universal principle; and if any of these should flow back to
Him, He would from that fact cease to be the principle. The reason, indeed,
of this is manifest from a comparison of natural examples, since this whole
thing proceeds not from natural power simply, in so far as it is natural,
but from the rational power of God. For it is a condition of natural power,
that it always produces one and the same thing in its own kind, and that if
it should produce any thing, out of itself, it must produce something like
itself from the necessity of nature, or something unlike from contingency. A
pear tree produces a pear tree, a bull begets one of its own species, and a
human being begets a human being; that is, in accordance with the distinct
form which exists in the nature of each thing.
But the operation of rational power, which is capable of all forms, is of
all kinds; to which three things must concur in the agent, knowledge, power,
and will. But the mode of those things, which rational power effects, is not
constituted according to the mode of knowledge or power, but to the mode of
the will which actually forms the works, which virtually are formed in the
knowledge and power, as in a root; and this from the freedom of the will and
not from the necessity of nature. If we would illustrate this by an example
in divine things, let it be this: the person of the Father begat the person
of the Son by nature, not by the will; God begat his creatures by the will,
not by nature. Therefore, the Son is one with the Father, but created things
are diverse from the Deity, and are of all classes, degrees, and conditions,
made by His rational power voluntarily to demonstrate His manifold wisdom.
It is indeed nothing new that those things which are of nature should be
reciprocated and refluent, since many of them are adequate, while many
indeed are essential. But it is a new idea that those things which are of
the will should be either reciprocated or made adequate. But if this is true
in nature, as it surely is, how much more must it be believed in reference
to God, if He be compared with created things. It was necessary that these
should be laid down by me, my brother, rather copiously, that the sequence
might be more easily determined by certain limits.
You say that the first opinion does not please you, because you think that
God cannot, in his purpose to illustrate his glory by mercy and punitive
justice, have had reference to the human race, considered as not yet made.
You add, in amplifying the idea, that God did not have reference even to the
human race, considered as created, and in his natural condition. That we may
each understand the other, I remark that I understand by your phrase, "have
reference to the human race," to have man as the object or instead of the
object of action. But let us consider, if you please, or rather, because it
does please you and you request it, how far your view is correct. Indeed,
from the first fundamental principle, which I have before laid down, (from
which I trust that you do not dissent,) I consider man as not yet created,
as created, as fallen, and, in fine, man in general, in whatever light he
may be viewed, to be the object of the power, knowledge, will, mercy and
justice of God; for if this is granted, it will then be a complete sequence
that there is something, aside from common providence and the special
predestination of the sons of God, not an object of the action of the Deity.
Then there can be some addition to God, if something can be added to His
power, knowledge, will, &c., since the power, knowledge, will, &c., of God,
is either God, or a divine, that is, an infinite act. Whatever eternity
looks upon, if it does not look upon it eternally, it ceases to be eternity;
it loses the nature of eternity. If infinity does not look on infinite
things, in an infinite manner, if it is limited by parts, it ceases to be
infinity. To God and His eternity, it is not is, was or shall be, but
permanent and enduring being, all at once, and without bounds. The creature
exists indeed in time, but is present to God, in a peculiar, that is, a
divine mode, which is above all consideration of time, and from eternity to
eternity; and this is true not only of the creature itself, but of all its
feelings, whatever may be their origin. You will perhaps say that this
principle is acknowledged in the abstract, but that here, as it is
considered in the concrete, it has a different relation, in that it has
reference to mercy and punishment, which can really be supposed only in view
of antecedent misery and sin. But these also, my brother, are present with
God as really as those; I do not say in the mode of nature, which is
fleeting, but in that of the Deity, which is eternal, and in all respects
surpasses nature. They, who think differently, are in danger of denying the
most absolute and eternal essence of the Deity itself. We said also, under
proposition three, that in created things misery and sin may be considered
in relation to the act, the habit, or the capability also in an absolute and
in a relative sense. But in God, (whom also Aristotle acknowledges to be
"energy in its most simple form," mercy and judgment exist by an eternal
act, and not by a temporal one; and contemplates the misery and sin of man
in all their modes, previous to all time, and does not merely take
cognizance of them as they occur in time.
Lastly, that we may disclose the fountain of the matter, this whole idea
originates in the fact that the third fundamental principle which, we before
laid down, has not been sufficiently regarded by those who so think. For
since all action is either internal or external, or both united together.
The internal is in God, as the maker: the external is in the creature in its
own time and place, and in the thing made just as the house is formed in the
mind of the builder, before it is built materially (as it is said). But when
both acts are united and from them is produced a work, numerically a unit,
which they style a result, then the internal act is the formal cause; the
external act is the material cause. Nothing in God is temporary; action in
God is alone eternal, for it is internal, it is therefore not temporary; so,
on the contrary, all things out of God are temporary, therefore the external
act is temporary, for it is out of God. "What, then, do you prove?" you will
ask. "That God in his mercy and punitive justice acts with reference to man
as not yet created, or indeed as created, but considered in his natural
condition?" I indeed admit that whatever it may be, which can be predicated
of man, it can sacredly and in truth be predicated of him. Yet I see that
two statements may be made of a milder character, and in harmony with the
words of Christ and the apostles, which are clearly intimated, if not fully
expressed by them; the former, that, in this question, we must consider, not
only the mode and the consequent event (which some call, catechrestically,
the end), namely, mercy and punitive justice, also life and eternal death,
but the fountain and the genus from which these result, and to which they
hold the relation of species, namely, grace and non-grace, adoption or
filiation, and non-adoption, which is reprobation, as we have said above
(Prop. 2), the latter, that, in the argument of election, we must propose
not any particular relation of the human race, but the common or universal
relation so that we may consider him as not yet created, as created, as
fallen &c., yet present in all respects in the conception of God, so that in
this election, grace towards mankind in the abstract, and mercy towards man
as fallen and sinful, which is of grace, concur, but in reprobation, the
absence of the grace of adoption and the absence of mercy concur. If these
statements are correct, I do not see in what respect a pious mind can be
offended. For Christ says that they are blessed of God, the Father who
"inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world."
(Matt. xxv. 34.)
And Paul says that God "hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in
heavenly places in Christ, according as he hath chosen us in him, before the
foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him
in love, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus
Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure, to the praise, &c."
(Ephes. i. 3-6.) "What then? is there no special reference?" I answer that
properly in the argument of election and reprobation (for the matter of
damnation is a different one) there is no particular reference to men as a
cause, but our separation from the reprobate is wholly of the mere will of
God: in that God has separated and made a distinction among men, whether not
yet created, created or fallen, and indeed among all things, present alike
to Him, yet equal in all respects by nature and condition, by electing and
predestinating some to the adoption of the sons of God, and by leaving
others to themselves and to their own nature, not calling them to the
adoption of the sons of God, which is gratuitous and can be ascribed only to
grace. This grace, also, unique in itself only, may be two-fold in the
elect, for either it is grace simply, if you look even from eternity on man
without reference to the fall, which grace is communicated to the elect,
both angels and men, or it is grace joined to mercy, or gracious mercy, when
you come down to the special matter of the fall and of sin. God dealt with
the angels according to His grace, with us according to His grace and mercy,
if you do not also have reference to possible misery (of which we spoke,
Prop. 3, and misery.) For in this sense mercy is, and can, with propriety,
be called a divine work of grace. But what is there here which can be
reprehended in God? What is there, which can be denied by us? God has
bestowed human nature on all; it is a good gift; on certain individuals he
has bestowed mercy and the grace of adoption; this is a better gift. He was
not under obligation to bestow either; He bestowed both, the former on all,
the latter on some men. But it may perhaps be said that reprobation is one
thing, and punitive justice and damnation, which is under discussion, is
another. Let that be conceded; then there is agreement between us in
reference to reprobation, let us then consider punitive justice and
damnation. It is certain that, as the vessels of mercy which God has
prepared for His glory that He might demonstrate the riches of His glory,
are from eternity fully present to Him in a divine and incomprehensible
manner, without any motion or change in Himself, so also "the vessels of
wrath fitted to destruction" that he might "show His wrath and make His
power known," (Rom. ix. 22,) are eternally presented to his eyes, according
to the mode of Deity. As vessels, therefore, they are of God, for He is the
maker of all things: as vessels of wrath, they are of themselves and of
their own sin, into which they rush of their own will, for we all are by
this nature the children of wrath, (Ephes. ii. 3,) but not in our original
constitution. Moses affirms in Gen. i. 31, that "God saw every thing that He
had made, and, behold, it was very good."
God, who is good, does not hate that which is good. All things, at their
creation, were good, therefore at their creation, God did not hate any one
of all created things: He hates that which is alien from Himself, but not
that which is His own: He is angry with our fall and sin, not with His own
creation. By creation they are vessels; by the fall, they are vessels of
wrath, and fitted to destruction, as the most just consequence of the fall
and of depravity: for "neither shall evil dwell with God." (Psalm v. 4.) As
in the knowledge of God is the good of the elect, with whom he deals in
mercy, so in the knowledge of God, as Isaiah says, chapter xlviii, 4 and 8,
is the evil of others: the latter He hated and damned from the period of His
knowledge of it. But He knew and foreknew from eternity; therefore, He hates
and damns, and even pre-damns from eternity.
As this is the relation of the former proposition, the relation of the other
also, added by way of amplification, "nor indeed to man as made and
considered in his original condition," is also the same. For the consequence
is plainly deduced in the same mode, in reference to the latter as in
reference to the former; and you are not ignorant that universal
affirmations follow by fair deduction from that which is general to that
which is particular. God has reference from eternity in election and
reprobation to mankind in general; therefore He had reference to man as not
created, created and fallen, and if there is any other term, by which we can
express our ideas. In the case of election, and of reprobation, I say, He
regarded man abstractly, with whatever relation you may invest him. In the
case of damnation, He regarded the sinner, whom He had not given to Christ
in the election of grace, and whom He from eternity saw as a sinner. Those
holy men, therefore rightly stated that the election and reprobation of man
was made from eternity: some considered them as having reference to man, not
yet created, others to man as not yet fallen, and yet others to man as
fallen: since in whatever condition you regard him, a man is elected or
reprobated without consideration of his good or evil deeds. Nor indeed can
it be proved that they are at variance in this matter, unless a denial of
other conditions is shown in plain terms. For such is the common statement
by universal consent. In which, if any one affirms that the supposition of
one involves the disavowal of the other he opposes the truth of natural
logic and common usage. But if such is the relation of election and
reprobation in a general sense, it is a complete sequence that they who say
that men, as not created, were elected, speak very truly, since God elected
them by the internal act, before He did by the external act; and that they
who affirm that the election was of man, as created, have reference to the
principle of the external act; and so with the rest. But all these things
are not in reference to His act per se, but in reference to the condition of
the act, which does not affect its substance. You say that in this opinion
you have me as a precedent since, in the discussion of predestination, I "no
where make mention of mercy, but every where of grace, which transcends
mercy." Indeed, my brother, I have never thought that I should seem to
exclude the other parts when I might use the term grace, nor do I see how
that inference can be made from the phrase itself. Grace is the genus; it
does not exclude mercy, the species. Grace includes, so to speak, the path
for all times; therefore it includes that of mercy. Nor do they, who mention
mercy, in presenting the species, exclude the genus, nor, in presenting a
part, do they exclude all which remains. And we, in presenting the genus, do
not deny the species, nor in presenting the whole, do we disavow a part.
Both are found in the Scriptures, which speak of grace in respect to the
whole and its single parts, and in a certain respect, of mercy: but they
take away neither by the affirmation of the other. I would demonstrate this
by quotations, did I not think that you with me, according to your skill and
intelligence would acknowledge this. Predestination is of grace: the same
grace, which has effected the predestination of the saints, also includes
mercy: this I sufficiently declared a little while since. I mentioned grace
simply, in the case of simple predestination, that is, predestination
expressed in simple and universal terms. I speak of mercy, also, in relation
to a man who is miserable, spoken of absolutely, or relatively. You add that
when I treat of the passed by and the reprobate, I mention justice, and only
in the case of such. Let us, if you please, remove the homonymy; then we
shall expedite the matter in a few words. We exposed the homonymy in the
second proposition; we speak of the reprobate either generally or
particularly. If you understand it generally, the mention of justice is
correctly made, as we shall soon show. If particularly, either reprobates
and those passed by refer to the same, which is the appropriate
signification, or the term reprobate is applied to the damned, which is
catachrestic. I do not think that you understand it in the former sense, if
you understand it in the latter (as you do), what you say is certainly very
true, that I spoke of justice only when treating of the damned. However, I
do not approve that you write copulatively of the passed by and the
reprobate, that is, the damned. For although they are the same in subject,
and all the passed by are damned, and all the damned are passed by, yet
their relation as passed by or reprobate is one thing, and their relation as
damned is another.
Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is not of justice,
as its cause: damnation is with justice and of justice. Election and
reprobation or preterition are the work of free will according to the wisdom
of God; but damnation is the work of necessary will according to the justice
of God; for God "cannot deny Himself" (2 Tim. ii. 13.) As a just judge, it
is necessary that He should punish unrighteousness, and execute judgment.
This, I say, is the work of the manifold wisdom of God, which in those
creatures, in whom he has implanted the principle of their own ways, namely,
a free will, He might exhibit its two-fold use, good and bad, and the
consequent result of its use in both directions. Hence he has, in His own
wisdom, ordained, both in angels and in men, the way of both modes of its
use, without any fault or sin on His own part. But it is a work of justice
to damn the unrighteous. Therefore also it is said truly that the passed by
are damned by the Deity, but because they were to be damned, not because
they were passed by or reprobated.
Now I come to your argumentation, in which you affirm that, "according to
that theory, God is, by necessary consequence, made the author of the fall
of Adam, and of sin &c." I do not, indeed, perceive the argument from which
this conclusion is necessarily deduced, if you correctly understand that
theory. Though I do not doubt that you had reference to your own words, used
in stating the first theory, "that he ordained also that man should fall and
become depraved, that he might thus prepare the way for the fulfillment of
his own eternal counsels, that he might be able mercifully to save some,
&c." This, then, if I am not mistaken, is your reasoning. He, who has
ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is the author of the fall
and of sin; God ordained that man should fall and become depraved;
therefore, God is the author of sin. But the Major of this syllogism is
denied, because it is ambiguous; for the word ordain is commonly, though in
a catachrestical sense, used to mean simply and absolutely to decree, the
will determining and approving an act; which catachresis is very frequent in
forensic use. But to us, who are bound to observe religiously, in this
argument, the propriety of terms, to ordain is nothing else than to arrange
the order in acts, and in each thing according to its mode. It is one thing
to decree acts absolutely, and another to decree the order of acts, in each
thing, according to its mode. The former is immediate, the latter, from the
beginning to the end, regards the means, which in all things, pertain to the
order of events. In the former signification, the Minor is denied; for it is
entirely at variance with the truth, since God is never the author of evil
(that is, of evil involving guilt). In the latter signification the Major is
denied, for it is not according to the truth, nor is it necessary in any
respect that the same person who disposes the order of actions and, in each
thing, according to its mode: should be the author of those actions. The
actor is one thing, the action is another,-and the arranger of the action is
yet another. He who performs an evil deed is the author of evil. He, who
disposes the order in the doer and in the evil deed, is not the author of
evil, but the disposer of an evil act to a good end. But that this may be
understood, let us use the fourth fundamental principle, which we have
previously stated, according to this, we shall circumscribe this whole case
within this limit; every fault must always be ascribed to the proximate, not
to the remote or to the highest cause. In a chain, the link, which breaks,
is in fault; in a machine, the wheel, which deviates from its proper course,
is in fault, not any superior or inferior one. But as all causes are either
principles, or from principles, (in this case, however, principles are like
wheels, by which the causes, originating from the principles, are moved),
God is the universal principle of all good, nature is the principle of
natural things, and the rational will, turning freely to good or evil, is
the principle of moral actions. These three principles, in their own
appropriate movement, perform their own actions, and produce mediate causes,
act in their own relations, and dispose them; God in a divine mode, nature
in a natural mode, and the will in an elective mode. God, in a divine mode,
originates nature; nature, in its own mode, produces man; the will, in its
own appropriate mode, produces its own moral and voluntary actions. If, now,
the will produces a moral action, whether good or evil, it produces it, of
its own energy, and this cannot be attributed to nature itself as a cause,
though nature may implant the will in man, since the will, (though from
nature) is the peculiar and special principle of moral actions, instituted
by the Deity in nature. But if the blame of this cannot be attributed to
nature as a cause, by what right, I pray, can it be attributed to God, who,
by the mode and medium of nature, has placed the will in man? I answer then,
with Augustine, in his book against articles falsely imputed to him, artic.
10.
"The predestination of God neither excited, nor persuaded, nor impelled, the
fall of those who fell, or the iniquity of the wicked, or the evil passions
of sinners, but it clearly predestinated His own judgment, by which He
should recompense each one according to his deeds, whether good or bad,
which judgment would not be inflicted, if men should sin by the will of
God." He proceeds to the same purpose in art. 11, remarking, "If it should
be charged against the devil, that he was the author of certain sins, and
the inciter to them, I think he would be able to exonerate himself from that
odium in some way, and that he would convict the perpetrators of such sins
from their own will, since, although he might have been delighted in the
madness of those sinners, yet he could prove that he did not force them to
crime. With what folly, what madness, then, is that referred to the counsel
of God, which cannot at all be ascribed to the devil, since he, in the sins
of wicked men, aids by enticements, but is not to be considered the director
of their wills. Therefore God predestinated none of these things that they
should take place, nor did He prepare that soul, which was about to live
basely and in sin, that it should live in such a manner; but He was not
ignorant that such would be its character, and He foreknew that He should
judge justly concerning a soul of such character."
But if this could be imputed neither to nature, nor to the devil, how much
less to God, the most holy and wise Creator? God, (as St. Augustine says
again, book 6) "does not predestinate all which he foreknows. For He only
foreknows evil. He does not predestinate it, but He both foreknows and
predestinates good." But it is a good, derived from God, that, in His own
ordination, He disposes the order in things good and evil; if not, the
providence of God would be, for the most part, indifferent (may that be far
from our thoughts). God does not will evil, but He wills, and preserves a
certain order even in evil. Evil comes from the will of man; from God is the
general and special arrangement of His own providence, disposing and most
wisely keeping in order even those things which are, in the highest degree,
evil.
Here a two-fold question will perhaps be urged upon me:
first, how can these be said, in reference to the will, to be its own
motions, when we acknowledge that the will itself, that is, the fountain of
voluntary motions, is from nature, and nature is from God? Secondly, why did
God place in human beings this will, constituted in the image of liberty? I
will reply to both in a few words. To the first; the will is certainly from
nature, and nature is from God, but the will is not, on that account, the
less to be called the principle of those motions, than nature is called the
principle of natural motions. Each is the principle of its own action,
though both are from the supreme principle, God. It is one thing to describe
the essence of a thing, another to refer to its source. What is essential to
nature and the will? That the former should be the principle of natural
motions, the latter, of spontaneous motions. What is their source? God is
the only and universal source of all things. Nor is it absurd that a
principle should be derived from another principle: for although a
principle, which originates in another, should not be called a principle in
the relation of origin or source, yet, in the relation of the act it does
not on that account, cease to be an essential principle. God is, per se, a
principle. Nature and our wills are principles derived from a principle. Yet
each of them has its own appropriate motions. Nor is there any reason,
indeed, why any should think that these are philosophical niceties: they are
natural distinctions, and that, which is of nature, is from God. But if we
are unwilling to hear nature, let us listen to the truth of God, to Christ
speaking of the devil (John viii. 44), "when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh
of his own: for he is a liar and the father of it." Here he is called "the
father of a lie," and is said "to speak of his own."
According to Christ’s words, then, we have the origin and the act of sin in
the devil. For the act has a resemblance to himself, for he speaks of his
own. What, I pray, can be more conclusive than these words? Hence Augustine,
in the answer already quoted, very properly deduces this conclusion. "As God
did not, in the angels who fell, induce that will, which they did not
continue in the truth; so he did not produce in men that inclination by
which they imitate the devil. For he speaketh a lie of his own; and he will
not be free from that charge, unless the truth shall free him." He indeed
gave free will, namely, that essential power to Adam: but its motion is, in
reference to Adam, his own, and, in reference to all of us, our own. In what
sense is it our own, when it is given to us by God? Whatever is bestowed on
us by God, is either by the law of common right, or of personal and private
property. He gave the will to angels and men by the law of personal
possession. It is therefore, one’s own and its motion belong to the
individual. "This," says Augustine, (lib. de Genes. ad litt. in perf. cap.
5,) "He both makes and disposes species and natures themselves, but the
privations of species and the defects of natures he does not make, He only
ordains." Therefore God is always righteous, but we are unrighteous.
To the second question, namely, why did God create in us this will, and with
such a character? I reply; -- it was the work of the highest goodness and
wisdom in the universe. Why should we, with our ungrateful minds, who have
already made an ill use of those minds, obstruct the fountain of goodness
and wisdom? It was the work of goodness to impress his own image on both
natures, in the superior, on that of angels, and in the inferior, on that of
men: since, while other things in nature are moved by instinct, or feeling,
as with a dim trace of the Deity, these alone, in the freedom of their own
will, have the principle of their own ways in their own power by the mere
goodness of God. It was the work of wisdom to make these very species,
endued with His own image, together with so many other objects, and above
the others, as the most perfect mirror of His own glory, so far as is
possible in created things. But why did he make them of such a character,
with mutable freedom? He made His own image, not himself.
The only essential image of God, the Father, is the Lord Jesus Christ, one
God, eternal and immutable, with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Whoever
thou mayest be, who makest objections to this, thou hearest the serpent
whispering to thee, as he whispered once to Eve, to the ruin of our race.
Let it suffice thee that thou wast made in the image of God, not possessing
the divine perfection. Immutability is peculiar to the divine perfection.
This pertains by nature to God. The creature had in himself His image,
communicated by God, and placed in his will: but he, whether angel or man,
who fell, rejected it of his own will. Not to say more, this whole question
was presented by Marcion, and Tertullian, with the utmost fluency and
vigour, discussed it in its whole extent, in a considerable part of his
second book against Marcion, the perusal of which will, I trust, be
satisfactory to you.
You remark, finally, that they are not freed from the necessity of that
conclusion "by the distinctions of the act, and the evil in the act, of
necessity and creation, of the decree and its execution, &c." Indeed, my
brother, I think that, from those things, which have just been said, you
will sufficiently perceive in what respects your reasoning is fallacious.
For God does not make, but ordains the sinner, as I say, with Augustine,
that is, He ordains the iniquity of the sinner not by commanding or
decreeing particularly and absolutely that he should commit sin, but by most
wisely vindicating His own order, and the right of His infinite providence,
even in evil which is peculiar to the creature.
For it was necessary that the wisdom of God should triumph in this manner,
when He exhibited His own order in the peculiar and voluntary disorder of
His own creature. This disorder and alienation from good the creature
prepared for himself by the appropriate motion of free-will, not by the
impulse of the Deity. But that freedom of the will, says Tertullian against
Marcion (lib. 2, cap. 9) "does not fix the blame on Him by whom it was
bestowed, but on him by whom it was not directed, as it ought to have been."
Since this is so, it is not at all necessary that I should speak of those
particular distinctions, which, in their proper place, may perhaps be valid;
they do not seem to me to pertain properly to this argument, unless other
arguments are introduced, which I cannot find in your writings. Besides all
those distinctions pertain generally to the subject of providence, not
particularly to this topic. I am not pleased that the discussion should
extend beyond its appropriate range. But here some may perhaps say;
"Therefore, the judgments of God depend on contingencies, and are based on
contingencies, if they have respect to man as a sinner, and to his sin."
That consequence is denied: for, on the contrary, those very things which
are contingencies to us, depend on the ordination of God, according to their
origin and action. To their origin, for God has established the contingency
equally with the necessity: To their action, for He acts in the case of that
which is good, fails to act in that which is evil, in that it is evil, not
in that it is ordained by His special providence. They are not, therefore,
contingencies to the Deity, whatever they may be to us; just as those
things, which are contingent to an inferior cause, can by no means be justly
ascribed to a superior cause. But I have already stated this matter with
sufficient clearness, in the discussion of the fourth fundamental principle.
Let us, therefore, pass to other matters.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTH PROPOSITION
The meaning of the first theory is that which I have set forth in the third
proposition. But it is of little importance to me, whether the object,
generally and without distinction, or with a certain distinction, and
invested with certain circumstances, is presented to God, when
predestinating and reprobating, for that is not, now, the point before me.
If, however, it may be proper to discuss this also in a few words, I should
say that it cannot seem to one who weighs this matter with accuracy, that
the object is considered in general and without any distinction by God, in
the act of decreeing, according to the sentiment of the authors of the first
theory. For the object was considered by God, in the act of decreeing, in
the relation which it had at the time. when it had, as yet, been affected by
no external act of God, executing that decree; for this, in a pure and
abstract sense, is an object, free from every other consideration, which can
pertain to an object, through the action of a cause operating in reference
to it. But since, according to the authors of the first theory, the act of
creation pertains to the execution of the decree, of which we now treat, it
is, therefore, most certainly evident, that man, in that he was to be made,
was the object of predestination and reprobation. If any one considers the
various and manifold sets of that decree, it is not doubtful that some of
these must be accommodated and applied to this and others to that condition
of man, and in this sense, I would admit the common and general
consideration of the object. But all those acts, according to the authors of
that first theory, depend on one primary act, namely, that in which God
determined to declare, in one part of that unformed "lump," from which the
human race was to be made, the glory of his mercy, and, in another part, the
glory of his justice, and it is this very thing which I stated to be
displeasing to me in that first theory; nor can I yet persuade myself that
there exists, in the whole Scripture, any decree, by which God has
determined to illustrate his own glory, in the salvation of these and in the
condemnation of those, apart from foresight of the fall.
The passage which you quote from Beza, on Ephes. i. 4, plainly proves that I
have done no injustice to those authors in explaining their doctrine. He
says, in that passage, that God, by the creation and corruption of man,
opened a way for himself to the execution of that which he had before
decreed."
In reference to the harmony of those theories, I grant that all agree in
this, that this decree of God was made from eternity, before any actual
existence of the object, whatever might be its character, and however it
might be considered. For "known unto God are all his works from the
beginning of the world." (Acts xv. 18.)
It is necessary also that all the internal acts of God should universally be
eternal, unless we wish to make God mutable; yet in such a sense that some
are antecedent to others in order and nature. I admit also that they agree
in this, that there exists, in the predestinate or the reprobate, no cause
why the former should be predestinated, the latter reprobated; and that the
cause exists only in the mere will of God. But I affirm that some ascend to
a greater height than others, and extend the act of decree farther. For the
advocates of the third theory deny that God, in any act of predestination
and reprobation, has reference to man, considered as not yet fallen, and
those of the second theory say that God, in the act of that decree, did not
have reference to man as not yet created. The advocates of the
first, however, openly assert and contend that God, in the first act of the
decree, had reference to man, not as created, but as to be created. I,
therefore, distinguished those theories according to their objects, as each
one presented man to God, at the first moment of the act of predestination
and reprobation, as free from any divine act predestinating and reprobating,
either internal, by which he might decree something concerning man, or
external, by which He might effect something in man; this may be called pure
object, having as yet received no relation from the act of God, decreeing
from eternity, and no form from the external act. But when it has received
any relation or form from any act of God, it is no longer pure object, but
an object having some action of God concerning it, or in it, by which it is
prepared for receiving some further action, as was also a short time since
affirmed. We will hereafter examine your idea that they substantiate their
theory by the example of Jacob and Esau in Romans 9.
I may be permitted to make some observations or inquiries concerning what
you lay down as fundamental principles of this doctrine, and of your reply
to my arguments. In reference to the first, concerning the essence of the
Deity,
God is in such a sense immutable in essence, power, intellect, will, counsel
and work, that, nevertheless, if the creature is changed, he becomes to that
creature in will, the application of power, and in work, another than that
which he was to the same creature continuing in his primitive state;
bestowing upon a cause that which is due to it, but without any change in
Himself. Again if God is immutable, He has, for that very reason, not
circumscribed or determined to one direction, by any decree, the motion of
free-will, the enjoyment and use of which He has once freely bestowed on
man, so that it should incline, of necessity, to one direction, and should
not be able, in fact, to incline to another direction, while that decree
remains. Thirdly, God has the form and an eternal and immutable conception
of all those things which are done mutably by men, but following, in the
order of nature, many other conceptions, which God has concerning those
things which He wills both to do Himself, and to permit to men.
In reference to the second, concerning the knowledge of God;
I am most fully persuaded that the knowledge of God is eternal, immutable
and infinite, and that it extends to all things, both necessary and
contingent, to all things which He does of Himself, either mediately or
immediately, and which He permits to be done by others. But I do not
understand the mode in which He knows future contingencies, and especially
those which belong to the free-will of creature, and which He has decreed to
permit, but not to do of Himself, not, indeed, in that measure, in which I
think that it is understood by others more learned than myself. I know that
there are those who say that all things are, from eternity, presented to
God, and that the mode, in which God certainly and infallibly knows future
contingencies, is this, that those contingent events coexist with God in the
Now of eternity, and therefore they are in Him indivisibly, and in the
infinite Now of eternity, which embraces all time. If this is so, it is not
difficult to understand how God may certainly and infallibly know future
contingent events. For contingencies are not opposed to certainty of
knowledge, except as they are future, but not as they are present. That
reasoning, however, does not exhaust all the difficulties which may arise in
the consideration of these matters. For God knows, also, those things which
may happen, but never do happen, and consequently do not co-exist with God
in the Now of eternity, which would be events unless they should be
hindered, as is evident from 1 Samuel xxiii. 12, in reference to the
citizens of Keilah, who would have delivered David into the hands of Saul,
which event, nevertheless, did not happen. The knowledge, also, of future
events, which depend on contingent causes, seems to be certain, if those
causes may be complete and not hindered in their operation. But how shall
the causes of those events, which depend on the freedom of the will, be
complete, among which, even at that very moment in which it chose one, it
was free not to choose it, or to choose another in preference to it? If
indeed at any time your leisure may permit, I could wish that you would
accurately discuss, in your own manner, these things and whatever else may
pertain to that question. I know that this would be agreeable and acceptable
to many, and that the labour would not be useless.
The knowledge of God is called eternal, but not equally so in reference to
all objects of knowledge. For that knowledge of God is absolutely eternal,
by which God knows Himself, and in Himself all possible things. That, by
which He knows beings which will exist, is eternal indeed as to duration,
but, in nature, subsequent to some act of the divine will concerning them,
and, in some cases, even subsequent to some foreseen act of the human will.
In general, the following seems to me to be the order of the divine
knowledge, in reference to its various objects. God knows
1. Himself what He, of Himself is able to do.
2. All things possible what can be done by those beings which He can make.
3. All things which shall exist by the act of creation.
4. All things which shall exist by the act of creatures and especially of
rational creatures. Whether moved by those actions of His creatures and
5. What He Himself especially of His rational shall do. creatures; Or at
least receiving occasion from them.
From this, it is apparent that the eternity of the knowledge of God is not
denied by those, who propose, as a foundation for that knowledge, something
dependent on the human will, as foreseen.
But I do not understand in what way it can be true that, in every genus,
there must be one thing univocal, and from this, other things in an
equivocal sense. I have hitherto supposed that those things which are under
the same genus are univocal or at least analogous; but, that things
equivocal are not comprehended with those which are univocal, under the same
genus, either in logic, or metaphysics, and still less in physics. Then I
have not thought that the univocal could be the cause of the equivocal. For
there is no similarity between them. But if there exists a similarity as
between cause and effect, they are no longer equivocal. Thus those things,
which are heated by the fire as I should say, are heated neither univocally,
nor equivocally, but analogically. God exists univocally, we, analogically.
This they admit, who state that certain attributes of the divine nature are
communicable to us according to analogy, among which they also mention
knowledge.
In reference to the third, concerning the actions of the Deity; the actions
of God are, in Himself, indeed eternal, but they preserve a certain order;
some are prior to others by nature, and indeed necessarily precede them,
whether in the same order, in which they proceed from Him, I could not
easily say; but I know that there are those who have thus stated, among whom
some mention George Sohnius. Some also of the internal actions in God, are
subsequent in nature to the foresight of some act dependent on the will of
the creature. Thus the decree concerning the mission of His Son for the
redemption of the human race is subsequent to the foresight of the fall of
man. For although God might have arranged to prevent the fall, if he had not
known that He could use an easy remedy to effect a restoration, (as some
think,) yet the sure decree for the introduction of a remedy for the fall by
the mission of His Son, was not effected by God except on the foresight of
the disease, namely, the fall.
The mode in which God, as the universal principle, is said to flow into His
creatures, and especially his rational creatures, and concurs with their
nature and will, in reference to an action, has my approbation, whatever it
may be, if it does not bring in a determination of the will of the creature
to one or two things which are contrary, or contradictory. If any mode
introduces such a determination, I do not see how it can be consistent with
the declaration of Augustine, quoted by yourself, that God so governs all
things which He has created as also "to permit them to exercise and put
forth their own motions," or with the saying of Plato, in which God is
declared to be free from all blame.
I could wish that it might be plainly and decisively explained how all
effects and defects in nature, and the will, of all kinds universally, are
of the providence of God, and yet God is free from fault, the whole fault,
(if any exists,) residing in the proximate cause. If any one thinks that God
is exempted from fault because He is the remote cause, but that the
creature, as the proximate cause, is culpable, (if there is any sin,) he
does not seem to me to present a correct reason why any cause may be in
fault, or free from fault, but, concerning this also, I will hereafter speak
at greater length. In reference to the fourth, concerning the causes of the
actions of God; the universal cause has no cause above itself, and the first
and supreme cause does not depend on any other cause, for the very terms
include that idea; but it is possible that there may be afforded to the
universal, first and supreme cause, by another cause, an occasion for the
production of some certain effect, which, without that occasion, the first
cause would neither propose to be produced in itself, nor in fact produce
out of itself, and indeed could neither produce nor propose or decree to be
produced. Such is the decree to damn certain persons, and their damnation
according to that decree.
I readily assent to what you have said in reference to the modes of
necessary and contingent causes, as also those things which you have
remarked in reference to the distinction between natural and rational power.
I am, however, certain that nothing can be deduced from them against my
opinion, or against those things, which have been presented by me for the
refutation of the first theory.
Having made these remarks, I come to the consideration of your answer to my
arguments. In my former argument, I denied that man, considered as not yet
created, is the object of mercy rescuing from sin and misery, and of
punitive justice, and I persist in that sentiment; for I do not see that any
thing has been presented, which overthrows it, or drives me from that
position. For man is not, by that consideration, removed from under the
common providence or the special predestination of God, but providence must,
in this case, be considered as according to mercy and justice thus
administered, and predestination, as decreed according to them. But the
reasoning from the relative to the absolute is not valid; and the removal,
in this case, is from under the providence of God, considered relatively,
not absolutely; so also with predestination. You foresaw that I would make
this reply, and consequently you have presented a three-fold answer; but, in
no respect, injurious to my reasoning. For as to the first, I admit that sin
and misery were, in the most complete sense, present with God from eternity,
and, as they were present, so also there was, in reference to them, a place
for mercy and justice. But the theory, which I oppose, does not make them,
(as foreseen,) present to mercy and justice, but, according to the decree
for illustrating mercy and justice, it presents a necessity for the
existence of sin and misery, as, in their actual existence, there could be
in fact, a place, for the decree, made according to mercy and justice. As to
the second, I grant also that there could be, in one who was in fact neither
a sinner, nor miserable, a place for mercy saving from sin and possible
misery, but we are not here treating of mercy so considered: and it is
certain that mercy and judgment exist in the Deity, by an eternal act, but
it is in the first action of those attributes. In a second act, God cannot
exercise those attributes, understood according to the mind of the authors
of that theory, except in reference to a sinful and actually miserable
being. Lastly, what you say concerning the internal, and external action of
the Deity, and these conjoined, does not disturb, in any greater degree, my
argument. For neither the internal action, which is the decree of God in
reference to the illustration of his glory, by mercy and punitive justice,
nor the external action, which is the actual declaration of that same glory
through mercy and justice, nor both conjoined can have any place in
reference to a man who is neither sinful, nor miserable. I know, indeed,
that, to those who advocate this theory, there is so much difference between
internal and external action, that is, as they say, between the decree and
its execution, that God may decree salvation according to mercy and death
according to justice to a person who is not a sinner, but may not really
save, according to mercy, any one, unless, He is a sinner, or damn,
according to justice, any except sinners. But I deny that distinction;
indeed I say that God, can neither will nor decree, by internal act, that
which He cannot do, by external act, and thus the object of internal and
external action is the same, and invested with the same circumstances:
whether it be present to God, in respect to his eternal intelligence and be
the object of His decree, or be, in fact, in its actual existence, present
to Him and the object of the execution of the decree. Hence, I cannot yet
decide otherwise concerning that theory, than that it cannot be approved by
those, who think and desire to speak according to the Scriptures.
The "two statements" which you think "may be made, of a milder character,
and in harmony with the words of Christ and the apostles," do not serve to
explain that first theory, but are additions, by which it is very much
changed, and which its advocates would by no means acknowledge, as, in my
opinion, was made sufficiently manifest in my statement of the same theory
in reply to your third answer, and may be, at this time, again demonstrated
in a single word. For those very things, which you make the mode and the
consequent event of predestination and reprobation, are styled, by the
authors of that first theory, the cause, and the principle of that same
decree, and also the end, though not the final one, which, they affirm, is
his glory, to be declared by mercy and justice. Again they acknowledge no
grace in predestination which is not mercy, and correctly so, for the grace,
which is towards man considered absolutely, is not of election: also they do
not acknowledge any non-grace, or non-mercy, which is not comprehended in
punitive justice. Here I do not argue against that theory thus explained,
not because I approve it in all respects, but because I have, this time,
undertaken to examine what I affirm to be the view of Calvin and Beza; other
matters will be hereafter considered. I will notice separately what things
are here brought forward, agreeing with that view, thus explained. The
passages of Scripture quoted from Matthew 25, and Ephesians 1, in which it
is taught that "God, from all eternity, of the good pleasure of his will,
elected some to adoption, sanctification, and a participation of his
kingdom," so far fail to prove the common view that on the contrary there
may be inferred from them a reference to sin, as a condition requisite in
the object of benediction and election. In the former passage, the blessed
are called to a participation of the kingdom, which God has prepared for
them from eternity; but in whom and by whom? Is it not in Christ and by
Christ? Certainly; then it was prepared for sinners, not for men considered
in general, and apart from any respect to sin. For "thou shall call his name
Jesus; for he shall save his people from their sins." (Matt. i. 2.)
The passage from Ephesians 1, much more plainly affirms the same thing, as
will be hereafter proved in a more extended manner, when I shall use that
passage, avowedly to sustain the theory which makes sin a condition
requisite in the object. I did not present a particular reference to men, as
a cause, which I wished to have kept in mind, but according to a condition,
requisite in the object, namely, misery and sin. This I still require. The
distinction, which you make between grace and mercy, is according to fact
and the signification of terms, but in this place is unnecessary. For no
grace, bestowed upon man, originates in predestination, as there is no
grace, previous to predestination, not joined with mercy. God deals with
angels according to grace, not according to mercy saving from sin and
misery. He deals with us according to mercy, not according to grace in
contradistinction to mercy. I speak here of predestination. According to
that mercy, also, is our adoption; it is not, then, of men, considered in
their original state, but of sinners. This is also apparent from the
phraseology of the apostle, who calls the elect and the reprobate "vessels,"
not of grace and non-grace but of "mercy" and "wrath." The relation of
"vessels" they have equally and in common from their divine creation,
sustainment, and government. That they are vessels worthy of wrath,
deserving it, and the "children of wrath," (Ephes. ii. 3), in this also
there is no distinction among them. But that some are "vessels of wrath,"
that is, destined to wrath, of their own merit, indeed, but also of the
righteous judgment of God, which determines to bring wrath upon them; while
others are "vessels" not "of wrath" but "of mercy" according to the grace of
God, which determines to pardon their sin, and to spare them, though worthy
of wrath, this is of the will of God, making a distinction between the two
classes; which discrimination has its beginning after the act of sin,
whether we consider the internal or the external act of God. From this it is
apparent that they are not on this account vessels of wrath because they
have become depraved, the just consequence of which is wrath, if the will of
God did not intervene, which determines that this, which would be a just
consequence in respect to all the depraved, should be a necessary
consequence in respect to those, whom alone He refuses to pardon, as He can
justly punish all and had decreed to pardon some. That which is "added by
way of amplification" is confirmed by the same arguments. For there is no
place for punitive justice except in reference to the sinner; there can be
no act of that mercy, of which we treat, except towards the miserable. But
man, considered in his natural condition is neither sinful nor miserable,
therefore that justice and mercy have no place in reference to him. Hence,
you, my brother, will see that the object of predestination, made according
to those attributes and so understood, cannot be man, considered in general,
since it requires, in its object, the circumstance of sin and misery, by
which circumstance man is restricted to a determinate condition, and is
separated from a general consideration. I know, indeed, that, if the general
consideration is admitted, no one of those particular considerations is
excluded, but you also know that if any particular relation is precisely
laid down, that universal relation is excluded. I do not think that it is to
be altogether conceded that, in the case of election and reprobation, there
is no consideration of well-doing or of sin. There is no consideration of
well-doing, it is true, for there is none to be considered; there is no
consideration of sin as a cause why one, and not another, should be
reprobated, but there is a consideration of sin as a meritorious cause of
the possibility of the reprobation of any individual, and as a condition
requisite in the object, as I have often remarked, and shall, hereafter,
often remark, as occasion may require. In what respects, those theories
differ was briefly noticed in reply to your first answer. When God is said
to have elected persons, as not created, as created but not fallen, or as
fallen, all know that it is understood, not that they are in fact such, but
that they are considered as such, for all admit that God elected human
beings from eternity, before they were created, that is, by the internal
act; but no one says, that man was elected by the external act before he was
created; therefore a reconciliation of those theories was unnecessary, since
the object of both acts is one and the same, and considered in the same
manner. Besides the questions, when the election was made, and in what sense
it was considered, are different. I wished to confirm my words by the
authority of your consent; whether ignorantly, will be proved from these
statements. You make man, considered as a sinner, the subject of the
preparation of punishment according to justice, which I, agreeably to your
Theses, have called reprobation, and you, according to your opinion,
presuppose sin in him; but, in the first theory, they make sin subordinate
to that same decree. The preterition, which the same theory attributes to
punitive justice, you attribute to the freedom of the divine goodness, and
you exclude punitive justice from it, when you make man, not yet a sinner,
the subject of preterition. Predestination, which the first theory ascribes
to mercy, in contra-distinction to grace, your Theses, already cited
(answers 2 and 4) assign to grace, spoken of absolutely, since they consider
man in the state of nature in which he was created; but you make man, as a
sinner, the subject of grace, as conjoined with mercy, and you presuppose
sin. That first theory, on the other hand, makes sin subordinate to that
predestination, both of which cannot, at the same time, be true, therefore,
in this you seem to agree with me, as you ascribe election to mercy, only so
far as man is considered miserable, and preparation of punishment to
justice, only so far as man is considered sinful. You reply, that, when
grace is presented, as the genus, mercy, as the species, is not excluded,
and mercy being presented, as the species, grace, as the genus, is not
excluded. I grant it, but affirm, first, that grace cannot be supposed here
as the genus, for grace, spoken of generally, cannot be supposed to be the
cause of any act, that is, any special act, such as predestination. Again,
the relation of grace and mercy in this case, is different from that of
genus and species: for they are spoken of, in an opposite manner, as two
different species of grace, the term grace, having the same appellation with
that of the genus, referring to that grace which regards man as created, the
term mercy, receiving its appellation from its object, referring to that
grace which regards man as sinful and miserable. If man is said to be
predestinated according to the former, the latter can have no place; if
according to the latter, then it is certain that the former can have no
place, otherwise the latter would be unnecessary. Predestination cannot be
said to have been made conjointly according to both. My conclusion was,
therefore, correct, when I excluded one species by the supposition of the
other. If man is to be exalted to supernatural glory from a natural state,
this work belongs to grace, simply considered, and in contra-distinction to
mercy; if from a corrupt state, it belongs to grace conjoined with mercy,
that is, it is the appropriate work of mercy. Grace, simply considered and
opposed to mercy, cannot effect the latter, mercy is not necessary for the
former. But predestination is of such grace as is both able and necessary to
effect that which is proposed in predestination.
What I wrote copulatively, in reference to the passed by and the reprobate,
was written thus, because they are one subject. But that they are not the
same in relation, is admitted: and I expressed this when I remarked that you
referred to justice only in the case of the latter, namely, the reprobate,
that is, the damned. In my second proposition, however, I signified that,
according to the view of those to whom I ascribed the second theory, the
relation of preterition was different from that of predamnation, which I
there called reprobation. The homonymy of the term reprobation is explained
in my second answer, and all fault is removed from me, who have used that
word every where according to your own idea. But it is very apparent, from
what follows, that you dissent from the authors of the first theory. For you
assert that "predestination is of justice," but that preterition or
reprobation is according to justice, but not "of justice;" while the authors
of the first theory ascribe to justice the cause of reprobation, however
understood, whether synecdochically, or properly, or catachrestically, that
is, they affirm that both preterition and predamnation are of justice.
But how are election and preterition "the work of flee-will according to the
wisdom of God and damnation, the work of necessary will according to the
justice of God? I have hitherto thought, with our theologians, that this
whole decree was instituted by God, in the exercise of most complete freedom
of will, and I yet think that the same idea is true, according to the
declaration, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," and "He hath
mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardeneth." (Rom. ix.
15, 18.)
In each of these acts God exercises equal freedom. For, if God necessarily
wills in any case to punish sin, how is it that He does not punish it in all
sinners? If he punishes it in some, but not in others, how is that the act
of necessary will? Who, indeed, does not ascribe the distinction which is
made among persons, equally meriting the punishment, to the freewill of God?
Justice may demand punishment on account of sin, but it demands it equally
in reference to all sinners without distinction; and, if there is any
discrimination, it is of free-will, demanding punishment as to these, but
remitting sin to those. But it was necessary that punishment should be at
least inflicted on some. If I should deny that this was so after the
satisfaction made by Christ, how will it be proved? I know that Aquinas, and
other of the School-men, affirm that the relation of the divine goodness and
providence demands that some should be elected to life, and that others
should be permitted to fall into sin and then to suffer the punishment of
eternal death, and that God was free to decree to whom life, and to whom
death should appertain, according to his will, but their arguments seem to
me susceptible of refutation from their own statements, elsewhere made
concerning the price of our redemption paid by Christ. For they say the
price was sufficient for the sins of all, but if the necessity of divine
justice demands that some sinners should be damned, then the price was not
sufficient for all. For if justice, in him who receives that price,
necessarily demands that some should be destitute of redemption, then it
must have been offered by the redeemer with the condition that there must
always remain to the necessity of justice, some satisfaction, to be sought
elsewhere and to be rendered by others. Let no one think that the last
affirmation of the school-men (that concerning the sufficiency of the
price), which, however, they borrowed from the fathers, is to be rejected,
for it could be proved, if necessary, by plain and express testimonies from
the Scripture.
Let us now come to my second argument, which was this. A theory, by which
God is necessarily made the author of sin, is to be repudiated by all
Christians, and indeed by all men; for no man thinks that the being, whom he
considers divine, is evil; -- But according to the theory of Calvin and Beza
God is necessarily made the author of sin; -- Therefore it is to be
repudiated. The proof of the Minor, is evident from these words, in which
they say that "God ordained that man should fall and become corrupt, that in
this way he might open a way for His eternal counsels." For he, who ordains
that man should fall and sin, is the author of sin This, my argument, is
firm, nor is it weakened by your answer. The word ordain is indeed
ambiguous, for it properly signifies to arrange the order of events or
deeds, and in each thing according to its own mode, in which sense it is
almost always used by the school-men. But it is also applied to a simple and
absolute decree of the will determining an action. What then? Does it
follow, because I have used a word, which is ambiguous and susceptible of
various meanings that I am chargeable with ambiguity? I think not; unless it
is proved that, in my argument, I have used that word in different senses.
Otherwise sound reasoning would be exceedingly rare, since, on account of
the multitude of things and the paucity of words, we are very frequently
compelled to use words, which have a variety of meanings. Ambiguity may be
charged when a word is used in different senses in the same argument. But I
used that word, in the same sense in the Major and in the Minor, and so my
argument is free from ambiguity. I affirm that this is evident from the
argument itself. For the added phrase "that man should fall" signifies that
the word ordain, in both propositions, is to be applied to the simple decree
in reference to an action, or rather to a simple decree that something
should be done. It cannot, on account of that phrase, be referred to a
decree disposing the order of actions.
Let us now state the syllogism in a few words, that we may be able to
compare your answer with the argument.
He who ordained that man should fall and become depraved, is the author of
the fall and of sin; God ordained that man should fall and become depraved;
Therefore, God is the author of sin.
You deny the Major, if the word ordain is understood to mean the disposal of
the order of actions. You deny the Minor if the same word is used to mean a
simple decree as to actions, or things to be done. This is true, and, in it,
I agree with you. But what if the same word in the Minor signifies a simple
decree, &c.? Then, indeed, even by your own admission, the Major will be
true. Else your distinction in the word is uselessly made, if the Major is
false, however the word may be understood. But that the word is used in the
Major in this sense, is proved by the phraseology, "He who ordained that man
should fall." Then you say that the Minor is false if the word is used in
the same sense in which we have shown that it is used in the Major, and so
the conclusion does not follow. I reply, that the question between us is not
whether that Minor is true or false, the word ordain being used for the
decreeing of things to be done, but whether they affirm it, to whom the
first theory is attributed. If, then, they affirm this, and the Major is
true, then it follows (and in this you agree with me,) that God is the
author of sin. For you admit that he is the author of sin, who, by the
simple decree and determination of the will, ordains that sin shall be
committed. Calvin and Beza assert this in plain and most manifest
declarations, needing no explanation, and by no means admitting that
explanation of the word ordain, which, as you say and I acknowledge, is
proper. I wish also that it might be shown in what way the necessity of the
commission of sin, can depend on the ordination and decree of God otherwise
than by the mode of cause, either efficient or deficient, which deficiency
is reduced to efficiency, when the efficiency of that which is deficient is
necessary to the avoidance of sin. Beza himself concedes that it is
incomprehensible how God can be free from and man be obnoxious to guilt, if
man fell by the ordination of God, and of necessity.
This, then, was to be done: their theory was to be freed from the
consequence of that absurdity, which, in my argument, I ascribe to it. It
was not, however, necessary to show how God ordained sin, and that He is not
indeed the author of sin. I agree with you, both in the explanation of that
ordination, and in the assertion that God is not the author of sin. Calvin
himself, and Beza also, openly deny that God is the author of sin, although
they define ordination as we have seen, but they do not show how these two
things can be reconciled. I wish, then, that it might be shown plainly, and
with perspicuity, that God is not made the author of sin by that decree, or
that the theory might be changed, since it is a stumbling block to many,
indeed to some a cause of separating from us, and to very many a cause of
not uniting with us. But I am altogether persuaded that you also perceive
that consequence, but prefer to free the theory of those men from an absurd
and blasphemous consequence, by a fit explanation, than to charge that
consequence to it. This is certainly the part of candour and good will, but
used to no good purpose, since the gloss, as they say, is contrary to the
text, which is manifest to any one who examines and compares the text with
the gloss. Those two questions, which you present to yourself, do not affect
my argument, when the matter is thus explained.
Yet I am delighted with your beautiful and elegant discussion of those
questions. But I would ask, in opposition to the theory of Calvin and Beza,
"How can these movements of the will be called its own and free, when the
act of the will is determined to one direction by the decree of God?" Then,
"Why did God place the will in man, if He was unwilling that he should enjoy
the liberty of its use?" For these questions are necessarily to be answered
by those authors, if they do not wish to leave their theory without defense.
It is therefore, apparent from these things that my argument does not fail,
but remains firm and unmoved, since all things which you have adduced, are
aside from that argument, which did not seek to conclude, as my own views,
that God is the author of sin (far from me be even the thought of that
abominable blasphemy), but to prove that this is a necessary consequence of
the theory of Calvin and Beza: which (I confidently say) has not been
confuted by you: nor can it be at all confuted, since you use the word
ordain in a sense different from that in which they use it, and from that
sense, according to which if God should be said to have ordained sin,
nothing less could be inferred than that He is the author of sin.
I said, moreover, that the theory of Calvin and Beza, in which they state
that God ordained that man should fall and become depraved, could not be
explained so that God should not be made by it the author of sin, by the
distinctions of the act, and the evil in the act, of necessity and coaction,
of the decree and its execution, of efficacious and permissive decree, as
the latter is explained by the authors of that theory agreeably to it, nor
by the different relation of the divine decree and of human nature or of
man, nor by the addition of the end, namely, that the whole ordination was
designed for the illustration of the glory of God. You seem to me, reverend
sir, not to have perceived for what purpose I presented these things, for I
did not wish to present any new course of reasoning against that first
theory, but to confirm my previous objection by a refutation of those
answers, which are usually presented by the defenders of that theory, to the
objection which I made, that, by it, God is made the author of sin. For
they, in order to repel the charge from their theory, never make the reply
which has been presented by you, for, should they do this, they would
necessarily depart from their own theory, which is wholly changed, if the
word ordain, which they use, signifies not to decree that sin should be
committed, but to arrange the order of its commission, as you explain that
word. But to show that it does not follow from their theory, that God is the
author of sin, they adduce the distinctions to which I have referred, and
have diligently gathered from their various writings; which ought to be done
before that accusation should be made against their theory. For, if I could
find any explanation of that theory, any distinction, by which it could be
relieved of that charge, it would have pertained to my conscience, not to
place upon it the load of such a consequence. Your distinction in the word
ordain indeed removes the difficulty, but, in such a way, that, by one and
the same effort, it removes the theory from which I proved that the
difficulty followed. Prove that the authors of that theory assert that God
ordained sin in no other sense than that, in which you have shown that the
word is properly used, and I shall obtain that which I wish, and I will
concede that those distinctions were unnecessary for the defense of that
theory. For the word ordain used in your sense, presupposes the perpetration
of sin; in their sense, it precedes and proposes its perpetration, for "God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved," not that from a being,
fallen and depraved, He should make whatever the order of the divine wisdom,
goodness, and justice might demand.
There is here, then, no wandering beyond the appropriate range of the
discussion. You say that all those distinctions pertain in common to the
question of providence, and therefore the ordination of sin pertains in
common to the question of providence. If, however, the authors of the first
theory have ascribed the ordination of sin to the divine predestination, why
should it cause surprise, that those distinctions should also be referred to
the same predestination? There is, in this case, then, no blame to be
attached to me, that I have mentioned these distinctions. On the contrary, I
should have been in fault, if, omitting reference to those distinctions, I
should have made an accusation against their theory, which they are
accustomed to defend against this accusation by means of those distinctions.
But since you do not, by your explanation, relieve their theory from that
objection, and I have said that those distinctions do not avail for its
relief and defense, it will not be useless that I should prove my assertion,
not for your sake, but for the sake of those, who hold that opinion, since
they think that it can be suitably defended by these distinctions.
They use the first distinction thus: "In sin there are two things, the act
and its sinfulness." God, by his own ordination, is the author of the act,
not of the sinfulness in the act. I will first consider the distinction,
then the answer which they deduce from it. This distinction is very commonly
made, and seems to have some truth, but to one examining, with diligence,
its falsity, in most respects, will be apparent. For it is not, in general
or universally, applicable to all sin. All sins, especially, which are
committed against prohibitory laws, styled sins of commission, reject this
distinction. For the acts themselves are forbidden by the law, and
therefore, if perpetrated, they are sins. This is the formal relation of
sin, that it is something done contrary to law. It is true that the act in
that it is such, would not be sin, if the law had not been enacted, but then
it is not an act, having evil or sinfulness. Let the law be absent, the act
is naturally good: introduce the law, and the act itself is evil, as
forbidden, not that there is any thing in the act which can be called
unlawfulness or sin. I will make the matter clear by an example. The eating
of the forbidden fruit, if it had been permitted to the human will as right,
would, in no way, be sin, nor any part of sin, it would not contain any
element of sin; but the same act, forbidden by law, could not be otherwise
than sinful, if perpetrated; I refer to the act itself, and not to any thing
in the act to which the term evil can be applied. For that act was simply
made illicit by the enactment of the law. I shall have attained my object
here in a single word, by simply asking that the sinfulness in that act may
be shown separately from the act itself. That distinction, however, had a
place in acts which are performed according to a perceptive law, but not
according to a due mode, order, or motive. Thus he, who gives alms, that he
may be praised does a good act badly, and there is, in that deed both the
act and the evil of the act according to which it is called sin. But the sin
which man perpetrated at the beginning, of the ordination of God, was a sin
of commission; it therefore affords no place for that distinction. This
fundamental principle having been established, the answer, deduced from that
distinction, is at once refuted. Yet let us look at it. "God," they say,
"is, by ordination, the author of the act, not of the evil in the act." I
affirm, on the contrary, that God ordained that act, not as an act, but as
it is an evil act. He ordained that the glory of His mercy and justice
should be illustrated, of his pardoning mercy, and His punitive justice; but
that glory is illustrated not by the act as such, but as it is sinful, and
as an evil act. For the act needs remission, not as such, but as evil; it
deserves punishment, not as such, but as evil. The declaration, then, of His
glory by mercy and justice, is by the act as it is evil, not as it is an
act; therefore that ordination which had its end, the illustration of that
glory, was not of the act as such, but as evil, and of sin, as sin and
transgression. That distinction, therefore, is useless in repelling the
objection, which I have urged against that theory. I add, for the
elucidation of the subject, that if God efficaciously determines the will to
the material of sin, or to depraved objects, though it may be affirmed that
He does not determine the will to an evil decision, in respect to the evil,
He is still made the author of sin, since man himself does not will the evil
in respect to the evil and the devil does not solicit to evil in respect to
the evil, but in respect to that which is delectable, and yet he is said to
induce persons to sin.
The second distinction is that of necessity and coaction. They use it in
this way. If the decree of God, in which he ordained that man should fall,
compelled him to sin, then would God, by that decree, become the author of
sin, and man would be free from guilt: but that decree did not compel man.
It only imposed a necessity upon him so that he could not but sin; which
necessity does not take away his liberty. Therefore, man, since he sins
freely, the decree being in force, is the cause of his own fall, and God is
free from the responsibility. Let us now consider this distinction, and the
use made of it.
Necessity and coaction differ as genus and species. For necessity
comprehends coaction in itself. Necessity also is twofold, one from an
internal, the other from an external cause; the one, natural, the other,
violent. Necessity, from an external cause and violent, is also called
coaction, whether it be used contrary to nature, or against the will, as
when a stone is projected upwards, and a strong man makes use of the hand of
a weaker person to strike a third person. The former has the name of the
genus, necessity, but is referred to a specific idea, by a contraction of
the mental conception. There is, then, between these two species, some
agreement, as they belong to the same genus, and some discrepancy, since
each has its own form. But it is now to be considered whether they so differ
that coaction alone, and not that other species of necessity, is contrary to
freedom; and whether he who compels to sin is the cause of sin, and not he
who necessitates without compulsion. They indeed affirm this, who use this
distinction. First, in reference to freedom; it is opposed directly to
necessity, considered in general, whether natural or compulsive, for each of
these species causes the inevitability of the act. For a cause acts freely
when it has the power to suspend its action. Some say that freedom is fully
consistent with natural necessity, and refer to the example of the Deity,
who is, by nature and freely, good. But is God freely good? Such an
affirmation is not very far from blasphemy. His own goodness exists in God,
naturally and most intimately; it does not then exist in Him freely. I know
that a kind of freedom of complacency is spoken of by the School-men, but
contrary to the very nature and definition of freedom. We say, in reference
to sin, that he is the cause of sin, who necessitates to the commission of
sin, by any act whatever of necessitation, whether internal or external,
whether by internal suasion, motion, or leading, which the will necessarily
obeys, or by an application of external violence, which the will is not
able, though it may desire, to resist; though, in that case, the act would
not be voluntary. He, indeed sins more grievously, who uses the former act,
than he, who uses the latter. For the former has this effect, that the will
may consent to the sin, but the latter has no such effect, though that
consent is not according to the mode of free-will, but according to that of
nature, in which mode only, God can so move the will, that it may be moved
necessarily, that is, that it cannot but be moved. And in this relation, the
will, as it consents by nature to sin, is free from guilt; for sin, as such,
is of free-will, and tend towards its object, according to the mode of its
own freedom. The law is enacted not for nature but for the will, for the
will as it acts not according to the mode of nature, but according to the
mode of freedom. That distinction is, therefore, vain, and does not relieve
the first theory from the objection made against it. If any one wishes, with
greater pertinacity, still to defend the idea, that one and the same act can
be performed freely and necessarily, in different respects, necessarily in
respect to the first cause, which ordains it, but freely and contingently in
respect to the second cause, let him consider that contingency and necessity
differ not in certain respects, but in their entire essence, and that they
divide the whole extent of being, and cannot, therefore, be coincident. That
is necessary which cannot fail to be done; that is contingent which can fail
to be done. These are contradictions which can in no way be attributed to
the same act. The will tends freely to its own object, when it is not
determined, to a single direction, by a superior power; but, when that
determination is made by any decree of God, it can no longer be said to tend
freely to its own object; for it is no longer a principle, having dominion
and power over its own acts. Did it not pertain to the nature of the bones
of Christ, (which they present as an example,) to be broken? Yet they could
not be broken on account of the decree of God. I reply, that the divine
determination being removed, they could be broken; but, that determination,
being presented by the decree of God, they could not at all be broken, that
is, it was necessary, not contingent, that they should remain unbroken. Did
God, therefore, change the nature of the bones? That was not necessary. He
only prevented the act of breaking the bones, which were liable by their
nature to be broken, which act could have been performed, and would have
been, if God had not anticipated it by His decree, and by an act according
to that decree. For our Lord gave up the ghost when the soldiers were
approaching the cross to break his bones, and were about to use the breaking
of his legs to accelerate his death. That I may not be tedious, I will not
refute all the objections; but I am persuaded, from what has been presented,
that they are all susceptible of refutation. The third distinction is that
of the decree and its execution. They use it thus; though God may have
decreed from eternity to devote certain persons to death, and, that this may
be possible, may have ordained that they should fall into sin, yet he does
not execute that decree, by their actual condemnation, until after the
persons themselves have become sinful by their own act, and, therefore, He
is free from responsibility. I answer that the fact that the execution of
the decree is subsequent to the act of sin, does not free from
responsibility him, who, by his own decree, has ordained that sin should
occur, that he might afterwards punish it; indeed he, who has ordained and
decreed that sin should be committed, cannot justly punish sin after its
commission; he cannot justly punish a deed, the doing of which he has
ordained; he cannot be the ordainer of the punishment, who was the ordainer
of the crime. Augustine rightly says, "God can ordain the punishment of
crimes, not the crimes themselves," that is, He can ordain that they should
take place. I have already demonstrated that man does not become depraved of
his own fault, if God has ordained that he should fall and become depraved.
The fourth distinction is that of efficacious and permissive decree: which
distinction, rightly explained, removes the whole difficulty, but it removes
also the theory, by which God is affirmed to have ordained that sin should
take place. The authors, however, of the first theory endeavour to sustain
that theory by reference to permissive decree. They affirm that God does not
effect, but decrees and ordains sin, and that this is done not by an
efficacious, but by a permissive decree; and they so explain a permissive
decree, that it coincides with one, which is efficacious. For they explain
permission to be an act of the divine will, by which God does not bestow, on
a rational creature, that grace, which is necessary for the avoidance of
sin. This action, joined with the enactment of a law, embraces in itself the
whole cause of sin. For he, who imposes a law which cannot be observed
without grace, and denies grace to him, on whom the law is imposed, is the
cause of sin by the removal of the necessary hindrance. But more on this
point hereafter.
On the contrary, if permissive decree be rightly explained, it is certain
that he, who has decreed to permit sin, is by no means the cause of sin; for
the action of his will has reference to its own permission, not to sin. Nor
are these two things, God, in the exercise of His will, permits sin, and,
God wills sin, equivalent. For, the object of the will is, in the former
case, permission, in the latter, sin. On the contrary rather, the
conclusion, God permits, therefore, He does not will, a sinful act, is
valid, for he who wills any thing does not permit the same thing. Permission
is a sign of want of action in the will. That distinction, then, does not
relieve the first theory. The fifth distinction is that of the divine decree
and human nature, which they use thus: -- sin, if you consider the divine
decree, is necessary; but if you have reference to human nature, which is
equally free and flexible in every direction, it is freely and contingently
committed; and, therefore, the whole responsibility is to be placed on human
nature, as the proximate cause. We have discussed this, previously, in
reference to the second distinction, and have sufficiently refuted it. They
make another use of the same distinction, by a diverse respect of the ends,
which God has proposed to Himself in His decree, and which are proposed to
man in the commission of sin. "For," they say, "God intends, in His decree,
to illustrate His own glory, but man intends to gratify his own desire; and
though man does the very thing, which is divinely decreed, he does not do it
because it is decreed, but because his will so inclines him. I reply, first;
a good end does not approve, or make good, an action which is unlawful in
itself; for "we are not to do evil that good may come;" but it is evil to
ordain that sin shall be committed. Secondly, that man, to satisfy his own
desire, should do that which God has forbidden, also results from the decree
of God, and, therefore, man is relieved from responsibility. Thirdly, though
the fulfillment of the divine decree is not the end which moves man to the
commission of sin, yet that same thing is the cause which, by a gentle,
silent, and imperceptible, yet efficacious, movement effects that man should
sin, or, rather, commit that act which God had decreed should be committed,
which, then, in respect to man, cannot be called sin. Finally, the last
defense consists in a reference to the end, of which they make this use: "We
are accustomed to state the decree of God, not in these terms, that ‘God has
determined to adjudge some men to eternal death and condemnation,’ but we
add, ‘ that His justice may be illustrated to the glory of his name.’"
I answer, that the addition does not deny the previous statement, (for this
is confirmed by the rendering of the cause,) and the addition, even of the
best end, does not justify an action which is not in itself formally good,
as has before been stated. From these things, then, it is apparent, that
these grounds of defense are insufficient, and avail nothing for the defense
of that theory which states that God ordained that men should fall and
become depraved, in order to open to Himself, in that manner, a way for the
execution of the decree which He had, from eternity, determined and proposed
to Himself, for the illustration of His own glory by mercy and justice. If
any one may think that any other distinction or explanation can be
presented, by which that theory may be defended and vindicated, I shall be,
in the highest degree, pleased, if this is done. But let him be cautious not
to change the theory or add to it any thing inconsistent with it. You
mention, at the end of your sixth answer, an objection to your view; --
"Then the judgments of God depend on contingency, and are based on things
contingent, if they have reference to man as a sinner, and to his sin." I
must examine this with diligence, since it also lies against my view, in
that I think that sin must be presupposed in the object of the divine
decree. It is most manifest, from the Scriptures, that many of the judgments
of God are based on sin, which, yet, cannot be said, to depend on sin. It is
one thing to make sin the object and occasion of the divine judgments, and
another to make it the cause of the same. The judgment, which God pronounces
in reference to sin, He pronounces freely, nor does this depend on sin, for
He can suspend it, or substitute another in its place; yet it is based on
sin, because, apart from sin, He could not thus judge. But sin is
contingent, or contingently committed.
Therefore, the judgments of God are based on things contingent. I deny the
consequence. The judgments of God are based on sin, not as it is committed
contingently, but as it is certainly and infallibly foreseen by God.
Therefore, the sight of God intervenes between sin and judgment, and thus,
judgment is based on the certain and infallible vision of God. Then that
which exists, so far as it exists, is necessary. But the judgments of God
are based on sin, already committed and in existence. In your answer,
however, I could wish that it might be explained to me how those things,
which are contingent, depend on the ordination of God, whether according to
the source or the act, the word ordination having reference to a decree that
certain things shall be done, not to the disposal of the order in which they
shall be done, for so the word is to be understood in this place. For,
though God has appointed the mode of contingency in nature, yet it does not
follow from this that contingencies have their source in the ordination of
God. For a cause, which is free and governs its own action, can suspend or
carry forward a contingent act, according to its own will; so also in
reference to the act. I do not, therefore, understand in what way
contingencies, which are such in themselves, are not contingencies to God,
from the fact that He has established the mode of contingency in nature. Sin
is not, in any mode and in respect to anything, necessary. Therefore, sin is
also contingent to God, that is, it is considered by God as done
contingently, though in His certain and infallible sight, on account of the
infinity of the divine knowledge. Nor is it the same idea, that a thing
should be really contingent to the supreme cause, and that a thing, truly
contingent in itself, should be considered as contingent by that supreme
cause. For it is understood that nothing can be accidental or contingent to
God, for He is immutable, He is entirely uncompounded, and, as Being and
Essence, belongs to Himself alone. But the knowledge of God considers things
as they are, though with vision far exceeding the nature of all things.
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SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now adduce other reasons why that theory is not satisfactory to
me, since I perceive that you treat it in a mode and respect different from
mine. I come then to the theory of Thomas Aquinas, to which, I think, you
also gave your assent, and presented proofs from the Scriptures, and I will
openly state that, of which I complain. I would pray you not to be
displeased with the liberty, which I take, if your good will towards me was
not most manifest.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
I should prefer that those "other reasons," whatever they might be, had been
presented, that I might dispose of the whole matter, (if possible,) at the
same time, for I desire that my opinion should be known to you without any
dissimulation, and that your expectation should be satisfied. Nevertheless,
I hope, that, in your wisdom, you will perceive, from what I have already
said, and shall yet say, either what my opinion is concerning those reasons,
or what there may be, according to my view, in which your mind may rest,
(which may the Lord grant). The theory of Thomas Aquinas I unite with the
other, I do not follow it. But I will, briefly and in a few words, explain
what I shall state in this argument, and in what mode, from the word of God,
and what does not please me in that theory, noticing the words of your
writing in the same order.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTH PROPOSITION
If I thought, indeed, that you considered that first theory, as it is
explained by its authors, to be in accordance with the Scriptures, I would,
in every way, attempt to divest you of that idea, but I see that you so
explain it, as greatly to change it; on which account I am persuaded that
you judge that, unless it be explained according to your interpretation, it
is, by no means, in accordance with the Scriptures. You will also allow me,
my brother, to repeat, that, in your entire answer, you have not relieved
that theory from any objection. For it remains valid, that "God is made the
author of sin, if He is said to have ordained that man should fall and
become depraved that He might open to Himself a way for the declaration of
His own glory, in the way in which He had already determined by eternal
decree." Yet, that no one may think that my promise was vain, I will attempt
by other arguments also the refutation of that theory, which presents, as an
object to God, in the act of predestination, man not yet created or to be
created. I used two arguments, one a priore, the other, a posteriore or by
absurdity of consequence. The argument a priore was as follows; --
Predestination is the will of God in reference to the illustration of His
glory by mercy and justice; but that will has no opportunity for exercise in
a being not yet created. The argument a posteriore was as follows; If God
ordained that man should fall and become depraved, that He might open to
Himself a way for the execution of that purpose of His will
(predestination,) then it follows that He is the author of sin by that
ordination. These arguments have been already dwelt upon at sufficient
length.
I adduce my third argument. Predestination is a part of providence,
administering and governing the human race; therefore, it was subsequent to
the act of creation or to the purpose of creating man. If it is subsequent
to the act of creation, or to the purpose of creating man, then man,
considered as not yet created, is not the object of predestination. I will
add a fourth. Predestination is a preparation of supernatural benefits, it
is, therefore, preceded by the communication of natural gifts, and,
therefore, by creation, in nature, or act, or in the decree of God. Also a
fifth. The illustration of the wisdom of God in creation, is prior to that
illustration of the wisdom of God, which is the business of predestination.
(1 Cor. i. 21.) Therefore, creation is prior to predestination, in the
purpose of God. If creation is prior, man is considered by God, in the act
of predestination, as existing, not as to be created.
So also in reference to goodness and mercy, the former of which, in the act
of creation, was illustrated in reference to Nothing, the latter, in the act
of predestination, concerning that which was subsequent to Nothing. To the
same purpose can all the arguments be used, by which it was proved that "sin
is a condition requisite in the object of predestination."
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EIGHTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I shall, therefore, consider three things in that theory.
1. Did God elect from eternity, of human beings, considered in their natural
condition, some to supernatural felicity and glory, and non elect or pass by
others?
2. Did God prepare for those whom He elected, that is, for human beings to
be raised from a natural to a supernatural state, and to be translated to a
participation of divine things, according to the purpose of election, those
means which are necessary, sufficient, and efficacious to the attainment of
that supernatural felicity, but passed by others, that is, determine not to
communicate those means to them, but to leave them in their natural state?
3. Did God, foreseeing that those persons, thus passed by, would fall into
sin, reprobate them, that is, decree to subject them to eternal punishment?
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Let this be the rule which shall guide us in our future discussion. If any
use the term, "in their natural condition," they do not exclude supernatural
endowments, which God communicated to Adam, but use it in opposition to sin,
(which afterwards supervened,) and to native depravity. They, who use these
words otherwise, seem to me to be deceived by a diversity of relation. The
word reprobation is here used, (as we have before observed,) in its third
signification, which we have called catachrestic; but sufficient on that
point. We will come to those three points in their order.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTH PROPOSITION
Natural condition I have opposed both to supernatural endowments, and to sin
and native depravity, for I have supposed the former term to be used, to the
exclusion of the latter; -- not incorrectly, whether we consider the force
of the terms themselves, or their use by the school-men. Natural condition
has a relation to supernatural endowments, which they exclude as
transcending it, and to sin and depravity which they, in like manner,
exclude, as corrupting it. Though I have used the term reprobation in the
sense in which it is used in your Theses and other writings, yet I shall
desist from it hereafter, (if I can keep this in my mind,) and use, in its
place, the words preterition and non-election, except when I wish to include
both acts, by Synecdoche, in one word. For the term reprobation, as it is
used by me, I will substitute preparation of punishment or predamnation.
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NINTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first question, I do not present as a matter of doubt, the fact that
God has elected some to salvation, and not elected or passed by others for I
think that this is certain from the plain words of Scripture; but I place
the emphasis on the subject of election and non election; -- Did God, in
electing and not electing, have reference to men, considered in their
natural condition. I have not been able hitherto to receive this as truth.
THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
We remarked, in the sixth proposition, that, though the mode of regarding
man can and ought to be distinguished by certain respects or relations, yet
the authors of the first theory have stated that mankind was considered in
common by the Deity in the case of election and reprobation; but the authors
of the second have not excluded that common relation of the human race,
which they have referred to a special relation; but they have only desired
that the contemplation of supervenient sin should not affect the case of
election and reprobation, according to the declaration of the apostle,
"neither having done any good or evil," (Rom. ix. 11,) and according to
those words "natural condition," mean only the exclusion of any reference to
supervenient sin from the case of election. If this observation is correct,
the latter state of the question, properly considered, will not be at
variance with the former. For he, who states that man, as not yet created,
as not yet fallen, and as fallen, was considered by the Deity in the case of
election and reprobation, he certainly affirms the latter, and both the
former. The question, therefore, is, properly, not whether God, in electing
and in passing by or reprobating, had reference to men in their natural
condition, that is, apart from the contemplation of sin, as sin, but the
question should be, whether God had reference, in this case, to man, apart
from any contemplation of sin as a cause. We deny this, on time authority of
the word of God. Nor did Augustine, to whom the third theory is ascribed,
mean any thing else, as he has most abundantly set forth (lib. 1, quaes. ad
Simplicianum), for what he asserts concerning Jacob and Esau is either to be
understood, in the same manner, in the ease of Adam and Eve, or the rule of
election and reprobation will be different in different cases, which is
certainly absurd. Before, then, Adam and Eve were made, or had any thing
good or evil, the Divine election, as we have plainly stated in the same
argument, was already made according to the purpose of grace, which election
preceded both persons, and all causes originating from, or situated in,
persons. The truth of this is proved from authority, reason, and example.
From authority, in Romans 9, Ephesians 1, and elsewhere. From reason; for,
in the first place, election is made in Christ, not in the creatures, or in
any condition in them; secondly, it is admitted by all, (which you
afterwards acknowledge in part, though in a different sense,) that
predestination and reprobation suppose nothing in the predestinate or the
reprobate, but only in Him who predestinates, as the apostle affirms "not of
works, but of Him that calleth." (Rom. ix. 11.) Augustine presents a most
luminous exposition of that passage, showing, from the reasoning of the
apostle, that neither works, nor faith, nor will, was foreseen in the case.
The procreation of the child depends, in nature, on the parent only; much
more does the adoption of His children originate in God alone (to whom it
peculiarly pertains to be the cause and principle of all good), not in any
consideration of them. Finally the example of angels demonstrates the same
thing, of whom some are called elect, others are non-elect. Of the angels,
the elect were such apart from any consideration of their works, and those,
who are non-elect, passed-by; or reprobate, are non-elect, apart from the
consideration of their works. For, as Augustine conclusively argues in
reference to men, "if, because God foresaw that the works of Esau would be
evil, He, therefore, predestinated him to serve the younger, and, because
God foresaw that the works of Jacob would be good, He, therefore,
predestinated him to have rule over the elder, that which is affirmed by the
apostle, would be false, ‘not of works,’" &c. The state of the case is the
same in reference to angels. For God provided against the possible misery of
these, by the blessing of election; He did not provide against the possible
misery of those, in the work of reprobation and preterition. But how? by
predestinating the elect angels, to the adoption of sons, who are so styled
in Job 1, 2 & 38, and not predestinating the others. God begat them as sons,
not by nature, but by will, which will is eternal, and preceded from
eternity their existence, which belongs to time. What does the child
contribute towards his procreation? He does not indeed exist. What does an
angel contribute towards his sonship? If nothing, what does man contribute?
In reply to both these, Augustine, in the place already cited, surely with
equal justice, thunders forth that inquiry of St. Paul, "who maketh thee to
differ from another? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" &c. (1
Cor. iv. 7.)
God, therefore, regards man in general; He does not find any cause in man;
for the cause of that adoption or filiation is from His sole will and grace.
But if any one should say that sin is the cause of reprobation or
preterition, He will not establish that point. For, in the first place, the
reasoning of Augustine, which we have just adduced, remains unshaken, based
on a comparison of works foreknown; in the second place, since we are, by
nature, equally sinners before God, one of these three things must be true;
-- either all are rejected on account of sin, as a common reason, or it is
remitted to all, or a cause must be found elsewhere than in sin, as we have
found it. Lastly, "who makes us to differ," if it be not God, according to
the purpose of His own election? Therefore, the affirmation stands, that
God, in the case of election and reprobation made from eternity, considered
man in general, so that He has in Himself, not in man, the cause of both
acts. Yet let us accurately weigh the arguments, which are advanced here,
though, properly, they are not opposed to this theory.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINTH PROPOSITION
I think it is sufficiently evident how the authors of the first theory
considered man, from what was said in reply to your answer to Prop. 6. But
that the authors of the second theory, by the addition of that special
relation, did not exclude the universal relation, seems hardly probable to
me. For he, who says that sin supervened to election and preterition
originating in their own causes, excluding sin not only from the cause of
election and preterition, but from the subject and the condition requisite
in it, he denies that man, universally, considered as fallen, is presented
to him who elects and passes by, and if he denies this, he denies also that
man is considered in general, by God, in the act of decree. In other
respects I assent to what you affirm. Sin is not the cause of election and
preterition, yet this statement must be rightly understood, as I think that
it is here understood, namely, that sin is not the cause that God should
elect some, and pass by others: let it be only stated that sin is the cause
that God may be able to pass by some individuals of the human race made in
His own image. In the former statement there is agreement between us, in the
latter we disagree, if at all. It is not, then, the question, "Did God have
reference, in His own decree, to men apart from any consideration of sin, as
a cause, that is, as a cause that He should elect these, and pass by those."
For this is admitted even by Augustine, who, nevertheless, presupposes to
that decree sin, as a requisite condition in its object. But the question is
this; "Is sin a condition requisite in the object, which God has reference
in the acts of election and preterition, or not?" This is apparent by the
arguments presented by myself, which prove, not that sin is a cause of that
decree, but a condition, requisite in the object. Augustine affirms this,
and I agree with him. Let us look at some passages from his works. In Book
1, to Simplicianus, he excludes sin as a cause that God should elect or
reprobate, but includes it as a cause that He might have the power to pass
by or reprobate, or as a condition requisite in the object of election and
reprobation. The latter, I prove by his own words, (there is no necessity of
proof as to the former, for in reference to that, there is agreement between
us). "God did not hate Esau, the man, but He did hate Esau, the sinner," and
again, "Was not Jacob, therefore, a sinner, because God loved him? He loved
in him not sin, of which he was guilty, but the grace which Himself had
bestowed, &c., and again, "God hates iniquity, therefore He punishes it in
some by damnation, and removes it from others by justification." Again, "The
whole race from Adam is one mass of sinful and wicked being, among whom both
Jews and Gentiles, apart from the grace of God, belong to one lump." If you
say that Augustine was here discussing, not preterition, but predamnation, I
reply that Augustine knew no preterition which was not predamnation, for he
prefixes to preterition hatred as its cause, as he prefixes love to
election. Then, I conclude, according to the theory of Augustine, that what
is affirmed in the case of Esau and Jacob, is not to be understood in that
of Adam and Eve, and it does not, hence, follow that there would be a
diverse mode of election and reprobation, unless it be first proved that
God, in election, had reference to Adam and Eve, considered in their
primitive state, which, throughout this discussion, I wholly deny. But there
is a manifest difference between Esau and Jacob, and Adam and Eve. For the
former, though not yet born, could be considered as sinners, for both had
been already conceived in sin; if they had not been created, they could not
be considered as such, for they were such in no possible sense; not even
when they had been created by God, and remained yet in their original
integrity. It cannot be inferred from this, that "persons, and all causes
originating from, or situated in persons" preceded the act of election. For
sin, in which Jacob and Esau were then already conceived, did not precede.
Yet I admit that sin was not the cause that God should love one and hate the
other, should elect one and reprobate the other, but it was a condition
requisite in the object of that decree. Those arguments, however, which you
present, do not injure my case. For they do not exclude sin from the object
of that decree as a requisite condition, nor as a cause without which that
decree could not be made, but only as a cause, on account of which one is
reprobated, another elected.
This is apparent from Romans 9. For Esau had been conceived in sin when
those words were addressed by God to Rebecca. In the same chapter also, the
elect and the reprobate are said to be "vessels of mercy" and "of wrath,"
which terms could not be applied to them apart from a consideration of sin.
I will not now affirm, as I might do with truth, that Jacob and Esau are to
be considered, not in themselves, but as types, the former being the type of
the children of the promise, who seek the righteousness which is of faith in
Christ, the latter, the type of the children of the flesh, who followed
after the righteousness of the law, which subject requires a more extended
explanation, but here not so necessary. The first chapter to the Ephesians
clearly affirms the same thing, as it asserts that the election is made in
Christ, because it is of the grace, by which we have redemption in the blood
of Christ, &c.
Your arguments "from reason" do not militate against the position, which I
have assumed, they rather strengthen it. For in the first place, "the
election is made in Christ," therefore, it is of sinners, as will be
hereafter proved at greater length. Secondly, "predestination and
reprobation suppose nothing in their subject." Therefore, whatever character
the subject may have, which receives grace, for such a character, and
considered in the same relation, is the grace prepared. But the sinner
receives, and he only, the grace prepared in predestination. Therefore, also
for the sinner alone, is grace prepared in predestination, but of this,
also, more largely hereafter. Thirdly, men are the sons of God, not by
generation, but by regeneration; the latter, presupposes sin, therefore,
adoption is made from sinners.
The example of angels in this case proves nothing. Their election and
reprobation and those of men are unlike, as you in many places acknowledge,
for their salvation is secured by the grace of preservation and
confirmation, that of men by the grace of restoration. He begat angels, as
sons to Himself, according to the former grace; He regenerated men as sons
to Himself by the latter grace. Therefore, God regarded man not in general,
but as sinful, in reference to which point is this question between us,
though he might find in man no cause that He should adopt one and pass by
another, in reference to which we have no controversy. The question then
remains between us, did God, in His decree of predestination and
reprobation, have reference to man considered in his natural purity, or to
man considered as in his sins? I assert the latter, and deny the former, and
I have presented many arguments in support of my opinion; but I will now
consider, in their order, those things, which you have presented against it.
_________________________________________________________________
TENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS.
First, in general. 1. Since no man was ever created by God in a merely
natural state; whence also no man could ever be considered in the decree of
God, since that, which exists in the mind, is the material of action and
exists in the relation of capability of action, but takes its form from the
will and decree by which God determined actually to exert His power, at any
time, in reference to man. Hence, whatever distinction may be made, in the
mind, between nature, and a supernatural gift, bestowed on man at the
creation, that is not to be considered in this place. For the creation of
the first man, and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God, which image
of God in man is not nature, but supernatural grace, having reference not to
natural felicity, but to supernatural life. It is evident, from the
description of the image of God, that supernatural grace in man is that
divine image. For, according to the Scripture, it is "knowledge after the
image of Him that created him," (Col. iii. 10,) and "righteousness and true
holiness" pertaining to the new man which is created after" (according to)
"God." (Ephes. iv. 24.) In addition to this, all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a gracious state.
So, also, our Catechism, ques. 62. Since there is found, in the Scriptures,
no reference to the love of God according to election, no divine volition
and no act of God concerning men, referring to them in different respects,
until after the entrance of sin into the world, or after it was considered
as having entered.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
Before I refer to arguments, an ambiguity must be removed, which is
introduced here, and which will be frequently introduced whenever reference
is made to a "merely natural state." Things are called natural from the term
"nature." But nature is two-fold, therefore, natural things are also
two-fold. I affirm that nature is two-fold, as it is considered, first in
relation to this physical world, situated nearer and lower in elementary and
material things, which is described by Philosophers in the science of
Physics, secondly, in relation to that spiritual world, namely, that which
is more remote and higher, consisting in spiritual and immaterial things,
which is treated of in Metaphysics, rightly so called. From the former
nature we have our bodies, and by it we are animals; from the latter, we
have our spirits, and by it we are rational beings, which is also observed
by Aristotle (lib. 2, de gener. animalium cap. 3) in his statement that the
mind alone "enters from without" into the natural body, and is alone divine;
for there is no communion between its action and that of the body. Hence, it
is, that natural things must, in general, be considered in three modes;
physically, in relation to the body according to its essence, capability,
actions and passions; metaphysically, in relation to the intelligent mind,
according to its essence and being; and conjointly in relation to that
personal union, which exists in man, as a being composed of both natures.
But particularly, a distinction must be made in these same natural things,
in respect to nature as pure and as corrupt. Therefore, all those things,
which pertain to the nature of man in these different modes, are said to
belong to the mere natural state of man, sin being excluded.
Now, I come to the particular members of your Proposition. First, you
affirm, "that no man was ever created in a merely natural state." If you
mean that he was created without supernatural endowments, I do not see how
this can be proved, (though many make this assertion). The Scripture does
not any where make this statement. But you are not ignorant that it is said
in the schools, that a negative argument from authority, as, "it is not
written, therefore, it is not true" is not valid. Again, the order of
creation, in a certain respect, proves the contrary, since the body was
first made from the dust, and afterwards the soul was breathed into it.
Which, then, is more probable, that the soul was, at the moment of its
creation, endowed with supernatural gifts, or that they were superadded
after its creation? I would rather affirm that, as the soul was added to the
body, so the supernatural endowments were added to the soul. If God did this
in relation to nature, why may He not have done it, in the case of grace,
which is more peculiar. Lastly, I do not think that it follows, if man was
not made in a merely natural state, but with supernatural endowments, that
grace, therefore, pertains to creation, and also that supernatural gifts
would therefore, pertain, in common, to the whole race. That this
consequence is false, is proved by the definition of nature, and the
relation of supernatural things. For what else is nature than the principle
of motion and rest, ordained by God? If, then, supernatural things are
ordained on this principle, they cease to be supernatural and become
natural. Besides the relation of supernatural things is such that they are
not natural, as they are not common; for those things which are common to
all men belong to nature, but supernatural things are personal, and do not
pass to heirs. I acknowledge that Adam and Eve received supernatural gifts,
but for themselves not for their heirs; nor could they transmit them to
their heirs, except by a general arrangement or special grace. If this be
so, then man is without supernatural endowments, though, as you claim, the
first man may not have been made without them; and he is justly considered
by us as not possessing them, and much more would he have been so considered
by the Deity. Indeed, my brother, God contemplated man, in a merely natural
state, and determined in His own decree to bestow upon him supernatural
endowments. He could then be so considered in the decree of God. He
contemplated nature, on which He would bestow grace; the natural man, on
whom He would bestow, by His own decree, supernatural gifts. Was it not,
indeed, a special act of the will, to create man, and another special act of
the will to endow Him with supernatural gifts? Which acts, even though they
might have occurred at the same time (which does not seem to me necessary,
for the reasons which have been just advanced) cannot be together in the
order of nature, since one may be styled natural, and the other
supernatural. I know that you afterwards speak of the image of God, but we
shall soon see that this has no bearing, (as you think), on this case.
Meanwhile, I wish that you would always keep in view the fact, that, though
all these things should be true, yet they are not opposed to that doctrine
which asserts that in this decree, God considered man in general.
I will leave without discussion those subsequent remarks on the material and
the formal relation of the decree of God, since the force of the argument
does not depend on them, and pass to the proof. "The creation of the first
man," you affirm, "and, in him, of all men, was in the image of God," (I
concede and believe it,) "which image of God in man is not nature but
supernatural grace, having reference not to natural felicity but to
supernatural life." What is this, your statement, my brother? Origen
formerly affirmed the same thing, and on this account received the
reprehension of the ancient church in its constant testimony and harmonious
declarations, as is attested by Epiphanius, Jerome and other witnesses. I do
not, however, believe that you agree in sentiment with Origen, in opposition
to the united and wise declaration of that church, but some ambiguity, which
you have not observed, has led you into this mistake. Let us then expose and
free from its obscurity this subject, by the light of truth.
The first ambiguity is in the word nature, the second in the term
supernatural. We have just spoken in reference to the former, affirming that
this term may refer to the lower nature of elementary bodies, or to that
higher nature of spiritual beings, or finally to our human nature, composed
of both natures in one compound subject; and that this latter nature is
itself two-fold, pure and depraved.
The latter ambiguity consists in the fact, that the term supernatural is
applied, at one time, to those things which are above this inferior nature,
and pertain to the superior, spiritual, or metaphysical nature; at another,
to those things which are above even that higher and metaphysical nature,
that is, to those which are properly and immediately divine; and at another,
to those things which are above the condition of this our corrupt nature, as
they are bestowed upon us only of supernatural grace, though they might have
pertained to that pure nature. The body, for example, is of this lower
nature, and in comparison with it, the soul is supernatural. Again, our
souls are of the higher nature, which pertains to angels. In reference to
both the soul and the body, all divine things are supernatural as they are
superior to all corporeal and mental nature. How you say that "the image of
God in man is not nature but supernatural grace;" that is, as I think, it is
not of nature, but of grace, or not from nature, but from grace. Here
consider, my brother, the former ambiguity. "The image of God is not of
nature," if the lower or corporeal nature is referred to, is a true
statement, but if the higher nature is referred to, it is not a true
statement. For what is nature? It is the principle, ordained of God, of
motion and rest in its own natural subject, according to its own mode. Place
before your mind the kinds of motion, which occur in the lower nature,
generation, corruption, increase, diminution, alteration, local transition,
which they style fora &c. You will find this difference, that the subjects
of this lower nature experience these motions according to their own essence
and all other matters, that is, according to their material, form, and
accidents, but the subjects of that higher nature are moved by no means
according to their essence, but only according to their being; but that
divine things surpass both natures, in an infinite and divine mode, because
they are, in all respects, destitute of all motion. The body is mortal;
whence, if not from this inferior nature? The soul is immortal; whence, if
not from that superior nature? But both natures are ordained of God, and so
perform their work, immediately, that God performs, by both mediately, all
things which pertain to nature. But the image of God is from that superior
nature, by which God performs mediately in the children of Adam, as He
instituted our common nature in Adam, our first parent. It is indeed true,
that it was supernatural grace by which God impressed His own image on Adam;
just as he also performed the work of creation by the same grace. God
bestowed its principle not on nature, of nature, but of Himself; but when
nature has received its existence, that which existed by nature, was
produced by nature in the species and individuals. Though, in its first
origin, it is of grace, yet it is now, in its own essence, of nature, and is
to be called natural. But the image of God is produced, in the species and
in the individuals, by nature. Therefore, it must be called natural We shall
hereafter consider its definition, for it is necessary first to elucidate
the statement that "the image of God has reference, not to felicity, but to
supernatural life." Let us remove the ambiguity, as we shall thus speak more
correctly of these matters. Natural felicity pertains either to the nature
from which we have the body, or to that from which we have the spirit, or to
both natures united in a compound being. To this latter felicity the image
of God has, naturally, its reference; to that of the body as its essential
and intimately associated instrument; to that of the spirit, as its
essential subject; to that of the man, as the entire personal subject. If
you deny this, what is there, I pray you, in all nature, which does not seek
its own good? But, to every thing, its own good is its felicity. If, in this
lower nature, a stone, the herds, an animal, and, in that higher nature,
spirits and intelligent forms do this, surely it cannot be justly denied to
man, and to the image of God in man. You add that "it has reference to
supernatural life." This, however, is a life dependent on grace, as all the
adjuncts show. If you understand that it has reference to that life only, we
deny such exclusive reference. If to this (natural) life, and to that life
conjointly, we indeed affirm this, and assent to your assertion that the
image of God in man has respect to both kinds of felicity, both natural and
supernatural; by means of nature, in a natural mode, and of grace, in a
supernatural mode.
I would now explain this, in a more extended manner, if it was not necessary
that a statement should first be made of the subject under discussion.
Perceiving this very clearly, you pass to a definition of that image, in
proof of your sentiment. "It is evident," you say, "from the description of
the image of God, that supernatural grace, in man, is that divine image."
You will permit me to deny this, since you ask not my opinion. You add,
"According to the Scripture, it is ‘knowledge after the image of Him that
created him,’ (Col. iii. 10,) and righteousness and true holiness pertaining
‘to the new man which is created after God.’ (Ephes. v. 25)". I acknowledge
that these are the words of the apostle, and I believe them, but I fear my
brother, that you wander from his words and sentiment.
In the former passage, he does not assert that the image of God is
"knowledge after the image etc," but that the "new man is renewed in
knowledge after the image of him that created him." The subject of the
proposition is man, one in substance, but once "old," now "new." In this
subject there was old knowledge, there is new knowledge. According to the
subject, the knowledge is one, but it differs in mode; for the old man and
the new man understand with the same intellect, in the previous case as the
old, afterwards as the new man. What, therefore, is the mode of that
knowledge! "After the image of God." This is the mode of our knowledge and
intelligence. The former (that which is old) according to the image of the
first Adam who "begat a son in his own likeness;" (Gen. v. 3;) the latter
according to the image of the second Adam, Christ and God, our Creator. The
image of God is not said to be knowledge, but knowledge is said to be
renewed in us after the image of God. What, then, is knowledge? An act of
the image of God. What is the image of God? The fountain and principle of
action, fashioning in a formal manner, the action, or the habit of that
image. The mode, in which this may be understood, is a matter of no interest
to me. Consider, I pray you, and I appeal to yourself as a judge, whether
this can be justly called a suitable description; -- "The image of God is
knowledge according to the image of God." This description, indeed, denies
that the image of God is either one thing or another; either knowledge or
the image of God, if, indeed, knowledge is according to the image of God.
You will, however, understand these things better, from your own skill, than
they can be stated by me in writing. I now consider the other passage. "The
image of God is ‘ righteousness and true holiness’ pertaining ‘to the new
man, which is created after God."’ Here you affirm something more than in
the previous case, yet without sufficient truth. That knowledge, of which
you had previously spoken, is a part of truth, for it is the truth, as it
exists in our minds. Here you state that it is truth, and righteousness and
holiness. But let us examine the words of the apostle. He asserts, indeed,
that the new man is one "which after God is created in righteousness and
true holiness." I will not plead the fact that many explain the phrase
"after God," as though the apostle would say "by the power of God working in
us." I assent to your opinion that the words kata< Qeon mean simply the
same as would be implied in the phrase "to the image," or "according to the
image of God." Yet do you not perceive that the same order, which we have
just indicated, is preserved by Paul; and that the subject, the principle,
and the acts or habits, thereby inwrought, are most suitably distinguished?
The subject is man, who is the same person, whether as the old; or the new
man. The principle is the image of God, which is the same, whether old or
new, and purified from corruption. The acts or habits, inwrought by that
principle, are righteousness, holiness, and truth. Righteousness, holiness,
and truth are not the image, but pertain to the image. Let us return, if you
please, to that principle, which the Fathers laid down "natural things are
corrupt, supernatural things are removed." You may certainly, hence, deduce
with ease this conclusion; -- righteousness, holiness and truth are not
removed, therefore, they are not supernatural. Again, they have become
corrupt, therefore, they are natural. If they had been removed, none of
their elementary principles would exist in us by nature. But they do exist;
therefore, they are by nature, and are themselves corrupt, and, with them,
whatever originates in them. The same is the fact with the image of God. The
image of God is not removed; it is not, therefore, supernatural; and, on the
other hand, it has become corrupt; it is, therefore, natural. For it is
nowhere, in the Scriptures, said to be bestowed, but only to be renewed. I
shall offer proof, on this point, from the Scriptures, when I have made a
single remark. Righteousness, holiness, truth, exist only in the image of
God; there is, in man, some righteousness, holiness and truth; therefore,
there is in man somewhat of the image of God. Moses, in Genesis 1, certainly
relates nothing else than the first constitution of nature, as made in
reference to every subject and species. But he relates that man was made in
the image of God. This, then, was the constitution of human nature. But, if
it is of nature, then the image of God pertains universally to the human
race, since natural things differ from personal things in this, that they
are common. The same is evident from Gen. v. 3. Adam begat Seth "in his own
likeness," in his own image; but Adam was made in the image of God;
therefore he begat Seth in the image of God. It may be said, however, that
the image of God, and the image of Adam differ, and that a distinction is
made between them by Moses. They indeed differ, but in mode, not in their
essence; for the image of God in Adam was uncorrupted, in Seth it was
corrupted through Adam; yet in both cases it was the image. In the same
respect, this image, in the rest of the human race, is called according to
its corruption, the image of the earthy, according to its renewal, the image
of the heavenly. But since the image of God is diverse in mode only, and not
in essence, it is said to be renewed, and restored, and not to be implanted
or created, as we have before observed, as that which differs not in
essence, but in mode or degree. The same thing is taught in Gen. ix. 6.
"Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the
image of God made he man." If the image of God did not exist in the
descendants of Adam, who are slain, the argument of Moses would be
impertinent and absurd. But the argument, either of Moses or of God, is just
and conclusive; for if you say, -- "The slayer of him, whom God has made in
His own image, ought to be slain by man; God made the man who is slain in
his own image; therefore, let the murderer be slain by man." the argument is
valid. For since man was made in the image of God, it is just that his
murderer should be slain, and indeed that he should be slain by man. But if
you explain the passage "for in the image of God made He man," so that "He"
shall refer to man, my interpretation of the argument will be even more
confirmed. I do not, however, remember that it is affirmed any where in the
Scriptures that man made man, nor can it be proved to me. These things, I
think will be sufficient that you may see, my brother, that the image of God
is naturally in man.
What, then, is the image of God? For it is now time that we pass from
destructive to constructive reasoning. I will state it, in the words of the
orthodox Fathers. Let Tertullian, of the Latins, first speak (lib. 2 advers.
Marcion, cap. 9.) "The distinction is especially to be noticed, which the
Greek Scriptures make, when they speak of the afflatus, not of the Spirit,
(pnohn non pneu~ma) for some, translating from the Greek, not considering
the difference or regarding the proper use of words, substitute Spirit for
afflatus, and afford heretics an occasion of charging fault on the Spirit of
God, that is, on God Himself; and it is even now a vexed question. Observe,
then, that the afflatus is inferior to the Spirit, though it comes from the
Spirit, as its breath, yet it is not the Spirit. For the breeze is lighter
than the wind, and if the breeze is of the wind, the wind is not therefore,
of the breeze. It is usual also, to call the afflatus the image of the
Spirit; for thus also, man is the image of God, that is of the Spirit, for
God is Spirit, therefore, the image of the Spirit is the afflatus. Moreover
the image will never in all respects equal the reality; for to be according
to the truth is one thing, to be the truth itself is another. Thus, also,
the afflatus cannot, in such a sense, be equal to the Spirit, that, because
the truth—that is the Spirit, or God—is without sin, therefore the image, of
truth also, must be without sin. In this respect the image will be inferior
to the truth, and the afflatus will be inferior to the Spirit, having some
lineaments of the Deity, in the fact that the soul is immortal, free,
capable of choice, prescient to a considerable degree, rational, and capable
of understanding and knowledge. Yet, in these particulars, it is only an
image, and does not extend to the full power of divinity, and so, likewise,
it does not extend to sinless integrity, since this belongs alone to God,
that is to truth, and can not pertain to the mere image; for as the image,
while it expresses all the lineaments and outlines of the truth, yet is
destitute of force, not having motion, so the soul, the image of the Spirit,
is not able to exhibit its full power, that is, the felicity of freedom from
sin, otherwise it would be not the soul, but the Spirit, not man, endowed
with mind, but God, &c." Ambrose (hexaemeri lib. 6, cap. 7), after many
arguments, concludes in this way; "for ‘what will a man give in exchange for
his soul?’ in which there is, not merely a small portion of himself, but the
substance of the entire human race. It is this by which thou hast dominion
over other living creatures, whether beasts or birds. This is the image of
God, but the body is in the likeness of beasts; in one there is the sacred
mark of divine resemblance, in the other the vile fellowship with the herds
and wild beasts, &c." Also, in Psalm 118, sermon 10, "Likeness to the image
of God consists, not in the body, or in the material parts of our nature,
but in the rational soul; in respect to which man was made after the
likeness and image of God, and in which the form of righteousness, wisdom,
and every virtue is found."
To the same purpose are the words of Augustine, in his first Book "De Genes.
contra Manich," chap. 17th, and in many other places. I mention also Jerome,
because he evidently has the same view, and, in writing against Origen, he
uses the same argument with that of Epiphanius and the Greek Fathers. I
would refer to Basil, if you did not know that Ambrose quotes from him. Why
should I speak of Chrysostom, the two Gregories, Cyril, Theodouret?
Damascenus, an epitomist of all those writers, presents this subject, with
the greatest accuracy, in the book which he has inscribed "Concerning the
respect in which we were made in the image of God." Also, in another, which
has reference to "The two wills in Christ," in which he uses the following
words, "as to the rational, and intellectual, and voluntary powers, they
belong to the mind at birth, and the Spirit is superadded, as having
princely prerogative, and in these respects both angels and men are after
the image of God, and this is abundantly true of men, &c.," in which passage
he has, with the utmost diligence, introduced those things which are
essential and those which are adjunct.
I conclude with a single argument from Augustine against the Manichees.
"Those men," he says, "do not know that it is not possible that nature
should use any action, or produce any effect, the faculty for which has not
been received according to nature. For example, no bird can fly, unless it
has received the faculty of flying, according to nature, and no beast of the
earth can walk, unless it has received the faculty of walking, according to
nature. So, likewise, man cannot act or will, unless he has received,
according to nature, that faculty, which is called the "voluntary," and the
"energetic;" and he cannot understand if he has not received from nature the
intellectual faculty, and he cannot see, or perform any other action, and,
therefore, in every kind of nature, natural actions find place, and they
exist at once and together, but those which depend on the will and activity,
do not exist together." From which reasoning he infers that man understands,
reasons, wills, and, above other creatures, does many things which savour of
divinity; therefore, many faculties exist in man, in respect to which he is
said, in the Scriptures, to have been made in the image and likeness of God.
Here then is that image of God, in our soul; its essential parts not only
show, of themselves, some resemblance, by nature, to divinity, but are, by
nature and grace together, adapted to the perception of supernatural grace,
as we shall soon show. You add that "all the fathers, seem, without
exception, to be of the sentiment that man was created in a gracious state.
So also our Catechism, ques. 6." I have, indeed, known no one among orthodox
divines, who holds any different opinion; nor is there any other correct
explanation of our catechism.
But you seem to fall into an error from a statement, which is susceptible of
a two-fold interpretation, and to unite things really distinct. For it is
not meant that the first man was created with grace, that is, that he
received, in the act of creation, nature and supernatural grace; but this is
their meaning: the man who was first created, received grace, that is,
supernatural grace, as an additional gift—which idea we have before
presented in this answer. What then? Did he not have supernatural grace in
creation? If you understand, by grace, the good will of God, he had grace;
if you understand supernatural gifts, bestowed upon him, then he did not
have those things, which are supernatural, from creation, or by the force of
creation, since creation is the principle of nature, or its first term, but
supernatural things entirely differ from it; but he had them in creation,
that is, in that first state of creation in which Adam was until he fell
into sin. That you may more easily understand the subject, let us use the
illustration of the sun and moon, to explain the divine image. The moon has
an essential image, and one which is relative and accidental. As its image
is essential, it has its own light in some degree; yet it would be darkened,
unless it should look towards the sun; as its image is relative, it has
light borrowed from the sun, while it is looked upon by it, and looks to it.
So, there was, in man, a two-fold relation of the image of God, even from
the creation. For man had his own essential light fixed in the soul, which
shines as the image of God among created things; he had also a relative
light, as he was looked upon by God, and looked back to God. The essential
image is natural; the relative image was, so to speak, supernatural, for it
looked to God, through nature joined to grace, by a peculiar and free motion
of the will; God looked upon it, of grace, (for, what action of God towards
us is natural?) We have that essential light, corrupted by sin; it is plain
that we have not lost it. We have lost the relative light; but Christ
restores this, that we may be renewed, after God, in his own image, and that
the essential light may be purified, since natural things are corrupted, the
supernatural are lost, as we have previously said.
Your second argument is stated thus: "Since there is found, in the
Scriptures, no reference to the love of God according to election, no divine
volition, and no act of God, concerning men, referring to them in different
respects, until after the entrance of sin into the world, or after it was
considered as having entered." If I should concede this, yet the sentiment
of those, who say that man is considered, in general, by the Deity, would
not, therefore, be confuted, as we have before shown. But I may, perhaps, be
able to disprove this assertion by authority, by reason, and by example. You
have authority in Romans ix. 11-13. "For the children being not yet born,
neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, according to
election, might stand, not of works, but of Him that calleth; it was said
unto her, The elder shall serve the younger; as it is written, Jacob have I
loved, but Esau have I hated." What do those three phrases indicate "the
children being not yet born;" again, "neither having done any good or evil;"
and "according to election, not of works, but of Him that calleth." You will
say, "these expressions are according to truth; but they have reference to
fallen and sinful nature." But they exclude, with the utmost care, all
reference to sin and refer all blessing to the sole vocation of God, who
calleth, as even yourself, my brother, if you are willing to observe it,
(and you certainly are thus willing,) may easily deduce from that
proposition. To this authority you will certainly submit every semblance of
reasoning. (Ephes. i. 4, 5,) "He hath chosen us in Him before the foundation
of the world, having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by
Jesus Christ to Himself."
Election originates in special love; and when He is said to have chosen us
in Christ, all reference to ourselves is excluded; predestination also
precedes both persons and cases relating to them. Indeed this is indicated
by the words "foreknow" and "predestinate," (Rom. 8). Christ himself
attributes to the blessing of the Father only that they were made possessors
of the kingdom, "from the foundation of the world," (Matt. 30). In sin, or
previous to sin? In view of sin, or without reference to it? Why should the
former be true, I ask, rather than the latter? Why indeed, should not the
latter rather, since all things are said to depend on God, who calleth? To
these, let the following considerations be added:
1. Whatever absurdity may be connected with this subject, you will perceive,
(if you examine it closely,) that it pertains as much to the former
interpretation, and rather more to it than to the latter. This absurdity is
not to be passed by, but rather to be religiously and suitably removed.
2. I deny that a reference to sin belongs to the matter of filial adoption.
I call nature as a witness: Does not a father beget sons, before he
investigates or observes what shall be their condition? But this generation,
(namely that of the children of God), is of will and not of nature. True:
yet it is attributed to the will of God alone, not to any condition in us.
Every condition in us is excluded, even that of sin; the will of God, alone,
His purpose, alone, is considered in the matter. God distinguishes by His
mere will among those equal in nature, equal in sin; whom, considered in
their natural condition simply, not in that of sin, but generally in Christ,
He adopts as His children. As in nature, children are begotten without
reference to their future condition, so God, of His own will, adopted from
eternity His own children.
3. Whatever is more consistent with the wisdom and grace of God, would be
performed by the Deity, and is to be believed by us, rather than that which
is less consistent. But it is more consistent with His wisdom and grace that
He should adopt unto Himself children without any consideration of
character, than that He should do so on the supposition of such
consideration; otherwise nature would act more perfectly than God, as
according to nature, fathers beget children, without such consideration.
Therefore, the former view is more consistent with the character of God, and
rather to be received with faith by us.
As an example, for the confirmation of this matter, we will take, if you
please, that of the Angels. Whoever are the sons of God, are sons by
election. Angels are the sons of God, (Job 1, 2, & 37,) therefore, they are
such by election, as Paul affirms (1 Tim. v. 21,) when he calls them "the
elect." But they are elect without consideration of their sins, as they did
not sin, but remained in their original condition.
Therefore, the love of God is with election, without
reference to sin, or consideration of it, which you seem to
deny in your assertion. Perhaps you will say that your assertion had
reference only to men. But I reply, that love and election are spoken of in
relation both to angels and men, and in the same manner, since God placed,
in both, his own image, in reference to which election is made. The most
decisive proof of this is found in the principle that, if any act which
apparently exists in reference to two things, which have the same relation,
does not really exist in reference to one, it does not exist in reference to
the other. In the election of Angels, there is no reference to their
condition or their works; therefore, in the election of men there is no such
reference. If the condition of Angels and of men is, in some respects,
different, it does not follow that the mode of their election is different;
especially when the relation of that thing, in reference to which they are
chosen, is the same in both cases. This is the image of God, which,
preserved or restored according to His own will, he has called and united to
Himself, which will remain immutably in Christ, "gathering together in one
all things," (Ephes. i. 10,) and which he had placed on the common basis of
his own nature, from which, those, who were to be damned according to His
judgment, fell of their own will.
It is not possible to adduce any other example; because all other things are
created in a different relation. For they are destitute of the image of God,
in which consists, with suitable limitations, the object of election.
Therefore, the nature of the divine election, made concerning men, can be
illustrated by the example of angels, and by no other example. But the
divine election was such, not that it separated, at first, the Angels who
sinned from those who did not sin, but that, of His own will and grace, he
distinguished those who were not about to sin, as previously elected and
predestinated to adoption, from others who were about to sin of their own
free will. What reason, then, is there that we should think that another
mode of the divine election must be devised in reference to men?
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TENTH PROPOSITION
I apply the term natural to whatever pertains to the substance and existence
of man, without which man cannot exist. Such are the soul and the body, and
the whole system compounded of them, with all natural attributes,
affections, passions, &c. I apply the term supernatural to whatever God has
bestowed on man above and in addition to those natural characteristics,
which indeed pertain to the perfection of man, not in respect to his animal
nature, but in respect to his spiritual nature, to the acquisition not of
natural, but of supernatural good. I apply the phrase "merely natural," in
this place, to that which has nothing supernatural added to it. The sense
then of my words is that man is not made in a merely natural state, without
supernatural endowments.
I do not here contend, with much strenuousness, whether he has those
supernatural endowments from the act of creation or from another act of
superinfusion, but leave this without decision, as neither useful or
injurious to my cause. But I decidedly state and affirm, that God decreed to
make man such by nature, as he in fact did make him; but such, that He might
add to him some supernatural endowments, as He not only wished that he might
be such as he was by nature, but He wished also to advance him further to a
happier state, namely, to a participation of Himself, to which he could not
attain, unless endowed with supernatural gifts. But when I deny that man was
made in a merely natural state, and, therefore, was created with
supernatural gifts, I wish not to indicate that the act, by which
supernatural endowments are communicated, was creation, (for in my 26th
proposition I have called that act superinfused Grace,) but that God was
unwilling to cease from the act of communicating His blessing to that part
of primitive matter or Nothing from which He created man, and that of His
own decree, until he should also have bestowed those supernatural gifts upon
him. I thought that I ought to observe the mode of expression, used in the
Scripture, which declares that man was created "in the image and likeness of
God," which image and likeness of God comprehends in itself also
supernatural gifts. If this is true, as I contend, then man was created with
supernatural endowments. For he was made in the image of God, and the word
"made" is attributed, without distinction, to all parts of the image,
without separating that, in the image, which is natural from that which is
supernatural to man. I am glad to quote here the words of Jerome Zanchius,
who, in his first book concerning the creation of man, chapter 1, speaks
concerning this same matter in these terms;" I am pleased with the sentiment
of those, who say that with the inbreathing of life, there was also
inbreathed and infused by the Deity whatever Adam possessed of celestial
light, wisdom, rectitude, and other heavenly gifts; in which he reflects the
Deity, as His true image. For he was created such as the Scripture teaches,
affirming that he was made in the image of God, and Solomon in Eccl. vii.
29, "God made man upright." But he was not such when his body only was
formed. When, with a soul placed in him, he became a living soul, that is a
living man, that he was made upright, just, &c., and thus, at the same time
with his soul, rays also of divine wisdom, righteousness, and goodness were
infused." Thus Zanchius, who clearly decides what I left without decision in
either direction, and this for a twofold reason; I knew that it was a matter
of dispute among the learned, and I perceived that nothing could be deduced
from it either of advantage or disadvantage to my cause.
Those supernatural gifts, which were bestowed on man, he received for
transmission to posterity, on the terms, on which he received them, namely,
of grace, not as this word denotes the principle of natural endowments, for
from grace, understood in its widest sense, we have received even our
nature, as that to which we had no claim, but as it is used in
contra-distinction to nature, and as it is the principle of supernatural
gifts. I can then concede that God had reference to man in nature, as the
subject of grace, the natural man as the subject of supernatural gifts; but
that He had reference to him, contemplated in the administrative decree of
creation, not in the decree of predestination, which we have now under
discussion; as the subject of grace sufficient for supernatural felicity,
not of effectual grace, of which we now dispute; as the subject of
supernatural gifts, to be transmitted to his posterity, without exception,
according to the arrangement of grace, and without any condition, not of
such gifts as are peculiar to those, who are predestinated, and to be
bestowed, with certainty and infallibly, upon them, in reference to which is
the controversy between us.
Hence, these things are not opposed to my sentiment, for in them the fallacy
of ignoratio elenchi is committed. I wish, however, that you would always
remember that I speak constantly concerning the grace, prepared in the
decree of predestination, and in no other decree. But I have proved that man
was not made in a merely natural state, in the sense, as I have already
stated, of a destitution of supernatural endowments, whether he is said to
have them by the act of creation, or by the act of superinfusion; and I have
proved it by an argument, deduced from the image and likeness of God in
which man was created. Which argument is valid, whether the image of God
signifies only supernatural gifts, bestowed on man by the Deity, as our
Catechism and Confession, and some of our theologians affirm in reference to
the image of God, or nature itself, together with those supernatural gifts,
which is my opinion; according to which I wish that my affirmation, that
"the image of God in man is not nature, but supernatural grace," should be
understood, that is, that it is not nature alone, apart from supernatural
endowments, which is sufficient for any argument. For the question is not
concerning natural qualities, and therefore, the decision of the point
whether they belong to the image of God, according to my opinion, or not,
does not affect the subject of inquiry. Let supernatural qualities be
embraced in the definition of the image of God, in which man was made, and I
have obtained what I desire.
I also wish that my subsequent remarks should be understood in the same
manner, namely, that the image of God, has respect, not to natural felicity
only, but to supernatural, and if that is true, as you seem to concede, I
have attained my object. I did not wish to define with accuracy the image of
God in which man was made, since this was not necessary to my purpose: it
was sufficient to have shown that "knowledge, righteousness, and holiness"
pertained also to the image of God, whether that image consisted wholly or
only in part in them. For either of these statements would be equally
available for my purpose, as I had undertaken to prove that man was not
created without supernatural endowments, and therefore that he could not
have been considered, in the decree of predestination, as created in a
merely natural state, without supernatural endowments. But, before I come to
the defense of my argument on this point, I must speak, at somewhat greater
length, of three things, in considering which, a considerable part of your
answer is occupied. First. I will explain more fully than I have before
done, what I call natural, and what, supernatural qualities. Secondly. I
will speak of the image of God, and what things, whether natural or
supernatural, are embraced in it, and in its definition. Thirdly, by what
action of the Deity, man has both the former, and the latter qualities.
First; I call those qualities natural which pertain to the nature of man,
without which man cannot be man, and which have their source in the
principles of nature, and are prepared, by their own nature, for natural
felicity, as their end and limit: such are the body, the soul, the union of
both, and that which is made up of both, and their natural attributes,
affections, functions, and passions; under which I also comprehend moral
feelings, which are sometimes spoken of in contradistinction to those which
are natural. I call those qualities supernatural which are not a part of
man, and do not originate in natural principles, but are superadded to
natural principles, for the increase and perfection of nature, designed for
supernatural felicity, and for a supernatural communion with God, our
Creator, in which that felicity consists.
Between these, exists a natural relation of this character, that natural
qualities may receive the addition of supernatural, by the arrangement of
God, and that supernatural qualities are adapted for adding to, adorning and
perfecting nature, and are therefore ordained for exalting it above itself.
Hence, without ambiguity, under the term natural, I have comprehended nature
both corporeal and spiritual, and that which is composed of both. It is,
however, to be carefully observed—that ambiguities of words are to be
noticed and explained, in a discussion, when, if taken in one sense, they
favour any view, and, if in the other, they do not, when, according to one
sense, a statement is true, and, according to the other, is false. But when
the statement is true, and pertinent to the subject, in whatever sense a
word is taken, there is no need of an explanation of the ambiguity. Thus, in
this case, you observe that I understand, by natural qualities, both those
which pertain to the inferior nature, that is, to the body, and those which
pertain to the superior nature, that is, to the soul, and in whatever mode
you take it, my argument is equally strong and valid. We shall hereafter
notice examples of equally unnecessary reference to ambiguity.
Secondly; two things must be considered in reference to the image of God in
man, in what things does it consist, and which of them may be called
material, and which supernatural?
I affirm that the image of God in man embraces all those things which
represent in man any thing of the divine nature, which are partly essential:
yet God did not wish that the images of all of them should be essential to
man, whom He wished to create, in such a condition, not only that he might
be that which he was, but that he might have the capability of becoming that
which he was not, and of failing to be that which he was. I call essential
the soul, and in it the intellect, and will, and the freedom of the will,
and other affections, actions, and passions, which necessarily result from
them. I call accidental both the moral virtues, and the knowledge of God,
righteousness and true holiness, and whatever other attributes of the Deity
exist, to be considered in Him as essential to his own nature, but in man as
an express image, of which under the term "divine nature," Peter says, that
believers are "partakers." 2. I do not think that all these things can be
comprehended under the term natural, but I think that "knowledge,
righteousness and true holiness," are supernatural, and are to be called by
that name. I am in doubt whether I have your assent to this affirmation. For
in one part of your answer, you say that those are natural qualities, and
present arguments in support of that view, and in another place, in the same
answer, you acknowledge that Adam had supernatural gifts though not from the
act of creation: by which supernatural qualities, I know not what you can
understand, except those things which are mentioned by the apostle in
Colossians 3, and Ephesians
4. Yet you seem to set forth under the term reflexive image, those very
things which you acknowledge to be supernatural. But, whether I rightly
understand your sentiment or not, I will speak of those things which, I
think, tend to confirm my sentiment, and to refute your view, as I
understand it.
I prove, then, that those qualities are supernatural. First, from Colossians
3, and Ephesians 4. Whatever things we have, from regeneration, by the
spirit of Christ, are supernatural. But we have, from regeneration, by the
Spirit of Christ, "the knowledge of God, righteousness and true holiness."
Therefore, they are supernatural. If any one says that we do not have them,
in substance, from regeneration, but only a renewal of the same qualities,
which had previously been made corrupt, I do not see how that assertion can
be proved. For the phrases of the apostle teach another doctrine. For he who
must "put on the new man," is not clothed with the "new man," or with any
part of him. But to the new man, pertain "righteousness and true holiness."
Then, in the case of him, who must be "renewed in knowledge," it is not his
knowledge which has become corrupt and must be renewed, but his
intelligence, which must be enlightened with new knowledge, which has been
utterly expelled by the darkness of the old man. I designed this, only, in
my argument, and not to define the image of God in man. But I cannot see
that I differ from the view of the apostle in my explanation. For the
knowledge of God, in the passage quoted by me, is the "image of God" itself,
and "after the image of God." Nor are these expressions at variance with
each other, nor are they so absurd as you wish them to appear. You say "the
image of God is knowledge, according to the image of God, therefore, the
image of God is denied to be either knowledge or image." I deny this
sequence if the definition is rightly understood, namely, in the following
manner. The image of God, renewed in us by the regenerating Spirit, is the
knowledge of God, according to the image of God, in which, at the beginning,
we were created. This image has a two-fold relation, in that it is created
anew in us by the Spirit of Christ, and that it was formerly created in us
by the Spirit of God. That knowledge differs not only in mode, but in its
whole nature, from the knowledge of the old man: nor is it said to be
renewed, but the man is said to be renewed in it. But I confess that I
cannot understand how knowledge is an act of the image of God, and how that
image is the fountain or principle of that act, that is of knowledge. For I
have hitherto thought that man was said to be created in or to the image of
God, that is, because, in mind, will, knowledge of God, righteousness and
finally holiness, he refers to God Himself, as the archetype. In the other
passage from Ephesians 4, I do not find the three characteristics, "truth,
righteousness and holiness," but only two, righteousness and holiness, to
which is ascribed truth, that is, sincerity, purity, simplicity. Knowledge,
also, is not a member or portion of that truth, but a gift, created in the
intellect or mind of man, as righteousness and holiness are ingenerated in
the will, or rather the affections of man.
Secondly, I prove that the same qualities are supernatural in this way.
Those things, according to which we are, and are said to be, partakers of
the divine nature, and the children of God, are supernatural: but we are,
and are said to be partakers of the divine nature, and children of God,
according to knowledge, righteousness and holiness; therefore, these are
supernatural. The Major does not need proof. The Minor is evident from a
comparison of the first, second, third, and fourth verses of 2 Peter 1.
Thirdly, those things which have their limit in supernatural felicity, are
supernatural; but the knowledge of God, righteousness and holiness are such;
therefore, they are supernatural.
Fourthly, the immediate causes of supernatural acts are supernatural. But
the knowledge of God, righteousness and holiness, are the immediate causes
of supernatural acts: therefore they are supernatural. I now come to your
arguments, in which you attempt to show that the image of God in man is
natural, and that those qualities, knowledge, righteousness and holiness,
are natural, not supernatural.
Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were removed, natural
qualities were corrupted. But truth, righteousness, holiness, were not
removed, they were corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but
natural. Your first argument is this: Supernatural qualities were removed,
natural qualities were corrupted. But truth, righteousness, holiness, were
not removed, they were corrupted; therefore, they are not supernatural, but
natural. Your Minor is defended thus. The principles of these qualities are
in us by nature; they would not be, if they had been removed. I reply—that I
admit the Major; but the Minor does not seem at all probable to me, not even
by the addition of that reason. For, I affirm that the knowledge which is
according to piety, the righteousness and the holiness, of which the apostle
speaks, were not corrupted, but removed, and that none of the principles of
those qualities remain in us after the fall. I acknowledge that the
principles and seeds of the moral virtues, which have some analogy and
resemblance to those spiritual virtues, and that, even those moral virtues
themselves, though corrupted by sin, remained in us after the fall. It is
possible that this resemblance may mislead him who does not accurately
discriminate between these moral and those spiritual virtues. In support of
this sentiment, in which I state that those gifts were taken away, I have
the declaration of the Catechism, in the answer to question nine, in these
words:
"Man deprived himself and all his posterity, of those divine gifts." But an
explanation of the nature of those divine gifts is given in the sixth
question, namely, "righteousness and holiness." I know not but that I have
the support of your own declaration on this point. For in the eighteenth of
your Theses, Concerning Original Sin, discussed in 1594, are these words:
"For, as in Adam the form of human integrity was original righteousness, in
which he was made by God, so the form of corruption, or rather of deformity,
was a deprivation of that righteousness."
In the nineteenth Thesis, "The Scripture calls the form, first mentioned,
the image and likeness of God." In the twentieth Thesis, "The Scripture
calls the latter form, the image and likeness of Adam." If I rightly
understand these expressions, I think that it plainly follows from them that
original righteousness was removed, and that it is, therefore, supernatural,
according to the rule "supernatural qualities were removed; natural
qualities were corrupted." I have also, in my favour, most, perhaps all, of
the Fathers. Ambrose, in reference to Elijah and his fasting, chap. 4th,
says, "Adam was clothed with a vesture of virtues before his transgression,
but, as if denuded by sin, he saw himself naked, because the clothing, which
he previously had, was lost," and again in the seventh book of his
commentary on the 10th chapter of that gospel, marking, more clearly, the
distinction between the loss of supernatural qualities and the corruption of
natural ones, he speaks thus: "Who are thieves if not the angels of night
and of darkness? They first despoil us of the garments of spiritual grace,
and then inflict on us wounds." Augustine, (De Trinitate, lib. 14, cap. 16,)
says, "Man, by sinning, lost righteousness and true holiness, on which
account, this image became deformed and discoloured; he receives them again
when he is reformed and renewed." Again, (De civit. Dei. lib. 14, cap. 11)
he affirms that "free-will was lost." To conclude this part of the
discussion, I ask what were those spiritual qualities, which were renewed or
lost, if not the knowledge of God, righteousness and holiness.
Another argument, adduced by you, is this: "Whatever belongs to the species
is natural; But the image of God belongs to the species; Therefore it is
natural." I answer, the Major is not, in every case, true. For a quality may
pertain to the species either by a communication through nature or natural
principles, or by an arrangement of grace. That, which, in the former, not
in the latter, pertains to the species, is natural. In reference to the
Minor, I affirm that the image of God pertains to the species, partly
through nature, partly of grace; therefore the image of God in man is partly
through nature, partly of grace; therefore, the image of God in man is
partly natural, partly supernatural. If you make any other inference, you
deduce a general conclusion from a particular proposition, which is not
valid. If an addition be made to your Major, so that, in its full form, it
should stand thus:
"Whatever is produced in the species, and its individuals, by nature, is
natural," I will admit it as a whole. But in that case, the Minor would not
be wholly true. For the image of God is not promised in us wholly by nature,
for that part of it which is in truth and righteousness, and holiness, is
produced in us by nature, but is communicated by an act of grace, according
to the arrangement of grace. But it is objected that the image cannot be
common, if it is not natural. For natural qualities differ, in that they are
common, from those which are personal, (the question refers not to
supernatural qualities). I answer a thing is common in a two-fold sense,
either absolutely, according to nature, or conditionally, according to the
arrangement of grace. The image of God is common in part according to nature
and absolutely, in those things which belong to man according to his
essence, and which cannot be separated from his nature, and in part
conditionally, according to the arrangement of grace, in those things which
pertain not to the essence but to the supernatural perfection of man. The
former are produced in all men absolutely, the latter conditionally, namely
that he should preserve those principles, which are universal to the
species, and particular to the individual, uncorrupted. Therefore, the whole
image is common, but partly by nature, and partly of the arrangement of
grace; by nature, that part, which is called natural; according to the
arrangement of grace, that part which I call supernatural. This, also, is
according to the declaration of the Scripture that Seth was begotten in the
image and likeness of Adam, not in the image of God. He was indeed begotten
in the image of God, not as God communicated it, in its integrity, to Adam,
but as Adam maintained it for himself. But Adam maintained it for himself
not in its integrity, therefore, he communicated it in that condition. But
that, which is in its integrity, and that, which is not in its integrity,
differ, not only in mode and degree, but also in some of the essential parts
of that image, which are possessed by the image, in its integrity, and are
wanting to the image, not in its integrity, which Adam had originally, by a
complete communication from God, and of which Seth was destitute on account
of the defective communication from Adam.
Your third argument is this: "The image of God is not said to be produced or
created in us, but to be renewed or restored, therefore, it was not lost or
removed, but corrupted."
I answer—Neither part of your assumption is, in a strict sense, true; with
suitable explanation, both parts are true, but neither of them is against my
sentiment. I will prove the former assertion, namely, that neither part of
the assertion is true. We are said to be "new creatures in Christ" and "to
be created to good works." David prayed that God would "create" within him
"a clean heart." The image of God is nowhere said to be restored and renewed
within us, but as we are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of
God," "to be renewed in the spirit of our mind," and "to be transformed by
the renewing of our mind." Yet, with suitable explanation, both parts of the
assumption are true, but they are very favourable to my sentiment, as I will
show. There are in us, in respect to ourselves, two parts of the image of
God, one essential, the other accidental to us. The essential part is the
soul, endowed with mind, affection and will. The accidental is the knowledge
of God, righteousness, true holiness, and similar gifts of spiritual grace.
The former are not said to be produced or created in us, because it was
deformed and corrupt. The latter is not said to be restored or renewed in
us, because, from a defect in the subject, it has no place in us and not
because it was not corrupt and deformed, but it is said to be produced and
created in us, (for we are called, on its access, new creatures,) because it
resembles a mold, by the use of which, that essential part is restored and
renewed. The words of the apostle plainly set forth this idea, in which it
is affirmed not that the knowledge, referred to, is renewed, but that we, as
partakers of the image of God so far as it is essential to us, are said to
be renewed in knowledge, as in a new mold, according to the image of God, so
far as it is accidental to us. Both parts, then, of the antecedent are true.
For the image of God is restored and renewed in us, namely, our mind and
will, and the affections of the soul; and the image of God is produced and
created in us, namely, the knowledge of God, righteousness, and true
holiness. The former is the subject of the latter; the latter is the form,
divinely given to the former. Therefore, also, the argument of Moses in
commanding the murderer to be slain, is valid. For in man, even after
transgression, the image of God remained, so far as it was essential to him,
or that part remained, which pertained to the essence of man, though the
part, which was accidental, is removed through sin.
We now discuss the action of the Deity, by which we have both the natural
and the supernatural part of the image of God. I have not made any
distinction in the act, both because I wished to use the phraseology of
Scripture, according to which the word creation signifies the act by which
man has in himself, the image and likeness of God, for it speaks thus:
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness," and "so God created man
in his own image," and because both parts equally well answered my purpose.
But, if the subject is considered with accuracy, I think that a distinction
is to be made in those acts, and that one is rightly termed creation, by
which man received natural qualities, the other, superinfusion, by which he
received the supernatural. For life in man is two-fold, animal and
spiritual; animal, by which he lives according to man, spiritual, by which
he lives according to God. Of the former, the principle is the soul in man,
endowed with intellect and will; of the latter, the principle is the Spirit
of God, communicating to the soul those excellent gifts of knowledge,
righteousness, and holiness. It is probable that the principles of these
kinds of life, each so diverse from the other, were bestowed on man, not by
the same, but by a different act. But it is not important to my sentiment to
decide in what mode, whether by a two-fold or a single act of God, man had
these qualities, only let it be understood that he had both the former and
the latter, before God was employed concerning him in the act of
predestination; that is, he had them in respect to the divine consideration.
I make the statement in general terms, because those things, both natural
and supernatural, were conferred on the whole species, the former
absolutely, the latter on the condition that the species should preserve to
itself that principle. Hence, I conclude, if it was conferred on the
species, then it was conferred by a decree of providence, in
contra-distinction to predestination; if it was conferred conditionally, it
was not conferred by a decree of predestination, by which no gift is
conditionally conferred. It is now evident from this that my argument is
valid. For if man was created by God, under this condition, that he should
have, not only natural, but also supernatural gifts, either by the same act
of creation, or by the additional act of superinfusion, (in reference to
which I have never contended,) it follows, then, that God, in the acts of
predestination and reprobation, which separate men, could not have reference
to men, as considered in a merely natural state. You also seem, afterwards,
to concede this, that man had supernatural endowments, even in his primitive
state, but as an increment to nature, and not from the act of creation,
which is the principle of nature. This I concede, and from it make this
inference, since those things, which the first man had, were possessed by
all his posterity in him, (for all which he was, we also were in him,
according to the 40th Thesis of your disputation concerning Original Sin,
previously cited,) the former, of nature, the latter, of the arrangement of
grace, it follows that God could not, in the decree under discussion, have
reference to man, considered in a merely natural state, nor indeed, to man,
considered with supernatural endowments, for a being of such character could
not be passed by, or at least was not passed by, except from the fact that
it was foreseen that he would lose those supernatural endowments by
transgression and sin.
Your assertion that these statements, however true they may be, are not
opposed to that sentiment, which considers man in general, is valid, if it
is proved that man was, or could be considered universally by God in the act
of decree. But I think that my arguments are valid, also, against that
sentiment. For if God could not consider man in a merely natural state, if
not with supernatural endowments, if not without sin, regarding him as the
object of the acts of predestination and reprobation, then also he could not
consider the same being in a general sense. For a general consideration is
excluded by the necessary consideration of any particular circumstance,
which becomes the formal relation (ratio) of the object, apart from which
formal relation God could not consider man, when He was acting in reference
to man in that decree. Besides, how can the general consideration yet have
place, when a circumstance, which that general consideration comprehends
within itself, is excluded.
If what you say concerning "the essential and the relative image" has this
meaning, that the essential image comprehends truth and righteousness, and
holiness, and yet is entirely natural to man, as may be deduced from some
things alleged by you, then I affirm distinctly, that I cannot oppose it;
indeed, I think that I can prove the contrary. But if you apply the phrase
"essential image" to all which man has, essential to himself, according to
the image of God, I admit it. Then the "respective" image will embrace what
I call supernatural and accidental. But, as these things, with the premises
which I have laid down, do not tend to refute my sentiment, I proceed to the
remainder of my argument.
My second argument is this, that no love of God according to election, or
divine volition regarding human beings variously, or divine actions varying
in reference to them, is found after sin entered into the world, or after it
was considered as having entered. But if this argument is valid, it also
refutes the sentiment, which states that man was considered "in general."
For if there is no divine election and reprobation of men except after the
entrance of sin into the world, then man is considered, not "in general,"
but particularly, in reference to the circumstance of sin. But you plead
"authority, reason, and example." You plead "authority" from three passages
of Scripture, Romans 9, Ephesians 1, and Matthew 25. Neither of these is
opposed to my view, since I do not deny that election and reprobation were
made from eternity, and do not say that sin was the cause of the decree, but
a condition requisite in its object. The passage in Romans 9, is not adverse
to me; first, because Jacob and Esau had been already conceived in sin, when
those words were addressed to Rebecca, as is evident from the text. The
affirmative, that they had done neither good nor evil, is to be understood
in reference to the distinction which might be made between them, as is
explained by Augustine in many places. The apostle then denies all reference
to sin, namely, to that by which any distinction might be made between them,
not to that, of which they were both equally guilty. Secondly, because he
attributes all things to the vocation of God, who calleth, which is of
mercy, and has reference only to sinners. Thirdly, because the "purpose of
God, according to election" which states, "not of works," is a gracious
purpose in Christ, to the promise of which reference is made in Romans iv.
16 "it is of fruit, that it might be by grace, to the end the promise might
be sure to all the seed," that is, of faith of, or in Christ, which pertains
only to sinners, for he, who has not sinned, does not need faith in Christ,
since he obtains righteousness, and thereby life, by the laws. Let this,
then, be the answer in reference to this passage, if it is to be understood
of Esau and Jacob in their own persons, without any typical meaning. But the
meaning of that passage is far different, as could be proved, if it were
necessary.
I come, now, to the passage cited from Ephesians 1. That passage is so far
from being opposed to my sentiment that I shall hereafter use it as a strong
argument in my favour. Election is here said to be "from eternity;" I grant
it. It is said to have been made "in Christ;" I acknowledge it. It is said
to be "unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ;" I consent to it. I do
not, however, see that either of these statements is opposed to the idea,
that sin is a condition, requisite in the object of election and
reprobation. It is true that any reference to ourselves, as a cause of our
own election, is denied. Predestination precedes persons, in respect to
their actual existence, not as they are considered by the Deity. It refers
to causes, before they actually exist, but not before they are foreseen by
God from eternity, though, in the foresight of God, they exist, not as the
causes of predestination, but as a condition requisite in the object. In
Matthew 25, the blessed of the Father, who shall possess the kingdom
prepared for them of the mere benediction of God, are spoken of. But that
benediction is in Christ, by which the malediction is removed, which even
the blessed themselves had deserved according to the prescience of God,
before they were blessed in Christ; and the kingdom, which was prepared for
them, by the blood of Christ, is a kingdom, to which they are raised from
the ignominy and slavery of sin. If you had thoroughly considered that,
which is really in controversy, you would not have thought that those
passages could be used effectually against me.
The reasons, adduced by you, are not more adverse to my opinion, for they
oppose the sentiment which makes sin the cause of the decree, not that which
makes it a condition, requisite in the object. I will examine them. To the
first, I answer that my sentiment, either as antecedent or consequent, is
not absurd, until it is proved to be so. Your second and third reasons
change the state of the question. For they exclude from that decree sin, as
a cause, on account of which God adopted children unto Himself, or in view
of which He made the decree; in reference to which there is no question. To
the second, I say, that the subject of discussion, here, is the adoption
made in Christ, which pertains to no one except by faith in Christ, to which
we are not begotten but begotten again by God. From this it is proved, that
the adoption is of sinners, and of sinners equally involved in sin, not of
men equal in nature. To the third, I answer; --
In the first place, we must judge from the word of God, what may be more,
and what may be less in accordance with the wisdom and grace of God. In the
second place, I affirm that it is equally in accordance with the wisdom and
grace of God, that He should adopt unto Himself sons from those who are not
sinners as from those who are sinners, and vice versa, if such should be His
choice. What you say in reference to "the supposition of such consideration"
is aside from the subject. In the third place, the wisdom and grace,
according to which God adopted children unto Himself from among men in that
"hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory, which
none of the princes of this world knew," which wisdom is "Christ crucified,
unto the Jews a stumbling-block,"—and that grace, is that which is joined
with mercy, bestowed on the sinner, and is in Christ. The latter tends far
more illustriously to the glory of God than grace, as used in
contradistinction to mercy, and so much the more, as he, who has deserved
evil, is more unworthy than he, who has deserved nothing, either good or
evil. It has been shown before, that the example of angels is not analogous,
but the reverse. For God determined to secure the salvation of men and of
angels in different modes. The relations, therefore, of predestination, in
the former, and in the latter case, are diverse. God stamped His own image
on both, but with a different condition, namely, that it should be preserved
in none, but restored in some, among men. God so tempered, as Augustine
says, the natures of angels and of men, that He might first show, in them,
what their own freewill could effect, then what should be the beneficial
influence of His grace, preserving in the case of angels, and restoring, in
the case of men. He showed in the case of angels, namely, grace in
contradistinction to mercy. He showed in men, the power of the latter grace,
namely, grace joined to mercy, and both of his own eternal purpose. Since,
then, He did, in men, what He did not in angels, and, in angels, what He did
not in men, and this from the decree of predestination, I conclude that
there is one relation of divine predestination in the case of angels, and
another in the case of men. Therefore, there is no love of God towards men,
according to election, without the consideration of sin. There was no
discussion between us in reference to angels, and, in my argument, express
mention was made of men; whatever, then, is proved concerning angels, has no
weight in the refutation of my argument.
_________________________________________________________________
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, of Election.
1. Election is said to have been made in Christ, who was ordained as
mediator for sinners, and was called Jesus, because He should save, not
certain individuals, considered merely in their nature, but "His people from
their sins." He is said to have been foreordained, and we in Him, and He, in
the order of nature and causes, before us. He was ordained as saviour, we,
as those to be saved. But in Christ, having such a character, and being
considered such as the Scripture describes him to us, man could not be
considered in a merely natural state. Much less, therefore, could he be
elected in Him.
2. Election is said to have been made of grace, which is distinguished from
nature in a two fold manner, both as the latter is pure and considered
abstractly, and as it is guilty and corrupt. In the former sense, it
signifies the progress of goodness towards supernatural good, to be imparted
to a creature naturally capable of it; in the latter sense, it signifies the
ulterior progress towards supernatural good to be communicated to man, as
corrupt and guilty, which is also, in the Scriptures, called mercy. In my
judgment, the term grace is used, in the latter sense, in the writings of
the apostles, especially when the subject of discussion is election,
justification, sanctification, &c. If this is true, then election of grace
was made of men considered, not in a "merely natural state, but in sin."
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
It is true, that election is made by God the Father in Christ the Mediator;
but that the Mediator was ordained, only for sinners, is not absolutely
true. Therefore, the inference is not valid. Indeed, should its truth be
conceded, yet it has no weight against those, who state that, in election,
reference was to man in general. But that the Mediator was ordained, not for
sinners alone—to say nothing of that Mediation, which is attributed to
Christ in creation and nature, "all things were made by Him; and without him
was not any thing made that was made. In Him was life; and the life was the
light of men." (John i. 3, 4,) "by whom also He made the worlds." (Heb. i.
2, &c.) -- I demonstrate most completely by a single argument.
Christ is Mediator for those, to whom He was, from eternity, given as Head
by the Father; -- He was given as Head by the Father to Angels and men;
therefore, he is the Mediator for both the latter and the former. But angels
did not sin; he was not, then, ordained Mediator for sinners only. Let us
discuss each point, if you please, separately, that we may more fully
understand the subject.
When we speak of the Head, we consider three things, according to the
analogy of nature; its position, by which, in fact, dignity, and authority,
it holds the first place in the whole body; its perfection, by which it
contains all the inward and outward senses, in itself, as their fountain and
the principle of motion; finally its power, by which all power, feeling,
motion and government is accustomed to flow from it to the other members.
According to this idea, Christ is indeed the Head, in common, of all created
things; the Head, I say, of superior nature, and of interior nature, and of
all those things which are in nature. We transcend this universal relation,
when we contemplate the Head, as appointed from eternity. Angels and men
are, after God, capable of eternity; and to both Christ was given eternally,
by the Father, as the Head, not only that they should exist forever, (which
is the attribute of spiritual nature) but also, and this is specially of
grace, that they should be forever heirs of eternal glory, as sons of God,
heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. The latter were ordained of God,
by the adoption of grace in Christ Jesus, all to one end, namely, to the
sight, the enjoyment, and announcement of the glory of God, and of them was
constituted the mystical body of Christ, the celestial church. Finally, as
in all this life, that is the head of a living creature, from which power,
feeling and motion flow into the members of the body, so in all that eternal
life, the body grows by the influence of Christ, its Head, and each of the
members obtain immutability of life, that is, eternity from this fact, that
they subsist in Christ, their Head, apart from whom they would be dissolved.
But Christ, is the Mediator by the relation in which he is the Head of
angels and men, for, as Head, he’ joins them to Himself; as Mediator, he
joins them to the Father. That Christ is Head and Mediator, is in fact, one
and the same thing, only that the divinity intervenes in the relation, since
He is called the Head, as to our relation to Himself; and Mediator as to our
relation to the Father. "But," it may be said, "he did not redeem the angels
as he redeemed us. This indeed is true; but Mediator and Redeemer differ
from each other, as genus and species. To angels, Christ is Mediator of
preservation and confirmation; but to us, he is Mediator, also, of
redemption and of preservation from that from which we have been redeemed.
So he is styled Mediator for both, though in a different mode. The Major,
then, of my syllogism is true, that "Christ is the Mediator of those to whom
he was appointed from eternity as their Head." But that He was appointed,
both to angels and men, as their Head, and therefore, as Mediator, is taught
by the apostle in Colossians 1, when he affirms of Christ that he "is the
image of the invisible God," that is, He represents God the Father, in his
word and work, chiefly to those whom the Father has given to him, as their
Head and Mediator; "the first born of every creature," namely, every one
whom God has, of His grace, predestinated to adoption, and begotten then,
that they might be His children; for there is a comparison of things which
are homogeneous, and so the passage is to be understood. Then, explaining
both those attributes, he subjoins, first, in general terms, "For by Him
were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth visible,
and invisible," (but he explains these things, to take away the plea of the
angel worshipers, whom he assails in this epistle,) "whether thrones or
dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were created by Him and
for Him, and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist;" and
then, with particular reference to the glorious body of which He is
precisely the Head and Mediator, "and He is the Head of the body, the
church," who, in the confirmation of grace is "the beginning," but in
redemption, is "the first-born from the dead," the common end of all, which
is "that in all things he might have the pre-eminence." The cause, is the
decree of the Father, predestinating His Son for the adoption of His
children, "for it pleased the Father that, in Him, should all fullness
dwell, and having made peace through the blood of His cross to reconcile all
things to Himself;" &c. He sets forth this idea still more clearly, when,
warning them from the worship of angels under the pretense of philosophy, he
says, "for in Him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily. And ye
are complete in Him, which is the Head of all principality and power," that
is, of angels to the worship of whom, they were solicited. For, of every one
soliciting them to the worshipping of angels, he afterwards affirms that
they do not hold the "Head, from which all the body, by joints and bands
having nourishment ministered and knit together, increaseth with the
increase of God." To the same purpose is Ephesians 1.
It is then to be stated, generally, that he was ordained to be Mediator for
sinners, but not for them only, since he is also Mediator for the angels,
who have maintained their original purity, but he is ordained as Redeemer
for sinners only. We may be able to express this very idea in another mode,
if we say that he was ordained Mediator, both for those, who could sin, that
they might not sin, and for those, who had sinned, that they might be saved
from their sins. Both modes of interpretation tend to the same result. The
same is the case with the name Jesus. But what need is there of many words?
We say that he was ordained as Mediator both for those who stood and for
those who fell, as Redeemer only for those who fell; for those who stood,
that they might remain, standing, and for those who fell, that they might
rise again, and remain standing. From which it follows, a mode of
argumentation, plainly the same, being preserved, that when election is said
to have been made in Christ, God had reference to man, considered generally,
as not yet created as created in a natural state, as standing and as having
fallen, but this is the same thing as being considered in a merely natural
state, which you deny. The same argument applies to what follows.
I come to your second argument. You say "Election is said to have been made
of grace," and further, that "grace is spoken of in a two-fold sense, when
it is used in opposition to nature, and that it is to be taken, in the
latter sense, in this argument," and you conclude that, "the election of
grace was made of men, considered not in a natural state, &c." Do you not
see, my brother, that your conclusion is unsound, involving the fallacy of
division, and that it is also equivocal? For, in the Major, grace is used
collectively or generally, but in the Minor distributively; in the former,
it is used simply, as to its essence, in the latter, an accident is taken
into account, namely, the different modes of the object, which do not affect
the essence of grace. Why shall we not rather argue in this manner? Election
is of grace; -- grace has reference to those, whom it establishes in good,
and to those whom, saved from evil, it restores to good; election, then, has
reference to the same. That, which is stated in general terms, should be
applied in general terms, for this, both nature and reason demand, unless
there is a positive restriction in the necessity of the subject, or there be
some limitation by an adjunct. That election is used in a general sense, is
most clearly evident from a comparison of angels and men. You say, that
grace is used, in the latter signification, in the writings of the Apostles
in this and similar arguments. This may be correct, but this is not affected
by a restriction of the term grace, which in God and of God, embraces all
things, but by a restriction of the object kata ti the restriction is in the
object, that is, in man, not in that which is added or granted to him. What,
if a farmer should command his servant to cultivate a field, which field
needed first to be cleared, then plowed, and lastly to be sowed, &c., would
you, then, restrict the word cultivate to one of these processes? That,
which is general or common, remains general or common, and its generality
may not be narrowed down by any particular relations of the object.
Therefore, as you see, this consequence, deduced from faulty reasoning, is
not valid, nor is that, which is stated in general terms, to be restricted
to particular circumstances.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF THE ELEVENTH PROPOSITION
The two arguments advanced by me, as they are most conclusive, so they
remain unaffected by your answers. I prove this, in reference to the first.
Its strength and force consists in this, that the election of men is said to
have been made in Christ, as the Mediator between God and sinful men, that
is as Reconciler and Redeemer, from which I argued thus: Whoever are elect
in Christ, as Mediator between God and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler
and Redeemer, they are considered by God, electing them, as sinners; -- But
all men, who are elect in Christ, are elect in Christ, as Mediator between
God and sinful men, that is, as Reconciler and Redeemer; Therefore, all men,
who are elect in Christ, are considered by God, electing them, as sinners.
The Major is plain. For, in the first place, they, who are not sinners, do
not need a Reconciler and Redeemer. But election is an act, altogether
necessary to those who are elected. In the second place, Christ himself is
not considered by God as Mediator of Redemption, unless in view of the fact,
that he is ordained as such for those who have sinned. For the divine
foresight of sin preceded, in the order of nature, the decree by which its
ordained that His Son should be the Mediator, appointed to offer in the
presence of God, in behalf of men, a sacrifice for sins. In the third place,
the election of men by God is made only in the Mediator, as having obtained,
by his own blood, eternal redemption.
The Minor is evident. For since Christ is the Mediator between men and God,
only as Reconciler, Redeemer, and the advocate of sinners; Mediator, I say,
who, by the act of His Mediation, affords salvation to those, for whom he is
Mediator. (1 Tim. ii. 5 & 6; Heb. viii. 6 &c.; ix, 15; xii, 24.) Hence
follows the conclusion, since the premises are true, and consist of three
terms, and are arranged in a legitimate form.
Let us now examine your arguments in opposition to what I have adduced. You
affirm that Christ is not ordained as Mediator for sinners only, and
therefore, my conclusion is not valid. Let it be conceded that your
antecedent is true, yet it does not follow that my conclusion is not valid.
For, in my premises, I did not assert that Christ was ordained Mediator only
for sinners, nor are the questions discussed between us, -- of what beings
is Christ the Mediator—when spoken of universally—and in what modes. But I
spoke of Christ, as ordained a Mediator for men in particular, and affirmed
that he was ordained Mediator for them, only as sinners; for he was ordained
Mediator to take away the sins of the world. The subject of discussion,
then, in the mode in which he is the Mediator for men. Here, you commit two
fallacies, that of Irrelevant conclusion [ignoratio elenchi], and that of
reasoning from a particular case to a general conclusion, [a dicto secundum
quid, ad dictum simpliciter]. I speak of Christ’s Mediation as pertaining to
a particular case, namely, as undertaken for man, you treat of his
Mediation, as simply and generally considered. But you rightly separate the
consideration of the mediation, which is attributed to Christ, in creation
and nature, for the latter is, entirely, of another kind and mode. According
to this, he is the Mediator of God to creatures; according to that, of
creatures to God. The one, refers to all creatures, the other, only to
those, made in the image of God. The one tends to the communication of all
natural and created good to all creatures, the other, to the bestowment, on
rational creatures, of a participation in infinite and supernatural good.
You, indeed, prove that he was ordained Mediator, not for sinners only, but
without any necessity. For this is not the question between us. The point to
be proved by you, was that he is the Mediator of men, not of sinners, which
I know that you would not wish to attempt, as a different doctrine is taught
in the Scriptures. Yet, let us examine the argument. He was ordained as
Mediator also for the angels; --
But the angels did not sin; -- Therefore, he was not constituted Mediator
only for sinners. I may concede all this, for it weighs nothing against my
argument, since I have not said in general terms, that Christ was ordained
only for sinners. I restricted his Mediation to men, to the work of their
salvation, to the mode in which salvation was obtained for them. Hence, if
this be true, I conclude that my argument remains firm and unmoved, in which
I proved that, in Christ as the Mediator of men before God, only sinners
were elected.
I wish that we might always remember that there is no controversy between us
concerning the election of angels or the mediation, by which they are saved,
and that we are treating only of the election and reprobation of men, and of
the mode of mediation by which they obtain salvation, for it will be
perceived that statements, which, taken generally, are not true, may be, in
the highest degree, true, when applied to the particular case of mankind.
There is, then, no need of considering those things, which are said
concerning Christ as the Mediator of angels. If, however, I may be permitted
to discuss even this point, I may ask for the proof of your Major, in which
you affirm that "Christ is Mediator for those to whom he was given, as Head,
by the Father." I think that I have good reason for denying your postulate.
For, in Philemon 2, Christ is said to have received "a name which is above
every name, that, at the name of Jesus, every knee should bow, of things in
heaven, because he, "being in the form of God, humbled himself and became
obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." Here we see that the
reason of his being constituted the Head, even of heavenly things, was this,
that, by his own blood and death, he might perform the functions of Mediator
for men before God. If he was the Mediator for angels, then this fact, and
not the former reason, should have been alleged, in this passage, for his
appointment as Head, even of angels.
These two terms, Head and Mediator, seem to me to have an order and
relation, such that the appellation of Mediator pertains to Christ in a
prior relation, and that of had in a posterior relation, and the latter,
indeed, on account of the former. For, by the act of Mediation, he acquires
for himself the right of dominion, the possession of which the Father
delivers to him, when He bestows the title of Head upon him. This is
implied, also, in the distinction used in schools of Divinity, Christ is
Mediator by merit and by efficacy. By merit first, then by efficacy. For by
his merit, he prepares for himself a people, the blessings necessary for
their happiness, and the right and power of imparting those blessings to his
own people; from which are derived the titles Head, saviour, Leader, Prince,
and Lord; in accordance with which titles, there flows, of his own efficacy,
to his own people, an actual communication of those blessings, which he
obtained by the merit of his death. For in Hebrews ii. 16, it is said that
Christ: "took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed
of Abraham." Now, if the statement, made by our divines, is true—that this
assumption of nature was made that he might be able to perform the functions
of Mediator for those whose nature he assumed, you perceive that the
conclusion is valid, that since "he took not on him the nature of angels,"
he did not perform the functions of Mediator for them. To this add, that it
is very frequently said, by our Theologians that Christ is Mediator only as
he stands between God and men, which assertion they refer to his human
nature, taken into a personal union by the Word, that he might, in this way,
stand between both, partaking, with the Father, of the Divine nature, and
with us, of human nature. Hence, also, he is called Emmanuel in a twofold
sense, first, because he is God and man in the unity of his person, and
secondly, because, being such, he has united God and men in the office of
Mediation. But he does not stand between God and angels. Consider, also, the
declaration of Heb. v. 1, "every high priest taken from among men is
ordained for men in things pertaining to God." But Christ was not taken from
among angels, therefore, he was not ordained for angels in things pertaining
to God. Indeed, I affirm, with confidence, that there was nothing to be
done, by the way of any mediation for, or in behalf of angels before God. I
add, also, that a Mediator should not be inferior in nature to those for
whom he acts in that capacity. But Christ, in his human nature, was made "a
little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death. (Heb. ii. 9.)
Therefore, he is not Mediator for angels. Finally, I remark, angels are
"ministering Spirits sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of
salvation." (Heb. i. 14.) "Unto the angels hath He not put in subjection the
world to come," but unto Christ Jesus primarily, and unto all his brethren,
secondarily, whose nature he sanctified in himself, and exalted with himself
to that dignity. Therefore, Christ is not the Mediator of angels. But the
inquiry may be made, Cannot Christ, then, be said in any manner to be
Mediator for angels? I answer; --
The term mediator may be applied in a two fold manner, either in behalf of
creatures to the Deity, or of the Deity to creatures. I deny that Christ is
Mediator in behalf of the angels before God, but I do not deny he is
Mediator for God to angels. For this coincides with the appellation of Head,
which I confess belong to Christ, in respect to angels, though in a relation
different from that, by which he is the Head of believers. For the union,
which exists between Christ and believers of the human race, is more strict
and close, than that which exists between him and angels, on account of the
consubstantiality of his human nature with that of men, from which angels
are alien. But enough on these points. Whether they are, as I have stated
them, or not, it affects, neither favourably nor unfavourably, my argument,
but you entirely agree with me when you say that he was ordained as Redeemer
only for the fallen. From this, also, I infer the truth of my sentiment. Men
are elected in the Redeemer, only as fallen; for they are not elected that
they should remain standing, but that they should rise again, and then
remain standing, as you have rightly observed. But how can you infer, that,
since election is made in Christ, the election, I say, of men, in Christ,
the Redeemer, (for those words are to be supplied), it follows that God had
respect to men, in general, considered generally as not yet created, as
created in their natural state, as yet standing and as fallen. I think that
the contrary can, and must be inferred. Therefore, God, in election, had
reference to man, only as fallen. For, in election, He regarded man in the
Redeemer, and the Redeemer is such only of the fallen.
As to the latter argument, the form of the answer is the same. I do not use
the word grace equivocally; I do not use it at the same time collectively
and distributively. I admit that it is used in a two-fold sense, for the
grace of preservation and restoration; I admit that it is used collectively,
and absolutely, particularly and concretely, that is, the grace of
preservation and restoration. But, what then? If I use a word, which has a
general and equivocal sense, is equivocation, therefore, at once, to be laid
to my charge? But I have used that word, at all times in this discussion, in
the same way, namely, as referring to the grace by which some men are
elected. It is that grace by which restoration and its means are prepared,
not that by which preservation and its means are appointed. For the latter
grace was not bestowed on human beings.
From the former grace alone, all they, who are saved, obtain their
salvation. In the Major of my syllogism, grace is spoken of in a particular
relation, and in the Minor, it is used in the same way, and, neither in the
former nor in the latter, is it used in a general sense, as the following
syllogism will show. They who are elected according to the grace of
restoration, which is joined with mercy, having place only in reference to
sinners, are considered by Him, who elects, as sinners; But all men, who are
elected, are elected according to the grace of restoration, which is joined
to mercy, having place only in reference to sinners; -
Therefore, all men, who are elected, are considered by Him, who elects, as
sinners. Grace is spoken of, throughout, particularly and relatively in
respect to men, and in no case, is it used generally or absolutely. Indeed,
it cannot be used generally or absolutely when it has reference relatively
and particularly to election, whether of angels or of men. For neither these
nor those are elected or saved by grace, taken absolutely, but both by grace
used relatively, angels by the grace of preservation, men by the grace of
restoration.
When, however, we treat of election universally and abstractly, we must
discuss the subject of grace, as its cause, universally, absolutely and
abstractly; for, to a genus, general attributes are to be ascribed, which
may be afterwards applied to the species after their several modes. Your
argumentation, then, is aside from our controversy. Election is of grace;
grace respects those, whom it establishes, and those whom, saved from evil,
it restores to good. Therefore, election has reference to the same persons.
For we do not now discuss election in general, and absolutely, if so, the
word grace, according to correct usage, must be understood in a general
sense. But we discuss the election of men; therefore, the general term grace
must be restricted to that grace, according to which men are elected. It is
not, therefore, proper to say that "grace has reference to those whom it
establishes in good," for the grace, of which we here treat, does not refer
to those whom it establishes in good, for grace established no one of the
human race, it only restored those, to whom it had reference. But you say
that the grace, which establishes in good, and that, which restores, are one
in essence, and only distinguished and restricted in relation to the object.
What if I should concede this? My conclusion will still be valid. The
question between us has reference to the object and its formal relations by
which relation you say that grace is distinguished and restricted. But that
restriction of the object has only this force, that the grace, which,
according to your assertion, is one in essence, must unfold itself and be
applied to a sinner, and to one not a sinner, in a different mode; and
indeed must use acts of a different character in the two cases. There is,
then, a restriction in "that which is added or granted," but it is a
necessary consequence of the restriction of the object. This distinction,
then, is sufficient for the conclusion which I desire.
The question is not concerning objects of election, essentially different
from each other, but concerning different modes of considering an object,
which is one and the same in essence, and concerning a different formal
relation. I will illustrate it by a simile. Justice in God is one in
essence, namely, giving to each one that which is due to him; to him who is
obedient, what pertains to him, according to the divine promise, and to the
sinner that which pertains to him, according to the divine threatening. But
from the fact that justice renders the retribution of punishment an object,
it is necessarily inferred that the object is worthy of punishment, and was,
therefore, liable to sin; so likewise with grace. Grace then is one in
essence, but varies in its mode; one in principle and end, but varied in its
progress, steps and means: one, when taken absolutely and in general, but
two-fold, when taken relatively and particularly, at least in respect to
opposite and distinct matters. But in the whole of this course of reasoning,
I have used the term grace, in a particular relation, as it is varied in
mode, progress, steps and means, and as it is taken relatively and
distributively. No equivocation, then, has been used in this; there is no
reasoning from general to particular, from the abstract to the concrete.
But, though, all these statements be true, they avail nothing, you affirm,
against those who state that mankind in general were regarded in election.
These arguments, indeed, prove that mankind in general could not have been
regarded in election, or at least that such was not the case. For if man was
considered in general, then he was elected by grace, taken in a general
sense. For a general effect requires a general cause. But man was elected,
not by grace considered generally, but by grace considered particularly,
relatively, and distributively, with reference to the circumstance of sin.
If man was considered in general, then he was elected in the Mediator not
considered generally, but considered particularly as Redeemer. Therefore, in
election, man was not considered in general, but with restriction to the
circumstance of sin, which was to be proved. The illustration of the field
to be cultivated, is not against this view, indeed it is in its favour. For
if a farmer should command his son to cultivate a field, which was overrun
with briars, and, therefore, required culture joined with clearing, then the
word cultivate, though, when taken in a general sense, it is not restricted
to clearing, yet, when applied to that particular field, it necessarily
includes that act. Hence we infer, that, if a field cannot be cultivated
without the act of clearing, it is, therefore, overrun with briars and
weeds, and, by analogy, if a man can not be saved without the act of
restoration, he is, therefore, a sinner; for a sinner only is capable of
restoration, and restoring grace is adapted only to his case.
_________________________________________________________________
TWELFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, of Non-Election or Preterition. Non-election or preterition is an
act of the divine pleasure, by which God from eternity determined not to
communicate to some men supernatural happiness, but to bestow on them only
natural or animal happiness, if they should live agreeably to nature; --
But, in an act of this kind, God has not to do with men considered in a
merely natural state; -- Therefore, God does not pass by certain men,
considered in a merely natural state. The truth of the Minor is proved; --
1. Because there is no natural happiness of this kind, which is the end of
man, and his ultimate neither in fact, for there has not been, and there is
not a man happy in this sense, nor in possibility, derived from the decree
of God considered, either absolutely, for no man will ever be thus happy
naturally, or conditionally, for God did not design happiness of this kind
for any man on a condition, as the condition must be that of obedience,
which God remunerates by supernatural happiness.
2. Because sin is the meritorious cause of that act of the divine pleasure,
by which He determined to deny, to some, spiritual or supernatural
happiness, resulting from union with Himself and from His dwelling in man.
"Your iniquities have separated between you and your God." (Isa. lix. 2.)
Nor can that denial of happiness to man be considered otherwise than as
punishment, which is necessarily preceded by the act of sin, and its
appointment by the foresight of future sin. These arguments may be useful
also in the discussion of other questions.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Your definition of non-election or preterition, (which Augustine calls also
reelection,) is by no means just, -- and this in three respects.
1. Since that, which is made a difference, is not merely an accident. For if
the difference of the things defined is only an accident, the definition is
not a good one. The essential difference between election and reprobation
consists in adoption by Jesus Christ unto God the Father, the accidental
consectary of which is supernatural happiness. Ephesians 1, and Romans 8.
2. Because the thing defined is referred, not to its primary end, but to one
which is secondary, which is erroneous. The primary end of election is union
with God by adoption, but a secondary, and, as we have said, accidental end,
is happiness.
3. Because the definition is redundant; for an addition is made of something
positive, when you insert, in parentheses, "but to be bestowed," &c., while
the definition itself is purely negative. There is also a fault, and even an
error in that which is added. For non-election or preterition does not
bestow natural happiness, but rather supposes it; God does not, in that act,
bestow a gift on those on whom it already has been bestowed. This we remark
concerning the Major.
The Minor is denied. God, in this act, has reference to man in general,
therefore also, in this mode, He has respect to the same general reference.
Thus you perceive that your whole reasoning is false. To sustain your Minor
you use two arguments. The first is designed to confirm that part of the
definition, which does not, as we have asserted, belong to definition;
therefore, I need not notice it. Yet since you afford the occasion, I shall
be permitted to make certain suggestions. The argument denies that there is
any "natural happiness of this kind, which is the end of man, and his
ultimate." If you speak here of the depraved nature of man, I admit it; for
"an evil tree does not bring forth good fruit," much less does it acquire
any goodness of itself. If you speak of nature, in its purity, as it was,
originally, in Adam, I deny it. For, to undepraved nature, pertained its own
future natural happiness, though it was afterwards, so to speak, to be
absorbed, by the grace of God, in supernatural happiness. This happiness was
the natural design of man and his natural end. Do not all things in nature
seek their own good? But since nature seeks not any thing which may not
exist, (it is foolish to seek that, which does not exist, even in
possibility, and nature, the work of an infinitely wise Architect, is not
foolish,) it follows that the good of each thing exists by nature, in
possibility, if the thing does not attain to it, and in fact, if the thing
does attain to it. But if the condition of natural things is such, consider,
I pray you, my brother, how it can be truly said of man that he is deprived
of natural felicity, and his natural end, when all things, in nature, are in
a different situation. Surely, nature could not be blind, in her most
excellent work, and see so clearly in all her other works. But you say that
this fact never existed. I admit it, for Adam fell out by the way; but it
was to exist in the future. You say that it did not exist "in possibility."
This is an error, for God designed it for Adam, on the condition of his
remaining in the right way. I prove this from the words of God himself; "in
the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." (Gen. ii. 17.) What
is death? Is it not privation? What is privation? Is it not of some natural
attribute or habit? Adam, then, was deprived of natural life, and of that
happy constitution of life, which he obtained in Eden, otherwise he would
have remained happy in it, if he had continued in the discharge of duty,
until God had fulfilled in him the promise of supernatural life, which was
adumbrated to him by the tree of life in the garden of Eden. For, on the
contrary, it follows that, if he had not eaten the forbidden fruit, he would
not have become mortal, but, with life and sight, he would have been
prepared for translation to a higher life.
You affirm that God "remunerates obedience by supernatural happiness." He
indeed remunerates obedience in that way, but not in that way alone.
Conjunctively, it is true; exclusively, it is false. He remunerates
obedience in both ways. For even at the present time, when we are very far
removed from the natural condition of Adam, godliness has the "promise of
the life that now is and of that which is to come." (1 Tim. iv. 8.) I judge
that a two-fold idea, namely, of the end and of the mode, has led you into
error. You have thought that the only end of man is that which is
supernatural. It is very true, that things subordinate are not at variance.
There is a natural end. As nature is subordinate to God, so natural ends are
subordinate to those which are supernatural and divine. The end of our
nature, so far as it is natural, is this, that it should approach very near
to the Divine; so far as it is supernatural, it is that man may be united to
God. To the former, Adam could attain by nature; to the latter, he could be
exalted from the former, by grace. You indeed judged that there could be no
mode, in which both kinds of happiness should concur. But two things must be
observed in this case, one, that natural happiness is a previous
preparation, the other that it is a foundation to the supernatural. It is
prepared for and previous to it. Unless he had been already happy in nature,
even it he had remained without falling, he would not have attained the
other happiness, there must have been in him that natural happiness by which
he could approach the supernatural. But when he should have in fact, entered
into that supernatural felicity, then natural happiness would be the
foundation and upon it the consummation would be in supernatural happiness.
If perfection is added to perfection, the less is not destroyed, but the
increase is made upon the less, as fire is increased by fire, the vegetative
faculty by the sentient, and both by the rational. The less rests in the
greater as in its own principle, and is more fully perfected by it, as it
more fully ceases to be its own, and partakes of the perfection of another.
Thus it will be, in the resurrection of the dead and in eternal life. The
nature of man will be both perfected and glorified above the mode of nature.
It will so obtain the perfection of nature, as to rest in that divine and
supernatural perfection; and nature will not be abolished, but be clothed in
a supernatural mode, as the apostle says of the body, in 1 Corinthians 15.
These things, however, are merely incidental.
Your second argument may be stated thus: -- Sin is the meritorious cause of
that negative act; -- Man, in a merely natural state, has no sin; -- There
is not then, in him any meritorious cause. By consequence God has not any
cause of that negative act. The whole prosyllogism is admitted, but the
inference is denied, because it is made from a particular case. It would
indeed be true if the negative act of the Deity resulted only from a
meritorious cause, but this position is very far removed from the truth. The
cause of every negative act is either in God or in the creature. The same is
true of this act. But the cause of this act is not in the creature.
Therefore, it is in God. This prosyllogism will be denied by none. In the
will of God alone, exists the cause that you are not an apostle, and that
you may not live to the age of Adam or Methuselah. Iniquity in man is the
cause that he is far from God, and that God is far from him; namely, in that
respect, of which Isaiah spoke. (Isa. lix. 2.) For, in other respects, not
only is iniquity a cause, but also the will of God; who, if he would, might
remove their iniquity as a cloud, and bring man near to Himself: I prove
that the cause of this act is not in the creature, as was said before in the
10th proposition; first, by the authority of Christ in Matthew 25, and of
Paul in Romans 8 & 9, and Ephesians 1; secondly, by reason, since even that
first sin did not take place, except from the negative act of God, of which
negative act sin cannot be the cause, for the same thing cannot be both
cause and consequence of another thing. But election and non-election were
prior even to the first sin, as we have before demonstrated. A positive and
a negative act of God also precede every act of the creature, whether good
or bad. For there is no evil act which has not been preceded also by a
negative act of the Deity, permitting the evil. Adam and Eve sinned,
certainly not without a negative act of God, though there had been committed
by them no previous sin, deserving that negation. What, then, was the cause
of that negative act if it was not the free will of God? In subsequent sins,
however, it may be admitted that sin is, indeed, the meritorious cause, and
the free will of God is also a cause; for He destroys even sins, when He
wills. He has that power, and if He does not destroy them, it is because He
does not will to do it. But those sins which He destroys, can not, though a
meritorious cause, produce the negative act of God. You see then, my
brother, that sin may be indeed a meritorious cause of that negative act,
but not singly or alone or always; therefore, it is not the necessary cause.
Thirdly, by the example of the Angels? What has restrained the holy Angels
from evil and confirmed them in good? The positive act of God, that is, the
manifestation of Himself in election; for they are elect. What did not
restrain the fallen Angels from evil, into which they rushed of their own
will? The negative act of God, in non-election or preterition which
Augustine also calls reelection. It also belongs to this act of election,
that the former were confirmed in good against evil, and to reprobation,
that the latter were left, who (as Christ says in John 8.) speak a lie of
their own, and commit sin. However, I wish that you would always remember,
in this case and in subsequent arguments, that it is not suitable to
substitute, for the proper and proximate end, a remote consequence, or event
(which is also called in its own mode, an end), namely, supernatural
happiness. That it is appropriate and proximate to assert that sin is the
meritorious cause of that divine negative act, by which He does not adopt
certain men as children unto Himself by Christ, the consectary of which
adoption is happiness, is denied, my brother, by nature herself. God begets
sons unto Himself according to His own will, not according to their
character, whether good as in the case of the elect angels, or bad as in our
own case. He looks upon all, in Christ, not in themselves, that Christ
"might be the first-born among many brethren." (Rom. viii. 29.) In nature,
children are begotten by parents, without reference to their future
character, and may not God beget his adopted children, without reference to
their character? Nature claims the whole for itself in those about to be
begotten; may grace claim but a very small part? God forbid.
Of the same nature is the position that "denial of happiness to man cannot
be considered otherwise than as punishment." For in the first place, "denial
of happiness" is not suitably introduced into the discussion, the subject of
which is the denial of adoption, which, as we have said, is the appropriate
and proximate end of election. This, then, is not, primarily and per se, the
proposition. Again, if the subject of discussion is adoption, the statement
is not true; for a denial of adoption is not properly punishment; it is,
indeed, previous to punishment, since it is even previous to sin, but it is
not, therefore, punishment. Who, indeed, can affirm that the antecedent is
the same with its consequent, and that a most remote one? But if, as you
think, the statement is made in reference to happiness, it is not, even in
that case universally true; for a denial of happiness, on account of sin, is
considered as punishment of sin, but a denial of happiness on account of a
voluntary arrangement, or of the will only, is not punishment. To Adam, in
his primitive state of holiness, God denied supernatural happiness, until he
should fulfill his appointed course. That was not punishment to Adam. To a
private individual it is not a punishment that he is not an emperor. The
denial of happiness, is not punishment, then, of itself alone, but of some
accident, as a final consequence, (as they say), of the sin of the creature.
The same consideration is fatal to your statement, that "denial of happiness
is necessarily preceded by the act of sin." That is true, indeed, of the
denial of final happiness, as they style it; but we are now discussing the
denial of the principle of happiness, that is, of grace and gratuitous
adoption in Christ Jesus. Therefore, though it may be conceded to you, that
sin precedes, in fact, that denial, yet this also should be added, that
antecedent to sin is particular reelection by God in the beginning and
progress of sin, but that the foundation of that particular reelection is
non-election, or preterition and reprobation, which we acknowledge to be,
not the cause, but the antecedent of sin. So, likewise, your statement is
not universally true, that "the appointment of that act is preceded by the
foresight of future sin." For that foresight of future sin is both the
consequent, and the antecedent of that divine denial; since the divine
negative act, (as they call it), precedes the commission of sin, but, as has
been before shown, follows that commission by imposing final unhappiness on
the sins of men. These answers may also be adapted, in the most complete
manner possible, to the arguments which follow.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWELFTH PROPOSITION
Definition and demonstration are distinguished by their objects. The former,
is used for explanation, the latter, for proof: the former, for the
discussion of a single question, the latter, for that of a compound
question. But in this case, I did not undertake to explain, but to prove. I
therefore, thought I must make use, in my argument, of definition so far as
would tend to prove that which I had undertaken to prove, which was the
reason that I did not use special effort to adapt my definition of election
or preterition to the rules of art. For if what I lay down is on the whole
kata< pantov true, even if it do not reach the truth in all respects, kaq
o[lou it will be sufficient for me, for the proof which I have proposed to
myself. Hence, even with those substitutions, which you have considered
important, my proof remains valid, and therefore, that correction does not
seem to be necessary for our purpose. Yet, I must say something concerning
that matter. In general, I remark, that you could see that I was treating
distinctly of that predestination which is unto glory, not of that which is
unto grace, and of that preterition, by which glory was not prepared for
some, not of that by which God determined not to communicate grace. This is
evident from my eighth proposition. I must then abstain from matters which
belong in general to grace and glory. Among those general matters is
adoption as children, for the beginning and progress of which, grace is
prepared, and glory for its consummation. Thus you also remark elsewhere in
this answer.
I remark particularly, in reference to your corrections to the first; -- in
adoption and non-adoption consists the essential difference of election at
once to grace and to glory, and of reprobation from both. Therefore, that
the former difference pertains not to election to glory alone, and the
latter, is not of reprobation from glory alone. For a difference of genus
can not be a difference of species. Therefore, I ought not in this case to
have mentioned adoption unless I wished, in discussing a species, to set
forth the genus contrary to the law, referred to above kaq o[lou.
To the second; -- I mentioned no end in my definition of election, or rather
in the part of the definition which I presented. I did not, indeed, desire
to present it in full. For supernatural happiness or glory is not the end,
but the material or subject of election, which material, embraced in your
Theses in the term blessing, you divide into grace and glory. I know,
indeed, that supernatural happiness is not communicated to us, except by an
antecedent union of ourselves with God, which is implied in these words from
the same proposition, "to deny supernatural happiness, and resulting from
the union with Himself, and from His indwelling in man." But let us notice
the definition of preterition contained in your Theses. "Preterition is an
act of the divine pleasure by which God determined, from eternity, to leave
certain of His creatures in their own natural state, and not to communicate
to them supernatural grace, by which their nature, if unfallen, might be
confirmed, and, if fallen, might be restored; for the declaration of the
freedom of His goodness." In the phrase "to leave in their own natural
state," is comprehended, also, exclusion from supernatural happiness, or it
is not. If not, the definition is incomplete. I think, however, that you
designed to include, also, that idea, otherwise your Theses are imperfect,
as they treat of the predestination by which grace and glory are prepared
for the elect, but nowhere of the negative act by which God does not appoint
glory for the non-elect, if not in those words. Yet, even in those words,
according to your idea, that preterition, by which God does not determine to
bestow glory on any one, can not be included. For you define preterition
(Thesis 14) to be "contrary to the preparation of grace." But the
preparation of punishment is an affirmative act, by which He appoints
punishment for the sinner, opposed, not negatively, but affirmatively to the
preparation of glory. When, therefore, I wished to describe preterition or
non-election, so far as it is an act by which God does not determine to
bestow glory on some persons, it seemed proper that I should, in some
measure, keep in your track, in that, you nowhere, in your definition of
preterition, mention exclusion from adoption and union with God.
To the third; -- It is manifest that what is inserted, in parenthesis, was
added for the sake of explanation, and does not come within the order or
relation of the definition, like the other statements. I do not, however
see, that even those statements are false or faulty, though they may be
related, in the mode which you consider them, to that definition. For they
mark, not an affirmation, but a negative act, and there is emphasis in the
word (tantum) which marks the negative. To will the bestowment of natural
happiness is an affirmative act, but to will only that bestowment is a
negative act, for it excludes all other happiness, which He does not
determine to bestow. Also, what is that act by which God determines to
bestow only natural happiness, if not preterition or neglect. If to leave in
a natural state is a negative act, and otherwise your definition of
non-election, which considers it as opposed negatively to predestination, is
erroneous, I do not see how those words "to bestow only supernatural
happiness," do not designate a negative act. If you explain it so as to
distinguish, in this case, the two acts, one, that by which God determined
to bestow natural happiness, the other, that by which He determined to
bestow only that, and not some other kind of happiness, then I acknowledge
that the former, as an affirmative act, does not pertain to this decree of
preterition. But we have never discussed that kind of happiness. It might,
then, have been easily understood that I used those words so as to note a
negative act, that of the non-bestowment of any happiness other than
natural. When I was writing those words, I thought of using the phrase "to
leave" in imitation of you, but judged that it would be unsuitable as
presupposing that the bestowment was already made, and I considered that
supernatural happiness was not yet bestowed, but to be bestowed, if man
should live in obedience. In which I have also your assent, as is manifest
from your answer to my third proposition, at the end. The definition,
therefore, remains, and there is nothing in it to be blamed, for which there
can not be found apology in the example of your Theses, which I have
constantly had before my eyes in this discussion. That this may be made more
plain, I will compare your definition with mine. You thus define the
preterition by which grace is denied: "Preterition is an act of the divine
pleasure, by which God, from eternity, determined to leave some of His
creatures in their natural state, and not to communicate to them
supernatural grace, by which their nature, if unfallen, may be confirmed,
and, if fallen, may be restored, to the declaration of the freedom of His
own goodness." If I define the preterition by which glory is denied,
analogically according to the form of your definition, it will be like this.
"Preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural state and not to
communicate to them supernatural happiness, or glory, by which their natural
happiness may be absorbed, or into which their ignominy may be changed, to
the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness." In this definition, I
have proposed that which was sufficient for my purpose; with no evasion,
since, the other adjuncts are neither to the advantage, nor to the
disadvantage of my argument. Therefore, the Major of my syllogism is true,
even if it would not be true, as a complete definition and reciprocally. For
a conclusion can be proved from a Major, which is on the whole kata<
pantov true.
I come now to the Minor, which I proved by two arguments. The first is not
refuted by you, as it is proposed in a mutilated condition, and so it is
changed into something else. For I did not deny that natural happiness was
prepared for man, but I added "which is, the design and end of man," in
which words, I meant not that it alone, but that it also was prepared, but
on this condition that it would be absorbed by the supernatural happiness,
which should follow. I wish that the explanation, which I add, may be thus
understood; namely, that natural happiness, could, neither in fact nor in
possibility, occur to man, as the design of man and his end. For God
promised to man, on condition of obedience, not only natural but also
supernatural happiness. In which, since, I have also your assent, I conclude
my proposition thus. God does not will to bestow upon any man, considered in
his original natural state, natural happiness alone, as the end and design
of man, to the exclusion of supernatural happiness. Therefore, God passed by
no one, considered in his original natural state. For whether preterition is
the act by which God does not determine to bestow supernatural happiness on
any one, or that by which He determines to bestow natural happiness, which I
think that you concede, it is equally to my purpose.
I prove the antecedent in this way. All men are considered in Adam, on equal
terms, whether in their original natural sate, or in a state of sin, unless
some difference is introduced by the will of God. But I deny that any
difference was made in respect to man’s original state, and you confirm the
first reason for that denial, when you say that both kinds of happiness were
prepared for man. Again, that, which God, by His providence, has prepared
for man, is not denied to him by preterition, the opposite of election,
unless from the foresight that he would not attain to it, under the guidance
of providence, but would turn aside freely, and of his own accord. But God
prepared for the first man, and in him, for all men, supernatural felicity,
for He bestowed on him means sufficient for its attainment; with the
additional aid of divine grace, (if this was also necessary in that state,)
which is not denied to any man unless he first forsakes God.
Your opinion that I have been led into an error, by a two fold idea, namely,
that of the end and the mode, and that I thought that a single end only was
before mankind, is incorrect, for my words do not, of themselves, imply
this. I made a plain distinction between the subordinate ends, when I
mentioned natural felicity, which I denied was the end of man and his
ultimate. I, therefore, conceded that natural happiness belongs to man,
otherwise there would have been no necessity of the addition of the
statement that this does not belong to him as the end of man, and his
ultimate, that is, as that, beyond which nothing further can happen to man.
Does not he, who admits that natural happiness pertains to man, but not as
the end of man and his ultimate, acknowledge a two fold end of man, one
subordinate, namely, natural happiness, and the other final, which is the
end and ultimate of man, namely, supernatural happiness? I do not, however,
think that it can be said truly that happiness is the end and ultimate of
man. Your additional remarks, concerning the order of natural and
supernatural happiness, I approve, as truthful and learned; but they are, as
you admit, "merely incidental," and do not affect the substance of my
argument.
My second argument is also valid, but it should be arranged correctly, thus;
-- An act of the divine pleasure by which God determined to deny to any man
spiritual or supernatural blessedness, depends on a meritorious cause, which
is sin;
Preterition is such an act; -- Therefore preterition depends on sin as its
meritorious cause. The reason for the Major is contained in these words,
"that denial of happiness can not be considered otherwise than as
punishment," but it is necessarily preceded by sin, as its proper cause,
according to the mode of merit. From this it follows that God can not have
reference in that act to men, considered in a merely natural state, without
reference to sin.
I will briefly sustain the Major, and the reason assigned for it, and then
examine your answer. I prove the Major thus:
That which the Providence of God has prepared for man, under a condition, is
not denied to him, except on the non-performance or the violation of the
condition. But God, by His Providence, prepared supernatural happiness for
man, &c. Again, the passage from Isaiah plainly shows that God would not
have deserted the Jews, if they had not merited it by their "iniquities."
The reason, assigned for the Major, I sustain in this manner: Whatever is
contrary to the blessing of happiness, prepared, promised, and therefore
conditionally due to man, as made in the image of God, cannot be considered
otherwise than as punishment. A denial of supernatural happiness is contrary
to the blessing of happiness, prepared for man, as such, for even
supernatural happiness was prepared for him as such. Therefore its denial is
punishment. Again, there is no passage of Scripture, I assert it
confidently, from which it can be shown that such denial is or can be
considered otherwise than in the relation of punishment, than as it is
prepared only for sinners. For we have stated, with truth, that punitive
justice has place only in reference to sinners.
I proceed to examine your answer. In my syllogism the inference is not "made
from a particular case." For that negative act of God, now under discussion,
only exists in view of a meritorious cause, that is, it does not exist
except in view of that cause, and that act of God would not exist, if that
cause did not exist. The particle "only" does not amount to an exclusion of
the will of God. For it is certain that sin is not, in fact the cause of
punishment, except as the will of God, who wills to punish sin according to
its merit, otherwise he can remove sin, and remit its punishment. How indeed
could you suppose that he, who made sin the meritorious cause of punishment,
wished to exclude the will of God, when the very nature of meritorious cause
requires another cause also, which may estimate merit, and inflict
punishment in proportion as it is merited. I acknowledge that the cause of
every negative act does not exist in man, nor have I made that statement,
for why should I needlessly enter into the general discussion of this
matter. My subject is the act of preterition or non-election, by which God
denies supernatural happiness to man, and I affirm that the cause of this is
in and of man, so far, that without the existence of this cause, that act
would never be performed. But you argue that the cause of this act does not
exist in man. First, by authority, then by reason, finally by example. I
deny that proof is contained in the passages, cited as authority. Let it be
shown in what sense, these are the antecedents, from which this consequence
may be deduced. We have previously examined those passages, so far as the
necessity of the subject required.
Your argument from reason is not more conclusive. You say that the "first
sin did not take place, except from the negative act of God," also "a
positive and a negative act of God also precede every act of the creature,"
and "there is no evil act, which has not been preceded also by a negative
act of the Deity, permitting the evil. I concede all those points, if
rightly understood. But an affirmative statement, reasoning from the general
to the specific, is not valid, unless a mark of universality is added. Many
negative acts of the Deity precede the act of sin; therefore, also the
negative act of preterition precedes sin. I deny the sequence. The
controversy concerns that very act. The first sin results from a negative
act of God, but not from the act of preterition. A positive and a negative
act precede every act of the creature, but not the act of election and that
of preterition. You affirm that election and non-election are prior to sin.
To sin, as existing in fact, I admit, but not to sin, as foreseen. That
point, however, has been previously discussed. But you affirm that the free
will of God is the cause also of this negative act. Who denies it? It is
indeed within the scope of God’s free will, either to punish or to remit
sin, but neither is necessary, even though sin has been committed, (that is,
since God is "in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself,") but neither is
possible unless sin has been committed. The will of God is, in the most
complete sense, free, as the cause of creation, the cause of glorification,
the cause of condemnation. But He creates those non-existing; He glorifies
those created and existing, and, indeed, called and justified; He condemns
only sinners, and those, who die in their sins. There is, then, no
limitation placed on the freedom of God, even if we consider sin as
antecedent, and necessarily so, to that negative act of God. You see, then,
that sin is the meritorious, cause, which necessarily precedes that negative
act of God; and that I have reasoned correctly from that cause, necessarily
antecedent, that God, in that negative act of preterition, has reference
only to sinners.
That the example of the angels, in this case, is not analogous, I show in a
word. You say that "the negative act of God, in non-election or preterition,
which Augustine also calls reelection, did not restrain the fallen angels
from evil." But I affirm that the negative act of God, by which man is not
restrained from evil, but permitted to fall into sin, is not the act of
preterition, but a negative act of providence, and I prove, by two
arguments, that this is distinguished from predestination. If it is by the
negative act of preterition, then all are passed by, for all have sinned.
Also, if it is the negative act of preterition, then all men have sinned
irretrievably, and without hope of pardon and remission, as in the case of
the angels who sinned. I add a third consideration, that an act of election,
opposed at the same time to preterition, must have place here, in respect to
certain individuals; but there is not and can not be such an act, in this
case, since all men are comprehended under that preterition. There is a
great difference between the negative act, by which God left man to his own
counsel, and the negative act of preterition, which is to be here
considered. Nor do I think that it is of much importance to this subject
that, for non-adoption, as the proper and proximate end, I have substituted,
the remote consequence, the absence of supernatural happiness. For, in
addition to the fact that adoption, in your Theses already often cited,
occupies the place of form not of end, I affirm that, in the negative act,
by which He did not will adoption for any man, God could not, or, at least,
did not have reference to any except sinners.
But you say that "God begets sons unto Himself according to His own will."
He does this, however, from among sinful men. "He looks," you say, "upon all
in Christ, not in themselves."
Therefore, I affirm, He considers them as sinners, not in themselves, as
having, in themselves, any reason that He should regard them, but in
themselves, as in need of being considered in Christ as Mediator of such
character. "May not God," you ask, "beget His adopted children without
reference to their character?" I admit that He may, without such reference
to them as may influence God to beget them, not without such reference to
them, that, not generation, but regeneration may be necessary to them. Grace
claims for itself the whole in generation, but more strongly claims the
whole in regeneration. But that God begets sons to Himself from among men,
the word generation being used in any other sense than that of regeneration,
I consider contrary both to theology and to Scripture. The subject, however,
of discussion is adoption according to the decree of God.
Let us now consider the position, by which I strengthened my argument. I
said that the "denial of happiness to man can not be considered otherwise
than as punishment. I said "denial of happiness" not "of adoption." For I
am, here, discussing the denial of glory, not of grace; but non-adoption,
either alone or also, pertains to the latter. I wish, however, that it might
be shown in what mode a denial of adoption to a man, made in the image of
God, has not the nature of punishment, and is not caused by sin. You indeed
affirm that it is previous to punishment, since it is previous even to sin.
I deny both parts of the assertion. It belongs to him, who makes an
assertion, to prove it, but I, though denying the assertion, will give the
reason of my denial, to show the strength of my cause. He, who is made in
the image of God, as Luke says of Adam, "which was the Son of God," (chap.
iii, 38,) is, by the grace of creation, the son of God. But Adam was, not
begotten, but created, "the son of God," as said in the marginal note of
Beza’s Testament. That, which any one has by the gift of creation, is not
taken from him, unless the demerit of sin precedes, according to the justice
of God. Supernatural happiness, whether it is bestowed on condition of
obedience to law, or according to the condition of the covenant of grace, is
always to be considered in the relation of an inheritance; but it was
promised to Adam, on the condition of obedience; therefore, Adam was then
considered as the Son of God. Filiation, then, could not be denied to him
except on account of sin and disobedience. But the subject, of which I was
treating, was denial of happiness.
You assert, that denial of happiness, considered in general, is not
punishment, since that, which exists on account of a voluntary arrangement
of God, is not punishment. I wish that you would show that any denial of
supernatural happiness is according to voluntary arrangement of God, apart
from the consideration of sin. You remark, in proof of your assertion, that
"to Adam God denied supernatural happiness, until he should fulfill his
appointed course. That was not punishment to Adam." I reply, the term,
denial of supernatural happiness is ambiguous; it may be either final or
temporary. The former is peremptory, the latter is conditional. That, of
which we treat, is final and peremptory. The decree of predestination and
preterition is peremptory, and that, which is prepared for or denied to any
one, according to that decree, he will finally enjoy, or want. But you treat
of temporary denial, "until he should fulfill his appointed course,"
according to the rule of divine justice, and of denial, on the consideration
that he should not live according to the requirement of God, -- which denial
belongs to the just providence of God, in contra-distinction to
predestination and preterition. Indeed what you call a denial, can not be so
called except in catachrestic sense. For how shall he be said to deny
happiness to any one, who has promised it on a certain condition? You
concede, however, that sin is antecedent to the denial of final happiness.
But preterition or non-election is a denial of final happiness. Therefore,
sin is antecedent to preterition. You say that it should be stated in
addition "that antecedent to sin is particular abandonment by God, in the
beginning and progress of sin, the foundation of which abandonment is
non-election, or preterition and reprobation." I concede that abandonment by
God was antecedent to sin, so far that God left man in the power of his own
purposes; but it is not particular, but universal, in respect to the
beginning of sin, for in that abandonment he left Adam, and, in him, all
men; hence preterition can not be the foundation of that abandonment. For
all mankind were left, in the beginning of sin. In respect to its progress,
it may be called particular, for He freed some from sin and left others in
sin; and non-election or preterition may be called the foundation of this
abandonment, since some were left in the progress of sin, others being freed
from sin by the gratuitous election of God, which is the direct opposite of
preterition. Hence it follows that it can not be rightly said that
preterition or non-election is the antecedent of sin, since it is only the
antecedent of the progress of that which has already been perpetrated, and,
indeed, its cause, by a denial of that which prevents the progress of sin,
namely, grace. I affirm that it is universally true that the foresight of
sin precedes the appointment of that negative act by which he does not
determine to bestow felicity on an individual. For the act of preterition
does not precede commission of sin, as has been already frequently shown.
Sin, which is common to all men, does not result from that negative act
which discriminates among men, but from a negative act common to all men.
Preterition is a negative act, not common to all men, but discriminating
among them. Therefore, preterition is not an act antecedent to sin. So my
arguments are confirmed against your answers; they may, therefore, also be
available for the decision of the other questions.
_________________________________________________________________
THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
The second question, referring to the preparation of grace, and its
opposite, preterition, is not, whether God designed to bestow saving grace
only on some persons, and those considered in certain relations, and did not
design to bestow it on others, for this is very manifest from the
Scriptures, in many passages. But the question is, whether God, in the act
of predestination and its opposite, preterition, had reference to men,
considered in a natural condition. I have not been able to persuade myself,
either from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, or from those of the advocates
of his views, that this question is to be answered affirmatively. My reasons
for answering it negatively, are these: --
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE THIRTEENTH PROPOSITION
I have previously stated that divine election and non-election have
reference to men in general, and this is very true. The phrase, "merely
natural state," is ambiguous. The question before us, then, is not, whether
election has reference only to men, considered in a natural condition, (as
you understand that phrase,) if one attends closely to the subject. This is
rather the question, whether it also has reference to men, so considered. We
answer this affirmatively. Indeed, though it differs, in phraseology, from
the first theory, yet we think that, in fact, it is very much in harmony
with it, since this particular relation was added neither by Thomas Aquinas,
nor by others, that the relations, previously noticed, might be excluded,
but only that, in this argument, a consideration of sin, as a cause, might
be excluded. Yet, let us examine your arguments as they are presented.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE THIRTEENTH
PROPOSITION
That man, considered in general, is the object of the decree of which we
treat, has not yet been made clear to me from your answers. Indeed I have
proved from many arguments, adduced, as opportunity has been offered, that a
general consideration of man has no place in that decree, and I shall prove
the same by other arguments, as there may be occasion. Concerning the state
of the question, as you propose it, I will not contend with you. Let the
question be as you state it, whether God, in the decree of predestination
and reprobation, has reference also to men, considered in a merely natural
state. I maintain the negative. Not only does the affirmative of this
question please you, but, from your Theses and other writings, you seem to
me to incline to it so strongly that you seem even to have proposed the
affirmative of the former theory. For if He, who predestinates and passes
by, did not consider man as a sinner, then He did consider him as created
among those things, on which He imposed certain conditions, or as not
created, or as to be created. But let these remarks suffice. I have every
where denied, and still deny, that God, in the act of predestination and of
preterition, had reference also to men, considered in a merely natural
state; but I assert that He had reference only to men, as considered in
their sins. Concerning the difference between the first and second theory,
we have already spoken.
_________________________________________________________________
FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
First, because Adam and, in him, all men were created in a state of
supernatural grace, hence no one could be considered in a merely natural
state. The antecedent is proved, because all were created in Adam after the
image and likeness of God; but that is supernatural grace, as has been said:
secondly, the law, which was given to Adam, was enacted for all, which is
evident from the fact that all sinned in Adam, and became guilty of
transgression. But that law could not be obeyed without supernatural grace,
which I prove from the subject of the law, from the appendix of the law,
from the instigator of transaction, and from the mode of instigation. The
law required obedience towards God, that man should live, not according to
man, but according to God, which life is not animal, but spiritual, and its
cause in man is supernatural grace. The appendix of the law consisted in the
threatening of temporal and spiritual death, that of the body and of the
soul. Punishment, which is spiritual and opposed, not only to animal, but
also to spiritual good, ought not to be annexed, in equity, to a law which
can be observed without supernatural grace; especially when the same law, if
observed, could not afford supernatural or spiritual good, since it can be
observed without supernatural grace. It seems unjust that the transgression
of a law should deserve eternal and spiritual death, but its observance
could not obtain eternal and spiritual life from God, on the terms of divine
goodness and justice. The instigator was Satan, whose design was to cast
down man, by transgression, to death, not only of the body, but of the soul,
and when man could only resist through supernatural grace. The mode of
temptation was such that it could not be successfully resisted by man, if
destitute of supernatural grace.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH PROPOSITION
Your antecedent, namely, "Adam and in him all men were created in a state of
supernatural grace," is ambiguous. Again, it can not be proved, as we have
shown, in answer to the tenth proposition. The consequent is denied, and is
also ambiguous. Since I have previously discussed both of these points, I
come now to the arguments. The proof from the image of God, was related in
the same answer, and it was shown that it was not supernatural of itself;
but that it had relation and adjustment to supernatural grace, not of nature
or its own essence, but by the arrangement of grace. This argument,
therefore, now, as before, is denied. The first position in the second
argument, is not to be admitted without some distinction, for one law, given
to Adam, was general; the other particular. The general law, namely, that
which is natural and joined to the natural, was enacted for all. This was by
no means true of the particular law. The latter was that he should not eat
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. It is not credible that this law,
which was one of particular requisition should have been enacted for all; it
is not credible that, if all had remained unfallen, they would have come
into Eden to that tree, that their obedience should be tested.
The Scripture, also, does not make this statement. We concede the second
position in reference to the universal law, not in that the law was natural,
but in that the nature of man itself and the natural law, was adjusted to
grace. The natural, as such, was within the capability of man; as it was
related and adjusted to grace, it could not be observed without supernatural
grace. In reference to the special law, the second position is erroneous.
For the mere act of eating or not eating of any fruit, is natural. The power
to eat or abstain from that fruit, was, in fact, possessed by man, though
these acts were not both left with him by the requisition and arrangement of
the special law declared by God. Therefore the second point is, in this
case, erroneous, for it was possible for him not to choose, not to touch,
not to eat the fruit, as it was to do the contrary. This was of natural
power (which possessed full vigour) in a natural subject. To establish this
point, you adduce four arguments, all pertaining to the mode of general law.
I will briefly examine each in order. The first argument pertains to general
law, both as it is natural and as it is adjusted to grace. We concede, then,
that the affirmative is true of general law, but deny it as to the
particular law, by which God required obedience in a particular matter, and
in one merely natural or animal. It pertained to natural power to abstain
from or to eat that fruit; it pertained to natural will to avoid the
experiment of sin and death, of which God had forewarned them. God tested
the obedience of man in a matter merely natural, and in the same thing he
miserably renounced obedience to God, of his own will, not by any necessity.
He had then no just ground of complaint that God should hold him
responsible, because, in a matter of no difficulty, and according to nature,
he did not willingly render due obedience unto the Lord, but preferred, to
His word, the word of the serpent in the case of Eve, and that of his wife
in the case of Adam.
You will perhaps say that he would not have committed that transgression, if
grace had been bestowed upon him. Must you, then, always require grace, and
make it ground of accusation, if it is not bestowed, even in a matter which
is natural, and, indeed, merely natural? God bestowed a natural constitution
on Adam, for this very reason, that in a matter merely natural, he might use
his natural powers. He gave that which was sufficient. Do you demand more? I
quote, on this point, the words of Tertullian (lib. 2 advers. Marcion, cap.
7.) "If God bestowed upon man the freedom of the will and power to act, and
bestowed it suitably, He undoubtedly, according to His authority as Creator,
bestowed them to be enjoyed, but to be enjoyed, so far as depended upon
Himself; in accordance with His own character, that is ‘after God,’ that is
according to goodness, (for who would grant any permission against
himself,); but so far as depended upon man, according to the motions of his
freedom. Who, indeed, bestowing on a person any thing to be enjoyed, does
not so bestow it, that it may be enjoyed according to his mind and will? It
was, therefore, a consequence that God should not interfere with the liberty
once granted to man, that is, that He should retain in Himself the action of
His prescience and prepotency, by which He could have intervened, so that
man should not fall into danger, in attempting to enjoy his own freedom, in
an evil mode. For had He thus intervened, He would have rescinded the
freedom of the will, which, in reason and goodness, He had bestowed. Then
let it be supposed that he had intervened, that He had destroyed the freedom
of the will, by calling him back from the tree by not permitting the
tempting serpent to converse with the woman, would not Marcion exclaim, O
futile, unstable, unfaithful Lord, rescinding that which He had established!
Why did he bestow the freedom of the will, if He must interfere with it? Why
did He interfere, if He bestowed it? Let Him then choose the point in which
He shall charge Himself with error, whether in its bestowment, or in its
rescission, &c."
Your statement, that "supernatural grace is the cause of spiritual life in
man," we believe to be most certainly true, and we avow the same thing. Yet
there was one mode of spiritual life in Adam, and there is another mode in
us, in whom supernatural grace alone produces this life, while Adam had,
together with this grace, the image of God unimpaired and uncorrupted, and
therefore had spiritual life in both modes, the natural and supernatural.
But these things will be introduced, appropriately, in another place.
Your second argument, from the appendix of the law, is plainly in the same
condition. This seems to be its scope. If God, in the case of election and
reprobation, had reference to men considered in a merely natural state,
(that is, with the same ambiguity, and on the supposition which we have
denied above,) He would not have ordained spiritual punishment, opposed not
only to animal, but is spiritual good, for transgression of a law, which
might be observed without supernatural grace; for it is in accordance with
equity (which point was also regarded in the law of the twelve tables) that
the punishment should be adapted to the crime; -- But God ordained
punishment of this kind; --
Therefore, He did not have reference to men, considered in a natural
condition. In reference to the antecedent of the Major, I will say nothing;
I have already spoken often on that point. The consequent is denied. It
would be true, if both sins or evil deeds and their punishments were
estimated only from the deed (which the law forbids), and according to its
kind. But there are many other things, by which the gravity of offenses is
usually, and most justly estimated; the author of the law, the author of the
crime, its object, end, and circumstances. We must consider the author of
the law, for the authority of a law, enacted by an emperor, is greater than
that of one, enacted by a tribune, of one imposed by God, than of one
imposed by man. The author of the crime, whether he commands it, or
personally commits it. For a crime is greater which is committed through the
persuasion of an enemy, than one committed through that of a master or
father. The same distinction may be applied to the personal commission of
sin. The object, for an offense, against a parent, is more heinous than
against a stranger, against one’s self and family, than against a person not
thus connected, against God than against man. The end, for it is a greater
sin, if you transgress a law with an unimportant end or no end in view, than
if the same thing is done of necessity, if with all unworthy and wicked
design than if with a worthy and good design.
What shall I say in reference to circumstances? What I have already said is,
in my judgment, sufficient. But he, who transgresses the law of God, is
guilty of these aggravating particulars, of which even the first, alone, is
sufficient for the infliction, with the utmost justice, of spiritual
punishment. Should he regard lightly the legislator, God? Adding the second,
should he listen to an enemy, the enemy of God, and of his race, and of the
universe, Should he, the recent workmanship of God, and the tenant of
Paradise, transgress the recent commandment of God, Adding the third
particular, should he rush forward against himself, his family, and God, not
ignorantly, but with due warning? Do not these, my brother, seem to you to
be cases of the greatest aggravation? Are they not worthy of bodily and
spiritual punishment? As in general, so in special or particular law, the
same rule is to be observed. The law was particular, and that in a natural
requirement, which man could perform naturally, as we have before said. Here
perhaps, you will say, that it is improper that supernatural punishment
should be imposed in reference to a natural offense. But consider all those
things which I have just said. Man transgressed the law of God, from which
he has just received the blessings of nature and of grace, and to whom he
owed all things as his Supreme Ruler. He transgressed by the persuasion of
the Devil, the public and sworn enemy of God, of the universe, and of the
human race, to listen to whom, once only, is to renounce God. At the time of
his transgression, he was the recent work of God, the heir of all natural
and supernatural good, the inhabitant of Paradise, the foster-child of
heaven, the lord of all things, servant of God alone. Man transgressed,
using violence against himself, and bringing sin and death, and all evils
upon himself and his posterity, dishonouring God in himself, though
forewarned by the God of truth, and prescient, in his own mind, of coming
evil. He transgressed in a matter, most trivial, entirely unnecessary, of
the least importance, when he really abounded in the blessings of the whole
world, and this with a most unworthy and plainly impious design, that he
might be like God, "knowing good and evil." How could he, who was not
faithful and obedient in a matter of the least importance, be faithful in
one of great importance, He transgressed in a beastly manner, served his
belly and appetite, blind to all things belonging to heaven and earth,
except the flame of lust, wickedly placed before his eyes, deaf to all
things except the voice of the devil. Here, if we please to glance at other
circumstances, how many and how strong arguments exist for most just though
most severe damnation! Truly, was that, in many respects, an infinite fall,
which brought infinite ruin. But should any one affirm, that it was an
unworthy thing that man should be condemned for so small a matter, let him
consider these two things; first, it was an unworthy thing that man, in "so
small a matter," should disobey the mandate of his Supreme Ruler, of the
author of nature, of grace, and of his salvation; secondly, it is not a
small matter, which was ordained for the manifestation of due obedience in
natural things, and as a just method of the perception of supernatural
blessings. God willed that Adam should, by this sign, manifest his religious
and voluntary obedience in natural things, and in this way suitably exert
himself to attain supernatural blessings. Does this seem a small matter,
when he acted contrary to the will of God, and to all natural and
supernatural blessings in a thing of so little importance? But, to proceed;
do you think, my brother, that this punishment can be inflicted on man more
justly, if considered in his fallen state, than if considered in his natural
condition, This is the amount of your argument. I have not indeed hesitated
to affirm the contrary. I say that the sin of Adam was more heinous, because
he sinned when unfallen, than if he had sinned, as a fallen being. Consider
the simple fact in the case of man. You will, I know, declare that it was a
more unworthy thing that man, in a state of integrity, should become the
slave of sin, than if, in a sinful state, he should fall into sin. It is,
therefore, more just that Adam, at the time of that transgression, should be
considered as unfallen, than in reference to the fall which afterwards
supervened. This illustrates the truth of the righteousness of God. As to
your statement, "it seems unjust that the transgression could deserve
eternal and spiritual death, &c." I wonder, indeed, that it could have been
made by you. For you are not ignorant that the law of God, whether general
or particular, is the appointment of the present course according to which
we both worship God in the discharge of duty, and reach the goal of
supernatural grace. As a traveler, to whom his Lord has prescribed the mode
of his journey, if he departs from the prescribed path, by the same act
renounces both his journey and its goal, by his own sin, but if he remains
in the path, he performs his duty, thus I judge that it was necessary that
Adam should be treated. The unhappy traveler left the right path. Did he
not, therefore, also renounce the good which God had graciously set before
him? If he had remained in the path he certainly would have attained the
goal, of grace, not of merit. How, not of merit? Because, by not keeping the
path, the servant loses both his way and his life, as the proper cause of
his own evil, but by keeping the way, he obtains life, as the result of his
journey. Life is proposed, of grace, not of merit, both to the obedient and
to the disobedient, as the result of pursuing the right path. In this way
the obedient obtains grace, and the disobedient is the cause to himself that
he does not obtain grace, and, by his own act, forfeit the life, which
depends on that grace.
The third argument, from the instigator of the transgression, and the
fourth, from the mode of temptation, are disposed of in the same answer. The
third argument is this; "man could resist the Devil only through
supernatural grace; therefore the law could not be observed without
supernatural grace"—and the fourth; "the mode of temptation was such that it
could not be successfully resisted by man, if destitute of supernatural
grace; therefore, the law could not be observed without supernatural grace."
In the first place, though I should admit both arguments, in
reference to general law according to our previous
distinction, yet we might, with propriety, deny their validity in reference
to that particular law, which enjoined a natural act, situated properly and
absolutely within the capability of nature, for it is as truly natural not
to eat that which is bad in its nature or effect, as it is to eat that which
is good. It was then within the capability of man not to sin, for the
refusal or neglect to eat was in the capability of man, of his own natural
power.
In the second place, we must make a distinction in reference to both those
arguments, even when referred to the general law of God, concerning that
which is called supernatural grace. For, as in nature, the work of
Providence is threefold, to sustain a thing as to its existence, to govern
it as to its action, and to protect or preserve it as it may be liable to
destruction, so also in the pious, the work of grace is threefold, for it is
accustomed to sustain, and to govern, and to protect them. It always
sustains, because inherent and common grace is permanent, but it rules and
protects, or preserves when and as it chooses; for this act, as it is
assisting and not inherent, is particular, and the free act of variable
grace. This distinction having been stated, we thus judge concerning these
arguments. Man was never without supernatural grace, either inherent or
habitual: he was not without assisting grace, except in that particular act,
in which God did not govern, did not preserve, because it was an act of
nature, which must be tested in its own mode, which has been allotted to it
by the infinite wisdom of God. For, as Tertullian says—God retired, from the
administration not of all grace, but of supernatural grace from the time
when he said to man, "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat.
But of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it,"
(Gen. ii. 16 and 17,) and committed the whole matter, of compact and solely,
to the nature of man." Indeed he wholly transferred to the will of man,
according to the law of his nature, the power to render or not to render
obedience in all matters pertaining to nature. But "he could not resist the
devil, and the mode of the temptation was irresistible." This is denied; for
if he could, according to his nature, refrain from eating of the forbidden
fruit, he could, in this, resist the devil, and the mode of the temptation
was not irresistible. He could refrain from eating, because that was, in the
simplest sense, natural, and, by compact, as we have just said, was placed
in the power of man. But he did not refrain from eating, certainly, because
he did not wish to do so, but he willingly consented to the temptation,
concerning which point, we have already under Prop. 9 noticed the opinion of
Augustine.
In the observance of general law, the case is different, cause, as we have
before said, the law operates on nature and adjusts nature to the
supernatural, and it could not be observed, nor indeed could the devil be
resisted, without supernatural grace.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FOURTEENTH
PROPOSITION
My object, in the arguments which I now present, is to prove that Adam, and
in him, all the human race, were created in a state of supernatural grace,
that is, that in their original condition they had, not only natural
attributes, but also supernatural grace, either by the act of creation or
superinfusion. From which I conclude, that God, in the act of
predestination, and preterition or reprobation, could consider no one in a
merely natural state. My first argument is taken from the nature of the
divine image, to which or in which man was created. Another argument is
deduced from the law, which was imposed on Adam, and on all men in him,
which I assert, was not to be observed without supernatural grace. The
former argument was discussed in my reply to the answer to the tenth
Proposition, and I refer to what was then stated.
We will now consider the latter, and, in the first place, its Major, which
supposes that the law, given to Adam, was enacted for all men, with the
addition, as proof, of the fact that all men have sinned in Adam, and become
partakers of his transgression. You discuss this Major Proposition, without
reference to the proof. I notice the mode in which you assail the former,
and what force is possessed by the latter for its confirmation. You make a
distinction in the law, imposed on Adam, and regard it as having a two-fold
relation, first, as common and natural; second, as particular. You say that
the former was enacted for all men, the latter, not for all men. I agree
with what you say concerning common or general law, and shall hereafter make
use of it to confirm my own proposition. I do not, in all respects, assent
to what you say concerning particular law. The law, concerning the forbidden
tree, had, in part, a particular reference, and in part, a general one. For
it is symbolical, and consists, therefore, of two parts, the symbol and that
signified by it. The symbol was abstinence from the forbidden tree; the
thing signified was abstinence from disobedience and evil, and the trial of
obedience. So far as abstinence from disobedience and evil was prescribed by
that law, it was a general law. But as the law required an observance of a
symbolical character, it must be considered in a two fold light, either as
prescribing symbolical observance in general, or the observance of that
particular symbol. So far as the law should prescribe the observance of any
symbol, in general, to test the obedience of man, it would, to that extent,
be general. For God would have determined to test the obedience of all men
by some symbol, either this one or some other, if it had been their lot to
be born in a state of integrity. I prove this first from the fact that He
purposed that the condition of all men should be the same with that of Adam,
if they should be born in the state in which Adam was created, in respect to
the image of God. Secondly, it was most suitable that the experiment of
obedience should be made in a matter which was indifferent; but a law, which
commands or forbids any thing indifferent is symbolical and ceremonial.
But, so far as the observance, prescribed by the law, had reference to that
particular symbol, namely, abstinence from
the fruit of the forbidden tree, it can, in one sense, be called general,
and in another, it may be particular. It was general as prescribed to Adam
and Eve, the parents and social head of the human race, in whom, as in its
origin and root, was then contained the whole human race. It was particular,
as prescribed to the same persons as individuals, and as it, perhaps, would
not have been imposed on other human beings, if they had, at that time, been
born, and considered in themselves, and not in their first parents. I say
perhaps; for you know that there are those who think, that if the first
human beings had maintained their integrity, that their descendants would
have been born and would have dwelt in Paradise, and this idea has some
probability. For if that earthly paradise was a symbol of the heavenly
kingdom, as seems probable from the fact that the third heaven, the
residence of the blessed, is called, in the Scripture, paradise, it is most
probable that no one of the human race would have been excluded from that
paradise on earth, if he had not first rendered himself worthy of the
heavenly paradise. This point may, however, be left without decision.
That the law (to come to the argument of my Major) which Adam transgressed,
was enacted for all men, I proved by an irrefragable argument, which you
passed by. "Sin is the transgression of the law." (1 John iii. 4.) The law
can not be transgressed by him for whom it was not enacted. Hence that law,
which Adam transgressed, was enacted for all who are said to have sinned in
him. But that law was the same which is called particular by you. More
briefly; the law, which all men transgressed in Adam was enacted for all
men. But all men transgressed, in Adam, the law concerning the forbidden
tree. For against no other law is Adam said to have sinned, and, indeed, we
are all said to be guilty of the sin committed against that law. Therefore
that law was enacted for all men. In whatever respect, then, it is
considered, it is equally in my favour, and is equally adapted to sustain my
sentiment.
I come now to the Minor. "But that law could not be obeyed without
supernatural grace." You grant this in reference to the general law, you
deny it concerning that in which the eating of the fruit of that tree was
forbidden. I may assent to your position for the sake of the argument, and
from that position sustain my proposition. A law which can not be observed
without supernatural grace, should be imposed only on those to whom
supernatural grace has been given by God; --
But that general law could not be observed without supernatural grace; --
Therefore, it should be imposed only on those to whom supernatural grace was
given by God. It was imposed on Adam, and, in him, upon all men. Therefore,
Adam, and, in him, all men, had supernatural grace. Therefore, they could
not be considered in their natural condition by God in the act of
predestination and reprobation. This might suffice for my purpose. I affirm,
however, that even the particular law concerning the forbidden tree could
not be obeyed without supernatural grace, not indeed so far as the external
act of abstinence from the fruit of that tree was prescribed, but as, under
that symbol, obedience was commanded, and it was enjoined on man to live not
according to man, but according to God. This you acknowledge when you say
that "these acts" (eating and abstaining), "were not both left with him by
the requisition and arrangement of the special law declared by God, though
the power to eat is to abstain from that fruit was in fact absolutely
possessed by man. That law, however, was to be observed, not according to
fact only, but according to the arrangement of that particular law. You say
that my argument "pertains to the mode of general law." Let that be
admitted, and still sustain my proposition, as I have before demonstrated,
and I have also shown that, in the law which you call particular, there is
something of the nature of general law. Those arguments are, therefore, in
this respect valid. The first also is sustained, as is apparent from our
previous statements. For as the law required obedience which should consist,
not only in the external deed, but in the external disposition of the mind,
for that reason it could not be obeyed without supernatural grace.
My second argument does not seem to have been understood by you in
accordance with my meaning. The design of the argument was—and in this
consists its force—that spiritual punishment could not be inflicted for the
transgression of that law, to the observance of which spiritual good was not
promised. But spiritual good was not promised to the observance of this law,
if, indeed, it could be observed without supernatural grace. For
supernatural grace and supernatural happiness are analogous. Hence it
follows, that if spiritual punishment was the penalty of the transgression
of that law, then, also spiritual good was promised to the observance of the
same, and, therefore, it could be observed only by supernatural grace;
otherwise nature could, by its own fact, obtain supernatural good. Here we
must consider a three-fold distinction in the transgression and observance
of law. First, a single transgression of law deserves punishment, but reward
pertains only to those who observe the law even to the end; secondly, the
violation of one precept deserves punishment, but reward is bestowed only on
those who have kept all its precepts; thirdly, the violation of a precept
may be estimated from the omission either of an external act or of an
internal feeling, or of both at once, also, from the intention, so that he,
who fails in one of these points, may be considered a transgressor, but
observance is judged of from all these united, nor can it be regarded as
perfect if it is not complete in all these points. I acknowledge that what
you say concerning the heinousness of the sin perpetrated by our first
parents is very true, nor do I think that its heinousness can be declared in
words. But how do you infer that my argument is designed to set forth that
punishment would be inflicted more justly, on a man, if he should violate
the law, when he was corrupt and sinful by nature, than if he should do the
same thing, when he was pure by nature, These states of human nature were
placed in opposition by me, but I contrasted man in a natural condition with
one endued with supernatural grace. Punishment is inflicted with greater
justice on the latter than on the former; indeed it would be inflicted
unjustly on the former, if the law could not be observed without
supernatural grace; and if the observance of the law had not the promise of
spiritual good, spiritual punishment is inflicted unjustly on the
transgression of that law.
I will not now speak of my last two arguments and your answers to them, both
because so much has been said on the preceding points, and because you
concede to me that man was not without habitual, supernatural grace. I
conclude then that man could not be considered in a merely natural condition
by God in the act of predestination, since he was not in that state. In
this, then, we agree. But you say, "these arguments have no weight against
the opinion which considers man in general." I answer, that these arguments
prove that man could not have been considered in general, for he could not
have been considered in a merely natural condition. But in the state of
supernatural grace, he was not considered as reprobate or passed by. For, in
reprobation or preterition, man is left in the state of nature, which can
have nothing supernatural or divine, as is stated in your Theses. Also, that
state of supernatural grace has its measure and proportion to supernatural
felicity according to the providence of God. Moreover as to those, on whom
God wills to bestow supernatural happiness, by the affirmative act of His
providence, on them he cannot, by the negative act of preterition, will not
to bestow the same happiness, unless he has considered them as failing to
attain, by those supernatural means, to that happiness, but as either about
to sin, or as having already in fact transgressed, of their own free will.
Otherwise there would be two contrary acts of God in reference to one
subject, considered in the same relation, and performed at the same time.
_________________________________________________________________
FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, because the grace of predestination, or that prepared for man in
predestination, is Evangelical, not Legal; but that grace was prepared only
for man considered as a sinner. That it is Evangelical is clear, because the
decree of predestination is peremptory. It has reference, then, not to Legal
grace, of which a man may not make use, as in the case of transgression of
law, and yet be saved, but to Evangelical grace, by which he must be saved,
or excluded from salvation.
Again, the grace, prepared in predestination, is that of the remission of
sins, and of regeneration, that is, of the turning of sin and to God, by the
mortification of the old, and the vivification of the new man.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION
I accede to your first statement, if it be correctly understood, but some
explanation may be necessary concerning the second. In the assumption which
you make, there should be a distinction, for it is false, if referred to
Evangelical grace, understood with a general reference to nature; if that
grace be understood with reference to ourselves, it is very true. But, as
you know, it is fallacious to argue from the concrete to the abstract. I
will explain the subject in a few words. In supernatural Evangelical grace
there are two parts, one to preserve those who are now in a state of grace;
the other to gain those who are not in that state. The order of this grace,
considered according to nature, is one thing; considered according to
ourselves it is another. The order of nature is that they, who are in a
state of grace, should be preserved (as in the election and predestination
of angels), and afterwards that they, who are not in that state, should be
brought into it, as is done for men. Considered according to ourselves, who
have fallen from grace, the order is different. It is necessary that they,
who have fallen, should first be raised up, as Christ does in the gospel,
and then be kept, as He will do for us eternally, in heaven, when we shall
be like the angels. Your second statement, then, is false in the abstract,
if you say that Evangelical grace, in general, is not prepared for man,
except as he is considered sinful, for it was prepared for man in the
abstract and in common, as God also testified to man, in the symbol of the
tree of life, placed in Eden. But if you speak of Evangelical grace, in the
latter sense, that is considered in this mode and order, then indeed I
accede to your statement. But then the conclusion will not be valid, as we
have just said. For the Evangelical grace of God is one in its substance,
but two-fold in its mode and order, which mode and order does not change the
substance of the thing. Hence it was not at all to the purpose that your
first statement might be sustained, which we also, if it is rightly
understood, strongly affirm.
Your statement that "a man may not make use of Legal grace and yet be
saved," is a doubtful one, unless it be fully explained, and as I know that
you understand it; but this does not relate to the question. Finally,
Evangelical grace, by your limitation to the remission of sins,
regeneration, &c., is, as you also, my brother, perceive from what we have
now said, rendered incomplete, because you pass over preservation, which is
one essential part of it. In other respects we accede to your proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE FIFTEENTH PROPOSITION
My argument may be stated thus: -- Evangelical grace is prepared only for
man, considered as a sinner; -- But the grace of predestination, or that
prepared for man in predestination, is Evangelical; -- Therefore, the grace
of predestination is prepared only for man, considered as a sinner. This is
a syllogism in form, mode, and its three terms. Hence it includes nothing
else and nothing more than is in the premises. Though Evangelical grace,
considered in general, might have two parts, yet I have restricted the
Evangelical grace, which was prepared for man. But grace, considered in the
abstract, was not prepared for man, but only one part of it; that is, the
acquisition of those who are not in a state of grace, not the preservation
of those who are in a state of grace, for no one of men has been kept in
that state of grace, which he obtained at his creation, all have fallen.
There is, therefore, in this case no fallacy from the concrete to the
abstract. I use the term Evangelical grace in my first and second statements
in entirely the same manner; not in one case "according to nature" and, in
the other, "according to ourselves" or vice versa, but in both cases
"according to ourselves," namely, as that which was prepared, for men, not
angels. Therefore, by your own acknowledgment, both my statements are true.
You say that "it is false, in the abstract, that Evangelical grace is not
prepared for man, except as he is considered as sinful, for it was prepared
for man in the abstract and in common, as God also testified to man in the
symbol of the tree of life placed in Eden." I reply—there is an equivocation
in the word "prepared," and when that is removed, the truth of my view will
be manifest. The preparation of grace is either that of predestination or of
providence, as used in contra-distinction to the former. In providence,
sufficient grace is prepared, and if it is efficacious, as some think, it is
not finally efficacious. In predestination, grace, which is efficacious, and
indeed finally efficacious, is prepared. Predestination superadds to
providence, as the School-men say, fire certainty of the event. In
providence is prepared that general grace, which pertains promiscuously to
all men; in predestination is prepared that particular grace, which is
peculiar to the elect. In providence is prepared both Legal and Evangelical
grace; in predestination only Evangelical grace. In providence is prepared
grace communicable both in and out of paradise; in predestination is
prepared grace, communicable only out of paradise. It is true that God
symbolized, by the tree of life, general not particular grace, Legal not
Evangelical grace, grace communicable in paradise, and, finally, sufficient,
not efficacious, grace. Therefore, the grace, which God symbolized by the
tree of life, is that of providence, not of predestination. But Evangelical
grace, which is finally efficacious, particular not general, only
communicable out of paradise, and which is prepared for man in
predestination, is no other than that which is adapted only to man
considered as a sinner. I refer, then, in my first and second statement, to
Evangelical grace, in this mode and order. Therefore, my conclusion is
valid. And, though grace is the same, in substance, and varies only in its
mode and relation, yet that variation of mode, is a reason that grace,
constituted in that mode and order, can certainly be prepared only for the
sinner. The whole matter will be more manifestly evident, if I conclude by
the addition of proofs of the Minor of the preceding syllogism. Evangelical
grace, by which man is in fact saved, which consists in the remission of
sins and in regeneration, belongs only to man considered as a sinner; -- But
the grace, prepared in predestination for man, is Evangelical grace, by
which man is in fact saved, consisting in remission of sins and in
regeneration; -- Therefore, the grace, prepared for man in predestination,
does not belong to man except as he is considered as a sinner. Consequently
man was not considered by God, in the act of predestination, in his natural
condition.
If any one should argue thus, "Evangelical grace was prepared for man in the
abstract and in common; -- But the grace, prepared for man in
predestination, is Evangelical grace;
Therefore, grace was prepared in predestination for man, considered in the
abstract and in common," he will, on more than one account, be chargeable
with fallacy. In the first place, the Major, considered in the abstract, is
false. For that grace, which preserves its subjects in their primitive
state, which you call, also, Evangelical in respect to the angels, was not
prepared for man. Again, there are four terms in the syllogism. For, in the
Major, Evangelical grace is spoken of in the abstract; in the Minor, it is
spoken of in the concrete. If it be said that it is understood in the Minor
in the same manner as in the Major, then the Minor, also, is false. For the
grace prepared for man in predestination is Evangelical grace, in the
concrete, and understood in respect to us. I use your phraseology. But what
if I should deny that the grace which is bestowed on angels, in election and
predestination can be called Evangelical, and should ask for the proof of
your statement? This I could do with propriety and justice. For it is
certain, especially as the gospel is explained to us in the Holy Scriptures,
that the grace bestowed on angels can not be called Evangelical. The sum of
the gospel is this, "Repent and believe the gospel" or "believe in Jesus
Christ, the Son of God, and your sins shall be remitted unto you, and ye
shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, and afterwards, eternal life."
These expressions are by no means adapted to the elect angels.
If you say that it is not Evangelical in the mode in which the gospel is
adapted to sinful men, yet, it can be called Evangelical as, according to
it, they are preserved in their own state, you will permit me to ask the
proof of that statement. In the weakness of my capacity, I can conceive of
no other reason for that sentiment than that Christ is also called the
Mediator of angels, and that they are said to be elect in him. You know,
however, that this is in controversy among the learned, and we have already
presented some thoughts concerning it. But, even with the concession that
Christ can be called the Mediator of angels, I can not persuade myself that
the grace, which was bestowed on the angels, was prepared or obtained for
them by any merit of Christ, or any work which he performed, in their
behalf, before God. Grace, which Christ did not obtain, can not, in my
opinion, be called Evangelical. Again, I think that, in general, there is a
two-fold mode and way of obtaining supernatural and eternal happiness. One
of strict justice and Legal, the other of mercy and Evangelical, as there
is, also, a two-fold covenant with God, of works and of faith, of justice
and of grace, Legal and Evangelical. In the former mode and relation,
happiness is obtained by perfect obedience to the law, given to the creature
by God; in the latter, happiness is obtained by remission of disobedience
and the imputation of righteousness. The human mind can not conceive any
other mode; at least, no other is revealed in the Scriptures. These two
modes have, to each other, this relation, that the former precedes, as is
required by the justice of God, by the condition presented to the creature,
and by the very nature of the case; the other follows, if, in the former
way, happiness can not be allotted to the creature, and it seems good to the
Deity, also, to propose the latter, which depends on the mere will of God.
For He can punish or pardon disobedience. Both modes are used in reference
to man, as the Scriptures declare in many places, and briefly in Rom. viii.
3. "For what the Law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh,
God, sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin,
condemned sin in the flesh."
I think that the former mode only was used in reference to the angels, and
that God determined to treat the angels according to the Legal covenant
strictly of justice and works; but to display all His goodness in the
salvation of men. This is apparent from the fact that the angels, who fell,
sinned irremediably and without hope of pardon, and the other angels did not
obtain pardon for sins, for they had not committed them, but were preserved
and confirmed in their own state, through the grace, it may be, which they
received through the mediation of Christ, and which he communicated to them,
not, in a correct sense, by that which Christ either merited or obtained for
them by any work performed in their behalf, before God. These things,
however, are irrelevant.
In my statement that it is possible for man not to use Legal grace, and yet
be saved, I intended to convey the same idea which you also have expressed,
that God can, if he will, move iniquity "as a cloud;" and I think that the
apostle says the same in Romans iv. 5. "To him that worketh not," (that is,
who does not fulfill the law, and therefore, does not use Legal grace,) "but
believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for
righteousness."
In limiting Evangelical grace to the remission of sins and regeneration, I
committed no fault. For I explained it, not in the abstract, (if it is ever
so used), but in the concrete. But, thus explained, it excludes that part
which you call "the grace of preservation" (unless that phrase is applied to
perseverance in a state of restoration). We were not saved, in the primitive
state, by that grace, for it was not prepared for in that state, by
predestination. For we all fell and sinned. Here, again, there is need of
the admonition that we are not now treating of angels, therefore those
things which may be common to angels and men, are here, according to the law
of general and specific relations kaq o[lou, to be so restricted as to apply
only to men, otherwise, in discussing the species, we shall treat of the
genus.
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SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, because the reelection of a creature, in his natural state, of a
creature, on whom is imposed a law only to be performed by grace, is a cause
of sin by the removal or the non-bestowment of that which alone can restrain
from sin. This is grace. According to which view this sentiment is
equivalent to the former, which ascribes the ordination of sin to a decree,
from which sin necessarily exists.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE SIXTEENTH PROPOSITION
The proposition can not be predicated of man in his primitive integrity, for
the law, to Adam in his integrity, was not only his glory, but it was to be
performed both by nature and grace, since his nature was rightly adjusted to
grace, but he fell in a matter pertaining to nature, and capable of
performance by nature, which did not belong to general law, which is here
the subject of discussion, but to that particular law, which had reference
only to nature, and absolutely pertained to it, and was to be observed by
its power alone, as was declared to Adam by God, as shown in the answer to
the fourteenth proposition. In reference to ourselves, however, as we now
are, it can be stated, with the utmost propriety, that the law can be
observed only by grace. Indeed, it can not be observed at all by us, but its
observance is imputed of grace and is apprehended by faith in Christ. The
statement, also, is erroneous that "the reelection of a creature, in his
natural state, is a cause of sin by the removal or non-bestowment of
restraining grace," if it is understood in a universal sense. It is a
partial cause of sin, when removed or not bestowed, if there was obligation
to bestow it, but if there was no such obligation, it can not, with
propriety, be called a partial cause of sin. If there was obligation to
bestow it, there is responsibility, it there was no such obligation, there
is no responsibility for the sin, even if that grace should be wanting. This
is taught by nature itself, and it is very fitly illustrated by Clemens
Alexandrinus, in two places. But, in the law, there was something natural,
which Adam could perform by nature, and something adjusted to grace, for
which he could not, by nature alone, be sufficient.
Therefore, though Adam sinned against natural law, if he did sin in a matter
pertaining to nature, (in which grace was not due), his own will alone was
in fault, not destitution of grace, as evidently happened to him in the
particular law, given to him in Adam. The conclusion, then, is unsound.
Of the ordination of sin, and the decree of God, and what is signified by
ordination, properly understood, we have spoken, in answer to the sixth
proposition. Your argument, that sin, therefore, necessarily exists, is
inconclusive; since the Divine ordination would perform nothing unobligatory
upon it, but that is done by him who commits sin; and it omits nothing
obligatory upon it, but must perform and most wisely perfect all thing. But
there has been, in the answer to the sixth proposition, a sufficient
discussion of this whole subject.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SIXTEENTH
PROPOSITION
When I speak of grace, I do not exclude nature, for the former presupposes
the latter. The phrase "only to be performed by grace" is equivalent to
this, "not to be performed without grace," the word "only" referring, not to
the exclusion of nature, but to the necessary inclusion of grace. But these
antecedents being supposed—a law was given to man, which he could not
perform without grace—and grace was not bestowed—the conclusion follows that
the cause of sin was not man, but he, who imposed such a law and did not
give the means of its observance, or, to speak more correctly, a
transgression of a law cannot be called sin, when the law is unjust, as that
of God, reaping where He has not sown, which is far from a good and a just
God, and its transgression is necessary, not voluntary, on account of an
inability not to transgress. It is, then, in all respects, true, that he,
who does not bestow that without which sin can not be avoided, or removes
that without which the law can not be observed, is truly the author of sin,
or rather the cause that the law is not observed, which non-observance, can
not have the relation of sin. The condition, "if there was obligation to
bestow restraining grace," is added, in this case, in vain. For God is,
necessarily, under obligation to bestow on man the power to keep that law,
which He imposes on him, unless, indeed, man has deprived himself of that
power, by his own fault, in which case, God is not under obligation to
restore it. That, however, was not the case in the primitive state of man,
before his sin. In this sense, I grant that he, who is not under obligation
to bestow the power, to observe the law and to avoid sin, is not the author
of sin, if he does not bestow it; but this statement should be added, that
God is under obligation to give that power, if He gave the law, the
observance of which necessarily implies the power. God does not, indeed, owe
any thing to any person, in an absolute sense, for no one has given that to
Him which should be repaid, but God can, by His own act, place Himself under
obligation to man, either by promise, or by requiring an act of him. By
promise, if He has made it absolutely or on a condition, then He is a
debtor, absolutely or conditionally; "God is not unrighteous to forget your
work." (Heb. vii. 10.) By requiring an act, He is placed under obligation to
bestow the power necessary for the performance of the act. If He does not
bestow it, and yet, by an enactment of a law, requires the performance of
the act, then He, not man, is the cause of the transgression of that law.
In reference to those antecedents, whether a law was imposed on man, to be
observed without grace, or not, and whether man received, in his primitive
state, supernatural grace, there has been sufficient discussion under
propositions tenth and fourteenth. Nor is it to the purpose to say that "if
he sinned in a matter pertaining to nature, (in which grace was not due,)
his own will alone was in fault, not destitution of grace"; who denies that
statement, if that law could be observed by the powers of nature? But I deny
that such was the case in that particular law given to Adam, and the reasons
for this denial have been already given in my review of your answer to the
fourteenth proposition. We have also remarked, at sufficient length, in the
sixth proposition, concerning the ordination of sin, and how it is made,
according to the view of Calvin and Beza, the basis of the divine decree. I
grant that the ordination of God does nothing unduly, but as an ordination
of sin, such as they attribute to the Deity, is not in harmony with the
character of God, it is not wonderful that, from it, something undue should
he attributed to God.
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SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In reference to the third question, it is not in controversy whether God,
foreseeing the sins of some, prepared for their deserved punishment, but
whether, foreseeing the sins of those thus passed by and left in their
natural state, He prepared punishment for them from eternity. The latter
does not seem to me to be true.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE SEVENTEENTH PROPOSITION
They, for whose sins God prepared merited punishment, are not the elect:
therefore they are passed by and reprobate. It has been before demonstrated
that they were passed by, in a mode in harmony with the wisdom of God.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE SEVENTEENTH
PROPOSITION
It is not true, universally, that "they, for whose sins God prepared merited
punishment, are not the elect," for He prepared merited punishment even for
the sins of the elect, both by laying them upon Christ, that he might
expiate them, and by sometimes inflicting the consequences of sin even on
the elect, that they may learn how they have deserved to be treated forever,
and how they would have been treated, if God had not determined to have
mercy upon them. It is true, however, if it is understood with reference to
the preparation of punishment by the decree now under discussion. For by
that decree, the merited punishment of sin, is not only prepared, but it is,
in fact and forever, inflicted on sinners. It is indeed true, rather, that,
by the decree, punishment is prepared for sin, not as merited and due, but
as not remitted by mercy, which forgives the debt to some. This distinction
is required by the order of election, and of predamnation, its opposite. For
election remits merited and due punishment. Its opposite, preordination,
does not remit merited and due punishment. This then is inflicted, by
damnation, which is the execution of predamnation, not as merited or due,
but as not remitted.
Again, a distinction is to be made between the preparation of punishment,
made by the just Providence of God, and that made by the decree of divine
predamnation, which is the opposite of election. For the former is avoided
by all who repent and believe in the Son. The latter is avoided by none,
since the decree of predamnation is irrevocable and peremptory. The question
is not whether God prepared punishment for those passed by in a mode in
harmony with the wisdom of God"; for who denies that, if any are passed by,
they are passed by in a manner in harmony with the wisdom of God? But the
question is, whether God, foreseeing the sin of those, so passed by and left
in their natural state, as has been explained, prepared punishment for them
by the decree of predamnation, which does not seem very probable to me. I
have presented arguments for this opinion, which we will now consider.
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EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In the first place, from what has been already stated: since punishment can
not be justly prepared, of the mere act of the divine pleasure, for those
passed by on account of foreseen sin, which must be committed, as the
necessary result of that preterition and reelection in a state of nature.
Secondly, the punishment ordained for them is spiritual, but spiritual
punishment can not be ordained for those falling from their original state,
if spiritual reward, on the contrary, is not prepared for those who should
remain in their original state. But a reward of this kind was not prepared
for such, since they could, by mere natural power, remain in their original
state, and spiritual happiness could not be acquired by them.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION
In reference to the first argument, I deny:
1. that Adam was, to speak in general terms, passed by and left in a state
of nature by God, but, according to the mode of nature, he was left to
himself only in reference to a particular and natural act, which was in the
power of mere nature, and that he was carefully forewarned by God, and that
he received information from God, as by compact.
2. It is denied that sin was committed by him, of necessity, in view of that
preterition. For, if it was necessarily committed, it would have been a
habit, or passive quality in the nature of man; but it pertained to
capability, his will being free, and borne contingently in this or that
direction. It was not then perpetrated necessarily; therefore he committed
it contingently, (as the Scripture and the agreement of the church have
always declared,) according to the free natural power, which is that of the
will. The wise man rightly says in Eccl. vii. 27, "Lo, this only have I
found, that God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many
inventions."
Concerning the second argument, I remark that the word "also" should be
added to your proposition in this manner: "the punishment ordained for them
is also spiritual." For punishment of both kinds, of the body and of the
spirit, was ordained for them, by the testimony of Scripture. Your
assumption is denied, which states that a reward of this kind was not
prepared for them, in general, if they had remained in their original state.
For it is entirely evident that it was proposed to them in the covenant of
nature, and in the ordination to grace, if they should remain in their
original state, as was also signified in the symbol of the tree of life, and
declared in the denunciation of death. For what is death but the privation
of this and of the future life? What privation could there be, if man did
not possess life, on the one hand by nature, and on the other by the
ordination of grace to be consummated after the natural course of this life.
But to prove this statement, you add, "for they could, by mere natural
power, remain in their original state." This also is denied. They could do
so only in natural things, but by no means in things pertaining to grace, as
we have already frequently showed. The whole argumentation, then, is
erroneous. "But," you will say, "my reasoning is valid on the hypothesis of
Aquinas, who held that man, in the matter of election, was considered in his
natural condition." I reply in this manner:
1. This does not affect us, who affirm that God, in election, has reference
to man in general.
2. Though Aquinas uses that form of expression, yet it must be correctly
understood, since there may be ambiguity here, for the relation of election:
concerning which we have already presented the sentiment of Aquinas, in my
answer to the sixth proposition, is one thing, and that of the condition of
Adam, when he fell into sin, is another. It is evident from all his
writings, that it did not, even in a dream, enter into his mind, that Adam
was then merely in his natural condition. Could he, indeed, entertain such
an idea, who every where openly avows that man was made in a state of
supernatural grace, and expressly asserts this in his controversy with the
Master of Sentences. Therefore the hypothesis is false, and is erroneously
ascribed to Aquinas. If that is false, the argument also is without force.
Man also could not, by natural power alone, continue in his primitive
condition and state, (for I prefer these expressions to "origin," as more
clearly conveying the idea,) or by its means acquire spiritual happiness.
For that happiness is not the reward of labourers, but the inheritance of
children in Christ, bestowed by grace, not obtained by labour.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE EIGHTEENTH PROPOSITION
My first argument rests on the hypothesis of the definition by which
preterition is described in your Theses. That definition is in these words:
"Preterition is the act of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave certain of His creatures in their natural state, and not
to communicate to them the supernatural grace by which their pure nature
might be strengthened, or their corrupt nature might be restored, to the
declaration of the freedom of His own goodness, but a natural state is that
in which there can be nothing supernatural or divine," according to Thesis
10, of the same disputation. For those, who are passed by, are left in the
same natural state and condition in the same manner, as that from which
they, who are predestinated, are raised up. Being left in such a natural
state, "in which there can be nothing supernatural or divine," they can not
keep the law, which is not to be kept without supernatural grace. Hence
punishment can not be justly prepared for them on account of sin, committed
against a law which can not be kept by them. Therefore your first negation
seems to me to be irrelevant.
We are not treating of the mode in which Adam was left to his own nature and
given up to his own direction. The reelection of Adam to himself belongs,
not to the decree of predestination, but to that providence, in which God,
without the distinction of predestinate and reprobate, had reference to man,
newly created, and this, indeed, of necessity, according to the hypothesis
that He purposed to create man free. But we are treating of his reelection
in a natural state, which belongs to the decree of preterition. If you
should say that they who are passed by are considered by the Deity in Adam,
as partakers of the same things, which Adam had in his primitive state, I
answer that, thus considered, they were not left in that natural state,
which can effect nothing supernatural or divine. Hence the hypothesis will
be false, which seems only to rest on the definition of preterition given in
your Theses.
To your second negation, I reply—from the reelection in a natural state
"which can effect nothing supernatural or divine," (that is, neither of
itself, as I admit, nor by any thing superinfused, so that nothing
supernatural may be added to it, according to the hypothesis of your
definition,) sin must of necessity be committed by the person left, and it
can not be avoided without supernatural grace. The will is, indeed, free,
but not in respect to that act which can not be performed or omitted without
supernatural grace, just as it is not free in respect to that act by which
it wills the good of the universe and of itself. The reason of this is—there
is in man a passive quality, inclining him to that forbidden act, and
impelling the will to a consent to and commission of that act; and
necessarily impelling it, unless the will is endued with some power to
resist that motion, which power is supernatural grace, according to our
hypothesis. To explain this subject more fully, I add a few thoughts. The
negative act of the Deity, which preceded the sin of man, pertained either
to providence, or to reprobation, or to preterition, as distinct from
providence. In the first place, it did not pertain to reprobation.
1. Because the act of reprobation has reference to some men, not to all, for
not all are reprobates.
2. If sin exists from the act of reprobation, or not without it, then only
some men commit sin, and the rest do not commit it, that is, they sin, to
whom God had reference in the negative act of preterition, and they do not
sin, to whom He had no such reference. But all have sinned. It is not then
from that act.
3. If sin exists from the negative act of reprobation, it then follows that
Adam and all men in him are reprobates, for Adam, and, in him, all men have
sinned. This consequence is false, therefore the antecedent is also false.
4. By converse reasoning, if the sin of man resulted from the negative act
of preterition, then, from the affirmative act of predestination, which
exists at the same moment with the opposite of the act previously referred
to, for neither of these acts exists without the other, and they are
oppositely spoken of, results the perseverance of man in goodness, at least
in reference to this single act. But no man perseveres in the good in which
he was created, according to the affirmative act of predestination.
Therefore, also, the sin of man is not from the negative act of reprobation
or preterition.
5. To those, to whom God once, by the negative act of reprobation, denies
efficacious aid, He finally denies efficacious aid, otherwise the reprobate
are not reprobate. He does not deny, finally, to all men, efficacious aid,
for then all would be reprobate. Therefore, that act, by which efficacious
aid was denied once to all men, is not an act of reprobation. But some
negative act of the Deity preceded the sin of man, for otherwise man would
not have sinned. Therefore that is an act of providence.
Here, however, two things are to be considered. First, sin did not exist of
necessity from that negative act, but, in view of that act, it might or
might not be committed. For providence ordained man to eternal life, and
conferred means sufficient and necessary for the attainment of that life,
leaving, (as was suitable at the beginning), to the choice of man, the free
use of those means, and refusing to impede that liberty, lest it might
rescind that which it had established, as Tertullian happily remarks in the
passage quoted by you, (Advers. Marcion, lib. 2, resp. 14). From which act
of God, refusing to prevent sin efficaciously, (the opposite of which, the
affirmative act of determining to prevent it efficaciously, would be
inconsistent with the first institution of the human race, and the
affirmative act of determining to prevent a sin, finally, would have
pertained to predestination,) results the fact that man could commit sin,
not that he did commit it, but because God, in His infinite wisdom, saw,
from eternity, that man would fall at a certain time, that fall occurred
infallibly, only in respect to His prescience, not in respect to any act of
the divine will, either affirmative or negative. Whatever happens infallibly
in respect to an act of the divine will, the same also happens necessarily,
not only by the necessity of consequence but by that, also, of the
consequent. It may be proper, here, to mark the difference between what is
done infallibly and what is done necessarily. The former depends on the
infinity of the knowledge of God, the latter on the act of His will. The
former has respect only to the knowledge of God, to which it pertains to
know, infallibly and with certainty, contingent things; the latter belong to
the existence of the thing itself, the necessity for which resulted from the
will of God.
In the second place, the providence of God does not discriminate definitely
between the classes of men, as elect and reprobate. Therefore, that negative
act of God has reference to all men in general, and universally, without any
distinction of elect and reprobate. From these thing, I conclude, since that
negative act, which preceded sin, was not of reprobation or preterition, but
of providence as distinct from the former, it follows that God, in the act
of preterition, had not reference to men apart from sin or considered as not
yet sinners. For no negative act of preterition preceded, either in order or
in time, this negative act of providence. Likewise no other act of
preterition intervened between this act of providence and sin. If any act of
preterition intervened, an act of predestination also intervened. There was
no intervention of the latter, and, therefore, there was not of the former.
This act of predestination would be the preservation of some in goodness,
and their deliverance from possible sin. No one of mankind has been
preserved in goodness and delivered from possible sin, for all have sinned.
It was not, however, necessary to prove here that man sinned, not
necessarily but freely, for that point is not in controversy, but it was to
be shown, that, if preterition is supposed, man, nevertheless, sinned
freely, and not of necessity.
My second argument is also based on a hypothesis, which, in my opinion,
whether incorrect or correct your wisdom will decide, I have taken from your
Theses. The hypothesis consists of two parts; -- first, supernatural
happiness cannot be acquired by the powers of nature alone; secondly, the
law, given to Adam, could be observed by the powers of nature alone. The
first part is true. The second is contained in your Theses. Man is left in a
state of nature, which can effect nothing supernatural or divine. But yet he
was able to keep the law, otherwise God is unjust, who imposes a law, which
cannot be obeyed by the creature. Hence I concluded that spiritual
punishment ought not to be inflicted for the transgression of that law, to
the observance of which spiritual or supernatural reward is not promised.
But supernatural reward is not promised to the observance of a law, which
can be obeyed by the powers of nature alone, otherwise nature could acquire
that which is supernatural, therefore, spiritual punishment ought not to be
the penalty of the violation of the same law. Further, the law, imposed on
Adam, could be performed by the powers of nature alone, according to your
view, as I have understood it; therefore, spiritual punishment ought not to
be its penalty. But its penalty is spiritual; therefore it is unjust.
I will not, at this time, inquire whether such may or may not be the
consequence of your Theses, since you now say distinctly that a supernatural
reward was prepared for our first parents, if they should remain in their
original integrity. Therefore, I claim that my reasoning is valid, though
the hypothesis, on which it was based, is removed. From your own statement,
indeed, I deduced an inference in favour of my sentiment. That which was
prepared for all men on condition of the obedience, which they could render
the gift of divine grace, bestowed or to be bestowed on them, could not be
denied to some men by the sure and definite decree of God, except on account
of their foreseen disobedience. Eternal life was prepared for all men, on
condition of that obedience which they could render. Therefore, eternal life
could not be denied to some men, by the sure and definite decree of God,
that is, by preterition, except on account of their foreseen disobedience.
Therefore, also, men are considered by God, in the act of preterition, as
sinners; they are not, then, considered in general.
I do not touch the sentiment of Aquinas, except as it is explained in your
Theses. I might, however, require him to prove that God passed by man,
considered in a state of integrity, in which he had, not only natural, but
also supernatural endowments. I grant that supernatural happiness is that
inheritance of the children of God, but it would have been given to those,
who should remain in their primitive integrity, though in a different mode
from that in which it is bestowed on believers in Christ. It would have been
given to the former "of the works of the law;" it is given to the latter "of
faith;" to the former the reward would have been reckoned not "of grace, but
of debt;" (Rom. iv. 4), to the latter, as believers, it is "reckoned of
grace;" to the former, it would have been given by "the righteousness which
is of the law," which saith "that the man which doeth these things shall
live by them," to the latter by "the righteousness of faith, which speaketh
in this wise, if thou shalt believe in thine heart," &c. (Rom. x. 6, 9.) We
have already spoken in reference to that primitive state, and to
perseverance in it.
NINETEENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In addition to all that has been said, it is proper to consider that, since
predestination, preterition, and reprobation, really produce no effect on
the predestinate, passed by, and reprobate, the subject of the actual
execution, and that of the decree in the divine mind, are entirely the same
and are considered in the same mode. Hence, since God does not, in fact,
communicate grace, except to one who is a sinner, that is, the grace
prepared in predestination, since he does not, in fact, pass by, does not
condemn or punish any one, unless he is a sinner, it seems to follow that
God did not decree to impart grace, to pass by, to reprobate any one, unless
considered as a sinner.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION
Before I treat of the subject itself, it is necessary to refer to the
ambiguity which was alluded to, in my answer to the second proposition. In
the whole of your letter, to reprobate is to damn, and reprobation is
damnation. But in my usage, reprobation, and preterition or non-election are
the same. Hence that the subject may be made more plain, you will not
complain if I should substitute the word damnation for the word reprobation.
You say that "predestination, preterition and damnation, have no reference
to action in the predestinate etc," that is, that the predestinate or elect,
the passed by, and the damned, are elected, passed by, and damned by God
without any consideration of quality which exists in the individual. I
think, indeed, that the relation of these things is different according to
the Scriptures. Election and non-election have reference to nothing in the
elect and the passed-by: but damnation supposes sin, in view of which the
sinner is damned, otherwise the entire work of predestination, is limited to
eternity.
I readily acknowledge that, in these matters, the subject must be considered
in the same light whether existing in fact or only in the mind. For the
elect is elected, and the reprobate is passed by as a man; he is damned as a
sinner. He, who is, in fact, elected or passed by as a man, is so elected or
passed by in the mind of the Deity. He who is damned as a sinner, is so
predamned. Else, the internal and the external acts of God would be at
variance, which is never to be admitted. This being fully understood, you
see, my brother, that whatever things you construct on this foundation, they
can, in no way, be consistent.
You say that" God does not, in fact, communicate the grace prepared in
predestination," that is, saving grace, "except to one who is a sinner, he
does not, in fact, pass by any one, unless he is a sinner." If you affirm
this of saving grace, in an absolute and universal sense, it is shown to be
false by the salvation of the elect angels, and the preterition of others.
Did God elect and pass by the angels as sinners. Origen may hold this view.
We hold an entirely different one. If, however, you say that you are
speaking of grace towards man, then it follows, from this statement, that
the first man, in that primitive integrity, had not the communication of
saving grace. This, indeed, I think that you will not affirm. Therefore,
this grace is communicated to man as man, though not as a sinner, and not to
man only, but to the angels. If you say that it was communicated to man, in
his present sinful character, we do not deny it. Indeed, we believe that it
is now communicated to none except he is a sinner, since no one of the human
race is not a sinner. We readily concede to you that no one is damned or
punished unless he is a sinner. Thus, a part of your conclusion is denied,
namely, that which has reference to election, and a part is conceded,
namely, that which refers to damnation.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE NINETEENTH PROPOSITION
I used the word reprobation in the sense in which you use it, as I have
several times already stated and proved. I do not, however, object to your
substitution, in its place, of the word damnation. But you do not take my
argument in its true sense. I do not, indeed, consider that the
predestinate, the passed-by, the damned are elected, passed by, damned by
the Deity without reference to any quality, which may exist in them. Is it
possible that I should do so, when I, always and every where, endeavour to
prove that sin is a condition or quality requisite in the object of the
divine decree, My real meaning is this. Predestination, preterition,
pre-damnation, as acts remaining in the agent, or as internal acts, produce
no feeling in an external object, but the execution of those internal acts,
which consists in external acts, passes over to external things, and
produces an effect on them, as is explained by Thomas Aquinas (Summa prima
quaest. 23, artic. 2), from which passage it is apparent that, in the
scholastic phraseology, it is one thing to produce an effect and another
thing to suppose or have reference to something in the elect, the passed-by,
the damned. But if those internal acts have no effect on the object, then it
follows that the object is the same in every respect, and is considered in
the same mode by the Deity, both in the act of decree and in that of
execution. Hence, I conclude that, since it is certain that God, in the
external act, communicates the grace, which is prepared in predestination,
to man, only as a sinner, and, in the external act, passes by man only as a
sinner, and, in the external act, damns man only as a sinner, it follows
that God, in the internal act, prepared grace only for a sinner, determined
to pass by only the sinner, and predamned only the sinner, that is, in the
internal acts of predestination, preterition, and predamnation, had
reference only to man considered as a sinner. That God communicates the
grace, prepared in predestination, only to the sinner, passes by only the
sinner, (concerning damnation, we agree), is, I think, most evident. Your
two-fold argument does not at all affect this truth. To the first part, I
make the answer, which your foresight has anticipated that we are
discussing, not the predestination and reprobation of angels, but those of
men, the term grace being restricted to that which was prepared for man, in
the act of predestination.
To the second part of your argument, which charges my proposition with
absurdity, I reply, that there is an ambiguity in the phrase, saving grace.
It may refer to that grace which is sufficient and able to confer salvation,
or to that which is efficacious, and does, certainly, and in fact, bestow
salvation. Again, it may refer to the grace, which God bestowed on man in
his primitive state, or to that which is now bestowed in his sinful state,
that, being made free in Christ, he may, through Him, obtain life from the
dead. My proposition concedes that man possessed the former in his state of
innocence, and so avoids absurdity. It also denies that he possessed the
latter before the fall, and, at the same time, denies that this is absurd.
This latter grace, and not the former, was prepared in predestination, and
so my argument remains firm and immovable.
For these reasons, Reverend Sir, I can not yet persuade myself that man,
considered as a sinner by the Deity, is not the adequate object of
predestination, preterition and predamnation.
_________________________________________________________________
TWENTIETH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
It does not seem to me that this sentiment is established by the argument
from the necessary declaration of the freedom of grace and of the divine
goodness. For though I might concede that the declaration of that freedom
was necessary, yet I might say that it is declared in the very creation and
arrangement of things, and moreover that it could, and indeed ought to be
declared in another way.
The argument, from the necessary declaration of the divine justice, has no
more weight with me, both because justice in God, as His nature, is equally
directed towards the whole object and all its parts, unless, there be some
diversity, dependent on His will, and because God has declared Himself, in
Scripture, to be of such character that it was not necessary for Him to
punish the sinner, according to strict legal justice, in order to the
manifestation of His justice, but that He knew another, more noble, way for
the revelation of His own justice. Nor, does the argument, deduced from the
nature of providence, seem to have weight, since it pertains to providence
to permit that some should fail of the highest good, and of a supernatural
end, and that permission, understood in harmony with this sentiment, is to
be attributed not so much to a sustaining and governing, as to a creating
providence.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH PROPOSITION
After the discussion of election and reprobation, we come in this place to
the consideration of the design, according to which, the good or evil of an
action is often to be decided. But here a three-fold design is presented;
having reference to the divine freedom in grace and goodness, and to the
divine justice, and to the divine providence. Other attributes, might
indeed, be considered, but from these a decision may be made concerning
others. In reference to the first design, you present two arguments.
1. You affirm that this freedom "is declared in the very creation and
arrangement of things." You would infer then, that it was unnecessary that
it should be also declared in this way. This inference is denial. For it was
not sufficient that such declaration should be made in the creation and
arrangement of things, if it should not be declared also in their progress
and result. Nor, indeed, if it has been sufficiently declared in our present
nature and life, does it follow, of consequence, that there is no necessity
of any declaration in the life of the future world. For, on the contrary, if
God should have declared His liberty in matters of an inferior nature only,
and not in those, which are superior and pertain to the future world, it
would seem that he, through want either of knowledge or of power, had
omitted the more worthy declaration of His own freedom. For the nobler
manifestation of that freedom is made in things of a nobler nature; and that
good is better and more noble, the consequences of which are better and more
noble. Who can believe that God lacked either knowledge, power, or will in
this matter.
2. You affirm that this liberty "could, and indeed ought to be, declared in
another way." I grant it. It could and ought to be, declared in this, and in
other modes, as has been done by the Deity. But if you use the phrase
another, in an exclusive sense, as having reference to some particular mode
and not to this one, it is denied, and, in the preceding argument, is
sufficiently confuted.
The second design is, in like manner, opposed by two arguments. Your first
argument, contained in these words, "because justice in God, as His nature
is equally directed, &c.," is, in the very same sentence, refuted by the
addition of the words, "unless there be some diversity, dependent on His
will." For justice in us is regarded in two aspects, as a habit and as an
act proceeding from that habit, and diffusing itself first inwardly and then
outwardly. In God, it is also, considered in two modes, as nature, and as an
act of nature through the will, flowing from the nature and according to the
nature of God. In the former mode, it is the very essence of God; in the
latter, it is the work of that essence. Of theformer, you rightly affirm
that "justice in God as nature is equally directed towards the whole object,
and all its parts." The phrase "as nature" is susceptible of a two-fold
reference, as equivalent either to w[sper fusiv and imply a similarity of
operation to that of nature, (in which sense I understand you to use it), or
to kaqw<v fusiv and implying that the nature of God or His essence is
justice itself. For since the essence of God is entirely simple, justice,
nature, essence, and His other attributes are, in fact, one, though a
distinction is made in them in our usage. In reference to the latter mode of
justices the expression "unless there be some diversity dependent on His
will," is subjoined most suitably, and yet with some ambiguity. For in the
justice of God, as His nature, there is never diversity, not even as the
result of His will. What? Can a change in His essence, in His own nature
result from the will of God, whose attribute, I do not say in all respects,
yet absolutely, and pertaining to Him alone, and always, is immutability?
But that justice, which is the work of the divine essence, emanating from
that will, whether outwardly or inwardly, may indeed be diversified in an
infinite number of modes, according to His wisdom and will.
Your second argument, to speak in a few words and with directness, is faulty
in two respects. First, though your statement is true, if properly
understood, namely, "God has declared Himself, in Scripture, to be of such
character that it is not necessary for Him to punish the sinner, according
to strict legal justice, in order to the manifestation of His justice,"
since His justice, in all respects and infinitely, surpasses legal justice,
as, in the nature of things, the reality exceeds the type, and the substance
exceeds the shade. Yet it, by no means, follows from this, that God must not
so punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own justice, or that it is
from legal justice that He so punishes him. But, on the contrary, it follows
rather that God must so punish the sinner for the manifestation of His own
justice, and that the fact of such punishment is dependent on His justice,
which exceeds and in a most excellent, that is, in a divine method,
surpasses legal justice, and which, in His word, to us, according to our
measure, takes the form of legal justice, as the shadow of that most
excellent justice. There is no element of justice, expressed to us in the
law, which does not exist in the justice of God, and flow from it in a most
excellent manner. In the law, He has both expressed the justice due from us,
and shadowed forth His own. Consider only this, that God is justice in an
absolute sense, or (if you prefer), that He is the absolute principle and
cause of all justice, as of all good, you at once destroy your own argument.
For if He is, absolutely, justice, or the absolute principle and cause of
all justice, then He is the principle of this justice also, and the cause
and effector of it, as not only mediately shadowed forth in the law, but
also, immediately effected by His own work. For whence is that legal
justice, if not from God, expressing by His own infinitely wise will, what
He is, and what He does, as it is? Besides, if God is, absolutely, justice,
and the principle of justice, he punishes not according to the justice of
the law, but according to His own justice, which the law adumbrates to human
comprehension, and which He cannot but set forth in His creatures, both in
the present and the future worlds as he has declared in His word. I am still
less satisfied with your second statement, in which you affirm that "He knew
another, more noble way for the revelation of His own justice." God
certainly knew and thoroughly understood both that and the other, and every
possible way, according to the divine mode. But it is necessary, my brother,
that you should, in this case, consider that God always contemplates all
things, according to their individual relations, and according to their
relations to the universe, over which He presides. If it should be denied
that God, in respect to its individual relation, knew another more noble way
for the manifestation of His justice, how, I pray, would you prove it? Would
it not, indeed, on the contrary, seem, to the pious to be altogether more
probable, since God is infinitely wise, that He most wisely adopted the
noblest way to manifest (which is the work of the divine wisdom) His
justice, to His own glory, to our instruction, and to the perfection of the
universe, Let it, however, be conceded that God, since He has all knowledge,
knew another more noble way for accomplishing this thing, yet I deny, that
with reference to the relations of the universe there existed another more
noble way, in which God could obtain this object, since it would have been
better that He should use that other nobler way. For it concerns the wisdom
of God, that every variety of way should be adopted in manifesting His
justice, and should be set forth before the eyes of all in the universe. For
example, let the more noble way of displaying that wonderful justice of God,
be that which has punished and shall forever punish the wicked angels.
Should I grant this, do you not see that it would pertain to divine wisdom
to vary in this case also, the mode of the divine justice? This is
sufficient in reference to the second argument. The third design, which has
reference to the Providence of God, is excluded in your argument, in a
peculiar manner, by limitation, as it is called, "since that permission is
to be attributed, not so much to a sustaining and governing, as to a
creating Providence." By your permission, this whole limitation is denied.
It is indeed destroyed by the very definition of the terms, without any
argument on my part. Describe the course of the divine Providence. Its
principle, or first step, is called creation, that is the production of
existence from non-existence. Its middle step is government, containing
ordination and sustainment. Its third or last step is consummation.
Consider, now, to which part permission shall be ascribed. Creation is an
act of God alone, the glory of which He, by no means, communicates to the
creature, for it is created, not creating. In the act of creation, existence
is bestowed on some thing, that it may become what it is not, essentially,
in nature. By creation, then, it is given to man that he should be a man,
and that there should be in him whatever belongs to him as a creature. Thus
freedom of the will was bestowed on man.
What is permission? Not an act of God, but a cessation of action. It does
not bestow existence, but gives to that, which already exists, power over
its own life. Nature itself affirms that creation differs in kind and
characteristic from permission. Creation is not a part of ordination, but it
is the principle, point, first term. Permission belongs to ordination,
consequent on that principle. It does not then pertain to creation.
It is true, that freedom of the will in man pertains to creation, but as an
essential faculty, not as developed in action; which action, without doubt,
after the creation of the faculty and its endowment with its qualities,
depends on the divine ordination, and that ordination on providence. I do
not, indeed, see how that permission could be bestowed on our first parents
at their creation, which, in our case, must be referred to ordination. It is
necessary that there should be correspondence in both cases. But, finally,
though I should concede that permission pertains to creation, this also,
even on your authority, would be the work of providence, since you say that
providence is creating, as well as sustaining and governing. Permission,
then, by your consent, belongs to providence. It belong, according to our
argument, and, as I hope, with your assent, to governing or ordaining
providence. Therefore, whatever may be said concerning the relation of
providence, permission, by necessary consequence, pertains to it.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTIETH
PROPOSITION
I have now discussed the theory, which considers man as the object of
predestination and preterition, either in a purely natural state, or also
with some supernatural endowments, yet apart from the consideration of sin
as a condition requisite in the object. And I think that I have proved that
man is considered by God, in His decree, not otherwise than as a sinner. I
proceed to answer the three arguments usually urged in favour of this
theory; and I only show that a theory, like this, is not sustained by those
arguments. It seems, therefore, to be requisite, not only that my reasoning
should be refuted, but also that the force of those arguments should be
established. The latter has been entirely neglected by you. We will now
consider in what respects my reasoning has been invalidated.
The first argument from the necessary declaration of the freedom of grace
and of the divine goodness, I answer, first, by simply denying that such
necessity exists, and then, if that necessity is conceded, by denying that
mode, which is preterition, such as is described in the theory which I
oppose. This denial is confirmed, partly from the fact that God has declared
the liberty of His own goodness in the creation and various circumstances of
material things; partly because he could, and indeed must declare that same
liberty also in a mode other than that of preterition. For the better
understanding of these things, I will make a few illustrative remarks.
First, since no external act of the Deity is absolutely necessary, no
declaration of the freedom of the divine goodness is absolutely necessary.
For God is happy by the internal and essential knowledge of Himself, and is
glorious in Himself. Secondly, since, nevertheless, it seemed good to the
Deity, to communicate, by the free act of His will, His own good, to the
declaration of His goodness, it was suitable that there should be a
declaration, not only of His goodness, but also of the freedom of that
goodness, that it might be manifest that God communicated good to His
creatures, not by any necessity, but of His mere will; not to the increase
of His own good, which was already perfect, but to the perfection of
Nothing, and of the beings created out of it, according to the mode of
communication, adopted by the internal act of His will, both to the single
parts of Nothing, and to the individual creatures. The good which God
purposed to communicate, is two-fold in respect to the subject, on which He
determined to bestow it, natural and supernatural. In the communication of
both, it was just that He should declare, not only His goodness, but also
the liberty of His goodness and grace. In the communication of natural good,
He declared the freedom of His goodness in the creation and various
condition of material things. For when He communicated to that part of
original nature, which is purely nothing or chaos, this entity and form, He
declared His own liberty to communicate an entity and form which should be
different.
In the communication of supernatural good, He manifested the same freedom,
when He made a great part of His creatures without a capacity to receive
supernatural blessings, and made angels and men alone capable of those
blessings, and actually partakers of some of them. In respect to those
blessings of which He made all the angels, and the first human beings, and
in them all, conditionally, who should be born from them, partakers, there
is no place for preterition of this kind, as this pertains to a portion
either of angels or of men, but only for that preterition, which has
reference to other creatures, who were passed by, in the communication of
supernatural blessings. But in the communication of blessings, of which he
made angels and men not actual partakers, but only capable, the freedom of
the divine goodness and grace was also to be declared, that it might, in
this way, be evident both that those things, which they all received, were
bestowed, and that those things, of which they were made capable, would be
bestowed on angels and men, not according to the excellence of their nature
and of merit, but of grace.
I thus acknowledge and concede this, but I deny that the mode of declaring
the divine freedom in the communication of these blessings is the
preterition now under discussion; and I deny that this preterition was used
by the Deity for the display of that freedom, and this was my meaning when I
said "it could and indeed ought to be declared in another way," by the word
"another," excluding that mode which is contained in that preterition.
If it should be asked in what other way the freedom of the divine goodness
"could and indeed ought to be declared," I reply that, in reference to men,
(I have always excluded angels from the discussion), it was possible to
declare that freedom, if God should prescribe the condition on which He
would communicate good; that it was declared by his eternal decree, when he
prescribed to man the condition on which he might obtain eternal life, and
those gifts of grace, which, in addition to what had already been bestowed,
might be necessary for its attainment. I reply also that it ought to be
declared in some other way, if declared at all, since it ought not to be in
that way, for that one is in accordance neither with the wisdom of God nor
with His justice, since, by it, to creatures, capable of certain blessing
from the divine goodness and grace, the same blessings are, absolutely and
apart from any condition, denied. Therefore, it ought to be declared in some
other way, and, indeed, in that way of which I have spoken. For God can not
decree not to give to any creature that of which it is capable and for which
it was made, except on condition that it has made itself incapable of
receiving the blessings of which it was made capable by its Creator. But
whatever may be true in reference to this, you should have shown in what
manner the argument from the freedom of the divine goodness and grace proves
the preterition or non-election which is described in your Theses. The
second argument is from the necessary display of the divine justice. I
impugn it in two ways. That it may be seen how my reasoning avails against
this argument, it is to be considered that I design to assail it, in the
form in which it is presented in your Theses. These are your words: - -
(Thesis 17.) "The preparation of punishment is an act of the divine
good-pleasure, in which God purposed, from eternity, for the display of His
grace, to punish His creatures, who should not continue in their original
integrity," &c., and (Thesis 18) "God prepares punishment for His creatures,
who, sin contrary to His law, to be reprobated on account of sin, according
to the necessity of His justice." Since reprobation and preparation of
punishment, which are here used as synonymous, are in these words said to
have originated in "the necessity of the divine justice," I wished to
confute it, as, for two reasons, not in harmony with the truth. The first
reason is this; -- If God prepares punishment for sinners from the necessity
of His own justice, then He prepares punishment for all sinners universally,
that is, by the decree of predamnation. But the consequent is false;
therefore, the antecedent is also false. The reasoning is certainly valid.
For, since justice in God is considered as a natural attribute, it acts in
the same manner towards its whole object and all its parts. Sinners are the
objects of justice in this case. Therefore, it acts equally on all sinners,
that is, it prepares punishment for all. This is plainly signified in the
word "necessity" in connection with "justice." For, if He necessarily
prepares punishment for sinners or for those about to sin, He prepares it
for all without distinction, and that word added to "justice" indicates that
justice is to be considered as a natural attribute in God, and it can not,
for the reason already mentioned, superintend predamnation. I added,
however, the qualifying remark "unless there be some diversity dependent on
His will," my meaning, in which, was that it is dependent on the will of God
whether that attribute should act in an absolute manner or respectively, in
reference to all sinners, or in reference only to some. In this way I refute
not that which I previously said, but that necessity, which is considered as
laid on predamning justice. For if, by the will of God directing that
justice, it occurs that God prepares punishment for some sinners, and does
not prepare it for others but remits it to them, then that predamnation, or
reprobation (as it is here called), was decreed by God, not by the necessity
of His justice.
Let me more briefly state this idea. Justice in God tends to the punishment
of sin, as mercy or grace tends to its remission, without any distinction in
those who have committed sin. If justice should administer its own act, all
sinners would be punished; if mercy should administer its own act, all
sinners would be pardoned. These acts could not be performed at the same
time, and, in this case, the one would oppose the manifestation of the
other, which could not with propriety occur.
Therefore, the wisdom, appointed over them, for the direction of both,
judged that its own sphere of action should be assigned to each. In
accordance with this decision, the will of God directs His justice in such
manner, that there can be opportunity for mercy, and His mercy, that the
honour of His justice may also, in the mean time, be maintained. But it can
not, in my opinion, be affirmed that what is decreed by the divine will, was
done by the necessity either of justice or of mercy.
The second reason is this. If God knew a more noble way for the
manifestation of His justice than that by which, according to the law,
punishment was prepared for those who should sin, then the display of
justice, according to the law, was not necessary. But the former is true,
therefore the latter is also true. The reasoning is conclusive. If two ways
were open for the illustration of the divine justice, then it is not
absolutely necessary that God should make use of one to the complete
conclusion of the other. The justice of God may be displayed in the exaction
of punishment from the individuals who have sinned; the same justice may
also be displayed in the exaction of the same punishment from him, who has,
according to the will of God, offered himself as the pledge and surety for
those sinners. He is "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the
world," (John i. 29.) "He hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin,"
(2 Cor. v. 21). This is that "other more noble and more excellent way." In
it there is a more vivid display of the Divine execration of sin, than in
that, which demands punishment from the sinners, in their own persons, both
from the fact that, in the latter case, the infliction of punishment could
be ascribed, by His enemies, to the vindictive passion of the Deity, and not
to His justice, alone, which would be impossible in the former case, since
the punishment is inflicted on one, who has not personally sinned, and from
the fact that in this way, the inflexible rigor of divine justice is
displayed, which could not grant, even to the intercession of His Son, the
pardon of sin: unless punishment had been inflicted; according to which,
indeed, that Son could not even intercede, if his own blood had not been
shed, and atonement had not, by it, been made for sin. I conclude, then,
that the display of justice, according to the law, was not necessary, and
consequently that punishment was not, from any necessity of the divine
justice, prepared for these, who should sin, since God was free to impose on
His own Son, to be received and suffered, their due punishment, removed from
the individual sinners.
That, which you adduce in opposition to these ideas, does not seem to me to
be valid. For God, of His own justice, punishes either sinners or their
surety. The former mode of its manifestation is according to the law, the
latter mode transcends, the former is revealed to us in the gospel. It may
be said, however, that both modes were necessary. I deny it. The latter,
depended on the mere good pleasure of God; the former could be changed to
it. Otherwise it would have been necessary, for "without shedding of blood
there is no remission." (Heb. ix. 22.) These things which are said
concerning the justice of God, as exceeding the justice of the law, are not
to the purpose; for it was not my meaning that the justice, which actuates
God in the punishment of sin, and by which He punishes sin, is legal
justice, but that He should punish it according to the letter of the law,
"In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die," (Gen. ii. 17)
and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written
in the book of the law to do them." (Gal. iii. 10.) It should also have been
shown in this place how this argument, from the necessary display of the
divine justice, proves this preparation of punishment.
The third argument, deduced from the nature of providence, is of this
nature, in the view of Thomas Aquinas, (summa prima, quæs. 23, act 3.) "To
permit some to come short of the highest good, pertains to the providence of
God;"—"But to reprobate is to permit some to come short of the highest good;
-- Therefore, the reprobation of some pertains to the providence of God." I
affirmed that this argument possessed no weight in favour of the theory,
which I now oppose; against that which makes sin a requisite condition in
the object of reprobation or preterition. I proved it from the fact that
permission, understood in accordance with that theory, is to be attributed
not so much to sustaining and governing providence, as to creating
providence. I will first explain my meaning, and then show the force of that
argument.
I make three sets of providence—creation, sustainment, or preservation of
the creature, and its government, and according to those acts, I say that
providence is creating, sustaining and governing, and I attribute to each of
these modes its own particular acts, which are appropriate to each of them.
I also say that there are some acts, which so pertain to one of these, as,
at the same time, to depend on another preceding act, so that they may not
be entirely under the control of that providence from which they proceed,
but may be limited and determined by the act of some preceding providence.
These acts, being mixed in their nature, can be referred both to this and to
that providence, to one as immediately flowing from it, to the other as
determined by it, and necessarily dependent on its previous set. Such acts
seem to be attributed not so justly to that providence from which they
immediately flow, as to that, which prescribed their form and mode, to which
mode and form that immediate providence was bound, and in reference to those
acts was a servant to the other as principal. I now apply these thoughts.
The permission, by which God left man to his own counsels, pertains
immediately to governing providence, but it is government uncontrolled,
determined by a preceding act of creation. For it could not choose between
leaving and not leaving man to himself, for then, that, which had been
already divinely instituted, would be rescinded; it was bound by that
condition of creation, by which freedom of the will was bestowed on man, and
he was left to his own counsel.
This was my meaning, when I said that this permission pertained, not so much
to governing or sustaining, as, to creating providence. We may now consider
the validity of my argument in sustaining my view. We must here consider a
two-fold permission, that by which man is left to his own counsel and
permitted to sin, and that by which the sinner is left in his sins and
permitted finally to fail of the highest good. The former, pertains to
governing providence as was said, but determined by the act of creation; the
latter, pertains to governing and uncontrolled providence. The former,
pertains to providence, the latter, to preterition in contradistinction to
providence. For all men, represented in Adam, have been left to themselves,
and to their own counsel, yet all are not reprobates or passed-by. But all,
who are finally left in their sins, and given up to their own counsel, after
the commission of sin, are reprobate and passed by, and they who are passed
by, are all left finally in their sins, and are permitted to fail of the
highest good. Now I grant that, if by permission is understood a final
reelection in sin, the whole syllogism is sound and valid, but, in that
case, it sustains the theory, which makes sin a requisite condition in the
object of reprobation or preterition. For that permission has reference to
sinners.
But, if it is referred to the leaving of men to their own choice before the
commission of sin, I deny that reprobation can be defined by that kind of
permission. It is apparent, then, that no conclusion can be drawn from that
syllogism in favour of the second theory, and against the view which I
advocate. For the second theory presents man, apart from any reference to
sin, as the object of preterition and reelection. That syllogism, however,
is unintelligible, if it does not refer to permission and reprobation of
sinners. For, in the permission by which the first men were permitted to
sin, no one failed of the highest good, unless there was also a dereliction
in sin; and reprobation is not that permission by which men were permitted
to sin. It should also have been shown, in this place, how that argument
from providence and permission is adapted to the confirmation of the second
theory.
This might be sufficient for my purpose, but I am disposed to add some
thoughts concerning providence, in view of your remarks in reference to it.
Far be it from me, indeed, to disapprove them. They, however, omit the
mutual arrangement and connection of the particular parts of providence. I
made the distinction of providence into creating, sustaining and governing,
not so much from my own idea, as from that of Dr. Francis Gomarus, who, in
many passages of his writings, comprehends creation in the term providence.
In the Theses on The Providence of God, discussed under his direction as the
presiding professor, by Hadrian Cornelius Drogius, in the year 1596, it is
said (Thesis nine) "The parts of this execution" (that, by which God
executes the decree of providence) "are two, creation and government, &c.,
under which government are comprehended continuation, and preservation, and
legitimate ordination." (Libre de provdentia Dei. cap. 1, ex Cicerone) "I
affirm, then, that the world and all its parts were constituted at the
beginning, and are administered through all time by the providence of God."
(Ex Lactantio) "There is, then, a providence, by the force and energy of
which, all things, which we see, were made, and are ruled." (Ejusdem, libro
7) "That execution is distributed into the creation and the government of
this world. The parts of this government are two, the preservation and
ordination of the world, thus constituted." Your view is also the same, as
presented in your disputation. On the providence of God, discussed in the
year 1598, for, in the first Thesis, are these words: "The word providence,
taken in a wider sense, embraces the eternal decree of creation, government,
and ordination, and its execution." I am not very solicitous in reference to
the distinction of these words, government, preservation, ordination;
whether government embraces both preservation and ordination, or only the
latter, and there is a contradistinction between it and the former.
As to the arrangement and mutual connection of those parts, I affirm that it
is possible that the act of the latter should depend on some act of the
former, and in such a manner that the act of the latter should be determined
to one direction by the former. I showed this in the example of the
permission, by which God let, man to his own counsel. That act originated in
the government of God, or in His governing providence, but it was determined
by His creating providence, which made man free and self controlling, so far
as pertained to that freedom, but, in other respects, responsible to the law
of God. I here do no injustice to the providence of God, nor do I deny to
Him universal liberty in His own action. I acknowledge that the providence
of God is absolutely free. In the creation of man, He acted freely; in
bestowing free will on man, He acted freely. But, if one action of the
Deity, through the providence of God itself, be supposed, the necessity of
another act of the divine providence can be deduced from it, which necessity
is dependent on the free dispensation of the antecedent act of providence.
I will present another example, by which the same may be demonstrated. God
has created angels with this condition, that they, who should not continue
in their original innocence, should be punished forever without pardon. Some
sinned. God, in the act of his governing providence, inflicted punishment on
them by an act determined by previous creation, so that, if he did not wish
to change that which was established in creation, he could not remit their
punishment. This was my meaning in what I presented in answer to the third
argument, which you do not refute, even though it be conceded that
permission pertains to governing or ordaining providence, which I freely
concede to you in the sense in which I have explained it. It should have
been proved that the permission, by which man was left to his own control,
pertains to reprobation or preterition, or that the permission, by which he
was permitted to fail of the highest good, has place in reference to man,
not a sinner, or considered as a sinner. Hence, also, those words of Thomas
Aquinas (prima sum, quaes. 23, art. 3, in respons.
generali), "For as predestination includes the purpose to bestow grace and
glory, so reprobation includes the purpose to permit some to fall into
transgression, and to inflict the punishment of damnation for that
transgression," if diligently examined, are not accurately true. For the
purpose to permit some to fall into transgression, does not belong to
reprobation, since God permitted all men to fall into transgression. This is
also susceptible of proof from the acts which he attributes to
predestination. The purpose of bestowing grace and glory is attributed to
predestination. What grace? That by which some are not permitted to fall
into transgression, but are preserved in their original state of integrity?
By no means; but that grace by which some are delivered from that sin into
which all were permitted to fall. The act of reprobation, then, should have
been directly opposed to that act of predestination. But that is a
permission to remain in sin, or an abandonment in sin, which is a negative
act, and a purpose to inflict punishment for the sin, which is an
affirmative act. The former is the opposite of grace, the latter, of glory.
But it is not strange that a man who has written so many most erudite
volumes, should not have been able to examine accurately each and every
subject.
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TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
In a comparison of these two theories, the latter seems not more probable
than the former, since it involves the same absurd consequence. This I will
briefly prove. In the former theory, the following order may be observed.
God decreed to illustrate His own glory by mercy and punitive justice. He
could not effect this without the introduction of sin. Hence, sin must, of
necessity, and with certainty, have been committed. It could only be
committed by him who, being accountable to the law, was able to fulfill its
requirements, but it could not be committed, of necessity and with
certainty, by a free and contingent cause, (which could commit sin or
refrain from it,) if it was not circumscribed and determined by a more
powerful agent, surely and with certainty moving or impelling the cause, in
its own nature, free and contingent, to the act of sin, or else withholding
or withdrawing that which was necessary to the avoidance of sin, on which
conditions the necessity and certain existence of sin, committed by the
creature, depend. The chief advocates of the first theory disapprove of the
former mode of action in the more powerful agent (that which moves and
impels), and incline to the latter mode (that which withholds or withdraws).
This mode is also stated in the second theory. For the creature, left to his
own nature, necessarily sins, if a law is imposed upon him, which can not be
observed by the natural powers alone. God determined to leave the creature
in his natural state. He, therefore, determined also that the creature
should sin, since that was the necessary sequence. But the reason of that
determination can not be given, if it is not that which is proposed in the
former theory. Indeed the former theory seems even more probable than the
latter.
ANSWER OF JULIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST PROPOSITION
We have previously shown that those, which are called two theories, are not,
in fact or substance, two, but differ only in their relations and mode of
explanations; that there is, therefore, one, I say not probable, but true
theory, founded on the truth of God, and the authority of the Scriptures. We
have, also, in the appropriate place, shown that the charge of absurdity
which is made against this theory is futile. Since, however, this objection
is repeated, we may also briefly repeat in what respects and on what grounds
we demur to it. The first position—"God decreed to illustrate His own glory
by mercy and punitive justice," we have, in answer to the third proposition,
shown to be expressed in too narrow terms.
The second, "He could not effect this without the introduction of sin," we
thus proved to be an erroneous statement; for if the creature had remained
righteous, there would have been an opportunity for mercy and justice,
though the latter would not have been punitive in its character. Punitive
justice, even, might have been displayed in respect to those things, which
were unsuitable, on account, not of guilt, but of imprudence, for any just
person is liable to this without sin or guilt.
In the third place, we deny that" sin must of necessity have been
committed," as dependent on the energy of a cause, universally or in some
measure, efficient. That it must certainly have been committed, we
acknowledge, since it existed certainly in the knowledge of God, as
knowledge, not as a cause of sin. If, then, the word certainly is
explanatory of the word necessarily, and the latter word means no more than
the former, we assent to its use; but if otherwise, we deny the latter
(necessity), and assent to the former (certainty). The first man was not
under the necessity of committing sin, either from an internal, or an
external cause. He did it of his own free-will, not of any necessity. Again,
this conclusion is not valid, since it is deduced from incomplete and
erroneous antecedents, as we have just shown. Therefore, it is true, that
sin could have been committed with certainty, by a free and contingent
cause, which sinned (as was the case in the will of devils and of men), and
could have been avoided with certainty by a free and contingent cause, which
did not sin, (as in the case of the good and elect angels), and, on the
contrary, it is false, that it could have been committed of necessity, if
you refer to the necessity of any sufficient cause, that is, an external and
internal cause, for the will was the cause or rather the principle—the
attribute of which is freedom at that time free from all necessity, now
bound by its own necessity, but nevertheless free, and thus producing
contingent, not absolutely necessary effects as is the case in nature. When
it is said that it could have been committed necessarily, there is an
opposition in terms. For the word "could," which in this sentence is used in
its legal sense, supposes contingency, to which the adverb necessarily is
directly opposed.
In the fourth place, two conditions, are presented for the existence of sin,
neither of which is probable. The former is that "sin could not be committed
by a contingent cause, if it was not circumscribed and determined by a more
powerful agent, surely and with certainty, moving or impelling the cause, in
its own nature, free and contingent to the act of sin." This condition is
denied; for, in the first place, it is contrary to nature, which per se can
do or not do; otherwise it indeed has no power. Reference may, perhaps be
made to partial power. This, certainly, is inapplicable to the human will,
for it is a principle of action, and no wise man would ever place principles
of action among partial powers. Again, if it is limited and determined by a
more powerful agent, that agent must hold the relation of principle or
cause. If the latter, the will must cease to be a principle, for principle
pertains to the cause, it does not originate in the cause, of which it is
the principle; the same thing can not at the same time, be the cause and the
effect of itself. If the former is true, and the will is determined by a
superior principle, there is this difficulty, that no superior principle so
acts on an inferior one as to take away its peculiar mode of action, as we
have before quoted from Augustine. But freedom is the peculiar mode of the
will, and its appropriate adjunct is contingency, since it is freely per se
inclinable in this or that direction. Besides, if it is "circumscribed and
determined by a more powerful agent," that agent, either acts efficiently in
each particular case, or ordains generally according to an established order
in the universe. We have before, in answer to the sixth proposition,
admitted that such an ordination occurred. You say that it is affirmed that
the will is determined by an agent, absolutely efficient in particular
cases. I deny that this can, with propriety, be attributed to our writers,
whom it is unjust to charge so abruptly with that sentiment, if some of
their expressions seem to savour of this, since it is contrary to their
view, as they explain themselves in other passages. I will not argue this
point further, but repeat the simple denial that it can be absolutely
effected by a more powerful agent, operating efficiently, that a principle
and contingent cause should sin. Here, my brother, you present two modes,
one efficient, the other deficient, yet each, in its own way, efficient. For
that which acts efficiently, is present with the work, and effects it; that,
which is deficient, abstains from the work, and in itself effects that
abstinence. You refer to the former mode in these words, "by a more powerful
agent, surely and with certainty moving or impelling the cause in its own
nature, free and contingent, to the act of sin." This we deny, and you,
indeed, acknowledge that it is denied by our writers.
Let us, then, consider the other mode which you express, in these words, "or
else withholding or withdrawing that which was necessary to the avoidance of
sin, on which conditions the necessity and certain existence of sin,
committed by the creature, depend." Here, also, the mode is two-fold,
namely, that the "more powerful agent" withholds that which is necessary to
the cause, if it is absent, and removes it if it is present; either of which
would be a cause for the production of sin. Here three things are to be
considered, the necessity of the avoidance of sin; -- the withholding or
even the removal of what is necessary; -- and the consequence.
Concerning the first, it may be observed that every sin, that is, every
inordinate act contrary to law, whether it is regarded in a universal or
particular relation, is a habit or act of the individual, for genera or
species do not act per se. It is, therefore, primarily and per se inordinate
in the individual agent, and pertains, in a secondary sense, to that which
is common and universal. Indeed, it does not at all concern the constitution
of the universe that sin should be prevented, not only because sin could not
disturb the relations of the universe, and the Ruler of the universe
maintains its order, but also, because sin might, incidentally, be of
advantage even to the constitution of the universe, and illustrate the
wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy, justice, patience, power, and all the
beneficent attributes of the Ruler of the universe. It was, then, plainly
not necessary, in the abstract, to the constitution of the universe that sin
should be avoided, and, therefore, nothing was necessary for the avoidance
of sin. If it had been necessary to the constitution of the universe, God
would have provided for it, in the most complete manner, as Augustine
(Enchiridio ad Laurentium ) proves.
It may be said that it was necessary to the constitution of the individual
agent. It is true that if we regard the good of the individual only, the
avoidance of sin seems to be necessary. But since the common good of the
universe must be preferred to the good of the individual, and even sin
itself, though incidentally, may be to the advantage of the constitution of
the universe, and sin is committed only by the individual, it should be
stated that the constitution of the universe does not allow the assertion
that it is necessary that sin should not occur. If, however, the creature
knows that it is necessary, not for the universe, but for himself, that he
should not commit sin, the prevention of sin must be sought, neither from
the universe, nor from its ruler, but from the individual agent, especially
when the ruler of the universe bestowed on that same agent the unrestrained
power to sin or not to sin, publicly and in the very condition of his
nature, and when He made him the master of his own course, informed him of
his power in that respect, and most carefully admonished him of the
necessary result of his conduct in view of his individual end, with the
addition, even, of threatening. What then? Should God resume that which He
had bestowed. That would have been the act of an imprudent, inconstant or
impotent being, neither of which qualities can be attributed to the Deity.
Should He not have made the original bestowment. In that case He would not
have displayed all the modes of His own wisdom, and man would have desired
that, which had not been bestowed upon him, for he desired that which was
far higher, and indeed impossible—to be like God. If we have suitably
considered these points, which Tertullian discussed at length in his second
book against Marcion, we see, at once, that it was necessary, neither to the
constitution of the universe nor to the relations of the individual agent,
that sin should be prevented by an external influence, since man himself
possessed, within his own power, the means of preventing it, and had in the
strongest possible mode, received from the Deity, the knowledge of the
necessity existing in his case in view of his end. God infused into him the
principle of freedom. We, forsooth, wise in view of the result, judge that
that this was badly done by the Lord, that it would have been better that He
had not infused that principle, or, at least, that it would have been better
to have restrained that freedom.
Concerning the second, we have shown that it was not necessary that sin
should be prevented. It belonged to man to avoid it, not to another being to
prevent man. This being proved, we need not refer to the withholding and the
removal of that which was necessary for the avoidance of sin. But that the
truth may be presented, we remark, further, that it did not pertain to the
Deity to bestow that, which was necessary to the avoidance of sin, in that
particular act of Adam; first, because He had already bestowed it; secondly,
because He could not bestow it, unless He should resume what He had already
bestowed. That He had already bestowed it is evident from the gift of the
free-will to man, which was a principle, in the highest sense, free, and
sufficient for either course, either for the commission or the avoidance of
that sin. Nor, indeed, could He bestow any other hindrance, unless He should
resume that which He had already bestowed; for that was a natural principle,
namely, the free-will, constituted, by the Deity, without any exception or
modification, the pure and absolute mistress in natural things. If He had
prevented it, either the will must have wholly ceased to be a principle of
action, or, in that particular act, the condition of that principle, which
God had given to man by nature, and which He had, in that very act, pledged
to keep unviolated by Himself, would have been violated. Why should God use
such precaution with the man to whom He had given full power over himself,
and whom He had already cautioned by an admonitory precept. Then, you will
say, He should, at least, not have withdrawn that which He had bestowed; for
He bestowed grace, and then withdrew it. I deny that He withdrew any thing,
previously bestowed, except on account of sin, when man rejected it. Grace,
that is, the gift of grace, had been bestowed on man for the work of grace,
that is, according to which nature was ordained to supernatural glory. For
the work of nature, He bestowed, not grace, but nature and the will. It was
the office of nature that the man should eat or not eat; it was the office
of the will, according to the command of God, that he should not eat of the
forbidden fruit. This was purely and merely the office of the will, to which
it was not necessary that grace should be added, since it was bestowed in
reference to things of a gracious, not of a natural character.
Concerning the third, it may be observed that the remark "on which
conditions the necessity and certain existence of sin, committed by the
creature, depend," is wholly erroneous in reference to the act of Adam. For
Adam was under no necessity, from any source, of committing sin; he was
endowed with pure freedom, as we have now, and frequently at other times,
affirmed. Indeed that assertion is not absolutely and properly true in the
present condition of the human race. For, on the will of the creature, that
is, on our will, depends the necessity of the commission of sin, which
necessity the infinitely wise will of God permits and ordains; but, on the
contrary, the necessity of the non-commission of sin, by the communication
of grace, depends on that infinitely wise will of God. It is hardly correct
to say that the necessity of the commission of sin depends on the will of
God, withholding or withdrawing His grace. Yet that statement, in a certain
sense, may be allowed.
In the fifth place, we admit your proposition "the creature, left to his own
nature, necessarily sins, if a law is imposed on him, which cannot be
observed by the natural powers alone." But that particular law, imposed on
Adam, was observable by the natural powers alone, as we have proved in
answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth propositions. This whole argument,
therefore, and whatever depends on it, is destroyed. Adam was prepared, by
nature and grace, for the observance of natural law. He was prepared for the
observance of this particular command, because the requisition was only of a
natural character, and of the utmost facility. Your assumption is ambiguous
and improper. The proper form would be "God placed the creature in his
natural state." It is improperly affirmed that He "determined to leave the
creature, &c." Man left God, before God left man, as we have before shown.
The conclusion is, therefore, false. Your assumption is ambiguous on account
of the various use of the verb, statuit, which is used in this place. We
referred to that ambiguity in our answer to the sixth proposition.
Finally, it is unsuitably affirmed that "the former theory seems more
probable than the latter." Since in fact or substance and in their relation
they are but one theory, differing only in the mode of discussion and
language. Let us, however, see wherein one is more probable than the other.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
PROPOSITION
The respects, in which those theories differ, have been already stated in
the reply to your answer to the first proposition. We now inquire whether
the first or the second theory is founded on the truth of God and the
authority of the Scripture. I have already showed that the absurdity, which
I alleged against the first theory, is its necessary consequence. You have
not vindicated it, as it is explained by those authors, from that charge,
but have explained it differently from the view of its authors, and have
proved that, so explained, it can be, in various ways, defended from the
allegation of absurdity, but this is irrelevant to our present discussion.
There has never been any question between us concerning that theory,
explained, as you think that it ought to be explained. In this proposition,
however, I do not repeat this allegation, but show that the second theory is
liable to the same objection, and prove it by a comparison of the first and
second theories. This is the plan and scope of the twenty first proposition.
It will, therefore, be necessary that we consider, first, the grounds of the
correct and deserved allegation of absurdity against the first theory;
secondly, the same allegation against the second theory, and, at the same
time, what you have said in defense of both.
As to the first theory, I will show by certain syllogisms, that it is a
legitimate inference from it that God is the author of sin. Then I will
examine what you say in its behalf.
The declaration of mercy, saving from actual misery, and of justice,
punishing sin is necessary, according to the decree of God; -- But such
mercy and justice cannot be declared without the existence of sin and
misery; -- Therefore, the existence of sin and misery is necessary from the
decree of God, or—therefore, sin must necessarily be committed from the
decree of God. All the points of this syllogism are taken from the first
theory, rightly understood according to the sentiments of the authors
themselves, as I proved in my reply to your answers to propositions third
and sixth.
Again; -- Sin cannot be committed necessarily by a free and contingent
cause, unless it be circumscribed and determined by a more powerful cause,
which it can not resist; -- But the will of man is a free and contingent
cause; -- Therefore, sin cannot be necessarily committed by the will of man
(which must be the proximate cause of sin,) unless it be circumscribed and
determined by a more powerful cause which it cannot resist. I add, that the
mode of that determination is two-fold.
Lastly; -- the cause, which determines the will, in its own nature free and
contingent, to the commission of sin, is, by that determination, the cause
of sin; -- But, according to the first theory, God is the cause, which
determines the will to the necessary commission of sin; -- Therefore, God
is, by that determination, the cause of sin.
Now let us proceed to those things which you adduce in apology and defense
of that first theory. First, you affirm that "the first position, ‘God
decreed to illustrate His own glory by mercy and punitive justice,’ we have,
in answer to the third proposition, shown to be expressed in too narrow
terms." I reply that the question is not whether the position is true or
false, or whether it is expressed in too wide or too narrow terms, but
whether it is assumed by those against whose theory I have alleged
absurdity, as its consequence. And I showed in my reply to that answer that
they, in so many words, assume this position.
In the second place, you say that "the second, -- ‘He could not effect this
without the introduction of sin’ we thus proved to be an erroneous
statement." I reply, that it is not the question whether the statement is
erroneous or not, but whether it is made by those, whose theory I charge
with absurdity. That they do assert this, and in plain language, I proved in
the reply just mentioned. The error is, then, to be charged on them, not on
me. Their assertion, however, is true, that "mercy and justice—as understood
by them—could only be declared by the entrance of sin into the world." For
sin is the formal cause in the object of that justice, and of that mercy, as
having consequent misery, as its adjunct.
In the third place you "deny that ‘sin must, of necessity and with
certainty, have been committed.’" This is not the point in controversy. For
I, also, admit that it is not true that sin must necessarily be committed,
and affirm that they, who take the opposite ground, blaspheme the goodness
and justice of God, though I grant that the advocates of this theory do not
perceive this consequence, and the concession is due to them, that in other
places they teach that which is precisely the contrary. But if those two
premises are granted, I affirm that it is a legitimate consequence that sin
must of necessity have been committed. You concede that it "must certainly
have been committed," but "certainly" in the knowledge of God, not
"certainly" in the relation of the divine decree, which is dependent on the
will of God, with foreknowledge, as its antecedent. Those authors of the
first theory, of whom I have spoken, say that sin "must have been committed
certainly and necessarily in the relation of the decree, and that it could
only have been a subject of certain foreknowledge, because it was decreed
and ordained by God to be committed." But I denied and still deny that sin
could necessarily have been committed by a free and contingent cause. The
cause of a necessary effect is necessary, that of a contingent effect is
contingent. But the will of man is a free and contingent cause. Sin,
therefore, could not have been committed necessarily by it.
The "opposition in terms" is in your words, not in mine. I did not say that
sin "could have been committed necessarily" but that it "could not have been
committed necessarily." There is here no contradiction in terms, as will be
evident by an examination of the statement in the following form; --
It could not occur that sin should be committed necessarily by a free and
contingent cause. Is it an absurd statement that it can occur that a
necessary cause should produce a necessary effect, or its effect
necessarily? Indeed it must occur. I admit that the distinction which you
make between the words certainly and necessarily, is founded in truth;
certainty pertains to the knowledge of God; the necessity of an event, to
the will and decree of God. If this distinction had been correctly observed
by many, it might serve greatly to the solution of many grave questions
connected with this matter; this you have illustrated, in a very learned
manner, in your book Concerning the fall of Adam.
In the fourth place you say that "two conditions, neither of which is
probable, are presented for the existence of sin." Let us examine both. The
former is not fully stated by you, for the word which is the whole subject
of controversy, is omitted. Its insertion strengthens what I have affirmed;
if it is taken away, my statement is weakened. That word is necessarily, and
the condition should have been stated thus, "The former is ‘that sin could
not have been committed necessarily by a contingent cause, &c.’" Those
things, which you adduce, do not affect this condition. You indeed proved
that the will of man, as principle and complete power, could have, freely
and contingently, committed sin, but who denies that statement? I add that
if it did not freely sin, it did not, at all, sin; and there is a
contradiction in terms, if it is asserted that the will sins necessarily,
and this, not in a single, but in a two-fold mode. For it pertains to the
will to do freely that which it does, and sin, if it is necessary, is no
longer sin. We are here speaking on the hypothesis of the first theory,
which we have undertaken to refute.
You deny that the will is determined by a more powerful agent; since it is
not determined by a cause for then "the will must cease to be a principle;"
not by a principle, for, as opposed to partial power, a superior principle
so acts on an inferior one as not to take away its peculiar mode of action."
I readily concede that this is truly and learnedly affirmed. But did I say
that the will was determined by a more powerful agent? By no means. I
affirmed that it could not occur that the will should sin necessarily,
unless it was determined by a more powerful agent. That conclusion was to be
refuted by you, if, indeed, you wished to speak against me in these things,
not the antecedent or the consequent, concerning which there is no
controversy between us. I grant that if the will is determined by a cause,
it ceases to be a principle; if by a principle, there is, in fact, no
determination, for, if its peculiar mode, which is freedom, is not taken
away, then it is not determined. If, then, it is determined, it is by a
cause; -- But it is determined, for thence results the necessity of sin; --
Therefore, it is determined by a cause. But if it is determined by a cause,
then, you say, the will must cease to be a principle, which is absurd. I
assent to this, and, therefore, affirm that the first theory which involves
this absurdity, is deservedly disapproved. In your addition that in that
determination, the superior agent "either acts efficiently in each
particular case, or ordains generally," you do not, in my opinion, correctly
separate and distinguish between these two things, if you do not previously
show how that, which acts efficiently, can be separated from that which
ordains, (the latter word being used, in the sense of Calvin and Beza in the
first theory, for the ordination, not of a thing already done for a certain
end, but of a thing to be done to secure a fixed and prescribed result). If
the same word is used according to your idea, and as it should be used, I
admit that the distinction is a valid one, but this is not the point in
controversy, for it is in reference to the theory of Calvin and Beza, who do
not, at any time, so speak, but whose meaning and sentiment is, invariably,
that which I have presented.
I concur, then, in your denial that it can be absolutely effected, by a
superior, efficient cause, that a principle and a contingent cause should
sin. Your denial, however, should have been that the necessity of sin is a
legitimate sequence of that theory, and this denial should have been
sustained. Indeed, you should not have said that it can not "be absolutely
effected by a more powerful agent, operating efficiently, that a principle
and a contingent cause should sin," but that it can not be so effected that
a man should necessarily sin, for, in the case supposed, a man ceases to be
a principle and contingent cause. I stated that "the chief advocates of the
first theory disapprove of the former mode of action in the more powerful
agent (that which moves or impels) &c.," but they do this only in word, and
do not show how that mode has not an appropriate place in their theory.
Let us now examine the second mode, which I did not lay down as absolutely
necessary; but because I saw that the necessity of the commission of sin
could only be made out in one of these two modes, therefore, I separately
presented both. It seems, however, to have belonged to your duty in this
case, in the first place, to show that it was possible that sin should be
committed, apart from either of these modes; in the second place, set forth
that other mode in which this could be, and, in fact, was done; and in the
third place, to prove that this mode was such as not to make God the author
of sin. You do neither of these things: and I could, therefore, have passed
over all these things, as not within the scope of our discussion, and as
having no weight against my arguments. We will, however, consider your
answer.
In the first place, you show, by prolix argument, "that it was necessary,
neither to the constitution of the universe, nor to the relations of the
individual agent, that sin should be prevented." No one denies this; no one
affirms the contrary. In that case, sin would not have been committed; but
it was committed. How could you have supposed that I had any affinity for
that sentiment, when I have at all times contended that God made man of
free-will, and of self control that he might be able, of his own accord, and
freely, to avoid sin, or to commit it of his own choice, to which divine
constitution is directly opposed this idea of the necessary prevention of
sin. I, therefore, concede that it was not absolutely necessary that sin
should be prevented, that is, that sin should not occur. If, however, I may
be permitted briefly to consider this point, though it may be a digression,
I will note some things which do not seem to me to be said, with sufficient
correctness. You say that it was not necessary to the universe that sin
should be prevented, that is, as I interpret your meaning, it did not
pertain to the good of the universe that sin should be prevented. I may,
with your permission, deny this. For it pertained to the good of the
universe that the creature should remain in the perfection of that state, in
which the universe was created, and established in the economy of the
creation, by the Deity. But by sin, it fell from that perfection of the
universe, and "was made subject to vanity" (Rom. viii. 20), whence results
the desire of deliverance from that vanity (v, 21 and 22). If this does not
pertain to the good of the universe, it would not desire it. If it were not
necessary, the whole universe would not desire it. For its desire is for
every good thing, and its natural desire is for necessary good.
You prove your affirmation by a two-fold argument, first, "because sin could
not disturb the relations of the universe," and secondly, "because sin
might, incidentally, be of advantage even to the constitution of the
universe, and illustrate the wisdom, goodness, grace, mercy, justice,
patience, power, and all the beneficent attributes of the Ruler of the
universe." To the first, I reply that it does not seem to me to be very
probable. The constitution of the universe was such, by the creation and
ordination of God, that man was made in the image and likeness of God, and
other creatures were made subject to man, and subservient to his use and
advantage, because he was made in the image of God. Sin has very greatly
disturbed this relation and order. By it, man became a rebel against God,
and the whole creation was not only removed from under his authority, but
armed for his destruction, except so far as there has been a restoration in
Christ. (See Heb. ii, 6-9.) There are those who explain the word
ajnakefalaiwsasqai used in Ephes. i. 10, as referring to the restoration of
all things to that original condition from which they had fallen, on account
of human sin. The relation of divine providence in which it sustains and
governs all things, is far different from that which would have existed, if
sin had not entered into the world, as may be very clearly proved from many
passages of the Bible. "But," you will say, "sin could not so disturb the
constitution of this universe, that God could not reduce it to order." This,
I acknowledge; but that order is not one, which prevented that disturbance,
but followed and corrected it.
In the second argument, I think that there are two things to be observed and
corrected. First, that you say that "sin might incidentally be of advantage,
even to the constitution of the universe," for neither per se nor
incidentally, could sin be of advantage to the constitution of the universe.
Not per se, for it resulted not from the intention of the Creator of the
universe, but from the disobedience of the rational creature. Not
incidentally, for, since this whole universe is finite, its constitution is
also finite; and, therefore, the good, which pertains to its natural
perfection, is finite; the opposite of which finite good, that is, evil or
defect, erring from it, could be incidentally to the advantage of the
universe, that is, could be reduced to the good of the universe. But sin is
an evil, opposed not to finite but to infinite good, to the justice and will
of God. Hence, it could not, incidentally, be to the advantage of the
constitution of the universe, determined and circumscribed by its own
limits. It could contribute, incidentally, to the glory of the infinite
good, because that infinite good, more powerful than it, could, according to
its own choice, turn it out of its natural course, and, in this way, reduce
to order that, which is most disorderly; to the order, not of this universe,
but to one far transcending this whole universe, and only circumscribed by
the limits of infinite good. It can not occur that any creature should so
pass out of its own appropriate order, or that of the whole universe, as not
to be under the control of the Infinite Author. I know, indeed, that sin is,
in a certain respect, opposed to finite good, namely, to man, with whose
happiness it interferes, but it does not primarily prevent it, unless it is
previously regarded as opposed to the justice and will of God.
Secondly, I think that your statement, -- "Sin might, incidentally,
illustrate the wisdom, goodness, etc, of the Ruler of the universe," is
worthy of notice. This illustration of the divine attributes is not the
effect of sin, but of the action of God, which makes use of sin to the
illustration of those divine attributes. Sin, in itself, or abstractly,
disgraces and dishonours God. Sin is said to do this incidentally, for this
is the common phraseology, but, in my opinion, it will be more correctly
affirmed of sin that it is, incidentally, an occasion of illustrating the
divine glory by the exercise of those attributes. Indeed, if God had not
been able to triumph over sin, and to reduce it to order, He would, by no
means, have permitted it to be committed.
To return from this digression, I affirm that the subject of discussion is
not the necessity of avoiding sin, but what is necessary for such avoidance,
namely, that without which sin can not be avoided by a man on whom the law
is imposed. Concerning this, indeed, you acknowledge that God gave to man
those things, which were necessary to the avoidance of sin, which He neither
resumed nor withdrew until man had, by his own sin, rejected them. In this,
I agree with you. This, however, was not the point in controversy. It was to
be explained how, if a man could, avoid sin, the same man must necessarily
sin, which is the inference from the hypothesis of the theory, which I
impugn. It has been, previously, discussed, at sufficient length, to what
extent and in what respects, grace was necessary for the observance of this
or that law. I readily admit that, with the explanation, which you make, the
inference is that Adam was under no necessity to commit sin; but this is
irrelevant to the controversy, and indeed, is contrary to the view of Calvin
and Beza. As we have just affirmed, it was to be explained how it could be
true that Adam was under no necessity to commit sin, and yet that he did
necessarily commit sin, and how, if there was imposed on him any necessity,
either in this or that mode, or in any mode whatever, God is not made the
author of sin. Far be it from me to make such a charge against the Deity,
but I affirm that it is a legitimate inference from that first theory, and
that the theory is, therefore, to be disapproved.
I come, now, to the second theory, of which I affirm that the same absurdity
can be inferred from it, in the following way. My argument may be stated in
the following syllogism, -- That creature sins necessarily, on whom, left to
his own nature, a law is imposed, to the observance of which, the powers of
that nature are not adequate; -- But on man, left to his own nature, a law
was imposed, to the observance of which, the powers of that nature were not
adequate; -- Therefore, man, left to his own nature, necessarily sinned. By
consequence, God, who imposed that law, and determined to leave man in a
state of nature, is the cause of the sin of man.
You admit the truth of the Major, but deny that of the Minor, and then refer
to your answer to the fourteenth and sixteenth propositions. To these
answers, we replied, -- We remark further that if man has the ability to
observe that law, and God neither takes it away, nor prevents its free use,
then it must be conceded that it does not follow that man necessarily
commits sin. The phrase, which I use in the Minor, if improper and
ambiguous, is not to be imputed to me, who, in explaining and impugning the
theory of others, have used their phraseology. For, in your disputation,
already frequently cited, Thesis fifteen, I find the following statement.
"Preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural condition." But,
though I may not be able to prove by that syllogism, the Minor of which I
have thought to be laid down by yourself in your Thesis—in view of the
denial of that Minor—that the necessity of sin may be deduced from that
theory, and that God is, therefore, as a consequence of the same theory,
made the author of sin, yet I do not see how that denial of the Minor is
consistent with the sentiment set forth in your thesis, and how the
necessity of sin is not deducible from the same sentiment, and I will give
the reasons of my difficulty in both cases.
In the former case, you affirm that man could, by those powers, which he has
received from God, whether of nature or of grace, observe the law which was
enacted for them. Also, in your Theses, you affirm that God passed by men,
of such character and capability, without the condition of sin, or any
foresight of the same. I deny that these two things are mutually consistent,
and prove it thus; -- "To him who is made, from the condition of his nature,
capable of any grace, that is, of grace without which he can not obtain the
end for which he was made, that grace can be considered to be denied only in
view of the foresight of some act by which he may have made himself
incapable and unworthy of receiving it. But such an act could only be
sinful." In proof of this Major, I remark that, otherwise God in vain
bestowed on man the capacity for that grace, which is absurd. I add that, if
nature does not fail to bestow that which is necessary, much less is this
true of God, the author and finisher of nature. But God does not fail in
things which are necessary, if He denies to man that grace, without which he
is unable to attain the end for which he was made, which is also absurd. I
proceed with the syllogism: "But all men, not only the first pair, but, in
them, their posterity, considered in respect to the primitive state, were
capable of that grace, and were created for an end, which was attainable
only through that grace; -- Therefore, that grace could be denied, or could
be considered as denied to man apart from the fact that he was considered as
a sinner." I sustain this consequent, namely, that all men were capable of
that grace, first, because all men were created in the image of God.
Secondly, if they were not thus capable, they, who are to receive that
grace, must be made capable by some act on His part, which act could not be
that of predestination. For it is reasoning in a circle, to argue that any
act of predestination should make a person capable of receiving the grace of
predestination. Again, it does not pertain to predestination to render any
one capable of receiving grace, but simply to bestow grace. The act must,
then, be one common to all men. If it is such, then by it all men were made
capable of that grace, which coincides with my assertion that all were
capable. I wish, on this account, that it might be shown, in this place, how
God could justly deny, by a mere act of His pleasure, to any man that grace,
the capability of which He bestowed on him, and without which he could not
attain the end for which he was made, unless the man had made himself, by
his own demerit, unworthy of that grace, and unable to receive it.
In the latter case, namely, that the necessity of sin is not excluded from
the theory, which is set forth in your Theses, but may be fairly deduced
from them, I show in the following manner; -- The denial of grace, necessary
to confirm the pure nature of man, is a cause of the fall of man, that is,
of his sin, by the withdrawal or the non-bestowment of the necessary
preventive; -- But preterition, as defined in your Theses, is a denial of
grace, necessary to confirm the pure nature of man; -- Therefore,
preterition, thus defined, is a cause of the fall of man, that is, of his
sin, by the non-bestowment of the necessary preventive. The truth of the
Major is self-evident; nor is it affected by the exception, "if that grace
was due to man, for it was due to him, if it was necessary to the
confirmation of his nature, without which he could not attain the end for
which he was made. The Minor is sustained by your Thesis. "Preterition is an
act of the divine pleasure, by which God determined not to communicate to
some of His creatures that supernatural grace, by which their pure nature
might be confirmed, &c." But that grace is either necessary or not necessary
for the confirmation of the pure nature of man. If it was not necessary,
that pure nature could have remained unfallen, without that grace. If it
could have remained unfallen without that grace, then those who maintained
their integrity, would have been partakers of eternal life, and then, those,
to whom, He had determined to deny His grace, could have been among those
not passed-by. This is at variance with the definition, considered both in
itself and in relation to the other Theses. The necessity of that grace,
therefore, follows from that definition, and consequently the denial of the
same is the cause of the fall by the non-bestowment of the necessary
preventive.
Again, the final denial of supernatural happiness, of necessity, either
supposes or induces sin, for supernatural happiness is denied, and can be
denied only to sinners. Preterition is the denial of final supernatural
happiness.
Therefore, it necessarily either presupposes or induces sin. But
preterition, as defined in your Theses, does not presuppose sin; it must
then induce it. I do not see how it can do this in any way, other than that
of which I have spoken. Let another way be presented, and one which may not
charge the Deity with the responsibility of sin, and this theory may be
freed from the allegation of absurdity.
You say that the Minor is improper and ambiguous. If this is true, the
responsibility is not on me, but on yourself, who have thus spoken in the
Theses so frequently cited, for in them are the words "God determined to
leave, &c." This phraseology, however, is neither improper nor ambiguous. It
is not improper; for if He forsakes either the men who have not already
forsaken Him, or those who have forsaken Him, the words "determined to
leave" are properly used. It is not ambiguous, since the word "determined"
is used in the same sense, in all parts of the syllogism, as we demonstrated
concerning the word "ordain" in the sixth proposition. We spoke of the
difference between this theory and the first, in reply to your answer to the
first proposition.
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TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
First, it presents to the Deity, in the act of election, of non-election, of
predestination, and of preterition, man as created, and created of such a
character as did not in fact pertain to him, while the first theory presents
to the Deity, in the act of predestination and of reprobation, man as to be
created, and to be created such as he was, in fact, afterwards created.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SECOND PROPOSITION
That this difference is not real, we have sufficiently demonstrated in
answering the sixth and tenth propositions. The decree has reference to man
to be created, considered generally; and its execution to man as created
according to his various relations.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SECOND
PROPOSITION
I affirmed that the second theory was less probable than the first, and
proved it by five reasons. We proceed to a more extended consideration of
them, and, in the first place, we examine the first, that is, the one
presented in this proposition.
The theory of Calvin regards the Deity, as engaged, in the decree of
predestination, with an object identical with the object of the execution of
that decree, but the second theory regards the Deity as having reference, in
the decree of predestination, to man as he is considered in a purely natural
state, which can effect nothing supernatural or divine, while, in its
execution, He can not have reference to man in such a condition, since no
man ever existed wholly without a participation of supernatural endowments,
either by creation or superinfusion. It should be observed that
predestination does not intervene between creation and superinfusion, and
that superinfusion is not the work of predestination, as was previously
demonstrated. The answer which you present does not seem to be relevant. For
though the decree was made before the creation of man, yet predestination,
explained according to the second theory, had reference only to man
considered as created. Creation is not a result of the execution of the
decree of predestination, understood in that sense, and though the execution
of the decree may, according to this theory, refer only to man as created,
yet the question is to be answered—whence did the first act of execution
take its origin? Let those things be examined which are said in reply to
your answer to the 6th and 8th propositions.
_________________________________________________________________
TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Secondly, because it does not unite decrees between which there is a just
coherence. For it unites the decree in reference to leaving some in their
natural state with the decree of reprobation by the mode of the foresight of
sin, which foresight, or which sin it considers as contingent; while from
the decree of preterition sin results of necessity, and therefore, the
reprobation, according to the justice of God, of those on whom He has
determined not to have mercy, should have been united to that decree, not by
a conditional, but by a necessary copula. Those things, which have, to each
other the relation of necessary sequence, are decreed, by the Deity, in
decrees which necessarily cohere; -Preterition and sin necessarily cohere;
-- Therefore, decrees concerning them should be conjoined by a closer bond.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-THIRD PROPOSITION
We affirm, on the contrary, that, according to this theory, there is a just
copula of the decrees which mutually cohere. For it is necessary that any
transition from one decree to the other must be in harmony with its own
execution. But the transition has not reference properly and per se to the
necessity of that decree, but it pertains to contingency. As in the
predestination of the saints, the decree is two-fold, first, that of
election and the preparation of grace, secondly, that of glory; and the
transition of the former to the latter, is by death which is contingent, as
the wages of sin, so also in the predestination of the reprobate is
contained a two-fold decree, first, that of non-election, or preterition, or
reprobation and alienation from grace, secondly, that of damnation; and the
transition from the former to the latter, is by sin and death, the
consectary of sin, between which God graciously leaves a space that there
may be even in sinners and the reprobate themselves, a proof of the divine
forbearance, calling them to repentance. In this case, then, the copula
should have been stated to be not necessary, but contingent. For everywhere
in the Scriptures God disavows sin, and the saints commit it, "for the
righteous Lord loveth righteousness; His countenance doth behold the
upright." (Psalm xi. 7.)
We concede that "from the decree of preterition sin results of necessity,"
that is, certainly; since the inference from that which is true is
necessarily true? But we most firmly deny that sin is, universally or in
part, of necessity, in an efficient sense, the result of that decree, by the
necessity of the consequent or the conclusion. We by no means deny that sin
is the consequent of that decree, though not as caused by it, or as its
necessary effect.
A syllogistic argument is added for the proof of assertion, but we can not
absolutely or simply approve the Minor. We deny that "preterition and sin
necessarily cohere," per se, for if they necessarily cohere, it would be as
true that all are passed by who have sinned, as that some are passed by who
have sinned; that is, all sinners would be passed by as all the passed by
are sinners. But the consequent is false, therefore, the antecedent is also
false. It is not necessary, indeed, that there should be a reciprocal
coherence between those things, which differ in mode, one being necessary
and the other contingent; if it were so, nothing would be contingent. There
are many things which are necessary; yet without a cohering contingency. But
on the contrary, nothing is so contingent, as not to have, with it,
something of a necessary character. Such is the connection of preterition
and sin, in relation to themselves. But, in relation to man, in the case of
those who are descended from Adam, and involved in his corruption and fall,
and who are passed by of God, we confess that preterition and sin cohere
necessarily, that is immutably, since, though it is committed contingently,
yet that necessity of the connection of sin with preterition and reprobation
becomes absolute and immutable, as he who contracts a debt, if he is not
able to pay, necessarily remains a debtor. The other points have been
previously discussed.
THE REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY THIRD
PROPOSITION
Those decrees, neither of which can exist or not exist without the other,
are said to be united by a necessary copula. By this copula the decree of
the preparation of grace should be connected with the decree of the
preparation of glory. For neither exists without the other, and neither can
exist without the other. If preterition and predamnation are to be connected
by the same copula, I have already obtained what I desired. But the
transition by which one passes from grace to glory is not the copula by
which one decree is united to the other, but that copula is the will of God,
which wills to bestow, upon no person, one without the other, and which
wills to bestow both where it wills to bestow either. The transition to
glory is death; to which sin does not hold a corresponding relation in the
decree of preterition and predamnation. For predamnation is on account of
sin; glory is not account of death. With reference to sin and its merit, God
determined to damn some, for sin alone is the meritorious cause on account
of which God can damn a person. Death has no such relation to glory, which,
after death, follows of the divine predestination and grace. That death is
not the copula is apparent from the fact that it is the transition both from
grace to glory, and from non-grace to damnation or punishment by the
intervention of sin. For the copula of those opposite decrees can not be the
same, and without any modification.
I accede to what is said concerning death and transition, and I wish that
the consequence may be considered. If death is the transition from the
decree of the preparation of grace to glory, it follows that the decree of
preparation of grace and glory has reference to sinners. For death can not
be the transition from one decree to another, or from execution to
execution, apart from the relation of sin, as a condition requisite in the
object. I concede that death, as a transition, depends not, per se and
properly, on the necessity of the decree, by which God determined to bestow
grace and glory on any creature. It does, however, depend on the necessity
of that decree by which God ordained to lead man to glory only by the
intervention of death. This decree supposes sin. It has been proved that sin
necessarily results from the decree of preterition, that is, of preterition,
defined according your Theses.
In the Minor of my syllogism there was a verbal mistake, and the word
reprobation should be substituted for the word sin, and the syllogism should
be read with this correction. Preterition and reprobation (the latter
referring to preparation of punishment,) necessarily cohere, as is apparent
from the previous statement, in which I said that "it unites the decree in
reference to leaving some in their natural state, with the decree of
reprobation by the mode of the foresight of sin, &c." The Minor, thus
corrected, is true, and, when I wrote it, I satisfied myself of its truth by
that very argument, which you use. For all the passed-by are predamned (to
substitute that word according to the view which you have set forth in this
answer,) and all the predamned are passed by. Therefore, the decree
concerning the passing-by of some must be connected, by a necessary copula,
with the decree concerning the damnation of some. But, in this case, they
are united, not by a necessary, but by a contingent copula; for they are
connected by the mode of the prevision of sin, which is made contingent. But
preterition and predamnation have a necessary mutual coherence; preterition
and sin also necessarily cohere. For predamnation is decreed only on account
of sin.
Let us now consider your answer to my Minor as it was erroneously stated by
me. You "deny that preterition and sin necessarily cohere," as asserted in
my Minor. Your reason for denying it, is that "all sinners would be passed
by, as all the passed-by are sinners," and this is not true, for all the
passed-by are indeed sinners, but not all sinners are passed-by. I concede
the antecedent, and yet deny the consequent. It is not, of necessity, true
that every case in which a copula is necessary, that it should be so in a
reciprocal sense. Sin and preterition can cohere by a necessary copula, even
if this is not reciprocally true. Man and animal are connected by a
necessary copula, but this is not reciprocally true. We may say that every
man is necessarily an animal, but we may not say, reciprocally, that every
animal is a man. Here let us consider the reason on account of which it can
be truly said that all the passed-by are sinners, but it cannot be truly
said that all sinners are passed by. It is not this, that sin is a wider
term than preterition, and sinners a wider term than the passed-by, whence
also it seems to me to be a very probable conclusion that sin was prior to
preterition, since things, which are generic in their character, are
naturally prior to those which are specific. It also seems to me to be
deducible from this reciprocation and inversion, (namely, all the passed-by
are damned, and all the damned are passed by, and all the passed-by and
damned are sinners, and, indeed, only sinners are passed by and damned),
that, consequently, preterition and predamnation pertain to sinners, and,
therefore, to men considered in their sins, which I designed to argue, and
have especially undertaken to prove. In this way also, sin precedes both
preterition and predamnation, and if its natural efficiency is considered,
all sinners, not some merely, will be passed by and damned. But since the
natural efficiency of sin is hindered in some, by the force of a superior
cause, which is the will of God, it hence occurs that those sinners are
passed by and damned on whom God has determined not to have mercy, those are
not passed by or predamned, on whom He has determined to have mercy.
Your observations concerning the mode of coherence between the necessary and
the contingent, are not opposed to my view, even if they are true, which I
do not think to be beyond controversy. The necessary and the contingent
differ in their entire essence, so that no thing, whatever it may be, can be
said, at the same time, to be necessary and contingent, that is, (to
preserve the phraseology,) to be done necessarily and contingently. Yet I
think that it can not, without an exception necessary to be considered in
this place, be said that he necessarily remains a debtor, who has contracted
a debt, and is not able to pay it. There should have been the addition of
the exception "unless a remission of the debt is granted by the creditor,"
for without that exception, there would be a reciprocal relation between sin
and damnation, so that all sinners would be damned, and all the damned would
be sinners. For sin is a debt in which all sinners are involved, and not
only does it deserve punishment, but it will also be certainly punished,
unless it shall be pardoned and remitted.
From what you here say, I think that it is possible to deduce an argument in
favour of my theory. For you make an analogy between the contingent act of
sin and the contraction of debt; also between the being necessarily a
sinner, the being necessarily passed by, and the remaining necessarily in
debt, unless there is ability to pay. There is between the first terms in
each, an analogy, and also, between the second terms, such a relation that
in each case the former naturally precedes the latter; hence sin was
committed contingently by man before he was necessarily constituted a
sinner, also, before he was passed by of God. And who does not know that
man, since he freely sinned, made himself the bond-slave of sin, and,
therefore, is necessarily subject to sin, until his deliverance is effected
through Christ, the Mediator, according to the words of Scripture,
"Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin. If the Son, therefore,
shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." (John viii. 34-36.)
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TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Thirdly, because it leaves a hiatus in the decrees, not introducing, between
the decree of preterition and that of reprobation, the decree concerning the
certain and necessary existence of sin; for, sin, in my judgment,
necessarily results from preterition itself, by the removal, as they say, of
the hindrance
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH PROPOSITION
We deny that any intermediate decree is necessary between the decree of
preterition and that of damnation, (for so you understand the word
reprobation), or that any decree is interposed, and claim that this is so
from the very nature of the decrees. For these decrees are of the divine
efficiency, and they are effected by the Deity, immediately of His own will,
and justly of His own wisdom. But the decree concerning the existence of sin
pertains to the mediate work of nature, and is effected in that mode, in
which God decreed, that is, contingently, from a contingent cause, for the
will is, in this case, the principle of contingent causes, and that
particular motion of Adam towards the fall was the contingent cause of the
fall and of sin, which befell our race.
Therefore, it is necessary that a distinction should be made, in this mode,
in what is said concerning the certain and necessary existence of sin. The
existence of sin, if you regard its origin, was certain in the knowledge of
God, but not necessary by the power of the decree as a cause, because God,
as absolutely as possible and without any exception, by the order of nature
in natural things, bestowed on the will of Adam, the free power of
committing or avoiding sin. Thus, by the power of that decree, it was
necessary that man should sin or should not sin; by the power of the will,
it was contingent that man should sin; finally sin was committed
contingently by the motion of the will, because it was decreed contingently.
But the existence of sin, if you have respect to the act in which our first
parents fell, though contingent in its origin, is yet certain and necessary
in the order of nature, by which it occurs that the leprosy of that sin,
which infected them, is transmitted to their posterity. For an evil cause
produces an evil effect, "a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit," (Matt.
vii. 17), a serpent begets a serpent, a leper begets a leper. That, which
pertains to nature, can, with no probable reason, be ascribed to a decree
concerning supernatural things. The existence is, in every mode, of nature.
It can not then be ascribed to supernatural decrees. You present, as the
reason of your affirmation, that sin necessarily results from preterition
itself, by the removal of the hindrance. This was, in my judgment, refuted
with sufficient clearness, in the answer to your twenty-second proposition.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FOURTH
PROPOSITION
The mode should have been pointed out here, in which it could occur that the
decree of preterition should necessarily cohere with the decree of
predamnation, without a necessary copula. The foresight of contingent sin is
not a necessary copula. That they may necessarily cohere, since the decree
of preterition considers man, not as a sinner, and that of predamnation
considers him only as a sinner, there must, of necessity, be the necessary
existence of sin, either by the force of the decree of preterition, or of
some other divine decree, such, for example, as Beza describes. We speak
here of the existence of sin, in respect to the act of Adam, not of its
necessary existence in respect to our corrupt conception and birth. For the
latter is the effect of the former, by the mode of merit, by the
intervention of the judgment and sentence of God, imputing the guilt of the
first sin to all the posterity of Adam, not less than to Adam himself and to
Eve, because they also sinned in Adam.
I concede the truth of what you say, at the end of your answer, that those
things, which are natural, are not to be ascribed to supernatural decrees.
But sin, if it is necessary, that is, if it is necessarily committed, and is
not a natural act, namely, an act dependent on the will of man, as the
principle of his own action; and if sin is natural, then its necessity would
not have been ascribed, by Calvin and Beza, to the decree of predestination.
We do not here discuss the thing considered in itself, but considered on the
hypothesis of that theory which unites preterition with predamnation, by a
necessary copula, not by sin, existing previously both to preterition and
predamnation. Whether that, which I said concerning the necessary existence
of sin as a result of the decree of preterition, by the mode of the removal
of the hindrance, was refuted by you, may, perhaps, be decided by a
reference to my reply to your answer to the twenty-second proposition.
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TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Fourthly, because it is not consistent with the condition of the creation
and perpetuation of the human race, which was that all should be considered
in one, and that all should come from one. It regards men, either as not
considered in Adam, or as considered in various modes in Adam, that is, in
him as just created, not yet fallen.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH PROPOSITION
Those things, which are distinct in their whole genus, are distinct also in
their mode. The condition of the creation and the perpetuation of the human
race, is natural (for creation is natural by reduction, as unity is ascribed
to number, a point to a line,) but the condition of election and
predestination is wholly supernatural. They differ, therefore, in mode. A
consequence, from things which lack analogy and equality, is not valid. All
things, indeed, in nature are considered in one thing, and all come from
one, but in the case of predestination, all are not considered in one, but
each is considered in himself, nor do all come naturally from one, but all
are supernaturally distinguished, by God, in Christ. Man, according to
nature, is considered universally and individually in Adam; according to
grace, he is considered only individually in Christ, for this is not the
order of nature, but the benefit of grace. Therefore, the predestinate are
considered, not in nature and according to nature, but of nature according
to grace, which is personal and not natural. Law pertains to nature;
privilege to grace. Consequently, what is presented in reference to the
consideration of men in Adam, is irrelevant.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH
PROPOSITION
The force of my argument is sustained. For though creation and
predestination differ in mode and genus, as natural and supernatural, yet
predestination and reprobation, which impinge on the conditions of creation,
can not be true. I should have used a more correct phraseology, if I had
said inconsistent instead of not consistent. For a supernatural action can
add something to created nature, and exceed the order of nature, but can do
nothing contrary to creation. But predestination and reprobation, as set
forth in your Theses, ordain something contrary to the conditions of
creation; they cannot, then, have place among true doctrines. I will prove
my assumption. You state that some are passed by apart from the
consideration of sin. But a man can be considered apart from sin, only as he
was in his primitive state, but the theory under consideration regards some
as passed-by, considered in their primitive state, which can not be true,
because, in their primitive state, they had the power to persevere in good,
and in the avoidance of sin, and, therefore, they could be saved by
obedience to the law, and, by consequence, they were not passed by,
considered in that state, since the passed-by, according to the definition
of your Theses, necessarily fail of salvation, and are even necessarily
damned, though with the intervention of sin. If you say that they were
necessarily damned after they were foreseen as sinners, I reply that they
were also passed by after they were foreseen as about to sin, indeed, seen
as sinners. We notice, also, your two-fold distinction in that
consideration. Men are considered in one, and they are considered also, each
in himself, but all are considered in one such as they are in him, and each
is considered in himself, such as he is in himself, else the distinction is
false. This consideration is two-fold in reference to a two-fold condition.
They are considered in the condition of primitive integrity, and in that of
fallen, sinful creatures. In the primitive state, all are considered in one,
as in their origin and stock, and while this stands, they stand. Each is
considered in himself as standing, and as having, from the arrangement of
nature and grace, every thing which the original stock had, whether of
nature or of grace—the term grace being used in contradistinction to nature,
otherwise whatever a man has may be regarded as of gracious bestowal.
Therefore, all are considered as true, just, and holy. In the state of sin,
all are considered in one who sinned, and all are considered to have sinned
in him. Each is considered in himself as deficient in those things, which he
would have had of grace, if the first man had remained pure, and as involved
in sin and in the demerit of sin. Now, so far as all are considered in one,
whether as a pure or as a fallen being, there is no predestination, no
preterition or reprobation, no predamnation. For then all would be
predestinate and none reprobate, or all would be reprobate and none
predestinate. Therefore, predestination and reprobation have place in
reference to them, as they are each considered in themselves. Concerning
this, then, there is no question between us. But the point at issue, is
this—In what state are they each considered by God, in the act of
predestination and of preterition? You answer, that they are considered in
the primitive state, or rather that they are considered in general; I affirm
that they are considered, individually and definitely, in the state of sin.
Otherwise, I say that this decree impinges on the conditions of creation, as
I have demonstrated. This is absurd, for supernatural things can and indeed
must be superior to natural, but by no means contrary to them.
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TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
Fifthly, because, according to it, the decree is equivocal, and true only on
condition of a distribution of its terms. It is equivocal because glory and
grace, which are prepared in election and reprobation, are equivocal; for it
is the glory which follows the ignominy of sin through the grace of
remission and regeneration, or it is glory bestowed on nature, as originally
created, by supernatural grace superinfused into that nature. It is true
only on the condition of a distribution of its terms, because it absolutely
ordains neither kind of grace to its subject; not the grace, superinfused
upon nature, and glory by means of it, because it is not that grace by which
a man is saved and glorified; not the grace of remission and removal,
because it can ordain that grace only to the sinner. The decree must, then,
be understood with this distribution; -- I will to this man glory and grace,
certainly indeed, yet of the former or latter kind, as one or the other may
be necessary for him, according to the diversity of his condition.
REPLY OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH PROPOSITION
We deny that "the decree is equivocal and true only on condition of a
distribution of the terms." It is not equivocal for it is expressed in
general terms and refers to grace and glory in a general sense. That which
is thus stated is not equivocal. Neither grace nor glory, in the decree, is
two-fold, but both are one in substance, in fact, and in relation, but
different in degrees in relation to their object. As life in man is not
two-fold in its nature, though it may increase of itself, by the law of
nature, so neither grace nor glory is two-fold, though each may progress in
us by its own degrees. Grace, in both cases, is supernatural, both when it
graciously renews nature, and when it raises a person above the mode of
nature. Whatever may be said of it, it is supernatural and in fact one.
Glory, also, in both cases, is universally supernatural, both that which is
adequate to the mode of nature, and that which is above nature. The latter
embraces and absorbs the former, as the greater light does the less; yet, in
both cases, it is light, and is supernatural, since nature lost and grace
may restore it. Nor, indeed, is that decree to be considered as certain only
on condition of a distribution of terms; for God absolutely ordains His
whole grace, that is, every mode of it, to His own elect, without
modification or any exception. Therefore, also, He ordains and bestows upon
them the grace of remission and renewal, as its antecedent mode, and the
grace of that celestial glory, as its consequent mode. Indeed, if it was
possible that any thing of a supernatural character, in addition to the
antecedent grace or consequent glory pertaining to nature, should be
desired, and if there is any thing else to which I might wish to refer, God
will fully bestow it, because He has universally decreed to His own, that
grace and glory which is, indeed, communicable. But God can ordain the grace
of remission and renewal only to the sinner and in relation to sin, but He
had respect to the whole man, generally, on whom He could bestow His whole
grace and apply it in a supernatural mode. The decree, then, of grace and of
glory is to be understood absolutely, because it was ordained absolutely and
generally, without restriction, exception or modification of the grace and
glory which God communicates to His own. There is variety in the object and
in its mode, but the fact that grace and glory is absolutely and generally
decreed and bestowed on various objects, does not evince that the grace and
glory are diverse in themselves; as the light of the Sun is not various, if
it comes to us variously, or is variously perceived by us.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH
PROPOSITION
You seem not to have fully understood my proposition.—That you may
understand it according to my meaning, I will, so far as I am able, state it
in phraseology, used by yourself in this matter. I say that this decree is
equivocal, because grace and glory, prepared in this decree, are equivocal,
that is each of them is equivocal. For the grace, which preserves and
confirms in original integrity, is one thing; that, which restores from a
sinful state is another. Also, glory, in respect to the mode of the object,
which, being above nature, is superadded to that which is adequate to the
mode of nature, is one thing, and that, which is bestowed on nature, freed
from the ignominy of sin and misery, is another.
This decree is true only on condition of a distribution of its terms,
because it does not ordain to man either this grace or that, or glory of
this or that mode, absolutely, but one only, in the case of grace or of
glory, and on a certain condition. It does not ordain to man, absolutely,
the grace of preservation in his original integrity, and glory from or
through that grace, because that is not the grace and glory, by which man is
saved and glorified. It does not ordain to man, absolutely, the grace of
restoration from a state of sin, and of glory from a state of ignominy,
because it can absolutely ordain that grace and glory only to a sinner.
Therefore the decree must be understood with the following distribution of
its terms: -I ordained to this man grace or glory, certainly indeed, but
either of this or of that mode as the former or the latter shall be
necessary for him, according to his different state of integrity or of sin.
I will now consider your answer. You deny that this decree is equivocal: I
affirm it. To sustain your denial, you add, "it is expressed in general
terms, and refers to grace and glory in a general sense. That, which is thus
stated, is not equivocal." I concede the latter, and deny the former. I
affirm that grace and glory are spoken of, indeed in general terms, but they
are not understood in a general sense, which is equivocation. I prove that
they are not understood in a general sense, because grace and glory are
prepared for man, in predestination, not understood in a general sense, but
as they are spoken of particularly. Examine your remarks in answer to
Proposition 11th. That cannot be said to be prepared generally, which is not
prepared in some particular part or species. Much less can that be said to
be so prepared, which is of a nature, such that, if it is prepared, in one
part or species, of itself, it can not be prepared in another. But this is
the state of the case. Grace, taken generally, comprehends the grace of
preservation in the state of integrity, and of restoration from the state of
sin. Glory, taken generally, comprehends glory superadded to primitive
nature and glory bestowed on fallen nature, raised from a state of ignominy.
Neither grace nor glory, generally, is prepared for man. If, indeed, the
grace of preservation in a state of integrity, and glory, superadded to
nature, was prepared for man, then the grace of restoration from a state of
sin, and glory, from a state of ignominy, could not be prepared for him,
since he did not need this latter grace and glory, if he obtained the
former, and there could be no place for the latter, if the former had a
place. But, if there is any place for the grace of restoration from a state
of sin and of glory from one of ignominy, a place was not made, in the
predestination of God, for the grace of preservation and for glory by means
of that grace. Hence it is apparent that my proposition was not clearly
understood by you, who have thought that there is such a relation of
two-fold grace and glory, that one grace embraces and absorbs the other, and
one glory has the same relation to the other, according to the illustration
of light. Grace, renewing the nature, and grace, exalting, above the mode of
nature, the same renewed nature, sustain this relation, for one embraces and
perfects the other. I did not, however, refer to that two-fold grace, but to
the grace of preservation in the primitive state, and to that of restoration
from a state of sin. These are not mutually dependent; one does not
comprehend the other, but one excludes the other. But glory, adequate to the
mode of nature, and glory, above nature, sustain such a relation, that one
perfects and embraces the other. I did not, however, refer to this two-fold
glory, but to glory, in both modes supernatural, in one superadded to
primitive nature, in the other bestowed on fallen nature, restored from its
ignominy. In this sense, therefore, that decree is equivocal, since, in it,
the words, grace and glory, are spoken of, generally and in a universal
sense, but they are not prepared, generally and in a universal sense, in
predestination, but separately, distinctly and particularly.
You also deny that "this decree is true only on condition of a distribution
of its terms," but you deny it in the sense, which was really intended by
them. Your denial is true in the former sense. For the grace of remission
and that of renovation, as an antecedent mode, are simply and truly prepared
for man. But that was not my meaning, as is most clearly apparent from the
words themselves. For I placed the grace of remission and of renewal in
contrast not to the grace of celestial glory, but to the grace of
preservation in a state of integrity. God, in predestination, did not
absolutely ordain grace in those two modes, or those two parts or species of
grace for man, or either of them absolutely; but one only, and that on the
condition of distribution, according to the decree of which we treat. He did
not ordain both parts absolutely, since both parts can not have place at the
same time. The former excludes the latter as unnecessary, and, indeed, as
not being able to have place at the same time; the latter excludes the
former, as not having been applied, from which want of application in the
case of the former, namely, the grace of preservation in the primitive
state, the latter, namely, that of restoration from a sinful state, became
necessary, if indeed man was to be saved of grace. He did not ordain either
of these, simply and absolutely without any condition; not that of
preservation, for it was not bestowed on man, and it would have been
bestowed, if it had been prepared absolutely and of predestination; not that
of remission of sins and of renewal, that is, of renewal from a state of
sin, because He could ordain that grace absolutely only to a sinner, and
that decree did not regard man as a sinner. But it ordained, on condition of
the distribution of the terms, either this or that, as the condition of man
demanded one or the other.
That a decree of this kind is true only on condition of the distribution of
its terms is clear from the terms, if correctly understood. I will
illustrate it by an example. Every statement is necessarily true or false;
-- But this is a statement; Therefore it is necessarily true or necessarily
false. This does not follow. For on condition of a distribution of the
terms, it is true that every statement is necessarily true or false, and
neither part is, abstractly and separately, necessary. The nature of the
decree of predestination demands that it should be absolutely certain and
true that God ordained for a man the grace of preservation in a state of
integrity, or absolutely certain and true that God ordained for a man the
grace of renewal from a state of sin. But God does not ordain, on condition
of the distribution of terms, for a man either the grace of preservation or
the grace of renewal.
But since predestination, as it is defined by you, refers to the last mode,
I affirmed correctly that it is only certain on condition of the
distribution of terms. I conclude, by a fair deduction, that it is,
therefore, not predestination. If it truly pertains to predestination to
ordain, absolutely and definitely, the grace of preservation and, if it does
not ordain that, to ordain, absolutely and definitely, the grace of
restoration, then it follows that God did not and could not regard man in
general. For the ordination of the former grace definitely excludes sin,
that of the latter definitely includes the consideration of sin, and, in
both modes, that general consideration is equally refuted. For the general
consideration of an object neither excludes any circumstance, nor is united
to any certain and special circumstance. That predestination of grace,
however, which preserves in a state of integrity, excludes the circumstance
of sin, and this predestination of grace restoring from a state of sin, is
definitely united to the circumstance of sin. Therefore the decree of
predestination was not made abstractly and universally or generally, without
any restriction or modification of grace and glory, but it was, and
necessarily must have been, made with a restriction and modification of
grace and glory. For the decree of predestination is that, by which is
prepared the grace, through which a man is certainly saved, not that, by
which salvation would be possible, if indeed any state of man might require
the application of such grace, nor that, by which he would be saved, if it
should be applied to any state of man. But that grace, by which a man is
certainly saved, must be modified and restricted. For he is saved either by
the grace of preservation, or by that of restoration, by one or the other,
of necessity. If he is saved by one, he does not need to be saved and he can
not be saved, by the other; if he is not saved by one, he must be saved by
the other, or excluded from salvation, and that, by which he is saved, is
prepared in predestination, and the other, by which he is not saved, is
absolutely excluded.
You affirm that "there is variety in the object and in its mode." But we
here treat of that variety in the object and its mode, which variety is so
great that grace and glory must be modified and restricted to this or that
variety of the object; the grace of preservation in the state of integrity
and glory, by means of it, are suitable to the object, considered in its
original state; the grace of restoration and glory, by means of it, are
suitable to the object, considered in sin and misery. Grace and glory,
considered absolutely and universally, can not be decreed or bestowed, in
predestination, upon various objects. For predestination has reference,
necessarily, to a uniform and univocal object, that is either to one
absolutely not a sinner, or to a sinner, and it bestows grace only on a
subject, of one mode and univocal. It saves one, absolutely not a sinner or
absolutely a sinner; it does not adapt itself to this one or that one, of
this or of that character, but it adapts itself absolutely to an object of
this character, and not otherwise considered. The grace of preservation
saves, absolutely, the angels, for the grace of restoration was never
ordained concerning them or bestowed upon them. The grace of restoration
absolutely saves human beings, for the grace of preservation, in their
original state of integrity, was never ordained for them or bestowed upon
them. Grace is, indeed, as you say, one in itself, and in its essence, as,
also, is glory, but each is variously applied according to the mode and
relation of the object; and, between the application of grace and the mode
and relation of the object, there is this reciprocity that, from the
application of grace, the relation of the object may be inferred, and from
the mode of the object, reciprocally may be deduced what grace it may be
necessary to apply to that object. The same is true of glory.
The illustration of the light of the Sun, introduced at the end of your
answer, may also serve my purpose. The light of the Sun is one and the same,
whether it is shed upon and renders more luminous a body already
illuminated, or it is shed on a dark body and drives away the darkness, and
renders that light which was before dark. If only the same difference
existed between an illuminated and a dark body, as exists between a man in
his original state and a sinner, then rays of the Sun, sufficient to
illuminate the body already light, would not suffice to illuminate the dark
body, unless they were greatly increased and multiplied.
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TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION OF ARMINIUS
I will not now touch the theory of Augustine, because that would be a futile
task, if the theory of Aquinas, of prior consideration, can be sustained to
my satisfaction. These, then, are the matters which I would present to your
consideration.
ANSWER OF JUNIUS TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH PROPOSITION
I have always thought, and yet think, that the theory of Augustine was
substantially consistent with the two theories which have been considered.
You will see that this is the fact, if you make allowance for certain modes
of expression used by him, and for a single diverse circumstance.
I have thus, my brother, in this subject, used the diligence and promptitude
which was possible, in view of the duties which have, not rarely,
interrupted me. Receive my effort with kindness, if it may not answer your
expectation. May the God of truth and peace seal on your mind that saving
peace, more and more, and graciously guide both of us and all His servants
in the way of truth to His own glory, and to the edification of His church
in Christ Jesus our saviour. Amen.
REPLY OF ARMINIUS TO THE ANSWER TO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
PROPOSITION
The theory of Augustine is very different from both the preceding theories,
as may be seen from this whole discussion, on account of the circumstance,
added by him to the object of the decree, concerning which we treat. For, if
the circumstance of sin was, of necessity, to be considered by the Deity, in
the act of decree, and was definitely considered in that very act, then it
must be true that those discussions and explanations of the same decree, err
greatly from the truth, which state that there was no necessity of the
consideration of sin, and no actual consideration of it by God, when He
ordained the decree. The remark may be added, with propriety, that, by the
mere addition to the object of the decree and right explanation of the
circumstance of sin, all the absurdities and blasphemies, which are usually
alleged against the decree of predestination and reprobation may be repelled
and clearly refuted, not being logical consequences of that decree.
I have thus presented my objections to your answers to my propositions, not
so much with the thought of refuting them, as with a desire to elicit from
you more extended answers and explanations, by which I might perhaps be
satisfied and my mind might be freed from its difficulties on this subject.
I, therefore, beseech God, that, if I have written any thing contrary to the
truth, He may pardon me concerning it, and may reveal the truth unto me; if
I have advanced any thing agreeable to the truth, that He will confirm me in
it, and that he will grant to me yourself, assenting to my views, and aiding
me, that, by means of you, the truth may daily gain greater authority, and
may be more and more propagated to the glory of the divine name, to the
advantage and increase of the church, in our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen.
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APPENDIX
Theses Of Dr. Francis Junius
Concerning Divine Predestination,
Composed, In These Very Words, By Himself, And Publicly Discussed, Under His
Direction, By William Coddaeus, In The University Of Leyden, In The Year
1593 -- Also Some Brief Annotations Of James Arminius.
Appendix: 20 Theses Of Dr. Junius: Predestination & Arminius: Annotations
Appendix: 20 Theses And Brief Annotations
As We Have Frequently Referred To The Theses Of Doctor Francis Junias
Concerning Predestination, We Will Here Insert Them, And Make Some Brief
Annotations Upon Them.
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THESIS 1
Predestination is properly, according to the etymology of the word, a
determination to an end, but in common usage, it is equivalent to the Greek
word protagh and signifies the relation of the whole arrangement to the end,
and thus we use it.
Destination is a determination of an existing object to its end; the
particle prae, prefixed to the word, denotes that the act of destination is
antecedent to the actual existence of the object.
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THESIS 2
Predestination, therefore, is an act of the divine good-pleasure, by which
God, from eternity, prepared the plenitude of His blessings, in Christ, for
those, who should be heirs of salvation, to the praise of His glorious
grace. The word eujokia or good-pleasure, is here used, correctly, according
to the Scriptural sense, for the particle eu+ refers to the favourable and
benevolent inclination of God towards its object, not to the precise and
determinate will of God in reference to any of His own purposes, as the word
good-pleasure is used by the school-men, when they distinguish the will of
God into his revealed will and the will of His good-pleasure. Prepared in
Christ.] No blessings are prepared in Christ for men, except those which are
adapted to sinners. Christ himself; the saviour of men, is called Jesus only
because "He shall save His people from their sins," (Matt. i. 21). No one is
blessed in Christ, if he is not a believer;
"So then, they, which be of faith, are blessed with faithful Abraham" (Gal.
iii. 9.)
For those who should be heirs of salvation]. Salvation itself; and the
inheritance of eternal life, are comprehended in the fullness of those
blessings, which God has prepared in Christ. Therefore those, for whom that
fullness was prepared, should have been otherwise described. For there is an
absurdity in the statement, -- "predestination is an act, by which God has
prepared salvation for those who shall be heirs of salvation." For they are
made heirs of salvation according to which, the inheritance, comprehended in
the fullness of those blessings, was prepared. Persons, as one part of the
material or object of predestination, are not to be described by the divine
things, which were prepared for them in that predestination, and which
constitute the other part of the material or object of predestination. The
persons are more correctly described by Sohnius, thus: "Predestination unto
life, or election, is that by which God decreed, from eternity, to justify
and to accept unto eternal life, believers, or the faithful, to whom he
decreed to teach faith." To the praise of His glorious grace]. The
Scriptures recognize the grace of God as the cause and end of
predestination, only as mercy is united with it, and as it is exercised
towards sinners and the miserable.
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THESIS 3
It is an act (for God is simple energy) proceeding not from any external
cause, but purely from Him who predestinates; otherwise it would not be,
purely, predestination, preceding all things and causes.
The divine predestination, indeed, precedes all things and causes, so far as
their actual existence is considered; or it was decreed from eternity. It,
however, follows, in the mind and prescience of God, the pre-existence of
some things and causes; that of sin, for example, without which neither
grace, as it is described above, nor Christ, in his true character, nor
those blessings could have any adaptation to men. Therefore, although this
predestination may not depend on an extrinsic cause, yet it was occasioned,
as they say, by sin.
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THESIS 4
Its cause is eujdokia good-pleasure, by which He was favourably disposed
towards those, whom He pleased to adopt as sons, through Jesus Christ,
according to the purpose of His election.
By that same good pleasure, by which God was favourably disposed towards
some. He also was pleased to adopt the same persons as sons. Therefore, this
is not a correct description of the persons towards whom God was favourably
disposed. Indeed, it was because He was favourably disposed towards them,
that He adopted them as sons.
To adopt as sons]. Observe here that adoption is not placed among the
prepared blessing, but that it is used to describe the persons for whom
blessings are prepared. Compare this with your answer to my first
proposition.
But, that the inappropriateness of that definition may be more manifest, let
it be put in this form; -- Predestination is an act of the divine
good-pleasure, by which God, from eternity, prepared filial adoption, and
its consequent, eternal life, in Christ, for those whom He pleased to adopt
as sons, and who should be heirs of salvation.
To adopt as sons through Jesus Christ]. Christ Jesus is here to be
considered not only as the foundation on which is based the execution of the
decree, but also as the foundation on which the decree itself is based. For
we are adopted in him as in our head, therefore he is, in the order of
causes, first constituted and predestinated to be our head, then we are
predestinated in him as his members. This admonition I present, not because
I think that you understand that expression differently, but because I
perceive that Beza on the first chapter to the Ephesians, adopts an order
entirely different, and which seems to me to invert the correct order of
predestination.
According to the purpose of his election]. This purpose of election is
nothing else than the good-pleasure of God, by which he is favourably
disposed towards some, and by which He pleases to adopt some, in Christ, as
sons. But your words are so arranged as to convey the idea that this purpose
is something different from that good-pleasure.
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THESIS 5
It is, therefore, God alone, who predestinates, the cause of His own
predestination, and of that preparation which He proposed to Himself,
according to that good pleasure of His will.
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THESIS 6
Therefore, this act is said to be from eternity, that is, before all things
and causes, in things or of things, which He predestinated to exist.
If this Thesis excludes also the sin of man as a condition requisite in the
object of that predestination, it is not correctly said that predestination
precedes the provision of sin; for, though sin did not move God to the act
of predestination, (for it is the appropriate effect of sin to move the
wrath of God), yet this predestination was made in view of sin, the
occurrence of which in time, God foresaw in the infinity of His knowledge.
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THESIS 7
The material of predestination is twofold; divine things, and persons to be
partakers of them.
Divine things and persons, to be partakers of them, have a mutual relation
to each other, so that a conclusion concerning the character of the persons
can be formed from the nature of those things, and conversely, the nature of
those divine things may be inferred from the character of the persons. The
things are adapted to the persons, and such persons need such things for
salvation. Thus, from the grace of the remission of sins and the renewal of
the Holy Ghost, we infer that the men, for whom those things are prepared,
are sinners; also, if men are sinners, it is inferred that such grace is
necessary for them.
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THESIS 8
The genus of the divine things, which are communicable through
Predestination, is blessing, which the Apostle circumscribes within these
modes; it is complete, not partial; spiritual, not carnal; "in heavenly
places," not natural, but surpassing all nature; finally, in Christ, that
is, divine in its principle and foundation, that Christ may be the eternal
head of the predestinate.
The expression, in which divine things are said to be communicable through
predestination, does not seem to me to be in harmony with the nature of
predestination. For predestination does not cause that those things should
be communicable, but does in fact communicate them. They are made
communicable by the blood and death and resurrection of Christ, by which
those blessings were acquired and obtained from the Father. Since any thing
is communicable before it is, in fact, communicated, it follows that
predestination is posterior, in the prescience and preordination of God, to
the death and resurrection of Christ. I leave the inference for the
consideration of the intelligent.
Spiritual, not carnal]. spiritual is contrasted in the Scriptures not only
with carnal, but, also, with natural; as in 1 Corinthians ii. 14, also, in 1
Corinthians xv. 44, 45, 46. Carnal, however, may sometimes also comprehend
in itself the natural.
"In heavenly places," not natural]. Heavenly things are, in the Scriptures,
contrasted with mundane and earthly good, adapted to nature as such, and,
thus, heavenly and natural are indirectly opposed.
Finally, in Christ]. Christ obtained those blessings by his death; he has
received the same from his Father to be communicated to his followers; in
him believers are predestinated to a participation in the same.
Divine in principle and foundation]. Blessing is divine in principle, for
its principle is God, the Father, who confers it; but it is not said, in the
same sense to be divine in its foundation. For Christ is the foundation of
that blessing, not as he is God, but as he is God-man, Qeanqrwpov Mediator,
saviour and Head of the church. This consideration of Christ is, everywhere
in the Scriptures, distinguished from that, in which Christ is regarded as
God, as in John xvii, 3; xiv, 1;
1 Tim. ii. 5, 6; 1 Pet. i. 18, 19, 20, 21; 1 Cor. v. 19, &c.
That Christ might be the eternal head of the Predestinate]. Whether Christ
was constituted the head of those who were to be predestinated, or of those
who had been already predestinated, has been a point in dispute among
Theologians. It is my opinion that, in the order of nature, the decree by
which Christ was constituted the head of those to be saved, was prior to
that decree by which some are ordained in Christ to a participation in
salvation. For Christ, as our mediator before God and our High Priest,
merited those blessings, which were to be communicated by predestination,
and, at the same time, the dignity of head, and the power to communicate
those blessings. Then he actually received those blessings from the Father,
and obtained the titles of Head, King and Prince. "Having been made perfect,
or consecrated, he became the author of eternal salvation to all who obey
him."
Finally, in him believers are predestinated, that they should be partakers
of those blessings, by union with him. For God loves, in Christ, those whom
He has determined to make partakers of eternal life, but this love is the
cause of predestination. It was, indeed, in Christ born, dead, raised again,
and constituted the head of the church. "But," some will say, "God so loved
the world that He gave His only-begotten Son."—I answer, that the love,
referred to in this passage, differs in degree from that which is the cause
of predestination, and is prior to it. For that love, which sent His Son,
did not, with certainty, ordain eternal life to any one, and, indeed, it
could not do so, for Christ had not merited it by his death. Indeed, by
making Christ the foundation and Head of the predestinate, you seem to
declare that Christ was made the Head of them who were to be predestinated
in him unto life.
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THESIS 9
Of these blessings, the chief points are two, grace and glory; the former,
acting on men in the present life, the latter to be consummated in them in
the future life.
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THESIS 10
Human beings are creatures, in a condition of nature—which can effect
nothing supernatural or divine—to be exalted above nature, and to be
transferred to a participation of divine things by the supernatural energy
of the Deity.
It is here most manifestly evident that the object of predestination is
considered by you to be men in their natural state, which can effect nothing
supernatural or divine, that is, as I have said, considered, in a merely
natural state, apart from supernatural endowments, and from the corruption
which afterwards supervened. But this is not an adequate object of this
decree. For the exaltation, which is according to predestination, is not
from nature, but from sin beginning. The divine things, a participation in
which is prepared by predestination, are not adapted to man in his natural
state, but to man involved in sin and misery. That supernatural power
belongs to God, which He exercises in Christ, "the power of God and the
wisdom of God," 1 Corinthians i. 24, the Jews and Gentiles being called to
salvation. Therefore, it was applied to man, considered not in his primitive
natural state, but in sin and misery.
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THESIS 11
The form is adoption, as sons, through Jesus Christ, that is, that real
relation and ordination, in which we are blessed of God, by the
communication of "all spiritual blessings in heavenly places" in Christ.
Predestination is unto adoption, therefore adoption is not the form of
predestination. For "the form gives being to the thing," and adoption does
not give being to predestination, but receives its own being from
predestination; and it is the first per se and immediate work of divine
predestination, and its consequent is life and the heavenly inheritance. Nor
is that real relation and ordination, in which we are blessed, "the form of
predestination;" for that ordination, in which we are blessed; is the
execution of the divine predestination. But the preparation of those
blessings is the form of predestination, for, by it, predestination has its
being. That preparation is internal and eternal, and that is true also of
predestination. Or—to speak with greater accuracy -- the preparation of
those blessings is not the form of predestination, for that preparation was
made by the death of Christ, the Mediator, but the form consists in the
preparation of the communication of those blessings to believers in Christ.
We might add that the preparation is certain, and that, according to it, a
communion in the benefits of Christ is certainly bestowed on those for whom
the participation is prepared.
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THESIS 12
The order of this form is placed in the preparation, of persons, by
election, vocation, and "gathering together in Christ" (Ephes. i. 10); but
of things, by a gracious beginning, progress, and glorious consummation of
blessings, in a perfect union with Christ.
The order of that preparation, as the form, can, indeed, be declared, in
respect both to persons and to things. Persons are prepared in the minds of
God, when election from the world, vocation to a union with Christ, and the
gathering together in Christ, are ordained for them. Things are prepared in
this order, that their gracious communication should he ordained, in
reference to its beginning, progress, and final consummation; the beginning,
in Christ; the progress, in the same; but the consummation, in the perfect
union with God. For this is the consummation of a supernatural felicity
"that God may be all in all." If, however, the subject of discussion be the
mediatorial consummation, I concede that this is effected in Christ, but
this tends to that chief consummation, which is union with God, to which we
come by a perfect union with Christ. For Christ shall deliver up his own
kingdom "to God even the Father, that God may be all in all." (1 Cor. xv.
24, 28.)
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THESIS 13
The end is the praise of the glorious grace of God, by which He has freely
made us acceptable unto Himself, in the Son of His love.
The grace, by which God "has freely made us acceptable unto Himself, in the
Son of His love, is grace only adapted to sinners." The praise of that grace
is sung to God and the Lamb, who died and lives again, "who was delivered
for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification." (Rom. iv.
25.) That praise is ascribed to God by sinners, whom God has redeemed by the
blood of His Son, "out of every kindred, tongue, and people, and nation."
(Rev. v. 9.)
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THESIS 14
What is contrary to this predestination can not, with propriety, be
expressed in a single term, since the relation of predestination is single,
that of its contraries is various. For preterition is contrary to the
preparation of grace, and reprobation or preparation of punishment is
contrary to the preparation of glory.
Grace and glory are prepared in predestination. To this preparation, as an
affirmative act, is opposed the negative act of the non-preparation of grace
and glory, and the affirmative act of the preparation of those things, which
are affirmatively contrary to grace and glory. But here, to the preparation
of grace, is opposed only the negative act of preterition, and, to the
preparation of glory, only the affirmative act of reprobation or the
preparation of punishment. Hence it seems to me to be a correct conclusion
that this discussion is not absolutely consistent in all its parts, unless,
perhaps, there is no affirmative act, which can be opposed to the
preparation of grace. There is, however, such an act, namely, hardening,
blinding, and the delivering to a reprobate mind, which can be fitly and
fully explained only by negative acts. Also, the denial of celestial glory
is a negative act opposed to the preparation of glory. It is to be observed,
here, that the word reprobation is used for the preparation of punishment,
while, in your answers to my propositions, you affirm that it properly
signifies non-election or preterition.
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THESIS 15
Preterition is the act of the divine will, by which God, from eternity,
determined to leave some of His creatures in their natural state, and not to
communicate to them that supernatural grace, by which their nature might be
preserved uncorrupt, or, having become corrupt, might be restored, to the
declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.
Preterition is defined to be a denial of grace only, not of glory, while,
nevertheless, glory is denied to the same persons. It is rightly called an
act of the divine pleasure, not good-pleasure; for pleasure is the general
term, applied to any purpose or decree of God; good-pleasure, as has been
remarked, includes a favourable and benevolent disposition in the Deity. To
leave in their natural condition]. From this also it is evident that the
object of predestination is, in your view, men considered in a merely
natural state.
Supernatural grace, by which their nature might be preserved uncorrupt, or,
having become corrupt, might be restored]. If the e words are to be
understood to have reference to the particular predestination of men, then
that distinction is not correctly used. For the grace by which nature is
"preserved uncorrupt," is not denied by the decree of preterition. For that
grace was denied to all men without distinction. But the denial of grace, by
which nature, having become corrupt, is restored, is peculiar to the decree
of preterition, and, therefore the object of preterition is fallen man, and
to one who needs renewing grace.
To the declaration of the freedom of His own goodness.] The freedom of the
goodness of God is declared not only when God communicates to one, and
denies to another, His own goodness, but also when He communicates it only
on the condition, which He has been pleased to impose; I concede, however,
that the freedom of the divine goodness is also declared in the former mode.
But there is a declaration in preterition, as described to us in the
Scriptures, not only of the freedom of the goodness of God, but of His
justice. For God, according to justice also, uses preterition, by which He
determines to deny His grace to some on account of their sins. Sin, indeed,
is the only meritorious cause of the denial of grace, which is here
discussed. Therefore, the statement of the end of that preterition was not
sufficiently complete.
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THESIS 16
This preterition is without blame: for God bestowed on man the perfection of
human nature, He was not under obligation to bestow grace upon any one. It
is grace; therefore, there is no obligation.
God, in the abstract and absolutely, was not under obligation to bestow
grace on any one, but He could place Himself under that obligation in two
ways, by promise, and by making certain requisitions. By promise, if He
should promise to bestow grace, either with or without condition. By
requisition, if He should require, from a man, an act, such that it could
not be performed. without His grace, for then He would be under obligation
to bestow it, otherwise He would reap where He had not sowed.
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THESIS 17
The preparation of punishment is the act of the divine pleasure, by which
God, from eternity, determined, for the declaration of His own justice, to
punish His creatures, who should not continue in their original state, but
should depart from God, the author of their origin, by their own deed and
depravity, You call the preparation of punishment an affirmative act,
opposed to predestination; but it is opposed, affirmatively, to the
preparation of glory. That, which is opposed affirmatively, to the
communication of grace is not here stated. I think that it should be called
hardening and blinding, and that it should have been also treated in this
Thesis.
To punish His creatures who should not maintain their original integrity].
This decree was ordained by God, not until after the certain foresight of
future sin, lest any one should think that sin is necessarily inferred from
that decree, as some of our Doctors believe.
Should full away from God by their own act and transgression]. It should be
explained how he can, by his own act, fall away from God, who has, already,
been passed by of God, in the communication of that grace, which is
necessary for the avoidance of defection from God. And since all the
passed-by are also predamned, I could wish that it might be explained how
preterition and predamnation necessarily cohere, if preterition existed
apart from any consideration of sin, but predamnation, only on account of
sin.
The declaration of the justice of God, also, as has been previously
remarked, has a place in preterition.
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THESIS 18
Therefore, in the predestinate, God does all things according to the
good-pleasure of His own predestination. In those who are not predestinate,
He uses preterition according to the pleasure of His will, and prepares
punishment for His creatures who transgress against His order, and who must
be reprobated, on account of their sins, from the necessity of His justice.
In predestination, God provides only for the salvation of the elect; yet, in
such a manner, that many acts of the divine Providence concur to the same
effect, which acts are so administered by the Deity, that from them
salvation certainly results, which is the proper work of predestination. God
uses many acts of His providence towards those, who are not predestinated,
sufficient, indeed, for salvation, yet not efficacious, since this pertains
to predestination. It is not absurd nor irrelevant, then, to observe, here,
this distinction between providence and predestination. Who must be
reprobated on account of their sins]. You here, also, use the word
reprobation for the preparation of punishment.
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THESIS 19
If reprobation is made the opposite of predestination, the statement is
figurative, and synecdochical: wherefore, it either should not be made,
because it is improper, dangerous, and liable to give offense, or it should
be distinctly explained, as pious and learned men have done.
In your answer to my second proposition, you use this language: "Reprobation
is used in three senses, one common and two special. In its common use, it
comprehends preterition and damnation. Its second mode is special, when it
is opposed to election, and signifies non-election or preterition. The third
is also special, when it is used for pre-damnation. The first mode is by
synecdoche, the second proper, the third metonymical, and it may also be
called catachrestic." Here, you call that meaning of reprobation common,
which, in your Theses, and elsewhere, you call figurative. We are not to
abstain from the use of the term, for it is Scriptural, but we are to be
careful that it be also used in the sense in which it is used in the
Scriptures.
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THESIS 20
The presentation of this doctrine is especially necessary, if it is treated
skillfully, soberly, and reverently, that is, that not any thing else be
treated, not otherwise, not to another end than as the Holy Scriptures
teach, both in explanation and in application, according to the advice of
St. Paul: "not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think, but
to think soberly." Rom. xii. 3.
That, which is taught, and inculcated in the Holy Scriptures, can not but be
esteemed useful and necessary for salvation, though there may be different
degrees of necessity. But the doctrine of predestination, and its opposite,
that of reprobation, is taught and inculcated in the Scriptures; it is,
therefore, also necessary. It should, however, be considered what that
predestination is, and what is its character, which is discussed in the
Scriptures as necessary, and which is called the foundation of our
salvation. Your admonition is altogether proper and necessary, by which you
enjoin that the doctrine should be set forth entirely in accordance with the
Scriptures—"not any thing else, not otherwise, not to another end than as
the Holy Scriptures teach." But there is a practical difficulty in this
matter, because each one desires to appear to present his own doctrines
according to the Scripture. I am satisfied that, in your discussion of this
doctrine, you are not, in every case, sustained by the Scripture, but in
some parts you err, and I have treated this more fully in the discussion
held between us.
_________________________________________________________________
An Examination
By Rev. James Arminius, D. D. Of A Treatise; Concerning The Order And Mode Of
Predestination And The Amplitude Of Divine Grace
By Rev. William Perkins, D.D., A Theological Writer In England Also, An
Analysis Of The Ninth Chapter Of The Epistle To The Romans
_________________________________________________________________
* An Examination Of The Treatise Of William Perkins Concerning The Order
And Mode Of Predestination
* Rev. William Perkins Views On Predestination & Grace
* Allegation 1
* Allegation 2
* Allegation 3
* DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF PERMISSION
* ALLEGATION 4
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PART 1
William Perkins,. D. D., Fellow of Christ’ s College, Cambridge, was a
Theological writer at the close of the sixteenth century. As will be seen
from the following strictures on one of his treatises, he advocated views
highly Calvinistic. The following "Examination, etc," was written by
Arminius, in 1602.
Reverend Sir, and Beloved Brother in Christ, -- While I was lately, and with
eagerness, examining a certain library, abundantly supplied with recently
published books, a pamphlet presented itself to me, entitled "A Christian
and Perspicuous Discourse concerning the Order and Mode of Predestination,
and the extent of Divine Grace." When I observed that it bore your name,
which was already well known to me by previously published works of a high
character, I thought that I must diligently read and consider it, and see
whether you, who are devoted to the most accurate learning, could remove, in
that work, the difficulties which have long disquieted my mind. I,
therefore, read it once and again, with impartiality, as far as I could, and
with candour, as you desire. But, in reading, I perceived that all my
difficulties were not removed by your work, while I thought that some
things, written by you, deserved to be examined in the light of truth.
Accordingly, I judged it not improper to commence a friendly discussion with
you concerning your treatise. This I do, with the greater freedom and
confidence, because, in the second page of your pamphlet, you say, to the
encouragement of my mind, that you "have written these things, that, by
those devoted to theological investigation"—among whom I willingly reckon
myself—"they may be read without prejudice or acerbity of mind, duly
weighed, and judged by the pure word of God." This I undertake, and pledge
myself to do according to my ability; asking of you that in return, you
will, with the same disposition, read my remarks, weigh them, and examine
and judge them by the rule of the same Scriptures. May God grant that we all
may fully agree, in those things which are necessary to His glory, and to
the salvation of the church; and that, in other things, if there can not be
harmony of opinions, there may at least be harmony of feelings, and that we
may "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace."
With this desire, then, expressed at the beginning of our discussion, I
enter on the subject itself, following in the track, which, in your writing,
you have pursued before me. I will commence with your "Epistle to the
Reader," and then proceed, with the divine help, to the treatise itself.
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EXAMINATION OF THE EPISTLE
In your Epistle to the Reader, you lay down two fundamental principles, on
which this doctrine of Predestination and Divine Grace, can and must be
built. The first is "the written word of God;" the second "the common ideas,
and the principles which God has infused into the minds of men," I have no
opposition to make at this point, only let this be added, that, when, on
account of the darkness of our minds, and the weakness and diversity of the
human judgment (which you regret), it is not possible for us to agree
concerning these matters, we must recur, for definite and final decision, to
that which is first and equivalent to all other things—the word of God.
Of the first principle, laid down by you, I remark that it is true; but care
must be used, lest any thing, which is not in accordance with human
judgment, should be attributed to God, and defended as just, on the
consideration that it is declared to be unjust by corrupt human judgment;
unless it can be made clear, by a conclusive argument, that it is suitably
ascribed to the Deity. For, it is sufficient, for the sake of referring any
action or work to God, to say that He has justly performed it; though, from
the antecedent, God has done this, will follow, of necessity, the
consequent, therefore, it is just.
Of the second; -- I concede that it is true. For He is the first cause, and
the cause of causes, who, from the foreseen free act of rational creatures,
takes occasion to make any decree, and to establish a certain order in
events; which decree He would not have made, and which order He would not
have established, if the free second causes had acted otherwise. The Apostle
says, "the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason
of Him who hath subjected the same," (Rom. viii. 20.) To this vanity the
creature would not have been subjected, if he, for whose sake it was created
by God, had remained in his original integrity. The decree, in reference to
sending Christ into the world, depends on the foresight of the fall; for he
is "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world," (John i. 29.)
He "was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death,"
(Heb. ii. 9); "as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also
himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy
him that had the power of death, that is, the devil," (Heb. ii. 14.) He was
constituted a "high priest, ordained for men, that he might offer both gifts
and sacrifices for sins," (Heb. v. 1.) The decrees of God, by which He
ordains to punish His creatures, are universally on this principle,
according to the Scriptures: "That be far from thee to do after this manner,
to slay the righteous with the wicked: shall not the Judge of all the earth
do right?" (Gen. xviii. 25.) "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I
blot out of my book," (Exod. xxxii. 33.) "I said, indeed, that thy house,
and the house of thy father, should walk before me forever, but now the Lord
saith, be it far from me; for them that honour me I will honour, and they
that despise me shall be lightly esteemed," (1 Sam. ii. 30.)
But it is not therefore to be supposed that the imposing of penalties
depends on second causes; so far from it, they would put forth every effort
to escape punishment, if they could do so either by reason or force. I could
wish also that the word "ordaining" were used in its proper sense: from
which they seem to me to depart, who interpret it—to decree that something
shall be done. For its true meaning is to establish the order of things
done, not to appoint things to be done that they may be done; though it is
used sometimes by the fathers in the latter sense. But then God is denied,
by the fathers, to be the ordainer of evils. Thus says Augustine: "God knows
how to ordain, not crime, but the punishment of crimes."
Of the third; -- It is characteristic of a wise being to do nothing in vain.
But he does something in vain, who does it not to attain some end. But God
is infinitely wise. Let me caution you, then, not to extend the phrase, "to
regard with indifference," farther, or to interpret it otherwise than is
suitable. There is a real distinction between doing and permitting. He, who
permits any thing, that he may attain some end, does not regard it with
indifference. From this it is clear that not to regard with indifference is
not the same as to do or to make. Of this also I remind you for a certain
reason. Then consider whether the phrase, which you use, is correct. The
word "prudently" seems to be too feeble to be applied to so great wisdom.
And it is not a usual form of expression to say that an action is performed
"in view of a certain end," but for the sake of that end. The statement, He
does not will or decree that which He can not, is ambiguous, and not
sufficiently full. It is ambiguous, because it may be understood to mean
that He can not will or decree, or that He can not do. It is not
sufficiently full, because there should be an addition, so that the
statement would be this: "He does not will or decree to do or permit that
which He can not do or permit." For which reason also your conclusion is
likewise imperfect, and, to the expression, "He has decreed thus to do,"
add, "or permit."
Of the fourth; -- The decree of God is two-fold; that of efficacious action
and that of permission. Both are immutable. The creature, however free, can
not change himself by his own act, or receive any change from another,
contrary to either of these decrees, and without the certain and fixed
determination of the former or the latter. But it is not merely necessary
that God should fix these, and not other, limits of the change, as if the
creature—if this was possible without the divine superintendence of the
change—might be able either to change himself, or to receive change from
another, to such an extent that God could not bring it into order, and have
occasion for the illustration of his glory. For to Him even NOTHING ought to
be material for the declaration of His glory: and any change from Nothing to
Something, produced by Him, ought to serve the same purpose.
Of the fifth; -- All the judgments of God, "whatever they may be, whether
hidden or partly known to us, are to be honoured, and to be adorned with the
praise of righteousness, provided, however, that it be manifest that they
are the judgments of God. But under this pretense, no judgments are to be
attributed to God which the Scripture does not assign to Him; much less
those which are contrary to the righteousness of God revealed in the
Scriptures. Thus Augustine says: "As man becomes more like God, so the more
does the damnation of perishing men move him: it moves also our saviour
himself, and caused his tears, not once only, to flow. It moves also God
Himself; who says: "What could have been done more to my vineyard that I
have not done in it?" (Isa. v. 4.) "O that my people had hearkened unto me."
(Psalm lxxxi. 13.) "Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die,"
(Ezek. xviii. 23.) But it so moves God, that He is yet delighted in the
destruction of His enemies, who are refractory and refuse to repent. For His
righteousness demands this. It moves Him, I say, because they are unwilling
to be saved, not because, when they are unwilling to be saved, He may devote
them to just destruction. It so moves Christ, the saviour, that he shall
yet, willingly, banish, from his presence, unbelievers and evil doers, and
adjudge them to eternal fire. For this is demanded by the office of Judge.
It so moves a pious man, that he may not utter any objection against God in
reference to His various decrees, and the execrations of His righteous
judgments on the obstinate. This is required by the obedience which the
creature owes to his Creator and Redeemer."
Concerning that objection, I may be allowed, with the leave of Augustine, to
say that it is not the offspring of infirm and weak human nature, but of the
refractory disposition of the Jews and of those like them, of whom the
apostle speaks, (Rom. ix. 20.) It is indeed true that we, when compared with
God, "are as grass-hoppers," yea, and "are counted to Him as less than
nothing," (Isa. xl. 17, 22.) But, in such exaggerations of human
insignificance, we are to be careful not to do injustice to the creation of
God. For man was made in the image of God, and therefore, even to God
Himself, man, not any beast, is the noblest creature, with whom, as the
wisdom of God declares, are His delights, (Prov. viii. 31.)
Of the sixth; -- The concurrence of God with second causes to perform any
act, or produce any work, is two-fold, of the general, and the special aid
of His grace. It is most certain that nothing good can be performed by any
rational creature without this special aid of His grace. But whether it is
the province of the divine will, absolutely willing it, to communicate this
gracious aid, and by this communication, to absolutely work good in us, is
in controversy among Theologians. This is not improperly so, since the word
absolutely can not be found in the Scriptures, and it has not yet been
proved that its equivalent is found in the Scriptures.
Of the seventh; -- So also it is certain that "no evil can be avoided if God
does not prevent it." But there is dispute concerning the mode of
prevention; -- whether it is by the omnipotent action of the Deity operating
on the human will according to the mode of nature, from which there exists a
necessity of prevention, or by such an action as operates on the will,
according to the mode of the will as respects its freedom, from which the
certainty of prevention exists.
Of the eighth; -- It can not be concluded from an event that God has willed
something, but we may know either this fact, that He was unwilling to hinder
an event which He foresaw would occur.—Otherwise the distinction, which
exists between the action and the permission of God, is destroyed. For some
things occur, because God produces them, but others, because He permits them
to occur, according to Augustine and to truth itself. But to will that any
thing should occur, and to be unwilling to prevent its occurrence, are not
the same things. For, in the former case, the event is resolved into the
will of God as its first and special cause; in the latter, it is resolved
affirmatively into a second cause, and negatively into the divine will,
which has not prevented it, which prevention also is produced either by
power according to the mode of nature, or by persuasion according to the
mode of free-will. But concerning permission and prevention we shall treat
more fully hereafter in their own place. Of the ninth; -- But let us examine
this idea; "to be able to perform," "to will to do," and "actually to do,"
are divine gifts and effects on men. But there should be this additional
remark, that God gives to no one the power of doing right, unless He is
ready also to give the will and the act itself, that is, by the further aid
of grace, to concur with man in willing and in actually doing that good, for
which He has received sufficient strength, unless the man on his part may
interpose, or, as the school-men say, may have interposed some obstacle.
"For unto every one that hath shall be given; but from him that hath not
shall be taken away even that which he hath." (Matt. xxv. 29). Were this not
so, the power would have been given in vain. But the all-wise God doth
nothing in vain. Thus He gave to Adam the faculty of observing the law which
He had enacted, and He was prepared to give him whatever else was needed, in
addition to that faculty, for actual obedience, namely, both to will and to
do, unless Adam willingly and by voluntary motion turned himself away from
God, and from His grace. I see here a labyrinth which I will not now enter,
because I should not be permitted to make my egress from it, except by the
thread and guidance of an accurate explication of the mode of the
concurrence of God with man in the performance of any good thing; which
explication does not belong to this place, or, as I indeed, acknowledge, to
my abilities.
Of the tenth; -- That "God presides over the whole world, and all things
created by Himself, and administers and governs all and each of them" is
certain. But this is not only in justice, but also in mercy, even so far as
He, in His infinite wisdom, knows what place ought to be assigned to each.
But, indeed, do all those axioms seem to you to be natural and common
notions, They, indeed, belong to nature, as it was when it come from the
hand of its Creator, surely not to it, as it has been darkened by sin. For
to few among men is it given to know and understand those things. The whole
troop of Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians in the church itself, do not know
them. What the opinion of many of the Greek and Latin philosophers was
concerning most of them, is apparent from an expression used by not one of
them only:
"What we are, is given to us by the Gods; what of good we are, we have from
ourselves." To this notorious falsity, Augustine in more than one passage,
sharply opposes himself.
On these principles in part, as a foundation, you build up a doctrine of
Predestination, which is, indeed, beset with difficulties. This is caused by
the fact, that men do not fear to add to the Scriptures, whatever they think
proper, and are accustomed to attribute as much as possible to their own
conceptions, which they style natural ideas. I can not but praise your
effort. For light ought, by all means, to be thrown upon truth by all, to
the utmost of their ability. Calumnies and accusations, by which the truth
is assailed and beset, are to be refuted. Minds, embittered against it, are
not only to be softened and soothed, but also, to be induced to embrace it.
It can not be made an objection against you, that you adduce the opinions of
the ancient Theologians, especially those whom you quote, some caution being
observed, lest we go too far in that direction. For the Fathers are
themselves also liable to diverse interpretations, and, indeed, more than
the divine and inspired writers, as they were endued with knowledge of the
truth, which was less in degree and in clearness, and they could express the
thoughts of their minds only with less accuracy and fitness. When I consider
this, I doubt whether they have consulted the best interests of the church,
who have thought that, in this age, the opinions of the Fathers are to be
considered by them as authority in matters of religion. But the die is cast,
and we must advance, whithersoever the fates of the Church bear us. In
reference to your declaration, that you present the testimony of the ancient
Doctors and School-men, for the sake of exhibiting an agreement in that part
of doctrine, I do not see how that is so. For I am quite persuaded that
nothing can be thought of, more adapted to bring that whole doctrine of
Predestination and the grace of God into confusion, and to overwhelm it with
darkness, than the effort on the part of any one to bring forward and unite
together all the opinions of the Fathers and the School-men, in reference to
it. But I desire that you may not at once pronounce him an unjust estimator
or judge, who dares to assert that the dogmas, which you present in this
treatise, are found neither in the Scriptures nor in the Fathers. For if you
shall, after reasons have been adduced by that estimator, arbiter or judge,
be able to sustain your statement, you will find him not struggling against
it, with an unfair and obstinate mind, but ready to yield to what is proved
to be the truth with becoming equanimity. Nor will it be an easier matter to
persuade me that the dogmas of which you here treat, are, in that same mode
and sense, proposed and set forth in all the Reformed Churches. I say this,
lest you should think that you can bear down one thinking differently by the
prejudgment of those churches.
_________________________________________________________________
EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE
I come now to the treatise itself, which I will examine with somewhat more
care and diligence. You will not complain if, in some places, I may with the
closest criticism also subject some of the nicer points to the most rigid
scrutiny. For who would not consent that a serious and solid discussion
should be, as it were, spiced by a friendly diversity and a pleasant contest
concerning the more accurate handling of a subject.
You begin and rightly with a definition of Predestination. But that
definition does not seem to be adapted to the Predestination, which is set
forth in the Scriptures. For the Predestination, of which the Scriptures
treat, is of men in their relation as sinners; it is made in Christ; it is
to blessings which concern, not this animal life, but the spiritual life, of
which a part also are communicated in this animal life, as is clearly
evident from Ephesians 1, where, among the spiritual blessings to which we
have been predestinated in Christ are enumerated "adoption of children
(verse 5), "redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins," (verse
7th), "having made known unto us the mystery of his will," (verse 9th),
which blessings are given to the predestinated in this life. The apostle
well say "the life, which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of
the Son of God," (Gal. ii. 20)
signifying that he, in this animal life, was a partaker of spiritual gifts,
and from them lived a spiritual life. But perhaps you did not wish to give
an accurate definition, but only by some description to give us an idea of
predestination. I may concede this, yet in that description there seem to be
many things which ought to be noticed. For the word "counsel," by which you
have desired to explain one kind of Predestination is not a kind of
Predestination, but pertains to its efficient cause; for a decree is made by
"counsel," which decree can be fitly considered a kind of Predestination—if
indeed counsel can be attributed to God, by which He may decree anything, as
in the Scripture, -- e.g. Acts iv. 28, and Ephes. i. 11. This I say, is
apparent from the passages quoted. For in the former (Acts iv. 28),
"counsel" is said to determine before or predestinate things to be done; in
the latter (Ephes. i. 11), it is said that God "worketh all things,"—even
institutes predestination-after the counsel of His own will.
There is, in this life, an equality of the pious and the wicked as to
external blessings, but they are to be considered generally. For in
individual cases there is a great difference both among the pious and the
wicked, and so great indeed is it that, to those, who are dissatisfied with
that inequality, it may need a defense by an argument for reducing it,
hereafter, to an equality. Indeed it is said of the pious and the faithful
"if in this life, only, we have hope in Christ, we are, of all men, most
miserable." (1 Cor. xv. 19.)
I approve what you say concerning "the final cause of Predestination," when
rightly understood, that is, if a declaration of the glory of God through
mercy and justice is attributed to Predestination, so long as it is the
foreordination of sinners who shall believe in Christ to eternal life, and
on the contrary, the predamnation of sinners who shall persevere in sins to
eternal death; who shall believe, through the gracious gift of God, and who
shall persevere in sins through their own wickedness and the just desertion
of God. But if you think that God, from eternity, without any pre-existence
of sin, in His prescience, determined to illustrate His own glory by mercy
and punitive justice, and, that He might be able to secure this object,
decreed to create man good but mutable, and ordained farther that he should
fall, that in this way there might be a place for that decree, I say that
such an opinion can, in my judgment, be established by no passage of the
word of God.
That this may be made plainer, a few things must be said concerning the
glory of God and the modes of its manifestation. No one can doubt that God,
since He is the first and Supreme Efficient Cause of all His own acts and
works, and the single and sole cause of many of them, has always the
manifestation of His own perfection, that is, His own glory, proposed to
Himself, as His chief and highest object. For the first and supreme cause is
moved to produce any effect, by nothing, out of itself otherwise it would
not be the first and supreme cause. Therefore, not only the act of
Predestination, but also every other divine act has "the illustration of the
glory of God" as its final cause. Now it is equally certain and known to
all, who have even approached the threshold of sacred letters, that the
manifestation of the divine perfection and the illustration of his glory
consists in the unfolding of His essential attributes by acts and works
comparable to them: but an inquiry is necessary concerning those attributes,
by the unfolding of which He determined to illustrate His own glory, first,
by which, in the second place, and so on, by successive steps. It is certain
that He could not, first of all, have done this by means of mercy and
punitive justice. For the former could be exercised only towards the
miserable, the latter only towards sinners. But since, first of all, the
external action of God both was and must be taken up, so to speak, with
Nothing, it is, therefore, evident that goodness, wisdom, and omnipotence
were, first of all, to be unfolded, and that by them the glory of God was to
be illustrated. These, therefore, were unfolded in the creation, by which
God appeared to be supremely good and wise, and omnipotent.
But, as God made all His creatures with this difference that some were
capable of nothing more than they were at their creation, and others were
capable of greater perfection, He was concerned, as to the former, only with
their preservation and government, accomplished by goodness, wisdom and
power of the same kind and measure, since preservation is only a continuance
of creation, as the latter is the beginning of the former, and government
may not go beyond the natural condition of the creatures, unless when it
seems good to God to use them, for the sake of men for supernatural
purposes, as in the bread and wine used, in the Lord’s Supper, to signify
and seal unto us the communion of the body and the blood of Christ; as to
the latter, which He made capable of greater perfection, as angels and men,
the same attributes were to be unfolded, but in a far greater measure. In
the former case, the good communicated is limited, as each creature receives
that which is appropriate to itself, according to the diversity of their
natures, but, in the latter, there is a communication of supreme and
infinite good, which is God, in the union with whom consists the happiness
of rational creatures. Reason demanded that this communication should be
made contrary to justice, wherefore He gave a law to His creatures,
obedience to which was made the condition on which that communication should
be made. Therefore, this was the first decree concerning the final cause of
rational creatures, and the glory of God to be illustrated by justice and
the highest goodness—highest as to the good to be communicated, not
absolutely; by goodness joined to justice, in the case of those who should
be made partakers of the highest good, through steadfastness in the truth;
by punitive justice, in the case of those who should make themselves
unworthy of it by their disobedience. Then we see that justice, rewarding
obedience, which was its office, according to the gracious promise of God,
and punishing disobedience as it deserves, according to the just
threatenings of God, holds the first place; in the former case, justice
joined to goodness, in the latter, punitive justice opposed to the gracious
communication of the highest good, without any mention of mercy, unless it
may be considered as preserving the creature from possible misery, which
could, by its own fault, fall into misery; as mercy is not considered when
it is predetermined by the decree of Predestination. That decree was
peremptory in respect to the angels, as in accordance with it, they are
condemned: wherefore the predestination and reprobation of angels was
comprehended in this. But what grace was prepared for the former in
Predestination and was denied to the latter in Reprobation, and in what
respects, I do not now argue. But it was not peremptory in reference to men,
whom God did not decree to treat according to that highest rigor of the law,
but in the salvation of whom He decreed to exhibit all His goodness, which
Jehovah showed to Moses in these, His attributes, "The Lord, Lord God,
merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth"
(Exod. xxvi. 6). Therefore, the Predestination and Reprobation of men were
not considered in that decree. For since Adam sinned, and in him all who
were to be his descendants by natural propagation, all would have been
devoted to eternal condemnation without hope of pardon. For the decree of
Predestination and Reprobation is peremptory. So far, then, no
predestination of men unto life, and no reprobation unto death had any
place. And since there could be no Predestination and Reprobation, except in
accordance with those attributes by which men are at once saved or
damned—but the predestinated may be saved at once by mercy, and the
reprobate may be damned at once by justice opposed to that mercy—it follows
that there was no fixed predestination and reprobation of men, in reference
to whom there could be no place for mercy and justice opposed to it. But
there could be no place for them in reference to men who were not miserable,
and not sinners. Then, since Predestination includes the means by which the
predestinated will certainly and infallibly come to salvation, and
Reprobation includes the denial of those same means, but those means are the
remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and its perpetual
assistance even to the end, which are necessary and communicable to none,
except sinners, I conclude that there was no Predestination and Reprobation
in reference to men, in whose case these means were neither necessary nor
communicable.
Finally, since God can love no sinner unto salvation, unless he be
reconciled to Himself in Christ, hence it is, that there could be no place
for Predestination, except in Christ. And since Christ was ordained and
given for sinners, it is certain that Predestination and its opposite,
Reprobation, could have no place before human sin—its existence as foreseen
by God—and the appointment of Christ as Mediator, and indeed his
performance, in the prescience of God, of the functions of the office of
Mediator, which pertains to reconciliation. Nor does it follow from this,
that God either made man with an uncertain design, or failed of the end at
which He aimed. For He prescribed to Himself, both in the act of creation,
and in that of glorification, and its opposite, condemnation, the
illustration of His own glory as an end, and He obtained it; by goodness,
wisdom and power in creation, and He obtained it; by the same, but in a
greater measure, and joined with justice in glorification and condemnation,
and He obtained it. But, though the mode of illustrating His glory by mercy,
which is a certain method of communicating goodness and the approach of the
same to a miserable creature, and by justice, opposed to that mercy, could
have no place except from the occasion of human sin, yet the decree of God
is not, therefore, dependent on the man, for He foresaw from eternity what
would be in the future, and in ordaining, concerning the future, to that
end, He freely arranged it according to His own choice, not compelled by any
necessity as if He could not, in some other way, have secured glory to
Himself from the sin of man. But that the glory of God does not consist
merely in the illustration of mercy and, its opposite justice, is evident
from the fact that, then, He would not have obtained glory from the act of
creation, nor from the predestination and reprobation of angels. It is to be
understood, that mercy is not an essential attribute of the Deity distinct
from goodness itself, as in the womb and the offspring of goodness; indeed,
it is goodness itself extending to the sinful creature and to misery. It can
for this reason be said, in simple terms, that, in all His eternal acts, God
determined to declare His own glory by goodness, wisdom, and omnipotence,
with the addition of justice when equity demanded it at the prescription of
wisdom, but that He adapted the mode to the state, or rather to the change
of the object, in reference to which He had determined to unfold those
attributes. In reference to this thing Tertullian says, in a beautiful and
erudite manner, "God must, of necessity use all things in reference to all
being, He must have as many feelings, as there are causes of them; anger for
the wicked. and wrath for the ungrateful, and jealousy for the proud, and
whatever else would not be for the advantage of the evil; so also, mercy for
the erring, and patience for those not yet repentant, and honour for the
deserving, and whatever is necessary for the good. All these feelings He has
in His own mode, in which it is fit that He should feel them, just as man
has the same, equally after his own manner." (Adversus Marcion, Lib. 2, cap
16.)
Predestination does not arise merely from goodness simply considered, the
province of which is, indeed, to communicate itself to the creature, but
also from that mode of mercy, which goes out from that goodness to the
miserable to remove their misery, of grace in Christ, which goes out from it
to sinners to pardon their sins, of patience and long-suffering, going forth
from the same goodness towards those who, for a long time, struggle against
it, and do not at once obey the call, thus prolonging the delay of
conversion. So also reprobation is not merely fixed by justice, the opposite
of that goodness, simply considered, but by justice tempered by some mercy
and patience. For God "endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath
fitted for destruction." (Rom. ix. 22.)
From these things, thus considered, I may be allowed, with your kind
permission, to conclude that Predestination has not been sufficiently well
defined or described by you. If any one is inclined to consider the series
and order of the objects of the knowledge and the will of God, he will be
more and more confirmed in the truth of the things briefly set forth by me.
The passage from Augustine, is in agreement with these views, if one wishes
to gather his complete opinion from other passages. Fulgentius and Gregory
most clearly support me in the passages quoted by you. For, if the act of
predestination is the preparation for the remission of sins or the
punishment of the same, then it is certain that there is place for
predestination only in reference to sinners. If also the act of
Predestination is the pre-election of some who are to be redeemed from their
depravity, and the leaving of others in their depravity, from this also it
is evident that predestination has to do with men considered as sinners.
That sentiment of the School-men agrees most fully with the same views. For
it openly declares that Predestination depends on the foresight of the fall,
when they say that the perfection and goodness of God, who predestinates, is
represented by the mode of mercy and punitive justice, which mode, as I have
now frequently said, can have place only in reference to sinners. If any one
acknowledges that this is indeed true, but says that God has arranged this,
as an occasion for Himself, by decreeing that man should fall, and by
carrying forward that decree to its end or limit, we ask the proof of that
assertion, which, in my judgment, he will be unable to give. For that
sentiment is at variance with the justice of God, as it makes God the author
of sin, and introduces an inevitable necessity for sin. This I will prove.
For if that decree existed, man could not abstain from sin, otherwise the
decree would have been made in vain, which is an impious supposition. For
"the counsel of the Lord standeth forever." (Psalm xxxiii. 11). We remark
also that the human will would have been circumscribed and determined by
that decree, so that it could not turn itself except in one direction, in
which there would be sin; by that act its freedom would be lost, because it
would move the will, not according to the mode of free-will, but according
to the mode of nature. Such an act it could not resist, nor would there be
any volition in that direction, indeed, there would not be the power to put
forth that volition on account of the determination of the decree. Consider,
also, that, by that sentiment, mercy and justice are considered as means
resulting from Predestination, while they are the primary causes of
Predestination, as is evident from the fact that the final cause of
Predestination may be resolved into the manifestation of mercy and justice.
Here, observe, also, in what way you make the creation and the fall of man
the means in common lying at the foundation of the counsel, or rather the
decree of predestination, I think, indeed, that both the creation, and the
fall preceded every external act of predestination, as also the decree
concerning the creation of man, and the permission of his fall preceded, in
the Divine mind, the decree of Predestination. I think, also, that I have
partly proved this, in my preceding remarks. But it will be well to look at
this with a little more diligence.
Every act, which has reference to an object, is posterior in nature, to its
object. It is called an object relatively. Therefore, it has an absolute
existence prior to the existence of its relation to the act. The object,
then, exists in itself, before it can be under the influence of the act
which tends towards it. But man is the object of Predestination. Therefore,
man is prior to the act of Predestination. But man is what he is by
creation. therefore, creation is prior to Predestination—that is, in the
divine mind, or the decree concerning the creation of man is prior to the
decree of Predestination, and the act of creation is prior to the execution
of the decree of Predestination. If any one should reply that God, in the
internal act of Predestination, is employed with man considered as not
created, but as to be made, I answer that this could neither take place, nor
be so understood by a mind judging rightly. For Predestination is a decree,
not only to illustrate the divine glory, but to illustrate it in man, by the
mode of mercy and justice. From this, it follows that man must also exist in
the divine mind before the act of Predestination, and the fall of man must
itself, also, be previously foreseen. The attributes of God, by which
creation is affected, are, therefore, considered as prior, in the divine
nature, to those in which predestination originates. Goodness, simply
considered, wisdom, and power, operating upon Nothing, are, therefore, prior
to mercy and punitive justice. Add, also, that since predestination
originates, on the one hand, in mercy, and on the other, in justice, in the
former case having reference to salvation—in the latter, to damnation—it
cannot be that any means exist pertaining, in common, to the execution of
election and of reprobation. For they are provided neither in mercy nor in
justice. There exist, then, no means of Predestination, common to both parts
of the decree.
Whether the definition of the creation of man is correct. If you wished to
define the creation of man that should have been done with greater accuracy.
But if you wished only to describe it, there is yet, in that description,
something which I may note. "Man was made mutable," as was demanded by the
very condition of that Nothing from which he was made, and of the creature
itself. which neither could nor ought to be raised, by creation, to the
state of the Creator, which is immutability. But he was made mutable in such
a sense that actual change from good to evil would follow that possible
mutability, only by the voluntary and free act of man. But the act of the
creature does not remain free when it is so determined in one direction,
that, if that determination continues, there cannot but be a change.
Whether the permission of the fall, is rightly defined. But of the
"permission of the fall," we must treat at somewhat greater length: for very
much depends on this for the expediting of this whole matter. It is certain
that God can by the act of His own absolute power prevent all things
whatever, which can be done by the creature, and it is equally certain that
He is not absolutely under obligation to any one to hinder him from evil.
But He can not, in His justice, do all that He can in His absolute power. He
cannot, in His justice (or righteousness), forget the "work and labour of
love" of the pious (Heb. vi. 10). The absolute power of God is limited by
the decree of God, by which He determined to do any thing in a particular
direction, And though God is not absolutely under obligation to any one, He
can yet obligate Himself by His own act, as, for instance, by a promise, or
by requiring some act from man. He is obligated to perform what He promises,
for He owes to Himself the immutability of His own truth, whether He has
promised it absolutely or conditionally. By requiring an act, He places
Himself under obligation to give ability and the strength without which that
act can not be performed; otherwise, He would reap where He had not sown. It
is plain, from these positions, that God, since He conceded the freedom of
the will, and the use of that freedom, ought not, and indeed could not,
prevent the fall in any mode which would infringe on the use of that
freedom; and farther, that He was not obligated to prevent it in any other
way than by the bestowment of the ability which should be necessary and
sufficient to the avoidance of the fall. Permission is not, therefore, a
"cessation from the act of illuminating and that of inclining" to such an
extent that, without those acts, a man could not avoid sin. For, in that
case, the fault could be justly and deservedly charged upon God, who would
be the cause of sin, by way of removing or not bestowing that which is
necessary for the performance of an act which Himself has prescribed by His
own law. From which it also follows that the law is unjust, as it is not in
proportion to the strength of the creature on which it is imposed, whether
that deficiency of strength arises from the nonbestowal or the removal of it
before any fault has been committed by the creature.
Permission is, indeed, a cessation of the act of hindrance, but that
cessation is to be so explained that it may not be reduced to an efficient
cause of sin, either directly, or by way of the denial or removal of that,
without which sin can not be avoided. In reference to this permission, if it
be fitly explained, it can be doubtless said that "God not only foreknows
it, but He even wills it by an act of volition" affirmatively and
immediately directed to the permission itself, not to that which is
permitted. As it can not be said concerning this, that God wills that it
should not be done, for He permits it, and not unwillingly, so, also, it can
not be truly said that God wills it. For permission is an act intermediate
between volition and nolition, the will being inactive.
But the cause, in view of which He permits sin, is to be found, not only in
the consequent, but in the antecedent. In the antecedent, because God
constituted man so that he might have a free will, and might, according to
the freedom of his will, either accord obedience or refuse it. He could not
rescind this constitution, which Himself had established, in view of His own
immutability, as Tertullian clearly shows, in his argument against Marcion
(Lib. 2, cap. 5, 6 and 7). In the consequent, because He saw that He could
use sin as an occasion for demonstrating the glory of His own grace and
justice. But this consequent does not naturally result from that sin. From
this, it follows that even from the highest evil, (if there be any highest,)
evil, only, could result per se, or there would be an injury to the divine
majesty, opposed to the divine good; but that consequent is an incidental
result of sin, because God knows and wills to elicit, by His wisdom,
goodness and power, His own glory from it, as light from darkness. As, then,
evil is not good, per se, so it is not absolutely good that evil should
occur. For if this be true. then God not only permits it, but is its author
and effector. But it is incidentally good that evil should occur, in view of
that wisdom, goodness, and power of God, of which I have spoken, by which
God takes from sin the material for illustrating his own glory. Therefore,
sin is not, in this respect, the means per se, for illustrating the glory of
God, but only the occasion not made for this purpose, nor adapted to it by
its own nature, but seized by God and used in this direction with wonderful
skill, and praiseworthy perversion. No absolute good in the universe would
be prevented, even if God should prevent evil, provided that prevention
should not be affected in a manner not adapted to the primitive constitution
of man; and God is free to prevent sin, but in a way not at variance with
the freedom of the will. Any other method of prevention would be absolutely
contrary to the good of the universe, inasmuch as one good of the universe
consists even in this, that there should be a creature endued with free
will, and that the use of his own free will should be conceded to the
creature without any divine interference. But if the existence of evil or
sin should absolutely contribute to the good and the perfection of the
universe, then God ought not only not to hinder sin, but even to promote it,
else He would fail in His duty to His own work, and do injury to His own
perfection. I admit that, without the existence of sin, there would not be
that place for the patience of the martyrs, or for the sacrifice of Christ;
but the patience of the martyrs and the sacrifice of Christ are not
necessary results of the existence of sin. Indeed we shall see, by
considering the natural effect of sin, that from it would result impatience
in those who are afflicted, and by it the wrath, of God would be kindled,
which not only could, but in fact, would, prevent the bestowment of any
good, even the least, and much more that of his Son, unless God should be,
at the same time, merciful, and could, in His wisdom, find a way by which He
might prevent the natural effect of sin, and using sin as the occasion,
might promote other effects, contrary to the very nature of sin.
The passages cited from Augustine and Gregory, are not only not opposed to,
but actually in favour of this opinion. For they do not say that it would
have been good absolutely that evils should occur, but that God judged it
better to bring good out of evils than to prevent them; thus comparing two
acts of the Deity, and esteeming the one better than the other. I may be
allowed to observe, in reference to the remark of Gregory, that he is not
sufficiently accurate, when he compares the evils which we suffer on account
of sins with the blessing of redemption as something greater: for he ought
to compare our sins and faults, not the evils which we suffer on their
account, with the blessing of redemption. If he had done this, and had
carefully considered the words of the apostle, "and not rather (as we be
slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we say), Let us do evil that
good may come," (Rom. iii. 8), he would have judged otherwise, or, at least,
would have expressed his views more fitly, without making such a transition,
and without substituting the punishment of sin for sin itself. It is indeed
right, for men and for any believer, to say with entire confidence, that
there can be no redemption so excellent and no method of redemption so
glorious that, for the sake of obtaining either, any sin, however small, is
to be committed. For the Redeemer "was manifested that he might destroy the
works of the devil," (1 John iii. 8,) i.e., sins; they are not, therefore,
to be committed in order that the Son of God, the Redeemer, might come. For
that circular form of reasoning, the Son of God came that he might destroy
the works of the devil, and sin was committed that it might be destroyed by
the Son, is not only contrary to the Scriptures, but also hostile to all
truth, as it leads infinitely astray.
From this it is also easily proved that the fall can not be called a happy
transgression, except by a catachrestic hyperbole, which, while it may be
adapted to declamations, panegyric orations, and rhetorical embellishments,
should be far removed from the solid investigation of truth. To these is
always to be added the remark, which I have made, frequently and with
reiteration, that redemption could not have resulted from transgression,
except as the latter might afford an occasion for it, by the arrangement of
God, in accordance with His will, that the transgression should be expiated,
and washed away by a Redeemer of such character and dignity.
But the distinction which you make between "the permission of the fall" and
"the permitted fall" seems to me to be of no force. For the permission of
the fall is not less by the Divine arrangement than the permitted fall. For
God ordained His own permission for a certain end. But consider whether it
is not absurd to distinguish between "the permission of the fall" and "the
permitted fall." In the latter case, I speak of the fall, not considered in
that it is a fall, but in that it is a permitted fall: as you must, of
necessity, consider, when you style it "the means of the decree," which
appellation is not appropriate to the fall except on account of the adjunct
"permitted." For not the fall but the permission of the fall, tended to the
glory of God; not the act of many which is the fall, but the act of God,
which is permission, having immediate reference to that act of man according
to the prescript of the Divine arrangement, tended to His glory. But I
acknowledge that permission is the means of the decree, not of
predestination, but of providence, as the latter is distinguished from the
former. I speak now of providence, as governing and administrative, which is
not only not prior, in nature and order, to predestination, but is also the
cause of the mission of the Son as the Redeemer, who is our head, in whom
predestination is made, as the apostle teaches, (Ephes. 1.)
But how can it be true that the fall is permitted by God, and yet that "it
would not have occurred unless God had willed it" I wish that it might be
explained how God could, at once, will that the fall should occur, and
permit the same; how God could be concerned, by His volition, with the fall
both mediately and immediately—mediately by willing the permission, and
immediately by willing the fall itself. I wish also that these things may be
harmonized, how the fall could occur by the will of God, and yet the will of
God not be the cause of the fall, which is contrary to the express
declaration of God’s word, "Our God is in the heavens; He hath done whatever
He pleased," (Psalm cxv. 3.) Also, in what way could God will the fall, and
yet be "a God that hath no pleasure in wickedness," (Psalm v. 4,) since the
fall was wickedness. The distinctions which are presented are not sufficient
to untie the knot, as I shall show in the case of each of them separately.
For they distinguish between the fall and the event of the fall; between the
will of open intimation and that of His good-pleasure, revealed or hidden;
between the fall as it was sin, and as it was the means of illustrating the
divine glory. They say that God willed that the fall should occur, but did
not will the fall; that He willed the fall according to His good-pleasure
and His hidden will, not according to His will, of open intimation, revealed
and approving; that He willed the fall, not as it was sin, but as it was the
means of illustrating His own glory.
The first distinction is verbal, and not real. He, who willed that the fall
should occur, willed also the fall. He who willed that the fall should
occur, willed the event of the fall, and He, who willed the event of the
fall, willed the fall. For the event of the fall is the fall, as the event
of an action is the action itself. But if He willed the fall, He was the
cause of the fall. For "He hath done whatsoever He pleased," (Psalm cxv. 3.)
If any one replies, that He willed that the fall should occur by the act of
another, not by His own act, I answer—it could not be that God should will
that the fall should occur by the act of another, and not by His own act:
for it would not happen by the act of another, unless He should interpose
with His own act, and, indeed, with an act, such that, from it, the act of
another should necessarily exist; otherwise that, which He wished should
occur by the act of another, would not be effected or occur by that act of
another. The force of the argument is not increased: whether God willed that
the fall should occur, mediately, by the act of another, or, immediately, by
His own act. These are mediately connected—the act of God and the act of
another, that is, of man, or the fall. The fall proceeded from the act of
man, but that depends of necessity on the act of God; otherwise it could
happen that the act of another should not be performed, and thus it could
happen that the fall should not occur, which, nevertheless, God willed
should occur. It is not, therefore, denied that God is the cause of the
fall, except immediately; it is conceded that He is so, mediately. No one,
indeed, ever wished to deduce, from the declaration of any one, that God is
the immediate cause of the sin perpetrated by man, for he would deduce a
contradiction in terms, as they say in the schools, unless, indeed, the
subject might be the general concurrence of God with man, in producing an
act which can not be produced by man without sin.
The distinction of the will into that of hidden and revealed, while it may
have place elsewhere, can not avail here. For the hidden will of God is said
to be efficacious; but if, in its exercise, God willed that the fall should
occur, it is certainly a necessary conclusion, also, that He effected the
fall, that is, He must be the cause of the fall; for whatever God wills,
even by His hidden will, the same, also, He does both in heaven and on the
earth; and no one can resist His will, namely, that which is hidden. But I
may remark concerning that distinction in the will, that I think that it may
be said, that neither of these can be so contrary, or opposed to the other,
that God, by one, wills that to be done, which, by the other, He wills not
to be done, and vice versa. God wills by His revealed and approving will,
that man should not fall, it can not, therefore, be true that God, by any
will, considered in any way whatever, can will that man should fall; for
though there may be distinction in the will of God, yet no contradiction can
exist in it. But it is a contradiction, if God, by any act of His own will,
should tend towards an object, and at the same time towards its contrary.
The third distinction, in which it is said that God wills sin, not as such,
but as the means of illustrating His own glory, defends God from the charge
of efficiency in sin no more than the two preceding. For that assertion
remains true God doeth whatsoever He wills, but He wills sin, therefore, He
effects sin, not indeed as it is such, but as it is the means of
illustrating His own glory. But if God effects sin, as it is the means to
such an end, it can not be effected, unless man commits sin as such. For sin
can not be made a means, unless it is committed. There exists, indeed, that
distinction of sin into separate and diverse respects, not really, and in
fact, but in the mode of considering it. But that we may make that
distinction correctly, as it is indeed of some use, it must be said that God
permits sin as such, but for this reason, because He had the knowledge and
the power to make it the means, yea, rather, to use it as the means of
illustrating His own glory. So that the consideration of sin as such was
presented to the Divine permission, the permission itself being, in the mean
time, caused both by the consideration that the sin could be the means of
illustrating the Divine glory, and by the arrangement that the sin,
permitted, should be, in fact, the means for illustrating that same glory.
The simile, which you present, of the mutable decaying house is not apposite
for many reasons. For in the first place, in its fall, the house is passive;
but in the fall of man he is active, for he sins. Secondly, that house is,
not only mutable, that is, capable of decay, but subject to decay; but man,
though capable of sinning, was still not subject to sin. Thirdly, that house
could not stand if attacked by the winds; but man could preserve his
position, even though tempted by Satan. Fourthly, the necessary props were
not placed under that house; but man received strength from God, sufficient
for steadfastness against the onset of Satan, and was supported by the
assistance of divinity itself. Fifthly, the builder anticipated the ruin of
the house, and in part willed it, because he was unwilling to prevent the
fall when he could have done it; God, indeed, foresaw sin, but He did not
will it; indeed, He endeavoured to prevent it by precept and the bestowment
of grace, necessary and sufficient for the avoidance of sin. Farther than
this, He must not prevent, lest He should destroy the constitution which He
had established. The ideas, I will the ruin, and I will it, so far as I will
not to prevent it, do not agree. For the ruin and the permission of the ruin
can not be at the same time the immediate object of the will. For God can
not be concerned in the fall, at the same time, both by an affirmative and
by a negative act of the will. The act of willing the fall was affirmative,
the act of not willing to prevent is negative, intermediate between two
opposite affirmative acts, namely, between the act of volition and that of
nolition concerning the fall. It is altogether true, that so much causality
or efficiency is to be attributed to the builder as there is of will,
directed to the ruin of the house, attributed to him. Let us now consider
the application of the similitude. God left Adam to himself, but yet Adam
was not deserted by God; for He placed under him as it were a triple prop,
lest he might sin or fall. He gave him a precept, that he might, in
obedience, not choose to sin; He added a threat that he might fear to sin on
account of the annexed and following punishment; He bestowed grace that he
might be able in fact to fulfill the precept, and avoid the threatened
punishment. It may be lawful, also, to call the promise, which was placed in
opposition to the threatening, and which was sealed by the symbol of the
tree of life, a fourth prop. The reason, in view of which, God left man to
himself, was not that his ability might be tested by temptation, for from
the actual occurrence of the fall, his inability to stand could be neither
proved nor disproved; but because it was suitable that there should be such
a trial of the obedience of him whom God had made the ruler of his own will,
the lord and the head of his own voluntary sets. Nor was permission
instituted to this end, that it might be seen what the creature could do, if
the Divine aid and government over him, should cease for a time, both
because the Divine aid and government was not deficient, and because it was
already certain that man could do nothing without the government and general
aid of God, and nothing good without the special aid of His grace.
That "God was not the cause of that defection" is a Theological axiom. But
you, by removing those acts, do not remove the cause of the defection from
the Deity. For God can be regarded as the cause of sin, either by
affirmative or negative acts. You, indeed, take from Him the affirmative
acts, namely, the inclining of the mind to sin, the infusion of wickedness,
and the deprivation of the gift, already bestowed, but you attributed to Him
a negative act, the denial or non-bestowal of strengthening grace. If this
strengthening grace was necessary to the avoidance of sin, then, by that act
of denial, God became the Author of sin and of Adam’s fall. But if you
attribute the denial or the non-bestowal of strengthening grace to God, not
absolutely, but on account of the transgression of Adam, because he did not
seek the Divine aid, I approve what you say, if you concede that it was in
the power of Adam to seek that aid; otherwise it was denied to him to seek
that also, and so we go on without end.
You say—"There are two parts or species of predestination, the decree of
Election and that of Reprobation," concerning which it must be stated that
one can not exist without the other, and that, one being supposed, the other
must be also. This is signified by the word election, otherwise,
predestination may be considered per se and without an opposite, and so all
men universally would be predestinated unto life. In that case, there would
be no election, which includes the idea of reprobation, as united to it by a
necessary consequence and copula. Election and Reprobation are opposed to
each other both affirmatively and negatively. Negatively, because election
refers to the act of the will by which grace and glory are conferred,
reprobation, that by which they are not conferred. Affirmatively, since
reprobation refers to the act of the will, which inflicts punishment on
account of sin.
It is worthy of consideration that God, both in the decree of Election and
in that of Reprobation, was concerned with men considered as sinners. For
the grace which was provided by election or predestination, is the grace of
the remission of sins, and the renewal of the Holy Ghost; and the glory
which He has prepared by the same decree, is out of the ignominy to which
man was liable on account of sin. Reprobation, also, is a denial of that
grace and a preparation of the punishment due to sin, not in that it was
due, but that it was, through mercy, not taken away. Isidorus and Angelomus,
quoted by you, express this condition of the object both of Election and
Reprobation. The former, when be says—"the reprobate are left, and
predestinated to death," the latter, when he says that—of "the unbelieving
people some are predestinated to everlasting freedom, but others are left in
their own impiety, and condemned to perpetual death by occult dispensation,
and occult judgment."
Your definition of Election is obscure from the want of some word. It seems
that the phrase to be illustrated ought to have been added, thus: "The
decree of election is that by which God destines certain men to His glorious
grace to be illustrated in their salvation and heavenly life, obtained
through Christ," otherwise the phraseology is not sufficiently complete. But
the definition, even when completed, in that way, seems to me to have been,
ineptly arranged, as the parts are not arranged according to their mutual
relations. For "salvation" and "heavenly life" hold the relation of the
material prepared for the decree of election; "certain men" hold the place
of the object or subject for which that salvation is prepared; the
"illustration of His glorious grace" is the end of election;
"Christ" is here made the means of obtaining that salvation and life. The
order of all these in the definition according to their mutual relations,
ought to be, -- "The decree of election is that, by which God destined
certain men to salvation and heavenly life, to be obtained through Christ,
to the praise of His glorious grace." In this definition, however, Christ
does not seem to me to obtain that place, which he deserves, and which the
Apostle assigns to him. For Christ according to the Apostle is not only the
means by which the salvation, already prepared by election, but, so to
speak, the meritorious cause, in respect to which the election was made, and
on whose account that grace was prepared. For the apostle says that we are
chosen in Christ (Ephes. i. 4), as in a mediator, in whose blood salvation
and life is obtained for us, and as in our "head," (Ephes. i. 22) from whom
those blessings flow to us. For God chooses no one unto eternal life except
in Christ, who prepared it by his own blood for them who should believe on
his name. From this it seems to follow that, since God regards no one in
Christ unless they are engrafted in him by faith, election is peculiar to
believers, and the phrase "certain men," in the definition, refers to
believers. For Christ is a means of salvation to no one unless he is
apprehended by faith. Therefore, that phrase "in Christ" marks the
meritorious cause by which grace and glory are prepared, and the existence
of the elect in him, without which they could not be elected in him. The
definition, then, is susceptible of this form. "Election is the decree of
God, by which, of Himself, from eternity, He decreed to justify in (or
through) Christ, believers, and to accept them unto eternal life, to the
praise of His glorious grace." But you will say, "Then faith is made
dependent on the human will, and is not a gift of divine grace." I deny that
sequence, for there was no such statement in the definition. I acknowledge
that the cause of faith was not expressed, but that was unnecessary. If any
one denies it, there may be added after "believers" the phrase "to whom He
determined to give faith." But we should observe whether, in our method of
consideration, the decree, by which God determined to justify believers and
adopt them as sons, is the same with that by which He determined to bestow
faith on some, but to deny the same to others. This seems to me not very
probable. For there are, here, two purposes, each determined by the certain
decree of God; their subjects are also diverse, and different attributes are
assigned to them. I think that this ought to have been noticed in treating
correctly of the Order and Mode of Predestination. I do not much object to
your statement that "the act of the divine mind is two-fold, regarding the
end, and the means to the end, or to salvation," but that remark does not
seem correct to me, in which you say that "the former is commonly called the
decree, and the latter the execution of the decree"—for such is your
marginal annotation—each of these is an act of the decree, as you
acknowledge; but an act of the decree is internal, and precedes its
execution whether it is in reference to the end or the means. The passage in
Romans 9, does not favour your idea as you claim. For it not distinguish the
purpose from election, nor does it make the election prior to the purpose of
damning of conferring salvation, but it says that the purpose is "according
to election," not without election or apart from election, as is clearly
evident from the words of the apostle. For they are as follows—"i[na hJ kat
ejklogh<n tou~ Qeou~ proqesiv menh| " that the purpose of God according
to election might stand," from which it is apparent that, by these words, is
described the purpose of God, which is "according to election."
But that this may be more plainly understood, we may examine briefly the
design and the scope of the apostle. The Jews objected that they, by virtue
of the covenant and the divine word, committed to them, were the peculiar
people of God, and, therefore, that honour could not be taken away from
them, without the disgrace and the violation of the divine decree. They
asserted, however, that the honour referred to, and the title of the people
of God was taken from them by the Apostle Paul, when he made those only, who
should believe in the Christ whom he preached, partakers of the
righteousness of God, and of eternal salvation. Since they had not believed
in that Christ, it followed, according to the doctrine of the apostle, that
they were strangers to the righteousness of God and eternal salvation, and
unworthy to be longer considered the people of God. But since they
considered this to be contrary to the decree and the covenant of God, they
concluded that it was, at the same time, absurd and foreign to the truth.
The apostle answers that the covenant, decree, or word of God hath not
"taken none effect," (verse 6), but remains firm, even if many of the Jews
should not be reckoned among the people of God, because that decree or
covenant did not comprehend all Israelites, universally without election and
distinction; for that decree was "according to election," as set forth in
those words of God announcing his purpose. For God said "In Isaac," not in
Ishmael, "shall thy seed be called." Also "The elder," Esau, "shall serve
the younger," Jacob. The apostle asserts that God declared most clearly in
these words, that He did not regard the whole progeny of Abraham, or that of
Isaac, or of Jacob, or all of their individual descendants, as His people,
but only those who were "the children of the promise" to the exclusion of
"the children of the flesh." The Apostle reasons, most conclusively from
those words of God, that the purpose of God is according to election, and
that it, therefore, embraces, in itself, not all the Israelites, but, while
it claims some, it rejects others. From which it follows that it is not
wonderful or contrary to the purpose or covenant of God, that some of the
Jews are rejected by God, and those indeed, who are specially excluded by
that decree according to those words of God, as "the children of the flesh,"
i.e. those who were seeking to be justified "by the works of the law" and
according to the flesh. Compare Rom. ix. 7-11 and 30-32, also x, 3-5 with
ch. iv, 1-3.
In Romans viii. 29, those acts—I refer now to the decree and the execution
of the decree—are clearly distinguished. In the decree two things are
mentioned, foreknowledge and predestination, "for whom He did foreknow, He
also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son." It is
inquired—what is the import of this foreknowledge or prescience? Some
explain it thus: -- "whom He foreknew," i.e. whom He previously loved, and
affectionately regarded as His own, as indeed the simple word "to know" is
sometimes used, as "I know you not." (Matt. xxv. 12.) "The Lord knoweth the
way of the righteous." (Psalm i. 6.) Others say that foreknowledge, or
prescience of faith in Christ, is here signified. You assent to the former,
and reject the latter, and with good reason, if it has the meaning, which
you ascribe to it. But it is worthy of consideration whether the latter
meaning of the work "foreknow" may not be so explained, as not only not to
impinge upon the former, but also to harmonize with it most completely so
that the former cannot be true without the latter. This will be evident, if
it shall be demonstrated that God can "previously love and affectionately
regard as His own" no sinner unless He has foreknown him in Christ, and
looked upon him as a believer in Christ.
To prove this I proceed thus: -- God acknowledges, as His own, no sinner,
and He chooses no one to eternal life except in Christ, and for the sake of
Christ. "He hath chosen us in Him," (Ephes. i. 4); "wherein He hath made us
accepted in the Beloved," (verse 6). "Nor any other creature shall be able
to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."
(Rom. viii. 39). "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself." (2
Cor. v. 19).
For, if God could will to any one eternal life, without respect to the
Mediator, He could also give eternal life, without the satisfaction made by
the Mediator. The actual bestowment of eternal life is not more limited,
than the purpose to bestow it. God truly loved the world, and, on account of
that love, gave His own Son as its Redeemer. (John iii. 16). But the love,
here spoken of, is not that by which He wills eternal life, as appears from
the very expression of John—for he interposes faith in Christ between that
love and eternal life. Hence God acknowledges no one, in Christ and for
Christ’s sake, as His own, unless that person is in Christ. He who is not in
Christ, can not be loved in Christ. But no one is in Christ, except by
faith; for Christ dwells in our hearts by faith, and we are engrafted and
incorporated in him by faith. It follows then that God acknowledges His own,
and chooses to eternal life no sinner, unless He considers him as a believer
in Christ, and as made one with him by faith. This is proved by the
following testimonies:
"As many as received him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God,
even to them that believe on his name." (John i. 12.) But to those, to whom
He gave this power, and to them, considered in one and the same manner, He
also decreed to give this power, since the decree of Predestination effects
nothing in him who is predestinated, and there is, therefore, no internal
change in him, intervening between the decree and the actual bestowment of
the thing, destined and prepared by the decree. "God so loved the world that
He gave His only begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him shall not
perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16). "They which be of faith
are blessed with faithful Abraham." (Gal. iii. 9.) "Without faith it is
impossible to please him." (Heb. xi. 6.) Hence he is not in error who says
that foreknowledge or prescience of faith in Christ is signified in Rom.
viii. 29, unless he adds the assertion that the faith, referred to, results
from our own strength and is not produced in us by the free gift of God.
The same explanation is proved true from the following member: "whom He did
foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of He Son."
No one is conformed to the image of the Son of God if he does not believe on
him.
Therefore, no one is predestinated by God to that conformity, unless he is
considered as a believer, unless one may claim that faith itself is included
in that conformity which believers have with Christ—which would be absurd,
because that faith can by no means be attributed to Christ, for it is faith
in him, and in God through him; it is faith in reference to reconciliation,
redemption, and the remission of sins. It is true, also, since it is the
means of attaining that conformity. But you say, -- "They, who are
predestinated to be justified and to become the sons of God, are also
predestinated to believe, since adoption and justification are received by
faith." I deny that consequence; indeed I assert that just the contrary can
be concluded from that argument, if the act of predestination is one and the
same. This I will prove: -- If adoption and justification is received by
faith, then they, who are predestinated to be justified and to become the
sons of God, are, of necessity, considered as believers. For that, which is
destined to any one by Predestination, will certainly be received by him.
And as he is when he receives it, such he was considered to be, when he was
predestinated to receive it. Therefore, the believer alone was predestinated
to receive it. From which I again conclude, that no one is chosen by God to
adoption and the communication of the gift of righteousness, unless he is
considered by Him as a believer. You add—"It cannot be said correctly, that
God foreknew that men would believe, and then predestinated them to faith,
since those, whom He foreknew to believe, He thus foreknew because He
decreed that they should believe. But what relation has this to the matter.
Such an affirmation is not made by the defenders of the sentiment to which I
have referred. You confound two kinds of Predestination, and unite together
acts of a different character. The Predestination in which God decreed to
justify and adopt as sons believers in Christ, is not the same with that, in
which He decreed, by certain means, to give faith to these and not to those.
For the decree, is in this case, concerning the bestowment of faith in that,
concerning the justification and adoption of believers; which, can not,
indeed, be the same decree, on account of the diversity of the subject and
the attribute. Otherwise it is true, that "God first foreknew that men would
believe, and then predestinated them to faith." For He foreknew that they
would believe by His own gift, which decree was prepared by Predestination.
These things, having been thus plainly set forth, may throw some light on
this whole discussion, in reference to Predestination. This we will do, at
greater extent, hereafter, when we shall subjoin our own view of the mode
and order of Predestination.
Those testimonies, which you cite from the Fathers and School-men, can be
very easily harmonized with what has been said by us, yet to avoid
prolixity, I will dispense with that labour. One thing, however, I will
observe; namely, that the explanation of Peter Lombardus, however true it
may be elsewhere, it is not adapted to the passage in Rom. viii. 29. For the
Apostle has there presented the object of Predestination, (conformity to the
image of Christ,) in a different light from that in which it is set forth or
presented by Lombardus, namely, "that they should believe the word preached
unto them." I will add, also, that you do not rightly conclude, because the
word foreknowledge is used elsewhere by the Holy Spirit for the purpose of
God, that, in the passage under discussion, it can not signify prescience of
faith.
Further, in the decree of election, you refer to two acts, one "the purpose
of choosing certain men to His love and grace, by which choice, men are made
vessels of mercy and honour;" the other, "the purpose of saving, or of the
bestowment of glory. This is not an unimportant distinction, if all things
are correctly understood. For those things, which God prepares in election,
are contained in grace and glory. But your statement—"Some, by the divine
purpose, were chosen to the eternal love of God," must be explained to refer
to that communication of love, by which God determined to communicate
Himself to some.
If you regard, in a different light, that love of God which embraces us, it
must be considered as preceding, in the order of nature, that decree or the
Divine purpose by which grace and glory are prepared for us, grace, I say,
which is the means of attaining to glory. Otherwise if you understand, by
that word, the gracious disposition of God towards us, it coincides with the
love of God, and is to be placed above the purpose or decree of God as its
cause. This also is indicated by the order of the predicaments (in the
logical sense of that word). For the purpose or decree is placed in the
predicament of Action, the gracious affection and love, in the preceding
predicament of Quality. This is evident from Ephes. i. 5-6, where God is
said to have predestinated and adopted us "to the praise of the glory of His
grace." If grace, then, is to receive praise from those acts, it must be
placed before them as their cause.
Your position that "men to be created," are the object of the former purpose
is not correct. For we are now treating of the subject, not as it is, in
itself—for we know that the eternal purpose of God is antecedent to the
actual existence of man—but as it is presented to the divine mind, in the
act of decree, and in that of Predestination. If the object of that purpose
is considered with that limitation, it is certain that men, not" to be
created," but "already created, and sinners,"—that is, in the divine
mind—are the object of the divine purpose and Predestination. This is
evident, from the love and gracious affection from which, and the grace to
which he chose them. For that love is in Christ; in him is that gracious
affection of God towards us; the grace which is prepared for us as a saving
means, has place in Christ, and not elsewhere. This you have, with
sufficient clearness, signified, when you said that men, in that grace to
which He chose them, were made vessels of mercy;" which word is misplaced,
except when wretchedness and sin have preceded it.
But if you think of the love and gracious affection of God, as in God apart
from any consideration of Christ, I shall deny that the purpose and decree
of Predestination was instituted and established by God, according to those
things, so considered, and I shall claim from you the proof, which, in my
judgment, you will not be able to give, both because the love of God towards
those "to be created" is uniform towards all, for in Adam all were created
without any difference, and because that love and gracious affection, by
which the purpose of Predestination was executed, saves with certainty, the
predestinated; but the predestinated are not saved by that love and
affection, considered out of Christ. If you say that the love and gracious
affection in God is the same, whether considered in Christ or out of Christ,
I admit it: but man, "to be created," and man "having been created, and a
sinner," are the same man. Created, and continuing in the condition of
creation, he could be saved, by obedience, of the love and gracious
affection of God, considered out of Christ. As a sinner, he could not be
saved, except by the same feelings, considered in Christ. If you make the
sinner the object of Predestination, you ought to add to predestinating
grace, a mode adapted to the sinner who is to be saved. If you do not add
this, will grace, considered without that mode, be sufficient? I do not
think that you will urge that the grace and love, by which a man, who is not
a sinner, can be saved, and which is separate from mercy, is to be
considered in Christ, and affects us on account of, and in respect to, him.
If, however, you do this, I shall ask the proof. And, after all the proof
which you may be able to present, it will be proper to say that Christ
himself is to be here considered in different relations; in the former case,
as Mediator, preserving and confirming the predestinated in the integrity of
their state; in the latter, as Mediator, redeeming and renewing the same
persons from the state of sin and corruption; and I will add that grace and
salvation come to us, not by the former, but by the latter mediation. For he
is "Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins." (Matt. i. 21.) He
is "the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i. 29).
He is the Redeemer of the world by his flesh given "for the life of the
world" (John vi. 51); by the destruction of "the works of the devil" (1 John
iii. 8, and Heb. ii. 14); and by that reconciliation, which consists "in
imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of
reconciliation." (2 Cor. v. 19).
That act, indeed, is "of the mere will of God," but not "without respect to
sin in the creatures;" of sin, which is considered, not as the cause moving
God to election, but as a condition, which must exist in the object of that
act. And, in this sense, He does injury. to no one, if He does not elect
all, since He is not under obligation to bestow mercy on any one. But He can
ordain no one to punishment, without the prevision of sin, in view of any
right which He possesses over His creatures. For that right is not
unlimited, as many think—unlimited, I say, in such a sense that God can
rightly inflict any act, possible to His omniscience, upon any creature
considered in any respect, and without injustice bring upon the creature all
things which the creature can suffer from his omnipotent Creator. This can
be made plain by the following demonstration: Every right of God, over His
creatures, depends either on the goodness of God towards His creatures, or
on their wickedness towards Him, or on some contract entered into between
God and His creatures. Without considering the right, which depends on
contract, let us discuss the others. The right, which depends on the
goodness of God, or on the wickedness of men, can not exceed the magnitude
of those things severally. Man received from God, by His goodness in
creation, his existence, both that of nature, and that of supernatural
grace, in the latter of which is also included the power of attaining to the
highest felicity, and that of a supernatural nature, which God promised to
man on the condition of obedience. The opposite of this highest felicity is
the deepest misery into which the same man would fall, justly and according
to divine right, if he should transgress that law. Hence, exists the right
of God over man, in that he is a creature, according to which He can take
from him that very being which He has given, and reduce it to its pristine
Nothing. Hence, also, He can not have the right to condemn to eternal
punishment a man unless he has become a sinner. For these four
things—existence, non-existence, happiness, misery—are so mutually
connected, that, as happiness is better than existence, so misery is worse
than non-existence. This, Christ signified when he said "good were it for
man if he had never been born" (Mark xiv. 21). Therefore, the divine right
does not permit that He should inflict misery on man, to whom He has given
existence, except on the commission of that, by the opposite of which he
could obtain felicity, the opposite of that wretchedness. Hence, if He
should not elect all, He would do injustice to no one, if the non-elect
should be only deprived of the good to which they had no claim; but
injustice would be done to them, if, by non-election or reprobation, they
must suffer evil which they had not deserved. The right of God does not so
far extend itself over them.
There seems to have been need of this explanation, otherwise, we must, of
necessity, far into many absurdities, and impinge on the righteousness of
God. This, Augustine also, admits, in many passages. I will quote one or
two: "God is good, God is just; He can deliver some without merit, because
He is good;
He can not damn any one without demerit, because He is just." (In Julian,
lib. 3, cap. 18.) "If it is believed that God damns any one, who does not
deserve it, and is chargeable with no sin, it is not believed that He is far
from iniquity." (Epistola 106, ad Paulinum.)
I may be permitted, with your leave, to note some things in the explanation
of the second act, which seem to have been propounded by you with too little
accuracy. For, when you, here, change the formal relation of the object, and
consider men, under this act, as "about to fall," whom, under the first act,
you presented as "about to be created," you seem to do it with no good
reason. For, in your mode of considering the subject, men "to be created"
are the object of both acts. But if all things are duly weighed, the object
in both is, in fact, men as sinners, neither more in the former than in the
latter, nor more in the latter than in the former act. Nor was it necessary
to use the participle of future time, since the discussion is, here,
concerning the act of the divine mind to which all things are present. I
pass over the fact that the ordination to salvation depends on the fall, as
the occasion of making that decree, wherefore, you should have said
"fallen," not "about to fall." I could wish, also, that there might be an
explanation how that act, which is the purpose of saving and of bestowing of
glory, is the same with the act under which they are ordained, on whom that
glory is bestowed, and to whom it is manifested; also, how the second act,
namely, the purpose of saving, pertains to the execution and completion of
the former purpose, namely, that by which He chooses some to His own love
and grace.
That "the act referred to has no preparative cause, out of the good-pleasure
of God," is true, only let Christ be duly included in that divine
good-pleasure. To this, you seem, indeed, to assent, when you say "that act
is in respect to Christ, the Mediator, in whom we are all elected to grace
and salvation."
But when you so explain your meaning that we are said to be elected, in
Christ, to grace and salvation, "because he is the foundation of the
execution of election," you again destroy what you have said. For, if Christ
is only the foundation of the execution of election, the election itself is
made without respect to Christ in the decree of God, preceding, in fact, the
execution of it. It can not be said, then, that we are elected in him to
grace and salvation, but only that we, having, out of Christ, been
previously elected to grace and salvation, are by Christ made partakers of
them. But the Scriptures make Christ the foundation not only of the
execution, but of the act of election. For He is, according to the
Scriptures, Mediator, not only in the efficacy of the application, but in
the merit of obtainment; wherefore, also, when they speak of Christ, the
Scriptures affirm that grace and eternal life are bestowed upon us, not only
through him, but on account of him, and in him. The direct relation is first
presented, because God can not love the sinner unto eternal life, except in
Christ, and on account of Christ, since the justice of God requires that
reconciliation should be made by the blood of Christ.
The sum of the whole is, that both acts, that of choosing to grace and the
love of God, as well as that of the bestowment of glory and the preparation
of the means necessary to salvation, depends upon Christ as their only
foundation—upon Christ, ordained by God to be High Priest and Mediator by
the blood of his cross, the saviour from sins, the Redeemer from the bondage
of sin and Satan, the Author and Giver of eternal salvation. Therefore,
neither of those acts is in reference to men as "to be created," but both of
them in reference to them, as "fallen sinners, and needing the grace of the
remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy Spirit."
Those "five degrees" are well considered as mutually dependent, but they can
not all be attributed, nor are they all subordinate to the "second act;" nor
yet, indeed, to the first act. For the first three, namely, the "appointment
of the Mediator, the promise of him, as appointed, and the presentation of
him, as promised" are in the order of nature and of causes antecedent to all
predestination of men to grace and glory. For Christ, appointed, promised,
presented, yet more, having accomplished the work of reconciliation, having
obtained eternal redemption, and having procured the Holy Spirit, is the
head of all those who are predestinated in him unto salvation, not yet, in
the order of nature, predestinated, but to be predestinated. For Christ is
the head; we are the members. He was, first, in the order of nature,
predestinated to be the head, then we to be the members. He was first,
ordained to be the saviour, then we were ordained, in him, to be saved for
his sake and in him. He inverts the order laid down in the Scripture, who
says "God first predestinated men, and then ordained Christ to be the head
of those predestinated." It need not be inquired, with much prolixity, why
many have conceived that the order should be inverted, yet I think that some
passages of the Scripture, in which the love of God towards men is said to
be the cause of the mission of his Son, on the one hand, and on the other,
that, other passages, in which Christ is said to gather together and to
bring to salvation the children of God, and the elect, have given occasion
for a conception of this kind—an occasion, not a just cause. For that love
is not the cause of predestination, and it has no necessary connection with
predestination, and Christ is not only the saviour of those, who have been
elected and adopted as Sons by God, but he is also the Mediator and head in
whom the election and adoption were made. This I have already often said.
Your definition of the "appointment of the Mediator" was not sufficiently
complete, for the condition of men was omitted, in reference to which the
whole matter of Mediation was arranged. The passage which you have cited
from 1 Peter i. 18-20, might admonish you of this. For Christ is there said
to be the foreordained Mediator who redeemed us by his own "precious blood,
as of a lamb without blemish, from vain conversation." The word "sinners"
ought to have been added. For Christ was ordained to be Mediator, not
between God and men absolutely considered, but between God and men
considered as sinners. From this, I may also deduce a proof of what I have
already argued in reference to the object of predestination. For if Christ
is Mediator for sinners, then it follows that no one is loved, in Christ the
Mediator, unless he is a sinner. Therefore, no one is predestinated in
Christ, unless he is a sinner.
It seems to me that there is, also, some confusion in your discussion of
"the promise of the Mediator". For the promise is considered either as the
pure revelation of the decree to give and send the Mediator, or as having,
united with it, the offering of the Mediator, who was to be given, with all
his benefits. The former is a mere prediction of the advent of the Messiah
himself, antecedent to his mission. The latter is the offering of the
Messiah, in reality to come at a future time, but, in the decree of God,
having already discharged the office of Mediator, pertaining, with the gifts
obtained by the discharge of the office, to the application of its benefits.
In this latter respect, it is made subordinate to predestination. Considered
in the former respect, it precedes, not predestination, it is true, for that
is from eternity, but the execution of predestination. The revelation,
without the offering, consists in these words, "I will give a Mediator to
the world;" but the offering in these words "Believe in the Mediator, whom I
will give unto the world, and you shall obtain salvation in him." By that
revelation and prediction, God binds Himself to offer the Mediator to the
world, whether it should believe or not; but by that offering He demands
faith, and by the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, added thereto, He
effects faith and binds Himself to give salvation to the believer. It
appears from this, that the promise is to be considered with this
distinction, that in the former part, only, it is antecedent to the mission
of the Messiah, but in the latter part it pertains to the execution of
predestination.
Let us now, passing over that distinction of the promise and the offering,
consider the universality of the promise, and the offering, taken jointly
and in connection. Its universality is not to be measured by the degree of
faith. For faith is posterior to the promise and the offering, as it marks
the apprehension and embraces the application of the promise. But a
distinction must be made between the promise and offering made by God, with
the act of man which apprehends the promise, which is faith, and that act of
God which applies, to the believer, that which is promised and offered. The
promise and the offering extends itself to all who are called, -- called by
the external preaching of the gospel, whether they obey its call or not. For
even they received an invitation, who "would not come" to the marriage, and
were, therefore, judged unworthy by God, (Matt. xxii. 2-8), since they
"rejected the counsel of God against themselves," (Luke vii. 30), and by the
rejection of the promise, made themselves unworthy (Acts xiii. 46). It is
not that unworthiness, in accordance with which all sinners are alike
unworthy, as the Centurion, and the publican, who are, nevertheless, said to
have had faith, and to have obtained the remission of their sins from
Christ; from which they are, in the Scripture, called "worthy" (Rev. iii.
4). But the passages of Scripture which are cited by you, do not limit the
promise made, but the application by faith of the promised thing, with the
exception of the second, Matt. xi. 28, which contains only an invitation to
Christ, with the added promise of rest, as an inducement to come, but in
reality not to be given, unless they should come to Christ.
You say also, that" an exhortation or command to believe is joined with the
promise, and that this is more general than the promise." In this last
assertion you are, in my judgment, in an error. For the promise, as made,
and the command to believe are equally extensive in their relation. If the
promise does not refer to all, to whom the command to believe is given, the
command is unjust, vain, and useless. It is unjust, Since it demands that a
man should have faith in the promise, not generally, that it pertains to
some persons, but specially, that it was made for himself. But the promise
was not made for him, if the command is more extensive than the promise.
This command is vain, since it is in reference to nothing. It commands one
to believe, but presents no object of faith, that promise which is the only
object of faith, having been taken away. For which reason, also, the command
is useless. It can in no way be performed by him, to whom the promise, as
made, does not pertain. Indeed, should he attempt to obey the command to
believe, he would effect nothing else than the conception in his mind of a
false opinion of a falsity. For since the promise was not made to him, he
can not believe that it was made for him, but only think so, and that
falsely. The Scripture, however, every where represents the promise and the
command to believe as of equal extent. "Repent and be baptized every one of
you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins; and ye shall
receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. For the promise is unto you and to your
children, &c." (Acts ii. 38, 39.) "Come unto me all ye that labour" the
command; "and I will give you rest," the promise, made to all who are
commanded to come (Matt. xi. 28). "If any man thirst, let him come unto me
and drink," the command; "He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath
said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water," the promise, made
to all who are commanded to come to Christ and drink (John vii. 37, 38).
Perhaps some may prefer to join the phrase "drink" to the promise, in this
way, "if any one thirst, let him come unto me; if he shall do this, he shall
drink so abundantly that out of his belly shall flow rivers of living
water." But explained in this way, it equally answers my present purpose.
You may say that you make the promise, in respect, not to its presentation,
but to its application, of narrower extent than the command to believe.
This, indeed, is correct. But the comparison is then incongruous. As, in the
promise, three things are to be considered, as we said before, the promise
made. faith exercised in the promise made, and the gift or application of
the promised good, so, also, in the command, three things are included, the
command itself, the obedience yielded to the command, and the reward
bestowed on obedience. These three things, in each, answer severally to
their corresponding opposites; the promise, as made, to the command; faith
exercised in the promise, to the obedience yielded to the command; the gift
or application of the promised good, to the reward bestowed on obedience. It
was suitable that you should have instituted the comparison in this way. If
you had done so, you would not have made the command more general than the
promise; unless in this way, that the command is to be considered more
general than the remuneration, which is bestowed on obedience. But who does
not know that the promise is made to many, by whom it is not apprehended by
faith, and that the command is addressed to many, by whom it is not obeyed?
Hence you can perceive that it was not fitly said—"the promise relates to
believers, (that is, the promise, not as merely made, but as applied, for
the promise in the latter sense is antecedent to faith); and "the command
relates to believers and to non-believers." It belongs to neither. The
command is prior to faith, demands faith, and prohibits unbelief.
But what are those things which follow? You seem, most learned Perkins, to
be forgetful of yourself, and to be entirely a different person from him
whom you have displayed in other of your published works. Again and again I
intreat you to be patient with me, as I shall discuss these points with
candour and mildness.
First, observe the coherence of that, which follows, with that, which
precedes. "For the elect are mingled with the wicked in the same
assemblies." What then? Is the promise, as made, therefore, less extensive
than the command to believe? You answer affirmatively, for the reason that
the promise relates to the elect only, the command pertains to the elect and
to the wicked. I reply, that the promise, as made and proposed by God,
relates not to the elect only, but to the wicked, whom you place in
opposition to the elect: and that the command, is not imposed either on the
elect or on those opposed to them, except with the promise joined. I think
that I see what you mean, namely, that, as the promise is not applied except
to the elect, so also the same is not proposed except to the elect, that is:
according to the divine mind and purpose. How this may be, we shall see
hereafter. Meanwhile, I make the same remark in reference to the command. As
the command, by which faith is not obeyed except by the elect, so, also, it
is not proposed except to the elect, that is, according to the divine mind
and purpose. For as, in the former case, the promise is proposed to the
non-elect, without the divine purpose of applying the promise; so in the
latter case, the command is proposed to the non-elect, without the divine
purpose that they should fulfill or obey the command. If, on account of the
absence of the divine efficacy, you think that the promise is not made to
the non-elect, on account of the absence of the divine efficacy, I affirm,
also, that the command is not imposed on the non-elect. The fact is the same
in reference to both. We will, hereafter, more filly discuss that matter.
Secondly, the phrases "elect" and "wicked" are unsuitably placed in
opposition to each other, since with the former, "reprobate," and with the
latter, "pious," should have been contrasted, according to the rule of
opposition. But here the opposition of the two things is unsuitable, since,
in one of the opposites, the other is also comprehended. For the wicked, in
this case, may comprehend also the elect. For it refers to those who are
commanded, in the exhortation of the ministers of the word, to repent. But
repentance is prescribed only to the wicked and to sinners, whether they are
elect or reprobate, though with a contrary result in each case. I now speak
of the call to repentance.
Thirdly, you seem to me to limit the office of ministers to the mere calling
of sinners to repentance, excluding the presentation of the promise, which
is another part of the message entrusted to them. For they say—"Repent and
believe the gospel, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Finally, of what
importance is it, whether they know, or do not know, "who, and how many are
elect and to be converted"? "Then," you will say, "they might arrange their
sermons, and present them to each person with an adaptation to his state."
This I deny. For Christ knew and understood that Judas was a reprobate, and
yet he did not arrange his sermons differently on his account. The preachers
of the word must not desist from the functions of their office in any
assembly, as long as they may be permitted to discharge them, and there are
those who are willing to hear. But when they are cast out, and none whatever
listen to their word, they are commanded by Christ to depart, and to shake
off the very dust from their feet as a testimony against them. From this it
appears, that their rule of teaching and exhorting is not an internal
knowledge, which they can have, of the election of some and the reprobation
of others, but the external obedience or contumacy of those whom they teach,
whether they be elect or reprobate.
You add, moreover, the cause, in view of which, "God wills that they should
be admonished to repent, who, as He sees, never will repent, namely, that
they may be left without excuse." But this, I say, is neither the only
object, nor the chief object, nor the object per se, but incidentally, and
the event rather than the object, except in a certain respect, as we shall
see. It is not the only object, since there is another, that they should be
admonished of their duty, and invited and incited to faith and conversion,
"not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth them to repentance" (Rom. ii.
4); also that God may satisfy Himself, and His own love towards His own
creatures also, by that exercise of long suffering and patience. "What more
could have been done to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?" (Isa. v.
4.) "God endured with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to
destruction," (Rom. ix. 22.)
These two objects are, also, of far greater importance than that of
rendering the impenitent inexcusable; therefore that is not the chief
object. It is not the object per se, because the admonition does not render
them inexcusable, unless it is despised and rejected, but this result of the
admonition depends on the wickedness of those called. God does not will this
result, unless He also foreknows that future admonition will be useless
through the wickedness, not through the infirmity, of those who are
admonished, and unless He has already frequently invited them in vain to
repentance, as in Isa. vi. 10, "Make the heart of this people fat, and make
their ears heavy," &c. For a distinction should be made between the
admonition, as first addressed to a person, and as repeated the second or
third time, and the final presentation of the same, after long contumacy.
For the former is done through grace and mercy to miserable sinners, the
latter through wrath against the obstinate, who, having hardened themselves
by their own sin, have made themselves worthy of divine hardening. Therefore
the rendering them inexcusable is rather the event of the admonition than an
object proposed to the Deity, except against the obstinate, and those who
are incorrigible through their own voluntary wickedness. This event
deservedly, indeed, results from that rejected admonition, as the admonition
becomes a savour of death unto death to those who were unwilling that it
should be to themselves a savour of life unto life, that it might become
against them a testimony of contumacy, as they refused to have the remedy of
repentance, that they might endure the just and punitive will of God, who
refused to obey His merciful and benevolent will.
But some one may reply that no other end was proposed to the Deity, in the
exhortation, than that they should be indeed inexcusable, both because God,
in the decree of reprobation, determined not to give the repentance and
faith, which they could not have, except by His gift, and because God
obtained no other end than that of rendering them inexcusable, and yet He is
never frustrated in His design. These arguments seem, indeed, to be of some
value, and to present no little difficulty, and if they can be fitly
answered, by the use of necessary analysis and explanation, there is no
doubt but that much light and clearness may in this way be thrown upon the
whole subject of which we treat. I will endeavour to do what I may be able,
trusting in divine grace, and depending on the aid of the Holy Spirit. Do
you, my friend Perkins, assist me, and if you shall desire any thing, which
may not be presented by me in the discussion, kindly mention it. I pledge
myself that you will find me susceptible of admonition and correction, and
ready to give my hand to the truth, when proved to be so. It will facilitate
the discussion, if I arrange both the arguments with the parts of the
subject under discussion in the form of a syllogism, and then examine the
parts of the syllogism by the rule of the truth. That which belongs to the
former argument may, in my judgment, be arranged thus: Those to whom God by
a fixed decree has determined not to give repentance and faith, He does not
admonish to repent and believe with any other object, than that they should
be rendered inexcusable; -- But God has determined, in the decree of
reprobation, not to give repentance and faith to the reprobate; --
Therefore, when God admonishes the reprobate to repent and believe, He does
it with no other object than that they should be rendered inexcusable.
I reply to the Major; -- It seems to depend on a false hypothesis. For it
presupposes that "God, by the external preaching of the gospel, admonishes
some to repent and believe, to whom He has determined by a fixed decree not
to give repentance and faith." This proposition seems to me to disagree with
the truth.
In the first place, because it inverts the order of the divine decrees and
acts. For the decree, by which God determined to exhort some to repentance
and faith, by the external preaching of the gospel, precedes the decree of
the non-bestowment of repentance and faith. For the former pertains to the
will of God, in the relation of antecedent, the latter, in that of
consequent. This can be proved from many, and very clear passages of the
Scripture. In Isaiah 6, hardening and blinding is denounced against those
who refuse to obey "the calling of God," as appears from the fifth chapter.
The Apostle Paul manifestly agrees with this in Acts xxviii. 26, 27, citing
the declaration of Isaiah against those Jews who did not believe. Again, it
is said, "My people would not hearken to my voice; and Israel would none of
me. So I gave them up unto their own heart’s lust; and they walked in their
own counsels" (Psalm lxxx. 11-12). In Hosea i. 6, the Israelites are called
"not beloved," or "not having obtained mercy," "and not the people of God,"
only, after they had merited that rejection by the foul crime of unbelief
and idolatry. "The Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God against
themselves, being not baptized of him" (Luke vii. 30. "Paul and Barnabas
waxed bold, and said, It was necessary that the word of God should first
have been spoken to you; but seeing ye put it from you, and judge yourselves
unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles" (Acts xiii. 46).
The Jews are said in Romans ix. 22, to have "stumbled at that stumbling
stone," because they had not sought to be justified by faith in Christ, but
by the works of the law. In 1 Peter ii. 7, 8, Christ is said to be "a rock
of offense, even them which stumble at the word, being disobedient." From
this it appears that the decree of blinding and hardening, of the
non-bestowment of the grace of repentance and faith, pertain to the decree
of God, in the relation of consequent, depending on the foresight of
incredulity, disobedience and contumacy. This proposition, then, ought to be
enunciated thus, the subject being changed into the attribute, and vice
versa; -- "God determined, by a fixed decree, not to give repentance and
faith to those who, as He foresaw, would reject, in their wickedness and
contumacy, the preaching of the gospel, by which they should be called to
repentance and faith." It does not, indeed, follow from this, that God
decreed to give faith to those whom He foresaw to be obedient. For there is
a wide difference between the acts of divine mercy and divine justice. For
the latter have their cause in men, the former have their occasion, indeed,
from men, but their cause from God alone. This is the purport of that
passage from Augustine, (Book 1, to Simplicianus, Ques. 2), "Esau did not
will or run; but if he had willed or run, he would have found God to be his
helper, who would even have effected that he should will and run by calling
him, unless he had become reprobate by the rejection of the call." In the
second place, because it charges God with hypocrisy, as if He would demand,
by an admonition to faith made to such persons, from them, that they should
believe in Christ, whom He had, nevertheless, made to them, not a saviour,
not a savour of life unto life, unto the resurrection, but a savour of death
unto death, a rock of offense, which charge must be contradicted both in its
statement and proof.
If any assert that God demands faith not of them, but of the elect, who are
mingled with the reprobates, but that this admonition, being presented by
the ministers of the world, ignorant who may be the elect, and who
reprobate, is to be presented also, to them, I shall reply that such can not
be called "disobedient," because they do not obey an admonition, not made to
themselves. If, however, that hypothesis is false, then the argument which
follows is of no weight, since it is presupposed on both sides, that God
does exhort to repentance and faith, those to whom He has determined not to
give repentance and faith. For if He does not exhort such to repentance, He
does not exhort them to any end, either that they may be rendered
inexcusable, or any other.
It is in no way unfavourable to my reply, that the decree of reprobation was
made from eternity. For we must consider what is the first external act,
either negative or affirmative, towards, or in reference to a man, reprobate
from eternity by the internal act of God. For the first external act,
towards, or in reference to a man, when really existing, makes him reprobate
in fact, as the internal act of God makes him reprobate in the mind and
counsel of God, that is, as is commonly said, a distinction is to be made
between the decree and its execution. It is certain that a man can not be
called a reprobate in fact, in reference to whom God has not yet, by an
external act, begun to execute the decree of reprobation.
I also remark, that the Major seems to me to be at variance with the truth,
because it regards those who are reprobate, as being rendered inexcusable,
while the order should be inverted, and those who are inexcusable should be
made reprobates. For reprobation is just, and therefore, the reprobate must
have been inexcusable before the act of reprobation; inexcusable in fact,
before the external act of reprobation, and, foreseen or foreknown as
inexcusable before the decree of reprobation. If they were reprobate on
account of original sin, they were inexcusable on this account; if reprobate
on account of their unbelief and rejection of Christ, they were inexcusable
on account of that unbelief, &c.
I reply to the same Major that it is not possible that the exhortation is
made, only to this end, that it might render one, who should hear it,
inexcusable, and should, in fact and of right, render him inexcusable. For
the exhortation renders its hearer inexcusable, not as it is heard, but as
it is rejected. Moreover a rejection, which must render the person, who
rejects, inexcusable, ought not to be inevitable. But the rejection of the
exhortation, which is here discussed, is inevitable. First, because the
exhortation is addressed to one in reference to whom God has already been
employed in the external act of reprobation. But such a man can not avoid
disobedience, according to the sayings of Christ. "Therefore, they could not
believe, because that Esaias saith again, He hath blinded their eyes, and
hardened their hearts, &c. (John xii. 39-40.) Secondly, since it is only
presented to the end that it may be rejected. But this presentation is of
the will of God, in the relation of consequent, which is always fulfilled,
and attains its end.
Therefore, that rejection is inevitable. As then the Major is false in these
three respects, it follows that the conclusion from the syllogism is not
legitimate. But let us look at the Minor. For in reference to this also, and
by occasion of it, there will be some things to be said which will be, in no
small degree, adapted to our purposes.
The Minor was this, -- "But God has determined, in the decree of
reprobation, not to give repentance and faith to the reprobate." I willingly
agree to that statement, but let it be correctly understood. That it may be
correctly understood, it is necessary to explain the non-bestowment or
denial of repentance and faith, which is established by the decree of
reprobation. For there is another denial of repentance and faith, which is
administered by the decree of providence, inasmuch as this is distinguished
from the decree of reprobation. If there is not an accurate distinction
between these, error can not be avoided. I say, then, that it is very plain,
from the Scriptures, that repentance and faith can not be exercised except
by the gift of God. But the same Scripture and the nature of both gifts very
clearly teach that this bestowment is by the mode of persuasion. This is
effected by the word of God. But persuasion is effected, externally by the
preaching of the word, internally by the operation, or rather the
co-operation, of the Holy Spirit, tending to this result, that the word may
be understood and apprehended by true faith. These two are almost always
joined. For God has determined to save them, who believe by the preaching of
the word, and the preaching of the word, without the co-operation of the
Holy Spirit, is useless, and can effect nothing, as it is said "Neither is
he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth, but God that giveth the
increase" (1 Cor. iii. 7). But God does not will that His word should be
preached in vain, as it is said, "So shall my word be that goeth forth out
of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void; but shall accomplish that
which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it" (Isa.
lv. 11).
It is in vain without the co-operation of the Holy Spirit; and it has,
always joined with it, the cooperation of the Holy Spirit. For which reason,
the gospel is called "the ministration of the Spirit" (2 Cor. iii. 8), and
they who resist it are said "to resist the Holy Spirit," (Acts 7 & 13, and
Matthew 12), not only because they oppose the external preaching
administered by the command and the guidance of the Holy Spirit, but also
because they strive against the cooperation of the Holy Spirit. Whence,
also, some are said to sin against the Holy Ghost, in that they wickedly
deny, and, through their hate, persecute and blaspheme the truth of which
they are persuaded in their own minds, by the persuasion of the Holy Ghost.
This internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit is two-fold. It is sufficient
and efficacious. In the former sense, since he, with whom it is employed, is
able to consent, believe, and be converted. In the latter, because he, to
whom it is applied, does consent and believe, and is converted. The former
is employed, by the decree of providence, with a sure prescience that it
will be rejected by the free will of man; the latter is administered by the
decree of Predestination, with a sure prescience that he, to whom it is
applied and addressed, will in fact consent, believe, and be converted, --
because it is applied in a way such as God knows to be adapted to the
persuasion and conversion of him to whom it is applied. These remarks are
made in accordance with the sentiments of Augustine. Hence also there is a
two-fold denial of grace, namely, of that which is sufficient, without which
he can not believe and repent, and of that which is efficacious, without
which he will not repent or be converted. In the decree of reprobation,
sufficient grace is not, with propriety, said to be denied, since it is
bestowed on many, who are reprobate, namely, on those, who by the external
preaching of the gospel, are called to faith and repentance, but efficacious
grace is denied to them, namely, that grace by which they not only can
believe and be converted, if they consent, but by which they also will
consent, believe, and be converted, and certainly and infallibly do so.
The Minor has this meaning, -- God has determined by a sure decree of
reprobation not to give to some persons repentance and faith, that is, by
using with them efficacious grace, by which they will surely believe and be
converted. But has not by that decree denied the grace, by which they may be
able, if they will, to believe and to be converted. Indeed by another
decree, namely, that of Providence, in distinction from Predestination, He
has determined to give to them faith and repentance by sufficient grace, --
that is, to bestow upon them those gifts in a manner in which they may be
able to receive them, by the strength given to them by God, which is
necessary and sufficient for their reception. God has, therefore, ordained,
by the decree of Providence, by which external preaching is addressed to
those whom God foreknew as persons who would not repent or believe, to give
to them, having this character, sufficient grace and the strength necessary
to their faith and conversion to God. Upon this determination, also, depends
the fact that they are without excuse, who are all called by sufficient
grace to repentance and faith. But He further decreed not to give
efficacious grace to the same persons, and this by the decree of
reprobation. But their inexcusableness does not depend upon this denial of
efficacious grace. If, indeed, sufficient grace should be withheld, they,
who do not believe and are not converted, are deservedly excused, for the
reason that, without it, they could neither believe nor be converted. But if
these things are explained in this way, according to the view of Augustine,
and, perhaps also, in accordance with the sense of the Scriptures, it
follows that it can not be concluded that God admonishes the reprobate to
repentance and faith with no other design than that they may be left without
excuse. For according to the decree of providence, by which He gives to them
grace sufficient to faith, and exhortation to repentance and faith is
addressed and it is to this end, that they may be led to repentance and
faith, and that God may satisfy His own goodness and grace, and be clear
from the responsibility of their perdition. The exhortation, then, is not
made according to the decree of reprobation, therefore, its design is not to
be measured by the decree of reprobation.
The second can also be arranged and disposed in the form of a syllogism; God
proposes to Himself in His acts, no end, without attaining it, for He never
fails of His purpose; --
But God, in the admonition which He addresses to the reprobate, attains no
other end than that they should be left without excuse; -- Therefore God, in
that admonition, proposes no other end to Himself.
To the Major I reply that it seems to me to be simply untrue. For God has
not determined all His own deeds in accordance with His own will, in the
relation of consequent, which is always fulfilled, but He administers many
things according to His will, in the relation of antecedent, which is not
always fulfilled. Legislation, the promulgation of the Gospel, promise,
threatening, admonition, rebuke are all instituted, according to the will of
God, as antecedents, and by these acts He requires obedience, faith,
repentance, conversion, and those acts were instituted to this end; yet God
does not always attain those ends. The falsity of this proposition can be
proved by the clearest passages of Scripture; "Wherefore, when I looked that
it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes" (Isa. v. 4);
"How often would I have gathered thy children together, and ye would not"
(Matt. xxiii. 37); "The Lord is long suffering to us-ward, not willing that
any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (2 Pet. iii. 9).
The Pharisees are said to have "rejected the counsel of God against
themselves" (Luke vii. 30), when they might have been brought, by the
preaching of John and baptism to a participation in his kingdom. But though
God might fail of any particular end, yet He can not fail in His universal
purpose. For, if any person should not consent to be converted and saved,
God has still added, and proposed to Himself, another design, according to
His will as consequent, that He should be glorified in their just
condemnation.
Therefore, that this proposition may be freed from its falsity, it must be
amended thus, -- God proposes to His will, as consequent, no end which He
does not attain. If any one should say that it follows from this that God is
either unwise and not prescient of future events, or impotent, I reply that
it does not follow. For God does not always propose an end to Himself from
His prescience—and further God does not always please to use His own
omnipotence, to accomplish any purpose which He has proposed to Himself.
As to the Minor, it also seems to me to be chargeable with falsity. For God,
by that admonition, attains another end than that they should be rendered
inexcusable, namely, He satisfies His own goodness and love towards us. Add
to this that, as the fact of their being without excuse arises, not from the
presentment, but from the rejection of the admonition, God has not proposed
to Himself their inexcusableness as an end, except after the foresight that
the admonition would come to them in vain. In this view, then, their
inexcusableness does not arise from the antecedent will of God,
administering the admonition, but from the consequent will, furnishing the
rejection of the admonition.
It follows, therefore, that a true conclusion can not be deduced from these
false propositions. The words of the Abbot Joachim must be understood
according to this explanation, or they will labour under the error, which we
have now noticed in your words.
The command of God by which He exacts repentance and faith from those, to
whom the gospel is preached, can, in no way, be at variance from the decree
of God. For no will or volition of God, whatever may be its character, can
be contrary to any other volition. But it may be possible that a decree may
be ignorant]y assigned to God, which is at variance with His command; also,
a decree of God, which is assigned to Him in the Scriptures, may be so
explained, as to be necessarily at variance with the command of God. The
command by which God exacts faith of any one, declares that God wills that
he, on whom the command is imposed, should believe. If, now, any one
ascribes any decree to God, by which He wills that the same person should
not believe, then the decree is contrary to the command. For it cannot be
that God should, at the same time, will things contradictory, in whatever
way or with whatever distinction the will may be considered. But to believe,
and not to believe are contradictory, and to will that one should believe,
and to will that he, the same person, and considered in the same light,
should not believe, are contradictory. The decree is of such a character,
that God is said to have determined, according to it, to deny the
concurrence of His general government or of His special grace, without
which, as He knew, the act of faith could not be performed by him, whom, by
His command, He admonishes to believe. For He, who wills to deny to any
person the aid necessary to the performance of an act of faith, wills that
the same person should not believe. For he, who wills in the cause, is
rightly said to will, also, in the effect, resulting, of necessity, from
that cause. For, as it can not be said that God wills that a person should
exist longer, to whom He denies the act of preservation, so, also, it can
not be said that He wills that an act should be performed by any one, to
whom He denies His own concurrence and the aid, which are necessary for the
performance of the act. For the act of the divine preservation is not more
necessary to a man, that he may continue to exist, than the concurrence of
the divine aid, in order that he may be able to exercise faith in the
gospel. If, then, that purpose not to do a thing, of which you speak, marks
a denial of the concurrence of God, which is necessary to the exercise of
faith in the promise, it certainly impinges upon the command, and can, in no
way, be harmonized with it. For that denial, being of this character, holds
the relation of most general and most efficacious hindrance, as that, which
is not, is hindered, that it may not become something, most efficaciously by
the purpose of creation, (i.e., by a denial of its exercise), and that which
is, that it may not longer exist, by the will of preservation (not being
exercised). If you understand the "purpose not to do a thing," in such a
sense, then, truly, you do not free the will of God from contradiction by
either of your answers.
You say that "God, in His commands and promises, does not speak of all which
He has decreed, but only in part manifests His own will." I grant it. But I
say that whatever God says in His commands and promises, is such in its
nature that He can not, without contradiction, be said to will or determine
any thing, contrary to it, by any decree; for it is one thing to be silent
concerning certain things which He wills, and another thing to will that
which is contrary to those things which He has previously willed. It is
certain, from the most general idea of command, that the whole will of God
is not set forth in a command, but only that which He approves and wills to
be done by us. There is no decree of God by which He wills any thing
contradictory to that command.
I wish, also, that you would consider how ineptly you express what
follows—What are these expressions? "God does not will the same thing alike
in all. He wills conversion in some, only in respect to their trial and
exhortation, and the means of conversion; in others, also: in respect to the
purpose of effecting it." If you say those things in reference to the will
of God as it requires conversion, they ought to have been differently
expressed; if in reference to His will as it effects conversion, they ought,
in that case, also, to have been differently expressed. Understood in either
sense, the phraseology is not correct. But I think that you are here
speaking of the will in the latter sense, according to which God does not
will to effect conversion equally in all, for whom He does equally, and of
the same right, require it. For, in some, He wills to effect it only by
external preaching, admonition, and sufficient means, for so I explain your
meaning. If this is in accordance with your views, it is well, but if not, I
would wish that you would inform us what you have understood by the word
"means." In others, He wills to effect it, by efficacious means,
administered according to the decree of Predestination. There is here,
indeed, no conflict of wills, but only different degrees of will, as far as
we are concerned, or rather different volitions of God in reference to
different objects, according to which God can not be said to will and not to
will the same object, that is, to will the conversion, and not to will the
conversion of the same man—the laws of just opposition being here observed.
I could wish that it might be explained how "God sincerely wills that the
man should believe in Christ, whom He wills to be alien from Christ, and to
whom He has decreed to deny the aid necessary to faith," for this is
equivalent to not willing the conversion of any one.
To your second answer, I say, that it is not sufficient that you should say
that "the revealed will of God is not adverse to the will of good-pleasure,
but the matter of predestination is to be so treated that the will of
good-pleasure is not to be opposed to the revealed will; for I think that
the limits of that opposition ought to have been thus expressed. For the
will which you call that of "good-pleasure," ought to be investigated by
means of the revealed will; hence the latter is to be brought into agreement
with the former, not the former to be reconciled with the latter. I desire,
also, that it should be considered by what right the revealed will is
usually considered as distinguished from the will of good pleasure, since
the good-pleasure of God is frequently revealed. It is the good-pleasure of
God that he who beholds the Son and believes on him, should have everlasting
life. The word eujdokia is often used in the Scriptures, for that will of
God, which is inclined towards any one, which is called "good-pleasure" in
distinction from the pleasure of God, considered in a general sense.
Reprobation can not be referred to good-pleasure; for every exercise of
good-pleasure towards men is in Jesus Christ, as the angels sung "good will
toward men" (Luke ii. 14). In reference to the passage in Matt. xi. 25, 26,
in which the word eujdokia is used in reference to the pleasure of God by
which He has hidden the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven from the wise,
and revealed them unto babes. I remark that the word eujdokia is properly to
be referred to that, concerning which Christ gives thanks to his Father,
that is, the revelation of the heavenly mysteries to babes. For it is to be
understood in this way: "I give thanks unto thee, O Father, that thou hast
revealed unto babes the mysteries which thou hast hidden from the wise."
Christ does not give thanks to the Father that He has hidden the mysteries
from the wise, for he prayed for the wise men of this world who crucified
him. For the "princes of this world" are said to have crucified the Lord of
glory" (1 Cor. ii. 8), and he is said to have prayed for his persecutors,
and particularly for those who crucified him. In what respect is it true
that the revealed will "always agrees, in its beginning, end and scope,"
with the good-pleasure, in the ordinary acceptation of that phrase, since
the revealed will has often a different object from that of the will of
good-pleasure? Also, if both are in reference to the same object, there can
not be the same beginning, and the same end and scope to both except it be
also true that God wills by His good-pleasure, that which, in His revealed
will, He declares that He wills, unless, indeed, that same beginning is
considered universally to be God, and the same end to be the glory of God.
But that "the revealed will of God seems often to be diverse, and, indeed,
in appearance, to be contrary to the decree of God, and also in reference to
the mode of proposing it," is true, if you mean that this "seems" so to
ignorant men, and to those who do not rightly distinguish between the
different modes and the various objects of volition. These two wills of God,
however diverse, never seem contrary to those, who rightly look into these
things, and so judge of them. As to the death of Hezekiah, and the
destruction of Nineveh, God knew that it belonged to His justice, unless it
should be attempered with mercy, to take away the life of Hezekiah, and to
send destruction on the Ninevites; for the law of His justice claimed that
these things should be denounced against them by Isaiah and Jonah. But God
was not willing to satisfy the demands of justice, unless with the
intervention of the decree of mercy, by which He determined that neither
death should come on Hezekiah, nor destruction upon the Ninevites, unless
they should be forewarned to seek the face of God by prayers, and, in this
manner, to turn away the evil from themselves; and, if they should do this,
they should be spared. But He knew that they would do this, being, indeed,
assisted by grace and the divine aid, by which He had determined to
co-operate with the external preaching; and so He determined to prolong the
life of Hezekiah and to preserve the city of the Ninevites from destruction.
Here, then, there seems to be not even apparent contrariety.
What you observe concerning "the human and the divine will of Christ," does
not affect our present subject of discussion. It is true that there was such
a difference; but this is not strange, since those wills belonged not to one
origin, though they did belong to one person, embracing, in himself two
natures and two wills. I may add, also, that Christ willed both to be freed
and not to be freed from death. For as a man, he said, "O, my Father, let
this cup pass from me," and as a man, also, he corrected himself,
"nevertheless, not as I will, but as thou wilt" (Matt. xxvi. 39). That this
is to be understood of the human will, is apparent, because there is one and
the same will, as there is one nature to the Father and to the Son, as
divine. I may say, in a word, that Christ, as to the outward man, willed to
be freed from immediate death, but according to the inward man, he subjected
himself to the divine will. And, if you will permit, I will say, that there
was, in him, a feeling and a desire to be freed, not a volition. For
volition results from the final decision of the reason and of wisdom, but
desire follows the antecedent decision of the senses or the feelings.
That "Abraham was favourably inclined towards the Sodomites, who were
devoted, by the decree of God, to destruction," the Scripture does not
assert. It also does not seem to me to be very probable that "he could pray
in faith" for those whom he knew to be devoted, by the decree of God, to
irrevocable destruction. For prayer was not to be offered in behalf of such
persons. God commands Jeremiah not to pray for the people, which He had, by
an irrevocable decree, and by His will as its consequent, destined and
devoted to captivity and destruction. For although it may not be requisite
in prayers, offered for any thing whatever, that one should certainly
believe that the thing, which he seeks, shall be granted, it is necessary
that the mind of him, who prays, should certainly believe that God, in His
omnipotence and mercy, is both able and willing to do that which is asked,
if He knows that it will be in accordance with His own grace. But that,
which God has decreed not to do, and what He has signified, absolutely, that
He will not do, He neither can do, nor will He ever will to do, so long as
the decree stands, and it is not right for a believer to intercede with God
in his prayers for that thing, if the decree of God has been known to him.
Your third answer is, that "God, as a creditor, can require what Himself may
not will to effect." But there is an equivocation or ambiguity in the words,
"what Himself may not will to effect." They may be understood, either in
reference to that concurrence of God, which is necessary to the doing of
that, which He commands, or in reference to that efficacious concurrence by
which that, which He commands, is certainly done. If in reference to the
latter, it is true.
There is no kind of conflict or contrariety between these two
"demand or command that any thing should be done," and "yet not to do it
efficaciously." If in reference to the former, it is not true. For God does
not command that, in
reference to which He denies the aid necessary to effect it,
unless any one, of his own fault, deprives himself of that grace, and makes
himself unworthy of that aid. The right of creditor remains, if he, who is
in debt, is not able to pay by his own fault. But it is not so with the
command, in which faith is prescribed; for faith in Christ is not included
in the debt which a man was bound to pay according to his primitive creation
in the image of God, and the primitive economy under which he lived. For it
began to be necessary, after God changed the condition of salvation from
legal obedience to faith in Christ.
We come now to "the presentation of the Mediator." consisted both in the
fact that the Mediator presented himself to God, the Father, as a victim for
the sin of the world, and that the Father, by the word and His spirit,
presents the Mediator, having performed the functions of that office, and
having obtained remission of sins and eternal redemption to the world,
reconciled through him. The former pertains to the provision of salvation,
the latter to its application by faith in the same Mediator. The former is
the execution of the act of appointment and promise, the latter coincides
with the actual offering, which we have previously considered in discussing
the promise. But the presentation, as it is defined by you, not immediately
antecedent to the application, for between that presentation, and the
application, there intervenes the offering of the Mediator by the word and
the Holy Spirit.
What you say concerning the virtue and efficacy of the price, paid by
Christ, needs a more careful consideration. You say, that "the efficacy of
that price, as far as merit is concerned, is infinite"; but you make a
distinction between "actual and potential efficacy." You also define
"potential efficacy" as synonymous with a sufficiency of price for the whole
world. This, however, is a phrase, hitherto unknown among Theologians, who
have merely made a distinction between the efficacy and the sufficiency of
the merit of Christ. I am not sure, also, but that there is an absurdity in
styling efficacy "potential," since there is a contradiction in terms. For
all efficacy is actual, as that word has been, hitherto, used by
Theologians. But, laying aside phrases, let us consider the thing itself.
The ransom or price of the death of Christ, is said to be universal in its
sufficiency, but particular in its efficacy, i.e. sufficient for the
redemption of the whole world, and for the expiation of all sins, but its
efficacy pertains not to all universally, which efficacy consists in actual
application by faith and the sacrament of regeneration, as Augustine and
Prosper, the Aquitanian, say. If you think so, it is well, and I shall not
very much oppose it. But if I rightly understand you, it seems to me that
you do not acknowledge the absolute sufficiency of that price, but with the
added condition, if God had willed that it should be offered for the sins of
the whole world. So then, that, which the School-men declare categorically,
namely, that Christ’s death was sufficient for all and for each, is,
according to your view, to be expressed hypothetically, that is, in this
sense—the death of Christ would be a sufficient price for the sins of the
whole world, if God had willed that it should be offered for all men. In
this sense, indeed, its sufficiency is absolutely taken away. For if it is
not a ransom offered and paid for all, it is, indeed, not a ransom
sufficient for all. For the ransom is that, which is offered and paid.
Therefore the death of Christ can be said to be sufficient for the
redemption of the sins of all men, if God had wished that he should die for
all; but it can not be said to be a sufficient ransom, unless it has, in
fact, been paid for all. Hence, also, Beza notes an incorrect phraseology,
in that distinction, because the sin-offering is said to be absolutely
sufficient, which is not such, except on the supposition already set forth.
But, indeed, my friend Perkins, the Scripture says, most clearly, in many
places, that Christ died for all, for the life of the world, and that by the
command and grace of God.
The decree of Predestination prescribes nothing to the universality of the
price paid for all by the death of Christ. It is posterior, in the order of
nature, to the death of Christ and to its peculiar efficacy. For that decree
pertains to the application of the benefits obtained for us by the death of
Christ: but his death is the price by which those benefits were prepared.
Therefore the assertion is incorrect, and the order is inverted, when it is
said that "Christ died only for the elect, and the predestinate." For
predestination depends, not only on the death of Christ, but also on the
merit of Christ’s death; and hence Christ did not die for those who were
predestinated, but they, for whom Christ died; were predestinated, though
not all of them. For the universality of the death of Christ extends itself
more widely than the object of Predestination. From which it is also
concluded that the death of Christ and its merit is antecedent, in nature
and order, to Predestination. What else, indeed, is predestination than the
preparation of the grace, obtained and provided for us by the death of
Christ, and a preparation pertaining to the application, not to the
acquisition or provision of grace, not yet existing? For the decree of God,
by which He determined to give Christ as a Redeemer to the world, and to
appoint him the head only of believers, is prior to the decree, by which He
determined to really apply to some, by faith, the grace obtained by the
death of Christ.
You allege these reasons in favour of your views, concerning the death of
Christ. "Christ did not sacrifice for those for whom also he does not pray,
because intercession and sacrifice are conjoined; -- But he prays, not for
all, but only for elect and for believers, (John xvii. 9,) and, in his
prayer, he offers himself to the Father; -- Therefore he sacrifices not for
all, and, consequently, his death is not a ransom for all men.
I reply that the Major does not seem to me to be, in all respects, true. The
sacrifice is prior to the intercession. For he could not enter into the
heavens that he might intercede for us in the presence of God, except by the
blood of his own flesh. It is also prior, as sacrifice has reference to
merit, intercession to the application of merit.
For he is called the Mediator by merit and the efficacy of its application.
He acquired merit by sacrifice; he intercedes for its application. He does
both, as Priest; but he makes that application as King and Head of His
church. It is indeed true that Christ, in the days of his flesh, offered up
prayers with tears to God, the Father. But those prayers were not offered to
obtain the application of merited blessing, but for the assistance of the
Spirit, that he might stand firm in the conflict. If, indeed, he then
offered up prayers to obtain the application referred to, they depended on
the sacrifice, which was to be offered, as though it were already offered.
In this order, sacrifice and intercession are related to each other.
In reference to the Minor, I assert, that Christ prayed also for the
non-elect. He prayed for those who crucified him, for his enemies, among
whom also were non-elect persons. For "the princes of this world" crucified
him, and to most of them the wisdom and power of God, which is Christ, was
not revealed (1 Cor. 2). Secondly, the prayer of Christ, which is contained
in the 17th chapter of John, was offered, particularly for those who had
believed, and those who should afterwards believe, and, indeed, to obtain
and apply to them the blessings merited by the sacrifice of his death. He
asks that they may be one with the Father and the Son, as the Father and the
Son are one; which He could not ask unless reconciliation had actually been
made, or was considered, by God, as having been made. But such is not the
character of all the prayers of Christ. Thirdly, I remark that the word
"world," in John xvii. 9, properly signifies those who rejected Christ, as
preached to them in the word of the gospel, and those who should afterwards
reject him. This is apparent from the contrast—"I pray not for the world,
but for them which thou hast given me," whom he describes as having believed
(8th verse) and as believing at a future time (20th verse). The word is used
similarly in many other passages—"The world knew him not" (John ii. 10);
"Light has come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light"
(iii, 19); "The Spirit of truth, whom the world can not receive" (xvi, 17);
"He will reprove the world of sin, because they believe not on me" (xvi, 8,
9); "How is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the
world?" (xvi, 22.) Therefore the extent of the sacrifice is not to be
limited by the narrow bounds of that intercession.
I could wish to learn from Illyricus how it can be in accordance with the
justice of God, and the infinite value of Christ’s sacrifice, that "prayer
is expiatory and the rule of the Sacrifice [Canon Sacrificii]. "I think, not
only that Christ did not ask of the Father to regard favourably his
sacrifice, but that it was not possible that He should present such a
petition: if that is indeed true, which our churches teach and profess with
one voice, that the most complete satisfaction was made to the justice of
God by the sacrifice of Christ. But that idea originated in the Polish mass,
in which, also, are those words-"Canon Sacrificii."
But the words, which contain your conclusion are remarkable, and have no
right meaning. What is meant by this? -- "Christ was appointed to be a
ransom by the intercession and oblation of the Son." Intercession is
subsequent to ransom. Therefore the latter was not appointed by the former.
Oblation belongs to the ransom itself, and is therefore prior to the
intercession, and could, in no way, be concerned in the appointment of the
ransom. But the action itself has the character of an oblation. Hence, also,
the ransom itself, as I have already often said, is prior to election. For
election is unto life, which has no existence except by the oblation of the
ransom; unless we may say that election is unto life, not now existing, nor
as yet merited, not even in the decree of God. For he is the "lamb slain
from the foundation of the world."
You proceed further, and endeavour, but in vain, to confirm the same
sentiment by other arguments. They seem to have some plausibility, but no
truth. You say, that "Christ is only the Mediator of those, whose character
he sustained on the cross;
But he sustained the character of the elect only on the cross; Therefore he
is only the Mediator of the elect." I reply to the Major, that it belongs
not to the essence or the nature of Mediator to sustain the character of any
one. For he is constituted a Mediator between two dissident parties.
Therefore, as Mediator, he sustains the character of neither; unless,
indeed, the nature of the mediation be, of necessity, such as to demand that
the mediator should sustain the character of one of the parties. But this
mediation has such a nature as the justice of God required. For it could
enter upon no way of reconciliation with a world, guilty of sin, unless the
Mediator should pledge satisfaction, and, in fact, should make it in
accordance with the right of surety. This is what is said in 2 Corinthians
v. 19, 21, "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself—for He
hath made him to be sin" for the world, that is, a sin offering. In this
sense, also, it is truly said that Christ is not a Mediator, except for
those, whose character he sustained. I speak here in respect to the
Sacrifice; "For every high priest taken from among men, is ordained from
me," &c., (Heb. v. 5, 1.) Here, also, a distinction may be made between the
act, by which reconciliation is obtained, and the completion of that act,
which is reconciliation. The act, obtaining reconciliation, is the oblation
of Christ on the cross. Its completion is the reconciliation. In respect to
the act, he sustained our character, for we deserved death, not in respect
to the completion. For the effect, resulting frown the oblation, depends on
the dignity and excellence of the character of Christ, not of us, whose
character he sustained. Indeed, if it be proper to use distinctions of
greater nicety, in this place, I may say, that Christ sustained our
character, not in respect to action, namely, that of oblation, but of
passion. For He was made a curse for us, and an offering for sin. From which
it is evident, that, as all men are sinners and obnoxious to the curse, and
Christ assumed human nature common to all, it is probable that he sustained
the character of all men.
We see this also in the Minor of your syllogism, which is "Christ sustained
the character of the elect only on the cross," in which I notice a two-fold
fault, that of falsity and that of incorrect phraseology. Its falsity
consists in this, that Christ is said to have sustained on the cross the
character of the Elect only. I prove it, from the fact that the Scripture no
where says this; indeed it asserts the contrary in numerous passages. Christ
is called "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world" (John i.
29) God is declared to have "so loved the world that He gave His only
begotten Son" (iii, 16). Christ declares that he will give "his flesh for
the life of the world" (vi, 51). "God was in Christ reconciling the world
unto Himself" (2 Cor. v. 19). "He is the propitiation for our sins; and not
for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world" (1 John ii. 2). The
Samaritans said "We know that this is indeed the Christ, the saviour of the
world" (John iv. 42). Also 1 John iv. 14, "We have seen and do testify, that
the Father sent the Son to be the saviour of the world." That, in the word
"world," in these passages, all men, in general, are to be understood, is
manifest from these passages and from Scriptural usages. For there is, in my
judgment, no passage in the whole Bible, in which it can be proved beyond
controversy that the word "world" signifies the Elect. Again, Christ it is
said to have died for all, in Hebrews ii. 9, and elsewhere. He is said to be
"the saviour of all men, especially of those that believe" (1 Tim. iv. 10),
which declaration can not be explained to refer to preservation in this life
without perversion and injury. Christ is also styled the "Mediator between
God and men" (1 Tim. ii. 5). He is said to have died for those "without
strength, ungodly, and yet sinners" (Rom. v. 6-8.)
What I said a little while since, is important also on this point; -- that
the case of the whole human race is the same, all being alike conceived and
born in sin, and the children of wrath; and that Christ assumed human
nature, which is common to all men, not from Abraham only and David, as
Matthew traces his genealogy, but also from Adam, to whom Luke goes back in
his third chapter. He offered, therefore, the flesh which he had in common
with all. "For as much then as the children are partakers of flesh and
blood, He also himself likewise took part of the same, &c." (Heb. ii. 14).
He offered that flesh for the common cause and the common sin, namely, for
the sin of the world, in respect to which there is no difference among men,
and the Apostle adds this cause in the passage just cited, "that through
death he might destroy him that had the power of death." Let the dignity and
excellence of the person, which could offer an equivalent ransom for the sin
of all men be added to this. Let the gracious and tender affection of God
towards the human race come into consideration, which, in the Scriptures, is
usually spoke of by the general term filanqrwpia as in Tit. iii. 4. Which
term signifies, in general terms, the love of God towards men; which
affection cannot be attributed to God, if He pursues with hatred any man,
without reference to his deserts and his sin.
I know that some will reply that God indeed hates no one except on account
of sin, but that He destined some to His own just hatred, that is,
reprobating some without reference to sin. But in that way the order of
things is inverted; for God does not hate because He reprobates, but
reprobates cause He hates. He reprobates a sinner, because the sinner and
sin are justly hateful and odious to Him. Hatred is an affection in the
Deity by which He hates unrighteousness and the unrighteous, as there is in
Him also love for righteousness and the righteous. Reprobation is an act of
God, internal in purpose, external in execution, and the act is, in the
order of nature, subsequent to the affection. The destination of any one to
hatred, however it may be considered, has necessarily these two things
preceding it, hatred against unrighteousnes, and the foresight that the
individual, by his own fault, will be guilty of unrighteousness, by omission
or commission.
I know, indeed, that the love of God, referred to, is not in all respects
equal towards all men and towards each individual, but I also deny that
there is so much difference, in that divine love, towards men that He has
determined to act towards some, only according to the rigor of His own law,
but towards others according to His own mercy and grace in Christ, as set
forth in his gospel. He willed to treat the fallen angels according to that
rigor, but all men, fallen in Adam, according to this grace. For every
blessing, in which also mercy and long suffering (Exod. xxxiii. 19 & xxxiv,
6-7) are comprehended, He determined to exhibit, in the deliverance and
salvation of men. Some, however, may wish to do away with the distinction,
which many Theologians make between the fall of angels and that of man. For
they say that the angels fell beyond all hope of restoration, but that men
could have a complete restoration, and they assign, as a reason, the fact
that angels sinned, by their own motion and impulse, and man, by the
instigation and persuasion of an evil angel. To all these things, we may
add, by way of conclusion, the proper and immediate effect of the death and
suffering of Christ, and we shall see that no one of the human race is
excluded from it. It is not an actual removal of sins from these or those,
not an actual remission of sins, not justification, not an actual redemption
of these or these, which can be bestowed upon no one without faith and the
Spirit of Christ; but it is reconciliation with God, obtainment from God of
remission, justification, and redemption; by which it is effected that God
may now be able, as Justice, to which satisfaction has been made, interposes
no obstacle, to remit sins and to bestow the spirit of grace upon sinful
men. To the communication of these effects to sinners He was already
inclined, of His own mercy, on account of which, He gave Christ as the
saviour of the world, but, by His justice, He was hindered from the actual
communication of them. Meanwhile God maintained His own right to bestow on
whom He pleased, and with such conditions as He chose to prescribe, those
blessings, (which are His by nature,) the participation in which He, through
His mercy, desired to bestow on sinners, but could not actually do it on
account of the obstacle of His justice, but which He can now actually
bestow, as His justice has been satisfied by the blood and death of Christ;
since He, as the injured party, could prescribe the mode of reconciliation,
which also He did prescribe, consisting in the death and obedience of His
Son and because He has given him to us, to perform, in our behalf, the
functions of the Mediatorial office. If we decide that any person is
excluded from that effect, we decide, at the same time, that God does not
remit his sins unto him, not because He is unwilling to do so, having the
ability, but because He has not the ability, as justice presents an
obstacle, and because He willed not to be able. He willed that His justice
should be satisfied, before He should remit his sins unto any one, and
because He did not will that His justice should be satisfied in reference to
that person.
On the other hand, also, if we decide that the nature of the Mediation is
such, as you seem to conceive, that the sins of all the Elect are taken from
them and transferred to Christ, who suffered punishment for them, and, in
fact, freed them from punishment, then obedience was required of him, who
rendered it, and, by rendering it, merited eternal life, not for himself,
but for them, not otherwise than if we had constituted him Mediator in our
place, and through him had paid unto God our debt. We must also consider
that, according to the rigor of God’s justice and law, immunity from
punishment and eternal life are due to the elect, and they can claim those
blessings from God, by the right of payment and purchase, and without any
rightful claim, on the part of God, to demand faith in Christ and conversion
to him. It is not easy to tell under how great absurdities, both the latter
and the former opinion labour. I will refute each of them by a single
argument. In reference to the former, I argue that, if God was unwilling
that satisfaction, for the sins of any, should be rendered to Himself, by
the death of His Son, then faith in Christ can not, justly, be demanded of
them, they can not, justly, be condemned for unbelief, and Christ can not,
justly, be constituted their judge. The latter, I compute by an argument, of
very great strength, taken from the writings of the Apostle. The
righteousness, rendered by Christ, is not ours in that it is rendered, but
in that it is imputed unto us by faith, so that faith itself may be said to
be "counted for righteousness" (Rom. iv. 5.) This phrase, if rightly
understood, may shed the clearest light on this whole discussion. I
conclude, therefore, that Christ bore the character of all men in general,
as it is said, and not that of the elect only.
I notice incorrectness of phraseology in the statement that he bore, on the
cross, the character of the Elect, when no one is elect, except in Christ,
as dead and risen again, and now constituted by God the Head of the church,
and the saviour of them who should believe in him, and obey him unto
salvation. Therefore, there were no elect, when he was yet hanging on the
cross, that is, both of these events being considered as existing in the
foreknowledge of God; hence He could not have borne, on the cross, the
character of the Elect. On this account, likewise, it would be absurdity to
say that Christ bore the character of the reprobate, because reprobation had
there no place. But he bore the character of men as sinners, unrighteous,
enemies to God, apart from any consideration or distinction between Election
and Reprobation. It is evident, then, from this reply, that it can not be
concluded, from that argument, that Christ is the Mediator for the Elect
only, the work of the Mediator being, now, restricted to the oblation made
on the cross.
You advance, also, another argument to prove the truth of your sentiment,
and say; -- "Whatever Christ suffered and did as Redeemer, the same things
all the redeemed do and suffer in him, and with him; -- But Christ, as
Redeemer, died, rose again, ascended, sat down on the right hand of the
Father;
Therefore, in him and with him, all the redeemed died, rose again, ascended,
sat down at the right hand of the Father." You then assume, as a position by
consequence, that "The Elect only die, rise again, ascend, sit at the right
hand of the Father, in and with Christ. Therefore, they alone are redeemed."
We will inspect and examine both parts of this argument in order.
The Major of this prosyllogism seems to me to be chargeable with notorious
falsity, as can, also, be easily demonstrated. For it confounds the
sufferings and the actions, by which redemption is effected and obtained,
with the completion of redemption itself, and the application of redemption.
For redemption does not refer to suffering, or to any action of Christ, but
to the completion, the event, and the fruit of that suffering and action;
therefore, the sufferings and the actions of Christ are prior to redemption;
but redemption is prior to its application. They, however, are called
redeemed from the application. Therefore, that, which Christ suffered and
did to obtain redemption, the redeemed did not suffer or do. For they were
not at that time redeemed, but, by those actions, redemption was obtained,
and applied to them by faith, and so they, as the result, were redeemed. The
very nature of things clearly proves that redeemer and redeemed are things
so related, that the former is the foundation, the latter, the terminus, not
vice versa, and, therefore, in the former is comprehended the cause of the
other, and indeed the cause, produced by its own efficiency; whence it
follows that the redeemed did not that, which was done by the redeemed,
since, in that case, they were redeemed before the act of redemption was
performed by the redeemer, and the redemption itself was obtained. If you
say that you consider the redeemed not as redeemed, but as men to be
redeemed, I reply that, in whatever way, they are considered, it can never
be truly said that they did, in and with Christ, what Christ did for the
sake of redeeming them. For those, who were to be redeemed were not in
Christ or with Christ, therefore, they could, neither in him nor with him,
suffer or do any thing. You will say that "they suffered and acted in him as
a surety and pledge;" but I say in him as constituted a surety not by them,
but by God for them, and on him the work of redemption was imposed by God.
It is true, indeed, that he assumed from men the nature in which redemption
was performed; yet He, not men in him, offered it. But, if they may be said
to have suffered, because their nature suffered in the form of Christ, you
see that, in this way also, the redemption is general for all those to whom
the same nature belongs. Perhaps you refer to those passages of Scripture,
in which we are said to be "dead with Christ, buried with him and raised
with him" (Rom. vi. 3, 4, 5). Your explanation is unsatisfactory, if it
regards them as having reference to our present subject. For those passages
treat of the crucifixion, death, burial, and resurrection, which we each, in
our own person, endure and experience. But they do not pertain to the
meritorious redemption, as the crucifixion, death, &c., of Christ. Again, in
those passages, the subject of discussion is that of our engraftment into
Christ by faith, and our communion with him, which pertain to the
application of redemption; but, here, the subject of discussion is the
obtainment of redemption, and the acts which pertain to it. Those passages
teach, that we, being grafted into Christ by faith, received from him the
power of the Spirit, by which our old man is crucified, dead and buried, and
we are resuscitated and raised again into a new life. From this it is
apparent that they have no connection with our present subject.
The right meaning of the Minor, is that Christ, performing the work of
redemption, died, rose again, and ascended into the heavens. For he was not
the redeemer, before he offered himself to death and rose again from the
dead. I remark, more briefly, that Christ died and rose again in that he was
Redeemer by the imposition and acceptance of the office, not by the
fulfillment of the same. For the death and resurrection of Christ pertain to
the function of the office of Redeemer. It now appears, from this, in what
sense the conclusion is true. not in that in which you intend it, that they,
whom you call "the redeemed," died and rose again in the person of Christ,
but as I, a short time since, explained it, in a sense, pertaining, not to
the obtainment of redemption, but to the application of the obtained
redemption. For Christ is said to have "entered in once into the holy place,
having obtained eternal redemption," (Heb. ix. 12), which redemption he
communicates to believers, by the Holy Spirit sent from heaven.
These things being thus considered, your position by consequence does not
weigh against the opinion, which I here defend. For it certainly happens to
the Elect, only in the sense which we have set forth, with Christ to die,
rise again, ascend, and sit at the right hand of the Father. They also, by
reason of their being engrafted in Christ, and the application of the
benefits of Christ, and of communion with Christ, are said to be "redeemed."
"Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou
wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred,
and tongue, and people, and nation; and hast made us unto our God kings and
priests; and we shall reign on the earth" (Rev. v. 9, l0). So, also, in Rev.
xiv. 3, 4, the same are said to have been "redeemed from the earth, and from
among men." It is, however, to be observed that this position is not a
consequence of the antecedents, unless there be added, to the Major, a
restrictive phrase, in this way:
"Whatever Christ suffered and did this all the redeemed, and they only,
suffered and did in him, and with him.
The arguments which you adduce to prove this position, are readily conceded
by me, in the sense which I have explained. But that, which you afterwards
present to illustrate your meaning, deserves notice. For the sins of those,
for whom Christ died, are condemned in the flesh of Christ, in such a manner
that they may not, by that fact, be freed from condemnation, unless they
believe in Christ. For "there is, therefore, now, no condemnation to them
which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the
Spirit" (Rom. viii. 1).
The error of confounding things, which should be distinct, and uniting those
which should be divided, is constantly committed. For obtainment, and the
act itself, which obtains, are confounded with the application, and the
former are substituted for the latter.
You say, also, "the expiatory victim sanctifies those for whom he is a
victim. For victim and sanctification pertain to the same persons; -- But
Christ sanctifies only the Elect and believers; -- Therefore, Christ is
victim for the Elect only and believers."
I answer to your Major, that the expiatory victim sanctifies, not in that it
is offered, but in that it is applied. This may be plainly seen in the
passage cited by yourself (Heb. ix. 13, 14). "For if the ashes of a heifer,
sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh—How much
more shall the blood of Christ, &c." For which reason, it is called in Heb.
xii. 24, "the blood of sprinkling." In the same manner, those, who, not only
slew the paschal lamb, but also sprinkled the door-posts with its blood,
were passed over by the destroying angel. If, then, the phrase "for whom"
implies, not the oblation only, but also the fruit and advantage of the
oblation, I admit the truth of the Major. But we are, here, discussing not
the application of the victim Christ, but the oblation only, which, in the
Scriptures, is simply said to be "for men" (Heb. v. 1). But faith must
necessarily intervene between the oblation, and its application which is
sanctification. The oblation, of the victim, then, was made, not for
believers, but for men as sinners, yet on this condition, that He should
sanctify only believers in Christ. Hence, it can not be considered, even
though the Minor should be conceded, that Christ offered himself for the
Elect only, since Election, as it is made in Christ, offered, dead, risen
again, and having obtained eternal redemption by his blood, must be
subsequent to the oblation.
You add—"Christ is the complete saviour of those, whom he saves, not only by
his merits, but by efficaciously working their salvation." Who denies this?
But the distinction is to be observed between these two functions and
operations of Christ, the recovery, by his blood, of the salvation, which
was lost by sin, and the actual communication or application, by the Holy
Spirit, of the salvation obtained by his blood. The former precedes, the
latter requires, in accordance with the Divine decree, that faith should
precede it. Therefore, though Christ may not be said to completely save
those who are not actually saved, yet he is said to be the saviour of others
than believers (1 Tim. xiv. 10). I do not see how that passage can be
suitably explained, unless by the distinction between sufficient and
efficacious salvation, or salvation as recovered and as applied. The
passages, which you cite from the Fathers, partly have no relation to the
matter now discussed, and partly are related to it, but they teach nothing
else than that the death and passion of Christ, which are a sufficient price
for the redemption of the sins of all men, in fact, profit the Elect only,
and those who believe unto salvation. What you say in reference to the
application is correct; but I wish that you would distinguish between it,
and those things which precede it.
From what has already been said, the decree, in reference to the bestowment
of the Mediator and to the salvation of believers through the Mediator, is
prior to the decree of predestination, in which some are destined to
salvation in Christ, and others are left to condemnation out of Christ. But
you say that "the decree of election is the cause and the beginning of all
the saving gifts and works in men." I grant it, but not in view of the fact
that it is the decree of election, but in that it is the desire of the
bestowment of grace. In that it is the decree of election, it is the cause
that grace is bestowed only on those: for it is the opposite of reprobation,
and necessarily supposes it. For there is no election without reprobation,
and the term elect itself signifies loved, with the contrast of not loved at
least in the same mode and decree, and restricts love to those who are
styled elect with the exclusion of those who are styled the non-elect or
reprobate. So far, then, as saving gifts are bestowed upon any one in that
act which is called election, it is properly love; in that the bestowment is
restricted to some, to the exclusion of others, it is called election.
From this, it is apparent, in the first place, that the love which is
according to election, would not be less towards the elect than it now is,
even if God should declare the same favour, and His own love towards all men
in general. Secondly, they, who make the love of God, in Christ, the cause
of the salvation of men, and that alone, do no injury to grace, even if they
deny that such love is according to election, that is, restricted to a few
by the decree of God. They may, indeed, deny that which is true, but without
injury to grace or mercy; for I presupposed that they make the same love to
be the cause of salvation, as they do, who contend for election. I know,
indeed, that Augustine often said against the Pelagians, that "they who make
the grace of God common to all, in effect, deny grace altogether;" but this
assertion is not, in all respects, true; but it was valid against the
Pelagians, and all those who, at that time, made the grace of God universal.
For they explained the grace of God, to be the gift bestowed equally on all
by creation, in our original nature. I acknowledge, indeed, that, from the
universality of grace, some consequences can be deduced, which will prove
that the universality of grace may be indirectly opposed to that grace by
which the elect are saved. But it should be known that those consequences
are not, all of them, tenable, we examine them accurately, and I wish that
you should demonstrate this.
You will thus effect much, not, indeed, in sustaining the view which you
here specially advocate, but in sustaining the doctrine of election and
reprobation in general. But it will be said that, by the reprobation of
some, that is, by election joined with love, the elect are more fully
convinced that the love of God towards themselves is not of debt, than they
would be if that same love were bestowed by God upon all without any
distinction. I, indeed, grant it, and the Scripture often uses that
argument. Yet that love, toward us, can be proved to be gratuitous, and not
of debt, and can be sealed upon our hearts, without that argument. It
appears, then, that there is no absolute necessity of presenting that
argument. I do not say these things because I wish that the doctrine of
election should not be taught in our churches; far be it from me; but to
show that this subject is to be treated with moderation, and without offense
to weak believers, who, for the very reason that they hear that they can not
be certain of salvation, unless they believe that which is taught concerning
Election with the rejection of some, begin to doubt whether the sense of
certainty of salvation, which they have at times enjoyed, is to be
attributed to the testimony of the Holy Spirit, or to a certain persuasion
and presumption in their own minds. I write this from experience. So much in
reference to Election. Let us now consider its opposite—Reprobation.
But you define the decree of reprobation in a two-fold manner. First you
say—"It is the work of divine providence, by which God decreed to pass by
certain men, as to supernatural grace, that He might declare His justice and
wrath in their due destruction." In my opinion, there are, in this
definition, four faults, which, with your consent, I will exhibit, if I may
be able to do so. The first fault is, you have made the decree of
Reprobation, "the work, &c.," when, as it exists in God, it can, in no way,
be called a work, which is something apart from that which produces it,
existing after an act, and from an act produced by the efficaciousness or
efficiency of an agent. I should prefer then to use the word "act" in this
case, The second fault is you do not well describe the object of that act,
when you say—"certain men are passed by," without any mention of any
condition required in the object, or any reference to the fact that the men
spoken of are sinners. For sin is a condition, requisite in a man, to be
passed by in reprobation, or, so to speak, in one capable of being passed
by. This I shall briefly prove in a few arguments.
First, the Scripture acknowledges no reprobation of men, as having been made
by God, unless its meritorious cause is sin. Secondly, since reprobation is
the opposite of election, it follows, if divine election has reference to
sinners, that reprobation has reference to persons of the same character.
But Election, as I have previously shown, has reference to sinners. Thirdly,
because that supernatural grace, which is denied by reprobation, is grace
necessary to sinners only—namely, that of remission of sins, and the renewal
of the Holy Spirit. Fourthly, because justice and wrath can not be declared,
except against a sinner, for where there is no sin there can be no place
either for wrath or punitive justice, (of which you here necessarily speak).
Fifthly, because punishment is due to no one, unless he is a sinner, and you
say that "the wrath of God and His justice are declared in the due
destruction of the Reprobate." When I make sin the meritorious cause of
reprobation, do not consider me as, on the other hand, making righteousness
the meritorious cause of Election. For sin is the meritorious cause of the
reprobation of all sinners in general. But election is, not only of that
grace which is not of debt, and which man has not merited, but also of that
grace which takes away demerit. Even if the meritorious cause is supposed,
the effect is not at once produced, unless by the intervention of His will,
to whom it belongs to inflict due punishment, according to the merit of sin;
but He has power to punish sin according to its desert, or to pardon it, of
His grace in Christ. Therefore, in both cases, in election and in
reprobation,. the free-will of God is considered the proximate and immediate
cause. If you oppose to me the common distinction, by which sin is said to
be required in the object of the execution, but not in the object of the
decree itself, I reply that it is not right that God should will to condemn
any one, or will to pass by him without consideration of sin, as it is not
right for Him, in fact, to pass by or condemn any one without the demerit of
sin. It is, then, truly said, the cause of the decree and of its execution
is one and the same. Your third fault is, that of obscurity and ill-adjusted
phraseology. For what is implied in the phrase "to pass by as to
supernatural grace," instead of—to pass by in the dispensation and
bestowment of supernatural grace? There is ambiguity, also, in the word
"supernatural." Grace is supernatural, both as it is superadded to unfallen
nature, bearing nature beyond itself, and as it is bestowed on fallen
nature, changing it, and raising it to things heavenly and supernatural.
The fourth fault is, that you present a result of the preterition which
coheres by no necessary copula, with the antecedent cause of the
preterition. For sin is not presupposed to that act; sin does not of
necessity exist from that act; one of which facts is necessarily required
from the necessity of coherence between the act and its result. If, indeed,
you say that sin necessarily results from that preterition, then you make
God the Author of sin by a denial of the grace, without which, sin can not
be avoided. But if that grace, which is denied to any one by preterition, is
not necessary for the avoidance of sin, then a man could, without it,
abstain from sin, and so not deserve destruction. If he could do this, that
declaration of justice and wrath does not result from the act of decreed
preterition. But you know that the parts of a definition should mutually
cohere by a necessary copula, and that a result should not be proposed,
which, even on the supposition of any act, does not result from that same
act. For such a result would be incidental, and therefore, ought not to be
found in a definition which is independent, and designed to convey absolute
knowledge.
Let us, now, examine the other definition, which you have adduced, perhaps
for the very reason, that you thought your former one somewhat unsound. It
is this; -- "The decree of reprobation is the purpose to permit any one to
fall into sin, and to inflict the punishment of damnation on account of
sin." I know that this definition is used by the School-men, and, among
others, by Thomas Aquinas, for whose genius and erudition I have as high an
esteem as any one; but he, here, seems to me to be under a kind of
hallucination. First, because he makes the decree of reprobation to be
antecedent to sin, which opinion I have already refuted. Secondly, because
he attributes that permission to the decree of reprobation, which ought to
be attributed to a certain other, more general decree, that of providence,
as I will show. An act which has reference to all men, in general, apart
from the distinction between the elect and the reprobate, is not an act of
reprobation; for, in that act, God had reference to the reprobate only; --
But that act of permission, by which God permitted man to fall into sin, is
general, and extending to all men; for in Adam, all sinned (Rom. 5). And all
are "by nature the children of wrath" (Ephes. ii. 3); -- That act, then, is
not one of reprobation, but of mere general providence, regarding all men
entirely without difference, and governing and administering their primitive
state in the person of Adam. If you say that both are to be conjoined, the
permission of the fall and the infliction of punishment, and that the whole
subject, taken in a complex manner, is the proper act of reprobation, I
answer that, on that principle, permission, according to which Adam, and in
him, all his posterity fell, which is one and univocal, is resolved into two
diverse matters, and thus becomes two-fold and equivocal; that is, into the
decree of reprobation, by which the reprobate are permitted to fall, and the
decree of providence, by which even the elect themselves are permitted to
fall.
I add another argument, which, in my judgment indeed, is irrefutable.
Reprobation and Election are spoken of as things separate and opposite; one
is not without the other. Hence, no act can be attributed to one of them,
the opposite of which, either affirmative or negative, may not be attributed
to the other. But no act, opposite to that of permission to fall, can be
attributed to Election. There is but one act which is opposite to the act of
permission, namely, hindrance from failing into sin. But no man, not even
one of the elect, is hindered from falling into sin. For the elect
themselves sinned in Adam. Therefore, the act of permission is not to be
assigned to the decree of Reprobation. If you diligently consider this
argument, you will see that it is clearly evident, from it, that permission
to fall was prior both to Reprobation and to Election, and therefore the
decree of Permission was prior to the decree of Election and
Reprobation—prior, in order and nature. Then, also, that other peculiarity
of reprobation remains, and as it presupposes sin, I conclude that men, as
sinners, are the object of reprobation.
You limit, moreover, the decree of reprobation to two acts. "The former is
the purpose to pass by certain men, and to illustrate justice in them." But
what justice, unless it is punitive? If it is punitive, then it coincides
with the second act—"the ordination to punishment." Others distinguish that
same decree into the negative act of preterition, and the affirmative act of
ordination to punishment. If you meant the same thing, you have not
expressed it well, for punitive justice superintends the ordination of
punishment, but the freedom of the divine will superintends preterition.
Your assertion that "this preterition has not its cause in men" will not be
proved by any passage of Scripture, which every where teaches that all
abandonment is on account of sin. Though this is so, yet it does not follow
that "the mere good pleasure of God" is not the cause of abandonment. For
God is free to leave or not to leave the sinner, who deserves abandonment;
and thus, the will of God is the proximate and immediate cause of
abandonment, and indeed the only cause in this respect, that when it is
possible for Him not to forsake the sinner, He may yet sometimes do so. For
God dispenses, absolutely according to His own will, in reference to the
merit of sin, whether, in His Son, to take it away, or, out of His Son, to
punish it. And how, I pray, does it "interfere with the liberty of the good
pleasure"—I would prefer the word pleasure—"of God," if He is said not to be
able to forsake one who is not a sinner? For it is only in view of His
justice that He is able to forsake one unless he is a sinner. And liberty
does not describe the objects with which God is concerned, in the operations
of His will, but the mode in which He pleases to operate in reference to any
object.
I could wish that you would not attribute any freedom to the will of God
which may impinge upon His justice. For justice is prior to the will, and is
its rule, and freedom is attributed to the will as its mode. That mode,
then, is limited by justice. Yet it will not, therefore, be denied that God
is completely free in the acts of His will. Since then He is completely free
in the acts of His will, not because He wills all things, but because He
wills freely whatever He wills, in what respect is it contrary to the
freedom of God, if He is said not to will certain things? For He can not, in
His justice, will them, and His freedom is not limited by a superior being
out of Himself, but by His own justice. In this sense, also, the will of God
is said to be "the cause of causes, and out of which, or beyond which no
reason is to be sought," which is true also according to my explanation. For
if any one asks, "why does God leave one, and choose another?" the answer
is—"because He wills it."
If it be asked, -- "but why does He will it?" The cause is found not out of
Himself. But there is a cause why He could justly will to leave any one, and
that cause is sin, not effecting actual desertion, but deserving it, and
making the sinner worthy of abandonment, and certainly to be abandoned, if
God should choose to punish him according to his demerit, which choice is
allowed to His free-will. Man is indeed as "clay in the hands of the
potter," but it does not follow from this that God can justly make of that
clay whatever it might be possible for Him to make by an act of His
omnipotence. He can reduce to nothing the clay formed by Himself and made
man, -- for this belongs to Him by supreme right: but He can not hate the
same clay, or be angry with it, or condemn it forever, unless that lump has
become sinful by its own fault, and been made a lump of corruption. Thus
also Augustine explains the passage in Romans 9, as having reference to the
lump of corruption. But you say, "if God had willed by His eternal decree to
pass over men as sinners only, not as men, then He did not make them vessels
of wrath, but He found them vessels of wrath, made such by themselves." I
reply that ignorance of the phrase, which the apostle uses in Romans 9, is
shown here. For "to make a vessel unto wrath," does not signify to sin or to
make one worthy of wrath through sin; but it signifies to destine to just
wrath him who has sinned and so made himself worthy of wrath, which is an
act of the divine judgment, peremptory indeed, because it is an act of
reprobation, but it has reference to man as a sinner, for sin alone is the
meritorious cause of wrath. If you urge further that in the word "lump,"
men, not as made but as to be made, are signified, and that this is proved
by the force of the word, shall deny that the force and radical meaning of
the word is to be, here, precisely insisted upon, and shall assert that, in
Scriptural use, the word is applied to men, not only as made but as sinners,
and as those received into the grace of reconciliation, and transgressing of
the covenant of grace; as in the prophet Jeremiah, "Behold as the clay is in
the potter’s hand, so are ye in mine hand, O house of Israel" (chapter
xviii, 6.)
In your third argument you turn aside from the controversy, and from the
real state of the case, contrary to the law of correct disputation, and,
therefore, you do not come to the conclusion which is sought, unless you may
say that to reject grace is the same as to sin, which two things are indeed
often distinguished in the Scriptures. For the Pharisees were already, in
Adam, and, indeed, in themselves, sinners before they "rejected the counsel
of God against themselves, being not baptized" of John (Luke vii. 30). The
Jews, of whom mention is made in Acts xiii. 46, were already sinners, in
Adam and in themselves, before they made themselves unworthy of the grace of
God, rejecting the word of life. But the question here is whether God passes
by sinners, not whether he sees that they will reject grace.
Again, it does not follow that "reprobation, therefore, depends on men," if
God reprobates no one unless reprobation and rejection is desired. For an
effect can not be said to depend on that cause which, being in operation,
does not certainly produce the effect. All men as sinners, but some of them,
namely, the Elect, are not left; hence sin is not the cause of rejection,
unless by the intervention of the damnatory sentence of the judge, in which
it is decreed that sin shall be punished according to its demerit. Who does
not know that the sentence depends on the judge, not on the criminal, even
if the criminal has deserved that sentence by his own act, without which the
judge could neither conceive, nor pronounce, nor execute the sentence. Nor
does it follow "that God chooses some, and so they are chosen by Him, and
that He rejects others, and, therefore, they are rejected." For sin, as to
demerit, is common to the elect and the reprobate, according to the theory,
which simply requires that men as sinners should be made the object of
predestination, without any special distinction in the sin itself.
But you present, as a proof, that the foreseen neglect of grace is not the
cause of rejection, the statement that "infants," dying out of the covenant
of the gospel, have not neglected this grace, and yet are reprobate and
"rejected by God." I affirm that they rejected the grace of the gospel in
their parents, grand-parents, great-grand-parents, &c., by which act they
deserved to be abandoned by God. I should desire that some solid reason
might be presented to me why, since all his posterity have sinned, in Adam,
against the law, and, on that account, have merited punishment and
rejection, infants also, to whom, in their parents, the grace of the gospel
is offered, and by whom, in their parents, it is rejected, have not sinned
against the grace of the gospel. For the rule of the divine covenant is
perpetual, that children are comprehended and judged in their parents. The
fourth argument, which you draw from Romans 9, does not relate to the
present subject. For the apostle there treats of the decree, by which God
determined to justify and to save those, who should be heirs of
righteousness and salvation, not by works, but by faith in Christ; not of
the decree by which He determined to save these or those, and to condemn
others, or of that by which He determined to give faith to some, and to
withhold it from others. This might be most easily demonstrated from the
passage itself, and from the whole context, and I should do it, if time
would permit. But this being granted, yet not acknowledged, namely, that the
apostle excludes works as the basis of the decree, of which he here treats,
yet that, which you intend to prove, will not follow. For Augustine
interprets it of works, which were peculiar to each of them (Esau and
Jacob), not common to both, such as original sin, in which they were both
conceived, when God spoke to Rebecca (12th verse). This interpretation of
Augustine is proved to be true from the fact that the apostle regards Jacob,
as having done no good, and Esau, no evil, when it was said to their mother
Rebecca, "the elder shall serve the younger," as if it might be thought that
Esau, by evil deeds, had merited that he should be the servant of his
younger brother, who, by his good deeds, had acquired for himself that
prerogative. Therefore, it does not exclude all respect of sin—sins, to
which they were both equally subject. That "will" of God, in which "Paul
acquiesces," is not that, by which He has purposed to adjudge any one, not a
sinner, to eternal death, but by which, of those who are equally sinners, to
one He shows mercy, but another He hardens; which words indeed mark the
pre-existence of sin. For mercy can be shown to no one, who is not
miserable; and no one is miserable, who is not a sinner. Hardening also has
sin as its cause, that is, contumacious perseverance in sin.
But from your last argument, you deduce nothing against those, who make sin
a requisite condition in the object of Predestination; for they acknowledge
that "it is of the mere will of God that this one is elected, and that one
rejected." The passage also which you cite from the author of the book "De
vocatione gentium," also places sin as a condition, prerequisite to
Predestination. For he is not "delivered" who has not been, first, made
miserable and the captive of sin.
The second act of reprobation, you make to be "ordination to punishment,"
which you distinguish into "absolute and relative." There might be also a
place for the same distinction, in the contrary act of election. For
absolute election is a reception into favour; relative election is that, by
which one person, and not another, is received into favour. You do rightly
in making the will of God the cause of absolute ordination, yet not to the
exclusion of sin. For it is very true that, in the Deity, there is the same
cause of willing and doing that which He has decreed. Sin also has the same
relation to ordination as to damnation. It has the relation of meritorious
cause to damnation, hence it has also the relation of meritorious cause to,
ordination. There is likewise no probable relation, to which a contrary can
not be conceived. Therefore, it can not be absolutely denied that "sin is
the cause of the decree of damnation." For though it may not be the
immediate, proximate or principal cause, yet it is the meritorious cause,
without which God can not justly ordain any one to punishment. But I should
desire the proof that "sin does not precede, in the relation of order, in
the divine prescience, that former act" of preterition and rejection. There
is, indeed, in my judgment, no passage of Scripture, which contains that
idea; I wish that one may be adduced. "Relative ordination is that by which
this person, and not that, is ordained to punishment, and on the same
condition." God has indeed the power of punishing and of remitting sin,
according to His will, nor is He responsible to any one, unless so far as He
has bound Himself by His own promises. In this, also, "the liberty of the
divine goodness is exhibited," but not in this only. For the same thing is
declared in creation itself, and in the dispensation of natural blessings,
in this, that He determined that one part of Nothing should be heaven,
another the earth, a third the air, &c. Indeed He has in creation
demonstrated "the same liberty in the bestowment of supernatural blessings."
For He has honoured some of His creatures with supernatural gifts, as angels
and men, and others, indeed all others, He has made without supernatural
gifts. He has likewise demonstrated the same freedom, not only in the
creation, but in the government and care of His rational creatures, since He
has made a communication of supernatural felicity, according to the fixed
law and pleasure of His own will. From which angels and men could understand
that God was free to communicate it to them according to His own will. This
is declared by the arbitrary prescription of its condition. I make this
remark that no one may think, that the act, which we now discuss, was the
first act by which God evinced the freedom of His will.
Your words—"and indeed if God should destroy and damn all those who are
rejected by Him, yet He would not be unjust," I can not approve, and you
will not, if you compare your previous statements with them. For you said
that ordination to punishment is subsequent to sin in the order of nature,
and, here, you do not place sin between rejection, which is the first act of
reprobation, and damnation, which is the second; while damnation does not
follow rejection immediately, but it follows sin. Those words; so to speak,
also contain a manifest falsity. First, because "the judge of all the earth
can not do right, if He should slay the righteous with the wicked" (Gen.
xviii. 25); and sin is the single and only meritorious cause of damnation.
"Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book" (Exod.
xxxii. 33). "The soul that sinneth it shall die" (Ezek. xviii. 4). Secondly,
because that rejection is the cause into which sin can be resolved, and,
therefore, the cause of sin, by the mode of removal, or non-bestowment of
that aid, without which sin can not be avoided. No small error is committed
here, in the fact that, when you do not suppose sin to be previous to
rejection and divine preterition, you yet make ordination to punishment
subsequent to rejection, without any explanation of the coherence of both
those acts. If you attempt this, you will fall into no less a fault; for you
will make God, on account of that rejection, the author of sin, as can be
shown by irrefutable arguments. The illustrations, which you propose, are
not adapted to your design, and fail through want of analogy. For it is one
thing to kill a beast, by which deed it ceases to exist and is not rendered
miserable, or to exclude from your house one whom you do not please to
admit, and a very different thing to condemn a man to eternal punishment,
which is far more severe than to annihilate the same person. "The cause of
this relative reprobation is the mere will of God without any consideration
of sin," namely, that which may have any effect in making a distinction
between different persons, but not in giving the power to ordain certain
persons to punishment, which power indeed exists in God as Lord and Judge,
but can not really be exercised except towards a sinner who deserves
punishment from the equity of divine justice. That which you quote from
Augustine and Gregory agrees with this distinction. For both make sin the
meritorious cause of reprobation, and consider sin and sinners as altogether
prerequisite to predestination; but attribute the act of separation to the
mere will of God.
In this "second act of reprobation," you make two "steps, just rejection,
and, damnation on account of sin." It is apparent, from this, that you
distinguish between that rejection which you made the first step of
reprobation, and this latter rejection. Yet you do not state the distinction
between those two rejections, which, however, ought to have been done, to
avoid confusion. Yet it may be right to conjecture, since you make the
former prior to sin, that you would make the latter consequent upon sin, and
existing on account of the desert of sin. You make the divine rejection
two-fold, but do not explain whether you mean, here, the latter, which you
consider the first step in the second act of reprobation, or divine
rejection in general. It is not the former, in my judgment, for that, as it
pertains to the second act of reprobation, is on account of sin; and this is
considered by you to be prior to sin. Perhaps it is the same with the
rejection, which is the first act of reprobation. If so, you can not in the
passages now referred to, escape the charge of confused discussion.
Let us see how you explain that two-fold rejection. You say that the former
is "the denial of aid, confirmation, and assisting grace, by which the first
is rendered efficacious for the resistance of temptations, and for
perseverance in goodness," and you style it "rejection of trial or test" and
affirm that it occurs in the case of those "who have not yet forsaken God,"
illustrating it from the example of the first man, Adam. But I inquire of
you, whether you consider that aid, confirmation, and assisting grace so
necessary for perseverance in goodness, that, without it, a man could not
resist temptation? If you reply affirmatively, consider how you can excuse,
from the responsibility of sin, the Deity, who has denied to man, apart from
any fault in him, the gifts and aids necessary to perseverance in goodness.
If negatively, then indeed, tell me by what right you call this a rejection
by God. Can he be said to be rejected by God, who is adorned and endued with
grace, rendering him acceptable, provided with all gifts and aids necessary
to perseverance in goodness, and even fortified by the help of the Holy
Spirit to resist temptation? If you speak in accordance with Scriptural
usage you can not call it rejection. You will say that it is not called, in
an absolute sense, rejection, but in a certain respect, -- that is, so far
that God affords to him, on whom He has bestowed all those things—not
efficacious aid, not actual confirmation in goodness, not that assisting
grace, without which the former graces are inefficacious. This is apparent,
you say, from the event, since, if he had obtained also those helps, he
would have been steadfast in goodness, he would not have fallen. This you
express in quoting from Augustine: -- "God rejected man, not as to ability,
but as to will." If he had possessed the latter, he would have maintained
his integrity.
Here we enter on a discussion of the utmost difficulty, and scarcely
explicable, at least by myself, as yet but a tyro, and not sufficiently
acquainted with those heights of Sacred Theology. Yet I will venture to
present some thoughts, trusting to the grace of Him, who gives wisdom to
babes, and sight to the blind. You will assist me in part, that, by our
mutual conference, the light may shine with greater brightness. For I have
undertaken to write not against you, but to you, for the sake both of
learning and of teaching.
I see here two things which will need explanation from me.
First, in reference to sufficient and efficacious grace. Secondly, in
reference to the administration and dispensation of both, and the causes of
that dispensation.
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EXAMINATION OF THE ANSWER OF PERKINS TO CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST THE ADVOCATES OF UNCONDITIONAL PREDESTINATION
We have, thus far, examined your doctrine of Predestination. If now it may
seem proper to you to correct it according to our observations, it will,
without doubt, be free from the liability to be called "Manichean," "Stoic,"
"Epicurean," or even "Pelagian"; though, as set forth by you, it is free
from the imputation of the last error. It can not be with equal ease
acquitted of the former, to him, who shall accurately compare not only your
opinion, but the logical consectaries of your opinion, with the dogmas of
the Manichees, and the Stoics. Some would deduce Epicureism also from the
same opinion, but only by means of a series of conclusions. I wish that you
had with sufficient perspicuity vindicated your doctrine from those
objections. You, indeed, attempt to do this in answering the various
allegations, usually made against the doctrine, set forth by you. We will
consider these, with your answers in order.
_________________________________________________________________
ALLEGATION 1
"IT IS TAUGHT BY US THAT CERTAIN MEN, AND FEW IN NUMBER, ARE ELECTED."
It is true that your theory, manifestly includes the very doctrine which is
stated in that allegation. Therefore, in that accusation, no sentiment
contrary to your opinion and doctrine is attributed to you. It is also true,
that the allegation contains no offense. For the Scripture in plain terms
declares that "Many are called, but few are chosen" (Matt. xxii. 14).
"Fear not, little flock" (Luke xii. 32). In your reply, you show most
clearly that nothing false is charged upon your theory, in that allegation.
I do not, indeed, think that there is any one who can object, on this
account, to that theory. For even all heretics, with whom we have become
acquainted, think that the elect are few; many of them, and, I would dare to
say, all of them, believe that "the few are known to God, and so definitely,
that the number can be neither increased nor diminished, and they, who are
numbered, can not be varied." But they offer another explanation of the term
election, contrary to, or at least different from your idea. You ought,
then, to have presented this allegation, not in such terms, that it could be
made against you only by a foolish opponent—but as it would be stated by
those who are opposed to your view. For they do not object to your theory,
because you say that "certain persons, and few in number, are elected by
God," but because you consider that "God, by a naked and absolute decree,
without any reference to sin or unbelief, elected certain men, and that they
were few; and that, by the same decree, He rejected the residue of the
multitude of men, to whom He did not give Christ, and to whom He did not
design that the death of Christ should be of advantage." But something shall
be said of the allegation in that form, under the other allegations referred
to by you.
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ALLEGATION 2
"WE TEACH THAT GOD ORDAINED MEN TO HELL-FIRE, AND THAT HE CREATED THEM, THAT
HE MIGHT DESTROY THEM."
In that allegation, the word "men" should have been limited and restricted
to certain men, namely, to those about to perish. For no one will impute to
you such an opinion in reference to all men, since all know that you except
and exclude the elect from that number. You ought then, to have set forth
that allegation thus; -- "We teach that God ordained some men, as men,
without any consideration of sin, to hell-fire, and created them, that He
might destroy them." This is, indeed, a serious allegation, and contains a
great slander, if it is falsely charged upon you. If it is a true charge,
you ought, by all means, to endeavour to free and relieve yourself of it, by
a change of sentiment. I admit that you, and they, who agree with you in
opinion, are not accustomed to speak in this way. But it is to be considered
whether or not you assert what is equivalent to this, and if that shall be
proved, you are held convicted of the charge. I will now, for the time, take
the place of those who accuse you, yet being by no means myself an accuser;
and do you see to it, whether I plead their cause well, and convict you of
that charge.
He, who makes hell-fire the punishment of sin, who ordains that the first
man, and in him all men, shall sin, who so, by his providence, governs that
first man that he shall of necessity, sin, and shall not be able, in fact,
to avoid sin, in consequence of which he, and all in him, commit sin, who,
finally, certainly and irrevocably decrees in Himself to leave in Adam (i.e.
in depravity) most of these, who shall sin in Adam, and to punish sin in
them by hell-fire, is said, most deservedly, to have ordained to hell-fire,
by an absolute decree, some, and indeed most men, as men, apart from any
consideration of sin, or any demerit on their part. There is a connection
between their sin and hell-fire, from the position of that law which is
sanctioned by penalty, and by the decree of God in reference to withholding
the pardon of their sin. Sin is also, of necessity, connected with the
decree of God, and, in truth, it depends on it, so that man could not but
sin, otherwise there would be no place for the decree. From which it
follows, that God has absolutely ordained very many to hell-fires since He
ordained men to the commission of sins and absolutely decreed to punish sin
in many.
But I will prove, that you and those who agree with you, hold each of these
opinions. First, you say, and truly, that hell-fire is the punishment
ordained for sin and the transgression of the law. Secondly, you say that
God ordained the first man, and in him, all men should sin; you not only say
this, but you also adduce the reason of that decree and divine ordination,
that God, in that way, might declare His righteousness and mercy, in which
His glory chiefly consists, for which there could be no place except through
sin and by occasion at it. Thirdly, you add that God, by His providence, so
arranged the primeval state of man that, though, as far as his own liberty
was concerned, he might be able to stand and not fall, yet he should, in
fact, fall and commit sin. These two things are mutually connected; for that
God might attain the object of His own act of ordination, it was necessary
that He should so arrange the whole matter that the object should be
attained. But you do not make prescience of sin the foundation of that
administration; wherefore it is necessary that you should consider, as
presiding over it., the omnipotence of God, to resist which, the man would
have neither the power nor the will. This being so considered, you make a
necessity of committing sin. To all these things you add, moreover, the
irrevocable decree of God, by which he determined to punish, without mercy
and of mere justice, sin committed according to that decree. From this, I
think that it is most clearly evident, that when that allegation is made
against you, nothing is charged upon you which is foreign to your sentiment.
I now consider the other part of the allegation, in which it is asserted
that, according to your doctrine, "God created men that He might destroy
them." The truth of this allegation is evident from this, that you say that
God created men for this purpose, that He might declare, in these, His
mercy, and in those, His justice, and indeed His punitive justice—which is
the opposite of mercy—and apart from foresight. From which it follows, as
punitive justice destroys men, that God created some men that He might
destroy them. For punitive justice and the destruction of man are connected,
and the former can not be declared except by the latter. It is evident then
that nothing, foreign to your theory is charged against you in the whole of
that allegation.
Indeed I think that you wished to show favour to your own sentiment, when
you made the charge less than it deserved. For it is much worse that God
should have ordained men to sin, and should have created them that they
might sin, than to have ordained them to hell-fire, and to have created them
that He might destroy them. For if sin is a worse evil than damnation, as it
is, evidently, since the former is opposed to divine good, and the latter to
human good, then truly is it greater to ordain one to sin than to ordain to
hell, to create a man that he might sin, than that he might perish. If,
however, accuracy of statement is to be sought, it should be affirmed that,
if a man is ordained to commit sin, then he can not sin. For sin is a
voluntary act, and the decree of God in reference to sin introduces a
necessity of sinning. Further, if a man is created that he may be condemned,
then he can not be condemned by God. For condemnation is the act of a just
judge. But a just judge does not condemn one unless he is wicked by his own
fault, apart from necessity; and he is not wicked, apart from necessity, and
of his own fault, who is created that he may sin, and thus perish.
Let us now examine your answer to this second allegation. You think that you
blunt and confute it by a distinction in the second act of reprobation, but
it is not so. For you freely admit that God, by His absolute purpose,
deserted the creature, from which desertion, sin, according to your opinion,
necessarily exists; otherwise you can not connect punitive justice with
desertion, except in view of a condition; namely, the contingency that man
should sin after that desertion. Therefore you admit what is imputed, in
that allegation, to your theory, you do not confute the charge. You also
blend, in a confused way, the permission of the fall, and the permission, by
which God allows one to finally fail of blessedness. For these are not the
same, or from the same cause. For all have fallen by the divine permission,
but many do not finally perish in their fallen condition; and permission of
the fall depends on the divine providence, which is general over the whole
human race; and the final permission to remain in that fallen condition
depends on reprobation, and only relates to some persons. Your assertion,
also, that "sin is subsequent to the desertion and permission of God," is to
be understood as referring to that permission, by which He permits man to
fall into sin, which pertains to providence, not to that permission by which
He suffers some to finally fail of blessedness, which pertains to
reprobation. For sin is the cause of this latter permission, that is, the
meritorious cause, as has now been frequently stated.
We, now, examine the testimonies which you present. In the remark of
Lombardus, the phrase "future demerits" is to be understood to refer to what
one has different from another. But common demerits, though they may not be
the moving cause, yet they are the meritorious cause, and a condition
requisite in the object of reprobation. So also the assertion of Jerome is
to be referred to the doing good or evil, by which the brothers were
distinguished from each other, and not to sin, in which they were both
conceived. This is apparent from what he says: -- "and their election and
rejection displayed not the desert of each, but the will of him who elected
and rejected. In the remark of Anselm that which I claim is clearly
apparent. For he says, that "God does justly, if He rejects sinners." The
word "miserable," used in another remark of the same father, indicates the
same thing. With these agree the remarks of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine.
For the question is not whether the will of God is the cause of election and
reprobation, but whether it has sin as an antecedent, as the meritorious
cause of reprobation, and a requisite condition in the object both of
election and of reprobation, which is most true, according to the views
always held by Augustine. The word "conversion," used by Thomas Aquinas, and
the word "drawing," used by Augustine, make sin the antecedent to the act of
the will which "converts" and "draws." We would examine the testimonies of
other School-men, if their authority was of much weight with us. But I make
this remark, that there is no one of those testimonies, which excludes the
sin of Adam—and that of men in common with him—from the decree of
Predestination, and some of them, indeed, clearly the same in that decree.
For when the words "grace" and "mercy" are used, there is a tacit reference
to sin.
That "the latter act"—that of destruction—takes place "in reference to sin,"
is certain, but it is in reference to sin, not by any previous decree
ordained to take place, but ordained to be punished in some by justice, and
to be remitted in others by grace, when it has been committed. This
explanation, however, does not show that "the allegation is a slander,"
unless you, at the same time, show that sin did not necessarily exist from
that decree of reprobation or from some other.
Your second answer consists only in words. For an act, if it is unjust, is
not excused by its end or object. It is unjust to destroy a man apart from
sin, and it remains unjust, even if any one may say that it is done "for the
declaration of judgment," or "for declaring judgment"; and that, which is
added, seems absurd—that "this is done for declaring judgment in just
destruction," as it can not be just unless it is inflicted on account of
sin. The statement, that "God pleases to punish, with due destruction, a
man, not as he is a man, but as he is a sinner," has the force of a sound
answer, on the condition that the man has sinned freely, not of necessity.
For the necessity and inevitability of sinning excuses from sin, and frees
from punishment, him who commits that act. I say act, and not sin, because
an act, which one necessarily and inevitably commits, can not be called sin.
The apparent distinction, by which a man is said to sin freely in respect to
himself, but necessarily in relation to the divine decree, has no effect in
warding off this blow; since it can not be that one should do freely that,
which he does necessarily, or that one act can be performed necessarily,
that is, can not but be performed, and yet contingently, that is, can
possibly not be performed. For this is at variance with the first principles
of universal truth, in reference to whatever it is proper to make an
affirmation or negation. I know that some defend this distinction by
referring to the example of God Himself, of whom they assert that He is both
freely and necessarily good. But this assertion is incorrect. So false,
indeed, is it that God is freely good, that it is not much removed from
blasphemy. God is, what He is, necessarily, and if He is freely good, He can
be not good, and who has ever said that those things which are in Him, of
nature and essence, are in Him freely? The assertion of Cameracensis is
indeed partly blasphemous, partly true. It is blasphemous to say that "God
can, without loss or detriment to His justice, punish and afflict eternally
His own innocent creature." It is true that "God can annihilate one of His
creatures apart from sin." But punishment and annihilation are very
different. The latter is to deprive of that, which had been graciously
bestowed, the former is to render one miserable, and indeed infinitely
miserable, and apart from any demerit on account of sin. Misery is far worse
than annihilation, as Christ says—"It had been good for that man if he had
not been born" (Matt. xxvi. 24). That it is contrary to the divine justice
to punish one, who is not a sinner, appears from very many declarations of
Scripture. "That be far from thee to do after this manner, to slay the
righteous with the wicked" (Gen. xviii. 25). "Whosoever hath sinned against
me, him will I blot out of my book" (Exod. xxxii. 33) "Seeing it is a
righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you,
and to you, who are troubled, rest with us" (2 Thess. i. 6, 7). "Fo r Go d i
s n ot u nri ght eous to fo rget yo ur w ork an d la bor of lov e," et c.,
(Heb. vi. 10).
The saying of Wisdom (chapter 12), quoted by Cameracensis, likewise teaches
the contrary of what he attempts to prove from it. For it treats of the
perdition of unrighteous nations, and, in plain words, declares in the 15th
verse—
"For so much, then, as thou art righteous thyself, thou orderest all things
righteously, thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemn him that
hath not deserved to be punished." I grant, indeed, that the error of
Cameracensis was caused by the fault of the old version. But you can not be
excused on the account of this. For you ought to omit the testimony of an
author who is led into an error by the fault of a version, since you are
acquainted with it from the Greek text itself, and from translations better
than that ancient one. It is true that "God is not bound by created laws,"
for He is a law unto Himself, He is justice itself. That law, also,
according to which no one is permitted to inflict punishment upon the
undeserving was not created, or made by men, and it has place not among men
only. It is an eternal law, and immovable in the divine justice to which God
is bound in the immutability of His nature, and righteousness. It is not
universally true, that "whatever is right, is right because God so wills
it," as there are many things which God wills, because they are right. It is
right that God alone should be acknowledged by the creature to be the true
God. We affirm that God wills this because it is right, not that it is right
because God wills it. The act of simple obedience is right, not because God
wills that it should be performed by the creature, but because it is such in
itself, and God can not but require it of the creature, though it may belong
to free-will to prescribe in what matter He wills that obedience should be
rendered to Him. As far as we are concerned, also, it is truly our duty in
reference to laws, divinely enacted for us, not so much to see whether that
which they command is just in itself, but simply to obey them, because God
prescribes and commands it. Yet this duty is founded on the fact that God
can not prescribe that which is unjust, because that He is essential
justice, and wisdom, and omnipotence.
I had designed to omit a more extended examination of the remarks, quoted by
you, from the Scholastic Theologians; but I will say a few words. "The four
signs of Francis Maro, necessary for understanding the process of
predestination and reprobation" of which he speaks, are of no value, are
notoriously false, and are confused in their arrangement. In the sentence
from D. Baunes, the "permission by which all nature was permitted to fall in
Adam" is absurdly ascribed to reprobation, as that permission, and the fall
which followed it, extended to the whole human race, without distinction of
the elect and the reprobate. Those "four things," which, Ferrariensis says,
"are found in the reprobate," are not in him, as reprobate, and in respect
to the decree of reprobation, but the latter two, only; for "the permission
of the fall and sin," to use his own words, are found in the elect, and
pertain to the more general decree of providence, by which God left man to
the freedom of his own will, as has been before and frequently said.
Therefore, arguments, other than these, should have been presented by you,
for the refutation of that charge. I very much wish that you would cite
Scripture for the confirmation of your sentiments and the overthrow of those
allegations. The writings of the School-men, ought not to have weight and
authority, especially among us; for our Doctors of Theology with one voice
affirm of them, "that they have changed true Theology into Philosophy, and
the art of wrangling, and that they endeavour to establish their opinions,
by the authority, not so much of the Sacred Scriptures, as of Aristotle."
_________________________________________________________________
ALLEGATION 3
"THE PREDESTINATION OF THE STOICS, AND THE FATALISM OF THE STOICS, HAS BEEN
INTRODUCED BY US: BECAUSE—THEY SAY WE ASSERT THAT ALL THINGS ARE DONE OF THE
NECESSARY AND EFFICIENT DECREE OF GOD; ALSO, THAT THE FALL OF ADAM WAS
ACCORDING TO OUR OPINION—AS THEY ALLEGE—DECREED AND WILLED BY GOD."
This is, indeed, a heavy charge, and yet it is set forth in a milder form by
you, than by those who make it. You ought to add those things which pertain
essentially to this allegation, and are charged by them upon you and your
doctrine. Such are these—"It would follow from this, ‘that God is the Author
of sin; that God really sins; that God alone sins; and that sin is not
sin,"’ which Bellarmine charges against the sentiment of certain of our
doctors—the sentiment also, which you seem to defend. But the reason that
they present all those things, as opposed to your doctrine, is this: -- You
say that all things happen by the efficacious will of God, which can not be
resisted, and that events do not occur, because God, by an absolute decree,
has determined that they should not occur. From this, it follows, also, that
sinful acts are performed by the will of God, which can not be resisted, and
that righteous acts are omitted, because God has simply and absolutely
decreed that they shall not be performed; and therefore, that God is the
Author of sin, and the preventer of righteousness and of good acts. From
which it is inferred that God, truly and properly speaking, sins; and, since
the necessity, from which men perform such acts, acquits them from sin, it
follows that God alone sins, just as He alone is responsible, who strikes a
blow by the hand of another person, of which he has laid hold. But since God
can not sin, it follows that sin is not sin. Hence, it seems to me that no
injustice is done to your doctrine by that allegation.
But let us see how you dispose of it. Neglecting the general charge, you
begin your discussion with that part which refers to the fall of Adam. You
admit that this occurred "not only according to the prescience of God, but
also by His will and decree; yet," as you explain it—"by His will, not
approving or effecting it, yet not prohibiting, but permitting it." This
distinction, properly used, indeed, solves the difficulty. If it is your
opinion and the opinion of others, that God did not approve, and did not
effect the fall; did not incite, and did not impel Adam to fall; did not lay
upon him any necessity of sinning, either by acting or not acting, but only
willed not to prevent, but to permit the fall of Adam; then, I acknowledge
that all those things are unjustly alleged against your sentiment. You,
indeed, make this statement verbally, while in fact you so explain
permission or non-prevention, that it amounts to the "efficient decree of
God." This I will prove. You say, "What God does not prevent, occurs,
because God does not prevent it, the reason of the non-existence of a fact,
or event, is that God does not will that it should exist." I conclude,
therefore, that the divine permission or non-prevention, and the event are
mutually, and indeed immediately connected, as cause and effect. Thus, also,
non-prevention has the relation of energetic performance. Therefore,
likewise, the volition of God, and the non-existence or event of a thing are
mutually connected as cause and effect, and hence, a volition that a thing
shall not be done, has the relation of energetic prevention. This I show,
more extendedly, in this manner.
Sin is two-fold, of Commission and Omission—of Commission, when that is
performed which has been forbidden—of Omission, when that is not performed
which has been commanded. There is, in your opinion, a concurrence in that
act which can not be committed by a man without sin, and indeed such a
concurrence that God is the first cause of the act, and man is the second,
the former moving man, the latter moved by God, and, indeed, moving, in such
sense, that man, of necessity, follows that motion, and consequently of
necessity performs that act which involves transgression. Not to prevent sin
of omission is, in your opinion, not to give that grace without which sin
can not be omitted, and the contrary good can not be performed. But he, who,
in that manner, concurs, and denies such grace, is absolutely the chief and
efficient cause of sin, and indeed, the only cause, as the joint cause of
the act—man, since he can not resist the motion of the first cause, can not
sin in following that irresistible motion. But, if you can so explain your
sentiment and that of others, that it shall not, in reality, differ from it,
then I shall not object to it.
You will not escape by the distinction that "it is one thing to will a thing
per se, and another to will it as to the event," unless, by the "event" of a
thing, you understand that which results from the prolongation and the
existence of the thing itself, which is not your sentiment. For you say that
"God wills the event of sin," that is, "that sin should happen, but does not
will sin itself;" which distinction is absurd. For the essence of sin
consists in the event, for sin consists in action. God, also, wills sin
itself, in the mode in which He wills that sin should happen, and He wills
that sin should happen in the mode in which He wills sin itself. He does not
love sin per se. He wills that sin should happen for His own glory; He wills
also sin for His own glory. I speak this in the sense used by yourself.
Show, if you can, the difference, and I will acquiesce.
Your assertion, that "God wills not to prevent sin," is ambiguous, unless it
is explained. What! Has not God hindered sin, as far as was suitable, and
according to the mode in which it is right for Him to treat a rational
creature, namely, by legislation, threatening, promise, the bestowment of
sufficient grace, and even the promise of His assistance, if man would
consent to have recourse to it? This he could do, or we go infinitely
astray. But He did not hinder sin by any omnipotent or physical action,
because that would not have been inappropriate; He would have thus prevented
man from using that primeval liberty in which He had placed him; and, by
consequence, as we have elsewhere quoted from Tertullian, "He would have
rescinded His own arrangement."
It is rightly said, that God properly, and primarily, and, we may add,
immediately, willed His own permission. But it does not thence follow, that
God also willed the event of sin. For it is a non-sequitur—"God voluntarily
permits sin, therefore, He wills that sin should happen." The contrary is
true, -- "God voluntarily permits sin; therefore, He neither wills that sin
should happen, nor wills that it should not happen." For permission is an
act of the will when inoperative which inoperativeness of the will may here
be properly ascribed to the Deity, since He endowed man with free-will, that
He might test his free and voluntary obedience. He could not have done this,
if He had imposed an inseparable hindrance upon man. But the cause of the
occurrence of that which God permits is not the permission, although it
would not happen without that permission. He who performs the act is the
proper and immediate cause, with the concurrence of the Deity, which is
always prepared for him. But permission can not be resolved into a cause per
se, if we are to treat this subject accurately and truthfully, but only into
a cause sine qua non, or one which removes, or, rather, does not present a
hindrance, and indeed such a hindrance as I have referred to, which cannot
be resisted by the creature.
Your statement, "as no good thing can exist or be done, except by the agency
of the Deity, so no evil can be avoided, unless God hinders it," is true, if
rightly understood; that is, the agency of the Deity being that, by which He
may suitably effect what is good by means of a rational and free creature,
and the hindrance of God being that, by which He may suitably hinder a free
creature from that which is evil. But the limit both of doing and hindering
is such that it does not deprive man of freedom, but permits him, also,
freely and of his own will, according to the mode of will, to do good and to
abstain from evil. Otherwise good is not performed by man, and evil is not
avoided by him, but an act, only, is performed or avoided, by a necessity
either natural or supernatural. Those words, also, are susceptible of
amendment, if any one should wish to discuss these things with greater
accuracy. The statement might have been this:
"As no good is, or is done, except by the agency of God, so no evil is
avoided, except by the hindrance of God." For by the agency of God, good not
only can be but is done, and by His hindrance, evil not only can be, but is
hindered. But if you wish to retain that word "can," you ought to have
expressed your ideas in this way: "As nothing good can be, or can be done,
unless God wills to do it, or to give to another the power and the will to
do it, and to concur with him in doing it, so nothing evil can be avoided
unless God wills to give, and actually does give strength sufficient for the
avoidance of sin, and wills to call out that strength and to co-operate with
it." In this sense, "not even the least thing is done without the will of
God, namely, either willing that it should be done, or willing not to
prevent, but to permit, that it should be done." It is not true that
"providence is inactive" in permission, even explained in such a manner as
to coincide neither with that will of God, by which He wills that something
shall be done, nor with that by which He wills that something shall not be
done. If it coincides with either of these, there is no permission, and the
assertion of Augustine—"nothing is done except by the agency or permission
of God," is without force.
I now examine some arguments, which you present in favour of your view. The
first is deduced from several passages of Scripture. Let us see now what can
be proved from these passages. The passage in Acts ii. 23, teaches, not that
God willed that the Jews should slay Christ, but, that he was "delivered by
the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God" into the power of those
who wished to slay him. Nothing more can be inferred from Acts iv. 28. For
God predetermined to deliver His own Son into the hands of his enemies, that
He might suffer from them that which God had laid upon him, and which the
Jews, of their own wickedness and hatred against Christ, had determined to
inflict upon him. God, indeed, "determined before" that death should be
inflicted on Christ by them; but in what character did God consider them
when He "determined before" that this should be done by them? In that
character, surely, which they had at the time when they inflicted death upon
Christ, that is, in the character of sworn enemies of Christ, of obstinate
enemies and contemners of God and the truth; who could be led to repentance
by no admonitions, prayers, threats or miracles; who wished to inflict every
evil on Christ, if they could only obtain the power over him, which they had
often sought in vain.
It is evident, then, that there was here no other action of God in this case
than that He delivered His own Son into their hands, and permitted them to
do their pleasure in reference to him, yet determining the limit to which He
pleased that they should go, regulating and governing their wickedness, in
such a manner, yet very gently, that they should inflict on him only that
which God had willed that His own Son should suffer, and nothing more. This
is clearly seen in the very manner of his punishment, in preventing the
breaking of his legs, in the piercing of his side, in the inscription of the
title, and the like. But there appears here no action of God by which they
were impelled or moved to will and to do what they willed and did; but He
used those who wished, of their own malice and envy, to put Christ to death,
in a mode, which, He knew, would conduce to His own glory and the salvation
of men.
But the reason that it cannot be said, with truth, that God and Christ, in
the delivery of Christ to the Jews, sinned, does not consist, only or
chiefly, in the fact that they were led to this delivery by various motives.
What if Judas had done the same thing with the design that Christ, by his
own death, should reconcile the world unto God, would his sin have been less
heinous? By no means. It was not lawful for him to do evil that good might
come. But the chief reason of the difference is that God had the right to
deliver His Son, and Christ, also, had the right to deliver his own soul to
death, and consequently, in doing this, they could not sin. But Judas had no
power in this case, and he, therefore, sinned. There is a distinction in
actions not only as to their end, but as to their principle and form. Saul
was not acquitted of sin, because he preserved the herds of the Amalekites
for sacrifice (1 Sam. xv. 9-22).
Again, what is implied by that inference? -- "therefore, we may also say
that, when Adam ate of the forbidden fruit, he did that which the hand and
counsel of God foreordained to be done?" This, indeed, never was the
language of the apostles and of the church, and never could be, in matters
having so much dissimilarity. For the relation of Adam and of those enemies
of Christ is not the same. The former, previous to eating the fruit, was
holy and righteous; the latter, before the death of Christ, were wicked,
unrighteous, unfriendly, and hostile to Christ. The latter, in all their
desires, sought for, and frequently and in many ways, attempted to put
Christ to death. Adam was disinclined to eat of the forbidden fruit, even
when he was enticed to it by his wife, who had already transgressed. The
death of Christ was necessary for the expiation of sins, and was, per se,
declarative of the glory of God; the fall of Adam was wholly unnecessary,
and, per se, violated the majesty and glory of God. He needed not the sin of
man for the illustration of His own glory. What, likewise, can be imagined
more absurd than that circular reasoning? "The death of Christ was
foreordained by God, that it might expiate the sin of Adam; the fall of Adam
was foreordained, that it might be expiated by the death of Christ." Where
is the beginning and where is the end of that ordination? Nevertheless God
ordained the fall of Adam, not that it should occur, but that, occurring, it
should serve for an illustration of His justice and mercy. The passage in 1
Peter iii. 17, is to be explained in a similar manner. "God wills that the
pious should suffer evils," for their chastening and trial. He wills that
they should suffer these evils from other men; but from men of what
character? From those, who of their own wickedness and the instigation of
Satan, already will to bring those evils upon them, which ill will God
already foresaw, at the time when He predetermined that those evils should
be inflicted upon the pious.
Therefore, they were moved, by no act of God, to will to inflict evils upon
the pious; they were moved, also, by no act to inflict evils, unless by an
act such as ought rather to move them from that volition, and to deter them
from that infliction; such as would, in fact, have moved and deterred them,
unless they had been deplorably wicked. The doctrine, life, and miracles of
Christ and the Apostles, drew upon them the odium and hatred of the world.
The fact that God is declared, in 2 Samuel xvi. 10, to have said unto
Shimei, "Curse David," also, if rightly explained, presents no difficulty.
Let Shimei, and David, and the act which may be called "the precept of
cursing," be considered. Shimei was already a hater of David, of most
slanderous tongue, and bitter mind, impious, and a contemner of God and the
divine law, which had commanded "Thou shalt not curse the rule of thy people
(Exod. xxii. 28)." David, by his own act against God and his neighbour, had
rendered himself worthy of that disgrace, and altogether needed to be
chastened and tried by it; he was, moreover, endued with the gift of
patience to endure that contumely with equanimity. The act of God was the
ejection and expulsion of David from the royal city and from the kingdom. In
consequence of this occurred the flight of David, the fact that the rumor of
that flight came to the ears of Shimei, and the arrangement that David and
Shimei should meet together. Thus, by the act of God, David, fleeing and
driven before his son, was presented to Shimei "a man of the family of the
house of Saul," and an enemy of David, ready to curse him. Add, if you
please, the hardening of the mind of Shimei, lest he should fear to curse
David, on account of the attendants of David, that so he might, in some way,
satisfy his own mind and his inveterate hatred against David. Therefore,
that opportunity, by which David, in his flight, was presented to Shimei,
and the hardening of the mind of Shimei, divinely produced, and also the
direction of that cursing tongue, were acts pertaining to that precept of
God, apart from which acts, nothing in that precept can be presented, which
would not impinge on the justice of God, and make God the author of sin.
A comparison of all these things will show that Shimei, not so much as God,
was the author of that malediction. Shimei was alone the author of the
volition, yet it is rather to be attributed to God, as He effected that
which He willed, not by moving Shimei to the malediction, but by procuring
for Shimei the opportunity to curse David, and the confidence to use that
opportunity. From this, it appears, most plainly, that God is without blame,
and Shimei is involved in guilt.
The passages—Jer. xxxiv. 22, and1 Sam. iii. 37 -- will be explained
similarly, and will present no difficulty. From an examination of these, it
will appear that they have no reference to the fall of Adam, -- which was
the beginning of sin; and all other evils have place, sin having now entered
into the world, and men having become depraved by sin.
We proceed to your second argument, that "God voluntarily permits sin" is
certain, and it is equally certain that "the will to permit is the will not
to prevent." But pause here. The will to permit or not to prevent, is not
the same with "the will not to bestow grace." For He permits that person to
fall, to whom he has given grace sufficient and necessary to enable him to
stand. Let us proceed. You say that "He, who does not will to prevent sin,
which he foreknows will happen, by confirming grace when he can do it, in
fact wills that the same should happen." But I deny that the volition of sin
can be deduced from the nolition of preventing or hindering. For there are
three things distinct from each other, no one of which includes another—"to
will that sin should not be committed," that is, to will its prevention; "to
will that it should occur or be committed," that is, to will its commission;
and "to will to prevent or not to prevent it," that is, to will its
permission or non-prevention. The former two are affirmative acts, the last
one a negative act. But an affirmative act can not be deduced from a
negative for there is more in an affirmative than in a negative act, and
there can not be more in a conclusion than in the premises.
Further, I say that your argument, on this point, is fallacious. For God
wills to permit sin in one respect, and to hinder it in another—to hinder it
so far as would be appropriate, which hindrance is not followed of
certainty, by the omission of sin, and to not to hinder it, in another mode,
which hindrance would, indeed, be followed by the omission of sin, yet
without any virtue or praiseworthiness in him who omits it, as he can not do
otherwise than omit it on account of that hindrance. But I may be allowed to
argue, in opposition to such a view, that He, who hates sin and by the
enactment of law and the bestowment of sufficient grace wishes to hinder,
wills, not that sin should happen, but that sin should not happen, which is
an affirmative act of the will. You will say that this is a correct
conclusion, the will being understood as that "of approval." I answer that
God can not, by any mode of volition, will things which are contradictory.
But "to happen" and "not to happen" are contradictory. Therefore, it can not
be that God, by one mode of volition should will that an event should
happen, and, by another mode of volition, should will that it should not
happen. It may indeed be true that God, in His will "of good pleasure" as
they style it, purposes to permit that which, in His will "of approval" or
"that which is revealed", He wills should not be done. Thus your conclusion
is faulty, and the remarks of Calvin and Beza, let it be said with due
respect to so eminent men, are hardly consistent with the truth. But
examine, I pray you, your subjoined statements, and you will see and
acknowledge that you put them on paper, when you did not observe what you
said. You say that "Whatever God does not hinder, He does not hinder it,
either because He wills it to be done, or because He is altogether unwilling
that it should be done, or because He does not will that it should be done."
What is the difference between the latter two reasons? "To be unwilling that
any thing should be done" is "not to will that any thing should be done;"
the modifying word "altogether" is of no effect, since, in things opposed to
each other, the negative can not receive any increase, as, for instance, in
the phrase "not a man;" a wolf is as much "not a man" as is the earth, the
air, the sky; but perhaps by the expression—"He is altogether unwilling that
it should be done" you mean "He wills that it should not be done," or
"because His will does not act." If the first be true, my view is correct.
But the second can not be true, for it is absurd to say "God does not will
to prevent any thing because He wills that it should not be done." You ought
not, in that enumeration of reasons, to have introduced such a statement;
for "not to will to prevent," and "to will that a thing should not be done"
are opposites and from this it is certain that one can not be the cause of
the other. In the investigation and distribution of causes, it is neither
usual nor proper to introduce that which is the opposite of an effect. But
let that pass.
You will say then, "that ‘not to hinder’ must be on account of one of those
three causes." I grant it. "But it is not ‘because His will does not act,’
which is Epicureanism, nor ‘because He does not will that it should be
done,’ therefore, it is, ‘because He wills that it should be done.’" I deny
the antecedent. For this is the reason that God does not hinder an event,
because He neither wills that it should occur, nor wills that it should not
occur, as will be more clearly evident, if you consider the matter in this
light. That, which God wills to be done, He efficaciously brings to pass.
That, which He wills not to be done, he efficaciously hinders. That, which
he neither wills to be done, nor wills not to be done, He leaves to the
creature. How is it possible that the human mind should conceive that God
does not prevent, that is, permits any thing, because He wills that it
should be done. Indeed the expression "He wills that it should be done" has
too much comprehensiveness to admit that permission or non-hindrance should
be deduced or concluded from it.
Your objection to this argument, namely, that, from it the conclusion is
drawn that "such things are done, either through the ignorance or through
the negligence of the Deity, is absurd; you can not defend it, even against
yourself. For you have already made a distinction between "not to will" and
"not to care that a thing should be done." Therefore, you can not deduce one
from the other. How, also, can it be asserted that a thing is done without
the knowledge of God, which is done by the permission of God, and by His
will, the agent of that permission. But, it will hereafter appear, when we
shall have explained, more largely, in reference to that permission, that
what God permits, He does not permit without knowledge or care. It is,
however, to be understood that permission is an affirmative volition, and
not one that is merely negative. For God wills His own permission by an
affirmative act. But in reference to the thing, which He permits, the act of
His will is a negative act.
Far be it from any one to think that any decree of God is contrary to
justice or equity. If God has decreed any thing, it is certain that He has
justly decreed it. But it is to be considered whether, and how God has
decreed it. It is not possible that any of His decrees should be at variance
with His justice, as revealed to us in the Scriptures; it is, then, to be
understood that it is not sufficient, in order to remove a charge from a
decree which we ascribe to God, to add
"He has decreed it but justly;" for the addition of that phrase does not
make the decree just, but it must be shown that the decree, which we
attribute to God, really belongs to Him, and there will, then, be no
question concerning its justice. Your third argument is weak. For, from the
event of any thing, it can not be concluded that God willed that it should
happen, but that He willed not to prevent it; and this volition, not to
prevent, is also an act of the providence of God, which is present to all
things and to each, and presides over them, either by effecting them, or by
permitting them; yet administering and ordaining all things for just and
legitimate ends, and in such a way as to "regard, not only the events of
things, but also their commencements, and the principles of things and
actions." It is known, indeed, that Satan and the wicked can not only not
perfect any thing, but can not even begin it, except by the permission of
the Deity. That which you add, "by His will," I do not concede, until you
shall prove it by a greater weight of arguments than you have yet adduced.
You say truly—"It is impious to affirm that any thing exists or is done,
unless the holy and just God has decreed it from eternity, and indeed willed
either to do or to permit it." For the decree of God is two-fold,
efficacious and permissive. Neither can take the place of, or intrude upon
the other. Let us consider also your fourth argument—"The decision of the
ancient church." Augustine, manifestly makes a distinction between
permission and efficiency. And although he says that "nothing is done unless
God wills it to be done" he yet explains himself when he says "either by
permitting it to be done, or by doing it Himself:" and thus, that which He
permits is not an immediate object of the will, but permission is the
immediate object, while that, which God permits, is the object of
permission. So, also, the statements of Tertullian, Jerome and others, are
to be explained, that they may not impinge on the Scriptures, which declares
absolutely "Thou art not a God which hath pleasure in wickedness" (Psalm v.
4.) Hence, if I may be permitted to speak freely, I shall affirm that I
should prefer that Augustine, Jerome, Catharinus and all others had
abstained from phrases of this kind, which are not contained in the
Scriptures, and which need lengthened explanation, that they may not be made
the occasion of heresy and blasphemy.
That second distinction, according to which God is said "to will that evil
may be, and yet not to will evil," has no force. For God hates evil, and
hates the existence of evil; and since evil exists in action, its being done
is its being, and its being is its nature. Through there may be a subtle
distinction between the essence and the existence of evil, it can not be
said that there is so much difference between them that God wills that sin
should exist, but does not will sin itself; For since God hates the essence
of evil, if I may so speak for the sake of form, He, therefore, forbids that
evil should be done, and the reason that He is unwilling that sin should
exist, is the fact that He hates sin itself. But He does not hate the
existence of evil, or evil itself, so much that He may not permit evil to be
done by a free agent, not because it is better that evil should be, than
that they should not be, but because it is better first, that He should
permit His rational and free creatures to act according to their own will
and freedom, in which consists the trial of their obedience, than that,
contrary to His own original arrangement, He should take away that freedom
from the creature, or even prevent its exercise; secondly, that He should
bring good out of evil, rather than not permit evil to be. But the idea that
God wills that evil should exist not as such, but as the means of good,
needs a more extended explanation, which by the will of God, we will
hereafter present.
The first objection to which you refer is of great weight. For the will is
said to be evil in view of an evil volition and that volition is said to be
evil, which is directed to an object to which it ought not to be directed.
But evil is an object to which it ought not to be directed. Therefore that
volition is evil, by which any one wills evil, and by which he wills that
evil should be done. For there is a verbal distinction, but a real agreement
between those ideas. Hence, also, "it belongs to an evil will to will that
evils should be done, whether that will delights in the evils, or wills to
use them for a good purpose." It is not right that any one should will that
evil should be done, that he may have an opportunity of using that evil to a
good end. The rule, which you cite is correct, -- "Evil is not to be done,"
or even willed "that good may come." The first wickedness exists in the will
or the volition of evil, the second in its perpetration.
Your answer does not remove the difficulty stated in this objection. Of what
importance are those "two principles?" Even if their correctness is
conceded, the objection is still valid. For, in reference to the first; --
As there is no evil in the nature of things, the will can not be directed to
evil, per se, and it pertains to universal will, and not only to that, but
to universal desire and appetite to tend to good, per se. The evil consists
in this, not that the will is directed to evil, but that it is directed
towards an undue good, or in reference to an undue mode and end. As to the
second; -- It is true that "there is no evil which has no good joined with
it." There is no supreme evil there is no evil except in that which is good.
It does not, however, follow that it is good that sin should happen. For sin
is so great an evil that it ought to be avoided, even if it have some good
united with it: The act of fornication has this good, it is the sexual
intercourse, natural to man and woman, yet it is to be avoided, because it
can not be committed without sin. But the good to which you seem to refer,
is not united to sin except incidentally, that is, by the intervention of
the Divine will, directing that evil to a good end.
The remark of Augustine, if understood strictly, can not be admitted, but,
with suitable explanation, it may be tolerated. It is not true that "it is
good that evils should exist." For God effects every good. Then it would
follow, according to the remark, that He effects the existence of evils.
This is at variance with another statement of Augustine, in which he
says—"God does some things, but permits other things to be done, as in the
case of sin." How can it be said, without a contradiction in terms, of
God—
"He causes that evils should exist, and permits evils to exist?" The reason,
subjoined, does not prove this. For Almighty God does not, therefore, permit
evil, because it is good that evil should exist, but because He knows that,
in His own wisdom and omnipotence, He can educe good from the evil, contrary
to its nature and proper efficacy, and this of His own pure act, either by
way of just punishment or gracious remission. It is not good that evil
should exist unless incidentally, namely, on account of the wisdom,
omnipotence and will of God. But that, which is incidental, is not under
consideration.
But let us, now, look at your answer. You say that "sin, considered
universally in its causes and circumstances, assumes a two-fold respect or
formality." In the first place, you say that "sin is considered not under
the relation of sin, but as far as it has the relation of good in the mind
of God, decreeing it." But I deny that sin has the relation of good in the
mind of God decreeing it. For the acts of God, in reference to sin,
altogether declare that sin is considered by God not in the relation of
good, but in that of evil. For He permits sin, but effects good: He punishes
sin, but He punishes that which is evil, and as it is evil. He remits sin
and pardons it; but that which is pardoned is considered as an evil by him
that pardons it. But God decrees the permission of sin because He knows that
He can produce good results from sin, not in that sin is good, but in that
it is evil. Nor is it rightly said—"sin has the relation of good in the mind
of God, who decrees it, because God knows how to make sin an opportunity of
good acts;" for He does not produce those acts except with the consideration
of sin as sin. It is wonderful, also, that any consideration can be affixed
to sin, which is contrary to its definition. The definition of sin is a
transgression of the law, and, therefore, it is a violation of the Divine
will. Hence it is, also, evident that it is incorrectly said that "sin has
the relation of good, because it exists in that which is good, and because
it tends to that which is good." For "good" is affirmed of a subject, in
which sin exists as a deforming vice and as corrupting, not of sin existing
in that subject. But how far God wills the subject, in which sin exists,
that is, the act which can not be performed by a man without sin, we will
perhaps discuss, more largely, hereafter, when we shall speak of permission
in general. Sin likewise tends to good not per se, but incidentally only,
because God ordains, not that it should be done, but that, having been done,
it should result in good, and makes, from it, an occasion for good. God is
not said—to will that sin should occur, so far as in His wonderful wisdom He
knows how to elicit good from it, but He so far wills to permit and not to
hinder it. For this is the reason that He permits and does not will to
hinder, not that He wills that sin should occur.
You affirm, in the second place, that another relation of sin is "that, in
which it is considered formally and properly, that is, as sin." Here, also,
you adduce a two-fold consideration of sin, either as it is sin in respect
to men, or as it is sin to God. But if you will listen to me, those are vain
and frivolous distinctions, and invented, not to explain the matter, but to
involve it more deeply. "In respect to men," you say, "God does not will, or
approve, or effect sin, but wills as to its event, not absolutely, as in the
case of those things which are good in themselves, but only by willing to
permit that sin should be committed." Be it so, and this, if rightly
understood, can be tolerated. I will not examine what you say in reference
to a three-fold action of the divine will, since it has no bearing at all on
the subject, at least against the sentiment which I defend.
What you say in the margin is true—"God wills that sin should happen, so far
as it is possible that it should happen without the efficiency of God." I
wish that you had discussed this subject more fully, and it would, indeed,
have been evident that you have, thus far, not rightly, set forth the mode
in which God wills that sin should happen. You so set it forth as not to
acquit God of the efficiency of sin. You say that "sin, as such to God, is
neither willed, nor approved, nor affected, nor indeed permitted by Him." I
concede the first three, but deny the last, for the proper object of the
divine permission is evil, as it is evil, and indeed considered by God as
evil; though the reason of His permission of sin, is not the evil itself. A
distinction is to be made between the object of permission and its cause. We
have already demonstrated that He permits evil as evil. But you have not
rightly stated the cause or reason why God permits evil, for He does not
permit evil on account of a conjoined good, but because He can elicit good
from evil, which good can not, on that account, be said to be conjoined to
sin, because it is elicited from sin only by the action of God. But if you
understand the phrase "conjoined good" to imply—not in the nature of sin
itself, but in the act of God, I do not oppose you. The words of Beza, which
you quote, will not bear a rigorous examination. The former is either false,
or equivocal; false, if understood of the permission, of which we now treat,
which is opposed not to legal prohibition, but to efficacious prevention. It
is true that God by law prohibits sin as sin, and yet permits, that is, does
not hinder the same sin as sin. But if it refers to the permission, which is
the opposite of the prohibition, made by law, the discussion is equivocal,
for we are not treating of that permission. For who does not know that God
can not, at the same time, strictly require and not strictly require the
same thing by law. Permission has likewise been previously defined or
described by yourself as "the denial of confirming grace" not indeed as "the
non-imposition of a law." The second statement of Beza is simply false. For
punishments of sins are not permitted by the Deity, but are inflicted by a
just judge, and have God himself for their author. "Shall there be evil in a
city, and the Lord hath not done it?" (Amos iii. 6). Also, of what sin, I
pray, was the first sin the punishment? Yet it was permitted. Therefore, it
was not a punishment.
The remarks of Calvin, must be understood according to the interpretation
already presented by us, otherwise they can not be defended. But, as it was
his aim to overthrow the doctrine of the School-men on this subject, it
ought not to be said by one, who has undertaken to defend his views, that
"the School-men speak correctly when they do not disjoin the will from
permission." This you say; they, however, state that there is this
distinction between the two, -- that permission is the immediate object of
the will, but sin is the object of permission. All the School-men openly
acknowledge that what God permits, He voluntarily permits. Nor is the
blasphemy of the Manichees to be charged upon Calvin, because though he
sometimes uses unsuitable phraseology, he elsewhere clearly defends himself
and his doctrine from that accusation.
The second objection, noticed by you, is this, -- "God wills contraries, if
He wills that to happen, which He, in His law, prohibits." This is, indeed,
a valid objection, and your answer does not remove it. For "to will anything
to happen," and "to will the same thing not to happen," do not differ "in
respects" only, but "absolutely and in their whole essence." Nor is there
any respect or mode, according to which God can be said to will that
anything should happen, and at the same time to will that it should not
happen. For the divine will can not be engaged in contrary acts about one
and the same object, in whatever respects it may be considered. Nor can one
and the same act of the divine will be engaged on two contrary objects, such
as "to happen" and "not to happen," in whatever respects those objects may
be considered. "God prohibits evil as evil," but He permits the same, not as
it puts on the relation of good, for it is false that sin ever puts on the
relation of good, but because God knows how, from it, to elicit and produce
good. The remark of Thomas Aquinas does not favour your view, and is not
opposed to mine.
The third objection you have formed at your own pleasure, that you might be
able more easily to overthrow it. For a boy, possessed of very little skill
in Dialectics, knows that there is a great difference between the cause
consequentiœ and the cause consequentis. The cause, indeed, can be inferred
from the effect. And therefore you, properly, affirm that the Major of the
syllogism, contained in the objection, "is not general." But your
correction, added to that Major, has no effect as to its truth. For it is
not true that "if no middle cause intervenes between the antecedent, on the
existence of which the consequent follows, and that consequent, then the
antecedent is the cause of the consequent." Nor does the antecedent,
therefore, cease to be the cause of the consequent, even if a middle cause
intervenes. For Satan was the cause of the eating of the forbidden fruit,
even if man was its proximate and immediate cause. By this, the force of
your reply is weakened. If you can show that these two things are mutually
consistent, that God can will that sin should happen, and that man still
sins of his own free will, you have gained your case. I indeed admit that
man can sin certainly, and yet freely; but to sin certainly is not the same
as to sin necessarily. For the word "certainly" is used in respect to the
divine prescience; but "necessarily" in respect to the decree of God, and
the divine will, by which He wills that sin should happen. Hence, also, you
incorrectly attribute certainty to the decree of God, when, you ought to
attribute it to His prescience, and necessity to His decree. You also,
afterwards, yourself acknowledge that God is the author of the sin of man,
that is, by a desertion of him, and by the non-bestowment of the aid
necessary for the avoidance of sins, from which it follows that man
necessarily sinned. For he, who makes a law, and does not bestow the aid
which is necessary for the fulfillment of the law, is the cause of the
transgression of his own law.
You say, that "in this desertion, the will of man comes in, since he is not
deserted, unless he wills to be deserted." I answer, that, if it is so, then
the man deserved to be deserted. I ask, however, whether the man could will
not to be deserted. If you say that he could, then he did not sin
necessarily, but freely. If, on the other hand, you say that he could not,
then the fault falls back upon God not less than before, because God is the
cause of that volition, by which the man willed to be deserted, since He did
not bestow the necessary grace, by which the man could will not to be
deserted, and nothing can be conceived, which may intervene between this
desertion on the part of God, and the volition of man, by which he willed to
be deserted.
Your second answer to this objection is of no greater advantage to you;
indeed you twice admit that God, by His own decree, by which He willed that
sin should happen, is the cause of sin. First, you say that "sin is the mere
consequent of the decree;" whence it follows that the decree is the cause of
sin, unless you present some other relation in which sin may be the
consequent of the divine decree, which you are wholly unable to do. You say
that "the decree of God is, in such a manner, the antecedent of human sin,
that it has no relation of cause, except that of deficiency. But I affirm
that, in the use of this second argument, you are convicted of making God
the author of sin. If that, which was deficient through the influence of the
cause, was necessary to the avoidance of sin, then certainly God, by the
deficiency of the operation, which was necessary to the avoidance of sin, is
the cause of sin; unless you teach that man had previously deserved this
deficiency of the divine operation. The words of Augustine do not sustain
your opinion. For he only means that sin, which is committed contrary to the
precept of God, is not committed when He is unwilling that it shall be
committed, and absolutely wills that it shall not be committed, but when He
permits it, and by a voluntary permission. You refer to another objection.
"The decree of God is the energetic principle of all things, according to
your sentiment; therefore, also, it is the principle of sin."
You acknowledge and teach that the antecedent is true. First, by the
authority of the Scripture, and cite the first chapter to the Ephesians, but
in a sense different from that of the Holy Spirit. For all those passages,
in that chapter, refer to salutary gifts and effects which God, in His Son,
and by the Holy Ghost, works in the elect, as is also proved by the word
"good-pleasure." Secondly, by a reason, which is a sound one; for God is the
cause of all beings and acts; yet it is to be suitably explained how He
produces all acts. You deny the consequence, because sin is a "defect of
being—not a real being, but only a being of the reason." It is necessary to
explain, more fully, in what sense sin is a "defect" rather than "a real
being." Sin is a being of the reason, because it not only has its
subsistence in the mind, but also has its origin from the mind, and was
produced by the mind, that it might serve to obtain for it the knowledge of
things of good and evil. But a defect, even if it has no substance or fixed
form, yet exists in the subject, from which the habitude of sin proceeds,
and so affects the subject that it is perceived by it; and it is not
understood by the mind, except in relation to its own habits, by which its
limits are also determined. From which it is apparent, that sins are not
purely beings of the reasons. You allow, indeed, that sin is not a being of
the reason, when you say "it follows and exists, immediately and surely,
from the removal of original righteousness." But though sin is, not a
positive being, but a defect, yet if God is the energetic cause of that act,
which can not be committed by man without sin, then He is also the energetic
cause of sin. You admit this, when you say that "God is the energetic cause
of all acts." You, then, do and must admit the consequent; unless you show
in what way it can be effected that a man should freely perform the act,
which, in respect to himself is sin, if the same act is produced by the
energetic decree of God, which no one can resist. But more on this subject
hereafter.
Finally, it is objected to your sentiment that it teaches that "God inclines
to sin and positively hardens." I admit that this objection is made, and not
without cause. It has never happened to me to see an answer, which frees the
doctrine, which you advocate from that objection and charge.
You answer, that you "do not approve of a permission, separate from the
will." Who does approve of such a permission? Who has ever denied that what
God permits, He voluntarily permits? You say—"I do not attribute to God
positive or physical action, as if He would infuse corruption and wickedness
into a man." I wish, however, that you would explain how sin is committed,
"necessarily in respect to the Divine decree," apart from any physical
action of the Deity -whether that physical action be positive or
negative—and, indeed, if you please, apart from positive action. You resolve
that act, which is not performed without sin, into a first cause, in such a
manner as, also, of necessity, to make God the positive cause of sin. But it
is not necessary that He should infuse wickedness or corruption to such a
degree that physical, or positive action can be attributed to Him; it is
sufficient, if He moves, if He impels to the act, if He limits the liberty
of the man, so that He can not but will and do that, which has been
prohibited. You admit that "God effectively hardens;" which, indeed, I do
not deny, but it is necessary that there should be an explanation, such that
God may not, in any way, be made the author of sin. This we shall hereafter
see.
I do not disapprove of the threefold action of Divine Providence in
reference to human acts, referred to by Suidas. But consider whether that
"action, which is according to the good-pleasure, by which God wills,
approves, effects, and is delighted in any thing," is referred to in a sense
different from that, in which you always use the word good-pleasure. For you
have before said, on the authority of Ephesians 1, that "God does all things
according to the good-pleasure of His own will;" of which passage, relying
on its true interpretation, which you here present from Suidas, I have
deprived you.
In reference to "the second action of Divine Providence, which is that of
arrangement, or that of sustentation and preservation," I would have you
consider whether it is so much the preservation and sustentation of motions,
actions, and passions as of existence and faculties. For since the existence
of things, and the faculties existing in them are the first acts, and
motions, actions, and passions, resulting from them are the second acts, or
from second acts, it seems, indeed, that an act of Divine Providence
presides over the latter, different from that which presides over the
former, It is true, indeed, that God sustains sinful nature. But it should
be carefully explained how far and in what way God concurs with the creature
in the performance of an action; but whatever explanation of that matter may
be made, there must always be caution that a concurrence, with a second
cause, may never be attributed to the first cause, such that the cause of
evil can be rightly ascribed to the latter. You say—"the will can do nothing
alone, yet it can act in an evil manner," and illustrate it by simile. Let
us see how far it is appropriate. It is especially to be considered that it
is applicable to a man, in an unfallen state, because "his pipe is not
disjointed;" therefore that simile is not to be applied to his primitive
state. Again, -- in "lameness," two things are to be considered, namely,
walking or motion, and lameness, which is irregularity of motion." You
compare walking with the act, and lameness with the irregularity of the act,
in which the relation of sin properly consists. But those two things are not
present in every act which is evil.
For instance, the eating of the forbidden fruit, in which it is not
allowable to distinguish between the act and its sinfulness. For the act
itself ought not to have been performed, and the relation of sin consists,
not in the fact that he performed the act of eating in a mode, in which it
ought not to have been performed, but in that he performed it at all. That
illustration would have place in acts, good in themselves, but performed in
a way, in which they ought not to be performed. Thus he, who gives aims,
"that he may be seen of men," performs a good act, but in an improper
manner, he walks, but is lame. Hence it follows that no one can be impelled
to an act, the commission of which is a transgression of the law, without
sin, and blame in the impeller and mover. You, also, see from this how
cautiously the mode, in which God is said to be the cause of an act, but not
of the sin existing in the act, is to be explained. You say that "the third
action of Divine Providence is of concession, that of acquiescence or
permission, by which God blamelessly effects certain things, in the evil
deeds of men." It is not doubtful that this may be truly said of the Deity.
In this third action, you make also another three-fold division. You say
that the first is "permission," but you explained it in such a manner, that
it could not be adapted to Adam, in his original state, but to those only
who have sinned, and, by their sins, deserved to be left by God to
themselves, and given "over to a reprobate mind." For "God did not loose the
reins upon Adam. He did not remove the impediments of sinning. He did not
free him, previously bound, with cords." I have nothing at all against "the
second action" and its explanation, if it be applied to sinners; yet I think
that some things, highly necessary, might be added to it.
You do not seem to me to explain, with sufficient distinctness,
"ordination," which is the third action. For the word is used in a two-fold
sense—that of decreeing and determining that something shall be done, and
that of establishing an order in that which is done, and of disposing and
determining to a suitable end, things which are done. This equivocal use of
the word should have been avoided, and the different significations of the
word should not be confounded, as you do, in the same discussion, when you
say that "God ordains sin as to its cause and principles," in which case,
the word "ordain" is used, in its first signification: again—"He ordains the
same thing as to its result and purposes," in which case, it is used in the
second signification. The explanation, which you add, from the case of
Satan, is only in reference to the ordination, as to the end and the result.
If there is not a suitable explanation of the mode in which "God ordains, as
to its causes and principles, an act, which can not be done by a man without
sin"—I prefer to use this phraseology rather than the word sin—the cause and
blame of sin will, by an easy transition, be charged upon God.
The words of Clemens Alexandrinus can only be understood of an ordination to
an end, and I wish that you and all our writers would persist in the use of
such language. For it is correct, and explains the action of God, who
effects His own work by the evil deeds of wicked persons. In the words of
Augustine, "there is the most manifest difference between "to make" and "to
ordain," and the word ordain is used in its second signification, that of
disposing and determining wills, evil by their own fault, to these and those
purposes and to certain actions. But those words of Augustine, "God works in
the hearts of men, inclining their wills whithersoever He pleases, even to
evil things, according to their demerits," are to be suitably explained, so
as not to impinge upon what follows; that "God does not make the wills
evil." He, therefore, inclines evil wills to evil things, that is, so that
they expend their wickedness upon one object, rather than upon another. If
he is said to impel any one to will that which is evil, it is to be
understood that He does this by the instrumentality of Satan, and, in such a
way as can be easily reconciled with His justice. Fulgentius explains the
matter most correctly and in a few words. For he sufficiently acquits Him of
sin, when he denies that "God is the author of evil thoughts." For thoughts
are the first causes in the performance of a work; and he also uses the word
"ordain" in the latter signification, as can be clearly seen from his
subjoined explanation. For he says that "God works good out of an evil
work."
Your third answer denies, and with propriety, that the "Fate of the Stoics"
is introduced by your doctrine, that is, Fate explained, as the Stoics
taught concerning it. But it does not remove this difficulty, that, on the
supposition of that Divine decree, which you suppose, a necessity is
introduced with which liberty can not be consistent. While, therefore, the
Fate of the Stoics may not be presented in your doctrine, yet a fate is
presented, which places a necessity upon all things, and takes away freedom.
You attempt to explain the decree of God in a way such as may not, by the
divine decree, take away freedom, though it supposes necessity; to do which
is, in my opinion, wholly impossible. But let us see how you present the
mode of explaining and of disentangling the matter. First, you distribute
that, which is necessary, into the simply or absolutely necessary, and the
hypothetically necessary. The absolutely necessary—you correctly say—
"is that which cannot be otherwise, and whose contrary is impossible," but
you do not, in your statement, make any distinction whether you treat of a
thing which is incomplex and simple, or of a complex being. But let that
pass. It is certain that there is nothing necessary in that sense, but God,
and what pertains to Him. All other things are placed outside of that
necessity. You say "that the necessary, of hypothesis, is that which can not
be otherwise when one, or a number of things, is supposed." You do not here
make a distinction in the supposition of things, between that, by which a
thing is supposed to be, and that by which a thing is concluded; which
latter necessity is distinguished into that of the consequent
[consequentis], and that of the consequence [consequentiœ]. The latter is
syllogistic, the former is that of causes, producing effects, or
consequents, causes which neither are necessarily supposed, nor act
necessarily as causes, but if they are supposed, and act as causes, the
effect necessarily exists. For example, God does not, necessarily, create a
world, but if He creates one, then it exists, necessarily, from that action.
You consider that "the necessary by hypothesis is of nature, of precept, and
of decree." That which is necessary of nature removes freedom and
contingency. So, also, that which is necessary of precept; for that, which
is rendered obligatory by law, is not left to the freedom of the creature,
though, from the necessity of nature, an act is necessarily produced unless
it be prevented by that which has greater power. But, by the necessity of
precept, the act is not necessarily produced; there is laid upon the
creature a necessity of performing the act, if it wishes to obey God, and to
be accepted by Him. You badly define necessity of decree, as "that which God
has foreknown and willed either to effect or at least to permit." For the
necessity of prescience, and of the Divine permission is one thing, and that
of efficiency is another. Indeed, we may allow that there is no necessity of
prescience and of permission, but only of efficiency, or of the divine will.
For, not the prescience of God, but "His will is the necessity of things,"
though, the prescience of God being supposed, it may follow that a thing
will be, not from prescience as an antecedent [causa consequentis],but as
sustaining to prescience the relation of conclusion [consequentiœ]. We shall
hereafter treat of permission, at a greater length. We remark, also, that
what is necessary of decree, can not at the same time, be called free or
contingent in respect to the will as efficient.
In the second place, you distinguish necessity into that of coaction, and
that of certainty. This is not well, for these are not opposed, as one and
the same thing can be produced, by the necessity of coaction, and can be
certainly foreknown. Again, they are not of the same genus. For the former
belongs to the will, effecting something, and is prior, in nature, to the
thing effected, while the latter is by prescience, and is subsequent, in
nature, to the thing. The former coincides with the necessity of consequent,
the latter, with that of the conclusion. Thirdly, there is a necessity which
is nearer, as to relation, cause and genus to the necessity of coaction, and
is the opposite of coaction, and from which, as its contrary, the necessity
of coaction ought to have been distinguished. It is the necessity of
inevitability, which term, also, indeed, comprehends the idea of coaction,
but an unnamed species may be called by the name of its genus.
That this may be more clearly understood, I explain myself thus: The
necessity of inevitability is two-fold, one introducing force, in things
purely natural, when it is called violence, and in things voluntary, when it
is called coaction; the other, inwardly moving a thing, whether it be nature
or will, so smoothly and gently, that it cannot but be inclined in that
direction, and will that to which it is moved. Yet I admit that the will is
not carried or moved, according to the mode of the will, but according to
the mode of nature, as, by the act of moving, freedom is taken away, but not
spontaneous assent, while both are taken away by the act of impelling. I
pass over your definition of coaction. That of certainty does not please me;
for, in that definition, you conjoin things, which do not belong together.
For a thing is said to happen certainly in respect to prescience, but
immutably in respect to the thing itself; and immutability does not
correspond with certainty. For certainty is attributed to prescience, which
can not be deceived on account of the infinity of the divine nature and
wisdom. You should, then, expunge that word "immutably" from your argument.
For that which can either happen or not happen, can not be done immutably,
yet it can surely be foreknown by Him who foreknows with certainty, all
things even those which are contingent. But you rightly add an axiom to the
certainty of necessity; "Every thing which is, so far as it is, is
necessary." Thus far, the distinctions of necessity. You will now show how
they mutually correspond. "All relations of effects are to their own
causes," but either to separate causes, or to concurrent causes, and to
joint causes, and to causes which act at the same time. If they are to
separate causes, the effects are named from the mode, in which those effects
exist from their causes. If necessarily, they are called necessary effects,
if contingently, they are called contingent. But if many causes concur to
produce one effect, that effect has relation to, and connection with, each
of its causes, but does not receive its name, except from the mode, in which
it exists and is produced from those united causes; if that mode is
necessary, the effect is called necessary; if that mode is contingent, it is
called contingent. It can not, however, be that one and the same effect
should exist in part contingently, and in part necessarily, in any respect
whatever. It is, indeed, true that, if that which is called a second cause,
operates alone and of its own will, the thing might be called contingent;
but, since the first cause moves the second, so that it can not but be
moved, the whole effect is said to be necessary, since it can not be that
the effect should not be produced, when those first and second causes are in
operation.
The position that "the freedom of second causes is not taken away by that
necessity," is, here, of no importance; as also your opinion that "an effect
can be called free and contingent in respect to a certain cause, which is
said to be necessary in respect to the first cause." For it is absurd to
wish to harmonize freedom with necessity, and the latter with the former.
All necessity, indeed, is at variance with freedom, and not the necessity of
coaction alone. This is so true, that even any degree of vehemence can not
be successful in weakening its truth. I grant that it is true, that "the
decree of God ordains second causes, and, among them, the freedom of human
will," but, in such a manner that freedom is not taken away by that
"ordination:" but freedom is taken away, when God, either by coaction (which
cannot be, both on account of the divine omnipotence, and on account of the
nature of the will), or, by an easy and gentle influence, so moves the will,
that it can not but be moved.
You seem to me not to discriminate between a free movement and one which is
spontaneous. A spontaneous movement is so different from one that is free,
that the former may coincide with a natural and internal necessity, but the
latter can by no means do so. For a man spontaneously wishes to be happy,
and not freely. Beasts are spontaneously borne towards those things, which
are good for them, by natural instinct, but no liberty can be attributed to
them. From these considerations, it is apparent that it can, in no manner,
be said that "Adam fell necessarily and at the same time freely," unless you
introduce the necessity of certainty, which belongs, not to the fall, but to
the prescience of God, on account of His infinity. But freedom is taken
away, if a decree of God is supposed, since "Adam could not resist the will,
that is, the decree of God." Your answer that "as he could not, so he also
would not," is refuted by the consideration that he could not will
otherwise. This you confess to be true "as to the event," but not true "as
to his power." But it is not the subject of disputation, whether the will of
Adam was deprived of the power, which is called freedom, which was not
necessary to induce the necessity of the fall, but whether the event itself,
that is, the fall, occurred necessarily. When you admit this, you must admit
also that he did not fall freely. For that power was limited and determined
as to the act and event, so that, in the act, he could not will otherwise;
else the decree of God was made in vain. Here, also, you unskillfully use
spontaneous motion for free motion..
To elucidate the subject, you "distinguish three periods, -- previous,
present, and future to the fall." But the present and the future are of no
importance to this discussion. For the fall can not have any necessity from
present and future time. Previous time only serves our purpose. You say that
a at the present moment, the fall was necessary, in a two-fold respect."
First, -- "on account of the prescience of God." But prescience is not a
cause of necessity, nor can anything be said to be done infallibly, on
account of prescience, but prescience is the cause, that a thing "which will
occur, contingently, at its own time," is certainly foreknown by God.
Secondly; -- "on account of the permissive decree of God." But permission
can not be a cause of immutability or of necessity. For it is a negative
act, not a prohibition; and from it an affirmative necessity can not exist.
The words of honourius, and Hugo do not aid you, for they treat of something
wholly different, and they are not reliable authorities. But the reason,
which you present, is partly fallacious, partly of no force. The fallacy, a
petitio principii, consists in this sentence, "because an evil, which is
permitted, can not but happen." The reason is of no force, when you say
"because it can not happen otherwise than God decreed." It does not follow,
from this, that it therefore happens necessarily; since, though evil can not
happen otherwise than God permits it, yet that permission does not impose a
necessity upon the event or sin. For the divine determination is not in
reference to sin, that is, shall be committed, but in reference to the same
thing, which is about to take place of its own causes, that is, shall not
extend further than seems good to God. I do not accede to your definition of
"permission" that "it is a negative of that grace, -- which is sufficient
for the avoidance of sin." For, as has often been said, this is not to
permit a man to sin freely, but to effect that he should sin necessarily. I
wish also that you had explained, in what way "the necessity of the divine
decree, by which He determined that Adam should sin, was evitable in respect
to the freedom of the human will, when it was inevitable in respect to the
event." I pass over the inconsistency of calling necessity evitable.
You do not wish that any one should think that "that necessity arose from
the decree of God." But you have said so many things, in proof of it, that
you now express your unwillingness in vain. Explain how that necessity
follows the decree, and yet the decree has not the relation of cause, in
respect to that necessity. For the decree is the cause of necessity, in the
relation of consequent, not in that of consequence. Those are words and
phrases, designed to avoid the force of truth, in which there is no truth,
and not even the semblance of truth. For it will always remain true that
whatever is necessary "of decree" has the cause of its necessity in and from
the decree of God. Is not that labourious investigation and use of many
distinctions a sign of falsity, when the statement of truth is simple and
open? The assertion that "the predestinate are saved necessarily, and the
reprobate are damned necessarily," is to be correctly understood. The fact,
that any one is predestinate, is at variance with the fact of damnation, and
the fact, that any one is reprobate, is at variance with the fact of
salvation. But the ability to be saved or damned, is at variance with
neither. For the decree is not in respect to the ability, but in respect to
the fact of salvation or damnation. But those two acts, which you mention,
namely, that of not showing mercy and that of damning, are subsequent to
sin. For mercy is necessary, only, to the miserable and the sinner, and it
is truly said that "the purpose of damning does not make any necessity of
damnation unless by the intervention of sin," but by its intervention, in
such a sense, that it is possible that it should not intervene. If, however,
God has decreed to make and govern men, that he can not but sin, indeed, in
order that He may declare His own righteousness in his destruction, that
purpose introduces a necessity of sin and of damnation.
It is an absurd assertion that "from prescience that necessity follows in
the same way." For what God foreknows, He foreknows because it is to take
place in the future. But what He decrees, purposes, and determines in
Himself to do, takes place thus because He decrees it. Also, from prescience
is concluded the certainty of an event, which is a necessity of the
consequence, and from the decree immutability of the same thing is
concluded, which is a necessity of the consequent.
You make an objection against yourself, -- "They who are predestinated to
death can not, if they will, be freed by repentance." That objection is not
appropriate to this time and place. But I present you with an objection,
that they, who are predestinated to death, are, also, according to your
doctrine, predestinated to sin; that what God has decreed to bring upon
them, namely, death, He may be able to bring upon them justly, that is, on
account of sin. But indeed, if God can predestinate to sin, that He may be
able to bring death upon the sinner; He is able also to bring death upon
one, who is not a sinner, because he, who is a sinner in consequence of the
divine predestination, is in fact not a sinner. It is far worse to
predestinate a just man to sin than to predestinate an innocent man to
death. Of this we have also, previously, spoken.
Your effort to charge the same necessity on the opinion "which supposes a
permission of evil" is futile. I refer, here, to "permission," when rightly
explained, and understood according to its own nature. But you describe
permission in such a manner, as really to amount to an act of efficiency.
For if "to permit is to will not to hinder," which it is in fact, and "the
will not to hinder is such, that, without that hindrance, sin can not be
avoided," as you assert, then, "to will not to hinder sin" is to effect sin,
by a negation of the necessary hindrance.
Thus evil also necessarily exists from that permission, but by no means
freely on the part of man. From which, it is clearly evident that the decree
of God is not more evitable than a permission of the kind, which you have
described. But, unless the distinction of the decree of God into energetic
or efficacious and permissive is without foundation, -- as it certainly is
not—then it is necessary that permission should be described so as not to
coincide with energetic decree.
The charge of holding the Stoic and Manichean doctrine, which is made by
some against you, is not made by them with the idea that your opinions
entirely agree with that doctrine, but that you agree with it in this, that
you say that all things are done necessarily. You ought to remove this
charge from yourself, and free your doctrine from this accusation. You unite
contrary things together when you say that "a man can not abstain from
sinning, and yet he sins not necessarily, but freely." Nor is it sufficient
to constitute freedom of the will, that it "be capable of being turned in
opposite directions, and to choose spontaneously," if it shall be
"determined to one directions only, by the Deity:" For that determination
takes away the freedom of the will, or rather the liberty of volition. For
though the will, in other things not determined by Gods may remain capable
of change in any directions and free, yet the volition is not free, since it
is determined precisely to one of two contraries.
The remark of Anselm presents the same idea as we have, often, presented,
that a distinction is to be made between the necessity of the consequent,
and that of the consequence: the former precedes, the latter follows the
action. But your necessity of decree precedes the act and does not follow,
while that of Anselm follows it, therefore, they are not the same. In the
remark of Gaudentius there is not even a trace of the doctrine which you
defend.
In your brief recapitulation, you fail, as greatly, of untying the knot. For
it will always remain true that a denial of grace, necessary to the
avoidance of sin, is a cause of sin, by the mode of the non-bestowment of
the necessary hindrance; and it will, always be false, that he sins freely
and voluntarily, who can not but sin, and that the will acts freely in that
direction, to which it is determined by the certain and inflexible decree of
God. It is false in the sense that freedom and determination are mutually
opposed in the limits of their action. For the former has respect to two
contraries, the latter to one only.
You present the example of the "angels who obey God both necessarily and
freely," on your own authority, and do not at all prove what you assert. I
assert that these two things are mutually inconsistent, so that, if you
affirm that the angels obey God freely, I shall say, with confidence, that
it is possible that the angels should not obey God. If, on the other hand,
you affirm that they can not but obey God, I shall thence boldly infer that
they do not obey God freely.
For necessity and freedom differ from each other in their entire essence,
and in genus. And I would dare say, without blasphemy, that not even God
Himself, with all His omnipotence, can not effect that what is necessary may
be contingent or free, and that what is done necessarily, may be done
freely. It implies a contradiction, that a thing should not be possible not
to be done, and yet be possible not to be done, and it is a contradiction,
opposed to the first and most general idea, divinely infused into our minds,
in reference to whatever subject the truth is affirmed or denied. And a
thing can not, at the same time, be and not be, at the same time, be and not
be of a given character. For the fact, that God can not do this, is a mark
not of impotence but of invariable power. The fact that a thing exists,
depends on the actual power of God. If it should happen, at once and at the
same time with the previous fact, that the same thing should not be, then
the actual power of God would be either overcome, or have an equal power
opposed to itself, so that it would happen that a thing, which is by the
power of God, at the same time, is not. Which is the greatest of all
absurdities.
_________________________________________________________________
DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT OF PERMISSION
As frequent mention of the permission of sin has been already made by us, it
will be a work, not useless in itself, and not displeasing to you, if I
shall distinctly set forth what I consider the true view concerning
permission, in general, according to the Scriptures. You will read, weigh,
and judge, freely and with candour, and if I shall, as to any point, seem to
err, you will recall me to the right way, by serious and friendly
admonition. I will treat, first, of permission in general, then of the
permission of sin.
We know that permission pertains to action, in a generic sense, from the
very form of the word, whether in itself or by reduction as they say in the
schools. For cessation from act may also be reduced or referred back to the
act, but it has, as its proximate and immediate cause, the will, not
knowledge, not capability, not power, though these, also, may be requisite
in the being, who permits. No one is rightly said to permit, who does not
know what and to whom he permits, and is not capable of permitting or
preventing, and finally has not the right and authority to permit. If
permission is attributed to any one, who is destitute of that knowledge, or
capability, or power, it is in an unusual and extended sense, which ought
not to have a place in an accurate discussion of a subject.
The object of permission is both the person to whom anything is permitted,
and the act which is permitted, and, under the act, I would include, also,
cessation from the act. In the person, to whom anything is permitted, two
acts are to be considered in respect to the person, -- first, strength
sufficient to the performance of an act, unless there is some hindrance;
secondly, an inclination to perform the act, for apart from this, the
permission would be useless. Strength is necessarily requisite for the
performance of an act; even if this is present, unless the person, to whom
an act is permitted, has an inclination to the act, it is permitted to no
purpose, and in vain. Indeed it can not be said, correctly, that an act is
permitted to any one, who is influenced by no inclination to the performance
of the act. From this it is apparent that permission must be preceded by the
prescience or the knowledge of the fact that both sufficient strength and an
inclination to perform the act, exist in him, to whom the permission is
granted. The mode of permission is the suspension of efficiency, which
efficiency is also possible to the being, who permits, either according to
right, or according to capability, or in both respects, and, when used,
would restrain, or in fact prevent the act. We may, hence, define permission
in general, thus; -- It is the act of the will by which the being, who
permits, suspends any efficiency which is possible to him, which, being
used, would restrain, or, in fact, prevent an act in him to whom the
permission is granted, to the performance of which act the same person has
an inclination and sufficient strength. These conditions being applied to
the Divine permission, by which He permits an act to a rational creature,
the definition may be thus arranged: -- Divine permission is an act of the
divine will by which God suspends any efficiency possible to Himself, either
by right, or by power, or in both modes, which efficiency, used by God,
would either restrain or really prevent an act of a rational creature, to
the performance of which act, the same creature has an inclination and
sufficient strength. But, since the will of God is always directed by His
wisdom, and tends to good, that permission can not but be instituted to a
certain end and the best end. There are two modes or species of permission,
as is manifest in the definition, in which, to efficiency, if used, either
the limitation of an act, or its prevention is ascribed. For the will of God
is considered, in a two-fold respect, either as He prescribes something to
His creatures, by command or prohibition, or as He wills to do or to prevent
anything. Hence the efficiency, which is under discussion, is two-fold, on
one hand, as the prescription or enactment of a law by which any act of the
creature is restrained, by which restraint or limitation that act is taken
away from the freedom of the creature, so that he can not, without sin,
perform it, if it is forbidden, or omit it, if it is commanded; and on the
other, as the interposition of an impediment, by which any act of the
creature is prevented.
In the first mode, there was a limit as to the eating of the forbidden fruit
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and as to the love due to a wife,
the former by prohibition, the latter by command. In the second mode, Balaam
was prevented from cursing Israel, Ahaziah from the murder of Elijah,
Sennacherib from the capture of Jerusalem, and Abimelech from sin with
Sarah. But since God, if He pleases, suspends this efficiency, in both
modes, when and where it seems good to Him, permission is also two-fold; on
one hand, as He does not restrain an act by a law, but leaves it to the
decision and freedom of the creature, whether this may be on account of the
simple nature of the act itself, as in that expression of the apostle "all
things are lawful for me" (1 Cor. vi. 12) or, on account of another
forbidden evil, an example of which may be taken from the "bill of
divorcement;" on the other hand, as He does not, by His own action,
interpose an impediment to an act, -- an impediment, by which the act may be
really prevented, not one, by which it can or ought to be prevented. Thus He
permitted Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit, and Cain to kill his own
brother. Though He used impediments, by which, each of those acts could, and
ought to have been prevented, yet He did not use impediments, by which the
act, in either case, was prevented. We may be allowed to divide, also, the
latter mode of permission which is by abstaining from the use of an
impediment, which would prevent the act, according to the difference of the
modes in which God is able, and, indeed, accustomed to prevent an act, to
the performance of which a creature is inclined and sufficient. I do not
wish, however, that such sufficiency should be ever understood apart from
the concurrence of the first cause. That variety arises from the causes by
means of which a rational creature performs an act. Those causes are
"capability, and will, -- we, here, speak of voluntary acts, to which the
permission, of which we now treat, has reference and, therefore, the
impediment is placed either upon the capability or the will of the creature;
that is, God effects that the creature should be either not able, or not
willing to produce that act. In the former mode He prevented the entrance of
Adam into Paradise, in the latter, He prevented Joseph from polluting
himself with adultery with the wife of his master.
More particularly, we must consider in how many ways God may prevent the
creature from being able or willing to perform the act, to which he has an
inclination and sufficient strength, that is, apart from this impediment. We
consider prevention as applied, first to the capability, secondly, to the
will. That the creature may be able to effect any thing, it is necessary
that he should have capability; that no greater or equal power should act
against him; finally, that he should have an object on which his capability
can act. From this it is evident that an impediment may be placed on the
capability in a four-fold manner; -- first, by the taking away of being and
life which are the foundation of capability; secondly, by the deprivation or
diminution of the capability itself; thirdly, by the opposition of a
greater, or, at least, an equal power; fourthly, by the removal of the
object; either of which ways is sufficient for prevention. We will adduce
examples of each mode.
In the first mode, the capture of Jerusalem attempted by Sennacherib, was
prevented by the slaughter of "an hundred four score and five thousand" men,
made by one angel (2 Kings xix. 35, 36). Thus, also, the effort to bring
Elijah before Ahaziah was prevented by the fire, twice consuming fifty men,
who were sent to take him.
In the second mode, Samson was prevented from freeing himself from the hands
of the Philistines, after his hair was cut off (Judges xvi. 19, 20), the
strength of the Spirit, by which he had formerly been so mighty, having been
taken away or diminished.
In the third mode, Uzziah was prevented from burning incense to the Lord by
the resistance of the priests (2 Chron. xxvi. 18), and the carrying of Lot
and the Sodomites into captivity was prevented by Abram with his servants,
attacking the victorious kings (Gen. xiv. 15, 16).
In the fourth mode, Ahab was prevented from injuring Elijah (1 Kings xix.
3), and the Jews, who had sworn to slay the apostle Paul, were prevented
from effecting their design (Acts xxiii. 10). God removed Elijah, and Paul
was rescued from the Jews by the chief captain. Thus, also, Christ often
removed himself out of the hands of those, who wished to take him; of those,
also, who wished to make him a king.
The permission, which is contrary to this prevention, also subsists by four
modes, contrary to those just exemplified, but united together. For a
complete cause is required to the production of an effect, the absence of a
single necessary cause, or element of the cause, being sufficient to prevent
the effect. Thus it is necessary that, when God permits any act to the
capability of a creature, that creature should be preserved as it is, and
should live; that its capability should remain adapted to the performance of
the act; that no greater or equal power should be placed in opposition;
finally, that the object, to be operated upon, should be left to that
capability. It appears, from this, that this divine permission is not
inactive, as so many actions of the providence of God are requisite to that
permission, -- the preservation of being, of life, and the capability of the
creature, the administration and government, by which a greater or an equal
power is opposed to the creature, and the presentation of the object. We may
be allowed, also to adduce similar examples of permission. Thus God gave His
Son into the power of Pilate and of the Jews. "This is your hour and the
power of darkness" (Luke xxii. 53). Thus He gave Job into the hands of Satan
(Job i. 12), Zachariah into the hands of his murderers (2 Chron. xxiv. 21),
and James into the hands of Herod (Acts xii. 2). Let us now consider how God
may prevent a creature from a volition to perform an act, to which he has an
inclination and sufficient strength. An impediment is placed by the Deity,
upon the propensity and the will of a rational creature, in a two-fold mode,
according to which God can act on the will. For He acts on the will either
by the mode of nature, or according to the mode of the will and its freedom.
The action, by which He affects the will, according to the mode of nature,
may be called physical impulse; that, by which He acts on the same,
according to the mode of the will and its freedom, will be suitably styled
suasion. God acts, therefore, preventively on the will either by physical
impulse or by suasion, that it may not will that, to which it is inclined by
any propensity. He acts preventively on the will, by physical impulse, when
He acts upon it, by the mode of nature, that, from it may necessarily result
the prevention of an act, to which the creature is inclined by any
propensity. Thus the evil disposition of the Egyptians towards the
Israelites seems, in the judgment of some, to have been prevented from
injuring them. God acts, preventively, on the will by suasion, when He
persuades the will by any argument, that it may not will to perform an act,
to which it tends by its own inclination, and to effect which the creature
has, or seems to himself to have, sufficient strength. By this, the will is
acted upon preventively, not of necessity, indeed, but of certainty.
But since God, in the infinity of His own wisdom, foresees that the mind of
the rational creature will be persuaded by the presentation of that
argument, and that, from this persuasion, a prevention of the act will
result, He is under no necessity of using any other kind of prevention. All
the arguments, by which the reason can be persuaded to the performance of an
act, can be reduced to three classes—that which is easy and practicable;
that which is useful, pleasant, and delightful; and that which is honest,
just and becoming. Hence, also, God, by a three-fold suasion, prevents a
person from the will to perform any act. For He persuades the mind that the
act is either difficult to be performed, or even altogether impossible; or
useless and unpleasant; or dishonest, unrighteous and indecorous.
By the argument from the difficult and impossible, the Pharisees and chief
priests were, often, prevented from laying violent hands on Christ: for they
knew that he was considered a prophet by the multitude, who seemed prepared
to defend him against the efforts of his enemies. The Israelites, pursuing
the king of Moab, when they saw that he had offered his eldest son, as a
burnt offering, and, from this fact, knew that he was strengthened in his
own mind, departed from him, thinking that they could not take the city
without very great difficulty and much slaughter (2 Kings iii. 23-27).
Sanballat and Tobiah, and the other enemies of God’s people, endeavouring to
hinder the building of the walls of Jerusalem, were prevented from
accomplishing their design, when they heard that their plots were known to
Nehemiah (Neh. iv. 15). For they despaired of effecting any thing, unless
they could take the Jews by surprise. By the argument from the useless, the
soldiers, who crucified Christ, were prevented from breaking his legs (John
xix. 33), because he was already dead, and it would have been useless to
break his legs, as this was designed, and usually done to hasten death; and,
at this time, the Jews desired that their bodies should be taken down from
the cross before sunset. But God had declared, "a bone of him shall not be
broken" (John xix. 36). By the same argument—of inutility—Pilate was
prevented from releasing Christ. "If thou let this man go, thou art not
Caesar’s friend" (John xix. 12). Thus, also, Pharaoh did not wish to let the
people of God go (Exod. chapters 5, 6 and 7). By the argument from the
unrighteous or dishonest, David was prevented from slaying Saul, when he had
fallen into his hands; "The Lord forbid that I should stretch forth my hand
against the anointed of the Lord" (1 Sam. xxiv. 6).
It is sufficient, for the prevention of an act by the argument of suasion,
that the act should seem to be impossible, useless, or unrighteous to those,
by whom God wills that it should not be performed, even if it is not so in
reality. Thus the Israelites were prevented from going up into the promised
land, when they learned, from the spies, the strength of the nations, and
the defenses of the cities, thinking that it would not be possible for them
to overcome them (Num. 13 and 14). Thus David was prevented from fighting,
for the Philistines, against Saul and the Israelites; for the Philistines
said to their king—"let him not go down with us to battle, lest, in the
battle, he be an adversary to us" (1 Sam. xxii. 4).
Thus Ahaz was prevented from asking a sign of the Lord, at the suggestion of
Isaiah, the prophet; for he said, "I will not ask, neither will I tempt the
Lord (Isa. vii. 12). To this last argument pertain the revelations of the
Divine will, whether they are truly such, or are falsely so esteemed. Thus
David was prevented from building the temple of the Lord, by the Divine
prohibition in the mouth of Nathan (2 Sam. vii. 5 &c.), though he had
purposed, in his own mind, to do this for the glory of God. Thus Laban was
prevented from speaking "to Jacob either good or bad," for, he said, "it was
in the power of my hand to do you hurt" (Gen. xxxi. 29). The king of Babylon
being prevented by the oracle of his own gods, which he consulted, from
attacking the Ammonites, marched against the Jews, whom God wished to
punish. Each of these is not always used separately, from the others, by God
to prevent an act which He wishes should not be performed, but they are some
times presented, two or three together, as God knows may be expedient, to
the prevention of an act which He wishes to prevent.
We do not, in this place, professedly discuss what that action is, by which
God proposes suasory arguments, designed to act preventively on the will, to
the mind of the creature, inclined to the act and having strength adequate
to its performance. Yet it is certain, whatever that act may be, that it is
efficacious for prevention, and will certainly prevent, which efficacy and
certainty depends, not so much on the omnipotence of the divine action as,
on the prescience of God, who knows what arguments, in any condition of
things or at any time, will move the mind of man to that, to which God
desires to incline him, whether on account of His mercy or of His justice.
Yet, in my judgment, it is lawful so to distinguish that action as to say
that, on the one hand, it is that of the gracious and particular providence
of God, illuminating, by His Holy Spirit, the mind of the man who is
regenerate, and inclining his will, that he may will and not will that which
God purposes that he should will and not will, and that, indeed, of a pure
inclination to obey God; on the other hand, it is that of more general
providence, by which He acts on men as men, or as only morally good, that
they may not will, and may will, as God purposes that they should not will
and should will, though not with this event and purpose, that they should,
in their nolition or volition, obey God.
We now deduce, from this, the modes of permission, the opposite of
prevention, which are not to be separated like those of prevention, but are
to be united. For, as a single argument can act preventively on the will,
that it may not will what God purposes to prevent; so it is necessary that
all those arguments should be absent by which the will would be persuaded to
an act of nolition, otherwise, there would be no permission. Therefore, the
permission, by which God permits a rational creature to perform an act, to
the performance of which he has inclination and adequate strength, is the
suspension of all those impediments, by which the will was to have been
persuaded, and in fact moved to a nolition. For it can be that God, being
about to permit an act to the will of the creature, should so administer the
whole matter, that not only some arguments of dissuasion, but all conjoined,
may be presented to the will of a rational creature; yet, as persuasion can
but result from that presentation of arguments, which is also known to God,
it is from this fact that the presentation of arguments, is most consistent
with the permission of that thing to dissuade from which they were used.
Let us illustrate the subject by examples. God permitted the brethren of
Joseph to think of slaying him; (Gen. xxxvii. 18;) and at length they sold
him, not caring that he was their brother, and that they were forbidden, by
the laws of God, to commit murder, or to sell a free person into slavery.
So, also, He permitted the enemies of His Son to condemn him, though
innocent and unheard, and finally to slay him, setting at naught their own
law, which not only had been imposed on them by the Deity, but was called to
their remembrance, by Nicodemus, Joseph and others, in the inquiry, "Doth
our law judge any man before it hear him?" They obtained false witnesses,
and found that "their witness agreed not together" (Mark xiv. 56). Yet they
did that, which their envy and hatred against Christ dictated. Thus God
likewise permitted Saul to persecute David (1 Sam. 23 and 24), making no
account of the fact that he had been taught and convinced of David’s
innocence by his own son, and by personal experience. From this discussion,
it is apparent that a difference must be made between a sufficient and an
efficacious impediment, and that the permission of which we here treat, is a
suspension of efficacious impediment. A sufficient impediment is used, by
God, partly to declare that the act, to prevent which He takes care that
those arguments should be proposed, and presented, is displeasing to
Himself, partly that they may be more inexcusable, who do not permit
themselves to be prevented; and even that He may the more, on account of
their iniquity, incite them to the act which is so eagerly performed. Then
we have this three-fold permission of the Deity—first, that by which God
leaves any act to the decision of a rational creature, not restraining it by
any law; secondly, that by which He permits an act, in respect to the
capability of the creature; third, that by which He permits the act, in
respect to the inclination and will of the creature. The last two can not be
disjoined in a subject, though they can and ought to be suitably
distinguished from each other. For it is necessary that an act, which God
does not will to prevent, should be permitted both to the capability and the
will of the creature, since, by the sole inhibition, either of the
capability, or of the will, an impediment is presented to the act such that
it is not performed.
Some may say that the species or modes of prevention are not sufficiently
enumerated; as no act is prevented in its causes only, but also, in itself.
It is necessary to an act, not only that God should bestow both the power
and the will, that he should produce the effect itself, and without the
intervention of means. It must follow, therefore, that an act will not be
certainly produced, even if God should bestow the power and the will, and
hence, it is possible that an act should be prevented, even if God does not
present an impediment to the capability or the will, that is, if He
withholds from the creature his own concurrence, either active or motive,
which is immediately necessary to produce the act. From this, it can be
deduced, also, that an act is not fully permitted, even if it is left by God
to the capability and will of the creature, unless God has determined to
unite immediately to produce the same act, by his own act, motion, or
concurrence. I reply, that I do not deny the necessity of that concurrence
or immediate act of God to the production of an act; but I say that it has
once been determined by God, not to withhold, from His creatures His own
concurrence, whether general or special, for the producing those acts, to
perform which He has given to His creatures the power and the will or which
He has left to the power and will of His creatures; otherwise, He has, in
vain, bestowed the power and the will, and He has, without reason, left the
act to the capability and the will of the creature. I add that an example of
an impediment, of that kind, can not be given, that is, an impediment,
placed by God, in the way of an act permitted to the capability and will of
a creature, by withholding from the creature His own immediate concurrence.
I, therefore, conclude that the modes or species of prevention, and
therefore, of permission, have been sufficiently enumerated. I grant that
not only much light, but also completeness, will be added to the doctrine of
the divine permission, if it not only may be shown how God prevents acts,
for which rational creatures have an inclination and sufficient strength,
but may be explained, with accuracy, how God produces and effects His own
acts and His own works, through His rational creatures, whether good or bad.
In which investigation, many learned and pious men have toiled, and have
performed labour, not to be regretted; yet I think that so many things
remain to be solved and explained, that no genius, however surpassing, can
be sufficient for all of them, and so it can be truly said that the mine of
this truth is not only deep and profound, but also inexhaustible. Yet, if we
descend into it with soberness, and, following the thread and guidance of
the Holy Scriptures, there is no doubt that it will be granted unto us to
draw thence so much as God, the only fountain and giver of the truth, knows
will conduce to the salvation of the church, and to the sanctification of
His name in this world, to whom be glory for ever, through Jesus Christ.
Amen.
Having thus discussed the subject of permission in general, let us now
consider the permission of sin. At the outset, it must be understood that
sin is not permitted in the first mode of permission, for it is sin in that
it is forbidden by the law, therefore, it can not be permitted by the law;
else, the same thing is sin and not sin; sin in that it is forbidden, and
not sin, in that it is permitted, and not forbidden. Yet, since it is said
truly that sin is permitted by God, it is certain that it is permitted in
some way, which will, generally considered, be a suspension of all those
impediments by the interposition of which sin could not be committed by the
creature. But the impediments by which sin, so far as it is sin, is
prevented, are the revelation of the divine will, and an act moving or
persuading to obedience to the divine will. From which it is evident that
permission of sin is a suspension of that revelation, or of that suasion, or
of both.
It may be stated, here, from the general definition of permission, that
revelation, motion, or suasion have so much efficacy, that if they are used
and applied, the sin would not, in fact, be committed. I say this, then: Let
no one think that God performs no act sufficient to prevent sin, when sin is
not, in fact, prevented, and thence conclude that God wills sin; and again,
let no one judge that, when God perform one or more acts, sufficient to
prevent sin, that He unwillingly permits sin. In the latter of which
remarks, we see that they are frequently mistaken, who do not consider the
subject with sufficient accuracy. For the sole consideration of efficacious
prevention, by the suspension of which, permission is properly and
adequately defined, effects, in view of the use of some, though
inefficacious, impediments, that we should understand that God does not will
sin, nor yet that he permits it unwillingly, because He has, in addition to
those sufficient impediments, also efficacious ones in the storehouse of His
wisdom and power, by the production of which, sin would be certainly and
infallibly prevented.
That, what has been thus said by us, in general terms, may be more evident,
let us explain, with a little more particularity, in reference to
differences of sin. Sin is either of omission or of commission. Sin of
omission is a neglect of an act, prescribed and commanded by law; sin of
commission, is a performance of that, which is forbidden and prohibited by
law. But since, in a preceptive law, not a good act, only, is enjoined, but
its cause, mode and purpose, also in a prohibitive law, not a bad act, only,
is forbidden, but also the cause and purpose of the omission, it is apparent
that sin, both against a preceptive law, and against a prohibitive law, is
two-fold: against a preceptive law if the enjoined act is omitted, and if it
is performed unlawfully as to manner and purpose; and against a prohibitive
law, by performing an action, and by not performing, but omitting it with an
unlawful reason and purpose. The examples are plain. He, who omits to bestow
alms on the poor, sins in omitting a prescribed act. He, who bestows alms on
the poor that he may be seen of men, sins in omitting the due reason, and
purpose of the bestowal. He, who steals, sins in committing a forbidden act;
he, who abstains from theft, that his iniquity may be covered for the time
and may afterwards more deeply injure his neighbour, sins in omitting the
forbidden act with a wrong purpose. The divine permission is to be
accommodated to each of the modes both of mission and of commission.
Sin is distributed, in respect to its causes, into sin of ignorance, of
infirmity, and of malice; and by some, an additional distinction is made,
namely, sin of negligence or thoughtlessness, as different and separate from
the former, while others think that this is embraced in the three species
previously mentioned.
The divine permission is also adjusted to these differences. It would be an
endless work to present all the divisions and differences of sin, and to
show how the divine permission is related to each class. But we must not
omit that, in sin, not it alone but the act also, blended with it, is to be
considered, as in sin there is the transgression of the law, and the act,
that is the act, simply as such, and the act, as forbidden or prescribed,
the omission of which prescript is sin. But permission can be considered,
either in respect to the act, or to the transgression, for sin is prevented
in the prevention of the act, without which sin can not be committed. Again,
the act is prevented in the prevention of the sin, which necessarily inheres
and adheres to the act, so that the act itself can not be performed without
sin. For one may abstain from an act, towards which he is borne by his
inclination, because it can not be performed without sin; another, on the
contrary, abstains from sin because he is not inclined to the act itself.
When he abstains from the act because it is sin, he abstains from sin per
se, from the act incidentally: but when he abstains because the act is not
pleasant to him, he abstains from the act per se, from sin incidentally.
When also an act, is permitted as an act, it is permitted per se, sin is
permitted incidentally. When sin is permitted as sin, it is permitted per
se, the act is permitted incidentally. All of which things are to be
diligently considered in reference to the subject of permission, that it may
be understood what efficiency God suspends in that permission, and what
efficiency He uses to no purpose—to no purpose in relation to the event, in
that sin is not omitted, not to no purpose in relation to the objects which
God has proposed to Himself, the best and the most wisely intended, and most
powerfully obtained. But though we have already discussed the permission of
acts in general, it will not be superfluous to treat here of the same, so
far as those acts are blended with sin, and sin with them; though, in the
mean time, the principal reference in this discussion, must be to the
permission of sin, as such. For, as these two are so connected, that they
can not be separated in an individual subject, the very necessity of their
coherence seems to demand that we should speak of the permission of both in
connection, though of the permission of sin per se, and of the act
incidentally. But since the relation of sin appears, most plainly, in an act
committed against a prohibitive law, as omission of good may be often
comprehended under it by synecdoche, as in the definitions of sin, -- "it is
that which is done contrary to the law,"—also, "a desire, word, or deed
against the law,"—it will not be irrelevant to show, in the first place, how
God permits that sin, whether as it is a sin, or as it is an act, which He
permits, or in both relations.
We will present the modes of permission corresponding to the contrary modes
of prevention, as before. The murder which Ahab and Ahaziah intended to
perpetrate on the prophet Elijah, was an act, which, being performed would
have taken away the life of Elijah, and it was a sin against the sixth
commandment of God. God prevented that murder, not as a sin, but as an act.
This is apparent from the mode of prevention, for in one instance, he took
Elijah out of the hands of Ahab, and in another He consumed, with fire sent
down from heaven, those who had been sent to take the prophet (2 Kings 1).
The former case was according to the fourth mode, heretofore mentioned; the
latter was, according to the first mode, in opposition to the power of
Ahaziah and in this case prevented the effect. David, being instigated by
his followers to slay Saul, his persecutor and enemy, refused, being
restrained from that act, not as an act, but as a sin, for he said "The Lord
forbid that I should stretch forth my hand against him, seeing he is the
anointed of the Lord" (1 Sam. xxiv. 6).
The mode of prevention was by a revelation of the divine will, and by a
persuasion to obedience, and was suitable to the prevention of sin as such.
The defilement of Sarah, the wife of Abraham when she was brought to
Abimelech, would have been an act, by which, as the violation of Sarah’s
chastity, would have caused great grief to Abraham, and would have been a
sin against the seventh precept of the Decalogue. It was divinely prevented,
if you consider the mode of prevention, as far as it was sin. For God, in a
dream, revealed to him that she was "a man’s wife" (Gen. xx. 3), and he
could not, without sin, have carried out his design. If you examine the
design and reason of the prevention, it was both in respect to the act and
to the sin; as an act, because it would have caused indelible grief to
Abraham, and from this God wished to spare his servant; as sin, because God
knew that Abimelech would have done this "in the integrity of his heart"
(6th v.) and He, therefore, withheld him from sin, in adultery with the wife
of his friend.
Let us look at the opposite modes of permission in examples, also selected
from the Scriptures. The sale of Joseph, made by his brethren, (Gen. 37),
was an act and a sin; also, the affliction by which Satan tried Job, the man
of God (Job. 1 & 2). Both were permitted by God. Was this in respect to the
act or to its sin? This can not be gathered from the mode of the permission,
for God abstains from all modes of restraint when He permits any thing, and
if He did not so abstain, He would prevent, and then would, consequently, be
neither the act nor sin. But, from the end and the mode of effecting the
permitted act and sin, a judgment may be formed of the respect according to
which God has permitted the act of sin. From the sale of Joseph resulted his
removal to Egypt, his elevation to the highest dignity, in that land from
which, food, necessary for his father’s family, could be procured, in a time
of most direful famine. God declares that He sent him into Egypt for this
purpose. All this resulted from the sale, not as it was a sin, but as an
act. In the affliction of Job, God desired that the patience and constancy
of His servant should be tried, and it was tried by the affliction not as a
sin but as an act. On the other hand, God permitted David to number the
people (2 Sam. 24), and Ahab to slay Naboth (1 Kings 21), in which cases the
numbering of the people, and the murder were acts, but were permitted as
sin. For God purposed to punish Israel, and that Ahab should fill up the
measure of his crimes. It is, indeed, true that God also wished to take
pious Naboth from this vale of sorrows to the heavenly land; this was
effected by the murder, not as it was a sin, but as an act. Yet the proper,
immediate, and adequate reason that God permitted Ahab to perpetrate that
murder, is that of which I have spoken—the measure of his crimes was to be
filled. For God could, in some other way, without human sin, have called
Naboth to Himself. Again, God permitted Absalom to pollute, by incest, the
wives or concubines of his father, and this was done in respect to both. For
it was permitted both as an act, and as sin. As an act, it served for the
chastisement of David who had adulterously polluted the wife of Uriah; as a
sin, it was permitted, because God wished that Absalom, by his crime, should
cut off all hope of reconciliation with his offended father, and, in this
way, hasten his own destruction, the just punishment of rebellion against
his father. In both respects, also, God permitted Ahab to go up to
Ramoth-Gilead contrary to the word of the Lord; as a sin, because God wished
to punish him; as an act because God wished that he should be slain in that
place, to which he came by the act of going up. From these examples a
judgment may be formed of similar cases. Thus far in reference to permission
of sin, which consists in the perpetration of an act, prohibited by law.
Let us now consider sin, as it is committed when an act, forbidden by law,
is not performed, but omitted not from a due reason and purpose. Here the
act is prevented, but sin is not prevented. There is, then, in this case,
the permission of sin only, as such, and the mode of permission is a
suspension of the revelation of the divine will, or at least of suasion and
motion to obedience to the known will of God. For the creature omits the
act, not because God has forbidden it, but for some other reason. Thus the
brothers of Joseph omitted to slay him, as they had determined to do, not
because they began to think that this crime would displease God, but
because, from the words of Judah, they thought it useless, and that it would
be better to sell him into bondage (Gen. 37). Absalom, after thousands of
followers had been collected, omitted to pursue his fleeing father as
Ahithophel counseled him, not because he considered it wrong to pursue his
father, for he was wholly hostile to him, but he followed the counsel of
Hushai, because he considered that the curse, advised by Ahithophel, would
be dangerous for himself and the people. In this and similar examples, we
see that God restrained an act, which had been forbidden and therefore was
sin, and yet did not prevent sin, which was committed by those, who omitted
that forbidden act; but he permitted them to sin in the mode of omitting the
forbidden act. The reason is manifest, as by the act, a person, whom God
purposes to spare, would be injured, but no one but the sinner himself is
injured by sin committed in an undue omission of an act, as is just. Indeed
by the prevention of an act, there is prepared for the persons, who have
omitted an act, the punishment due to them both on account of this sin of
undue omission, and for other reasons, as happened to Absalom.
We now proceed to the permission of sin, which is committed in the mere
omission of an act, which has been commanded. This is permitted by God, as
it is an omission of an act, and as it is sin. God, I assert, permits that
act, which the law commands to be omitted, either as it is an act, or as it
is sin. God permitted the sons of Eli to disobey the admonitions of their
father, (1 Sam. ii. 25); Saul, to spare the king of the Amalekites, (1 Sam.
xv. 8); the Israelites, when the statement of the spies had been made, to
refuse to go up into the promised land, (Num. xiv. 4), the citizens of
Succoth and Penuel, to deny bread to the army of Gideon, (Judges viii. 6 &
8); Ahab, to send away Benhadad alive, a man devoted to death by the Lord,
(1 Kings xx, xxxiv, ); Festus, before whom Paul was accused, not to
pronounce sentence against him, and in favour of the Jews, (Acts xxv. 12);
&c. He permitted all these things partly as they were omissions of acts,
partly as they were sins, that is, omissions contrary to a preceptive law,
which imposed commands, partly in both respects. In reference to the sons of
Eli, the Scripture says—"they hearkened not unto the voice of their father,
because the Lord would slay them." The permitted omission of obedience thus
far was sin. The omission by Saul of the slaughter of those, whom God willed
and commanded to be slain, was permitted as it was a sin, not as it was the
omission of an act, by the performance of which they would have been
deprived of life. For God had determined to take away the kingdom of Saul
from him, and had already denounced this against him, by the mouth of
Samuel, because he had sacrificed, not waiting for Samuel, (1 Sam. xiii.
9-14). Agag, also, was afterwards hewed in pieces before the Lord by the
prophet Samuel. The fact that the Israelites omitted to go up into the
promised land, as they had been commanded by the Lord, occurred because God
purposed that their bodies should fall in the wilderness, as they had so
often tempted God, and murmured against Him. Then that omission was
permitted as a sin. God permitted the citizens of Succoth and Penuel to
withhold bread from the army of Gideon, partly that He might test the
constancy of those, who were "pursuing after Zebah and Zalmunna," partly
that He might prepare punishment for the citizens of Succoth and Penuel. In
this case then, the omission of the act was permitted as it was such, and as
it was sin. For as, being provided with food, they would have been
strengthened, who were pursuing the Midianites, so the omission of the act,
as such, on their part, was grievous and to be worthy of punishment. The
sending away of Benhadad, or his release from death was permitted by God, as
a sin—a sin, committed against an express command—for God purposed that Ahab
should heap up wrath against the day of wrath, on account of his heinous
sins; and also as an act, as He purposed that Benhadad, in the prolongation
of his life, by the omission of an act commanded by God, might fight
afterwards with Ahab, and, after his death, with the Israelites, and besiege
Samaria to the great injury of its inhabitants. Festus was permitted by God,
to refrain from acquitting Paul—according to law and right as he could be
convicted of no crime—in respect to the act as such, and not as sin. For,
from that omission resulted a necessity for the appeal of Paul to Caesar,
which was the occasion of his departure to Rome, where God willed that he
should bear testimony concerning His Son.
In respect to sin, when a prescribed act is performed unduly as to manner
and design, it is certain that it is permitted as such, for in it nothing is
permitted except the omission of a due mode and purpose, which omission is
purely sinful. This is evident from the mode of permission, which, in this
case, is certain; namely, the suspension of efficiency by which sin, as sin,
is permitted. Joab performed many distinguished deeds and those prescribed
by God, in fighting bravely, against the enemies of the people of God, in
behalf of Israel, that it might be well for the people of God; but God did
not incline his mind to do this from a right motive. It is apparent that he
sought his own glory, in those deeds, from the fact that he, by wicked
treachery, destroyed men, equal to himself in bravery and generalship, that
he might be alone in honour. For the man who defends any cause, only that it
may be defended, and for the glory of God, will not be vexed that as many as
possible, endued with skill and bravery, should be united in its defense;
indeed, he would most deeply rejoice and be glad on this account.
As to the differences of sin in view of its causes—ignorance, infirmity,
malice, negligence—there is in respect to these a clear distinction in their
permission. For the permission of a sin of ignorance arises from the
suspension of the revelation of the divine will; of malice, from the
suspension of the act by which the perversity of the heart is corrected and
changed; of infirmity, from the withholding of strength to resist
temptation, of negligence, from the suspension of the act by which a serious
and holy care and anxiety is produced in us to watch our faculties, and to
walk in the law of the Lord. For God knows, when it seems good to him to
perform a work, by the acts of rational creatures, which can not be
committed by them without sin, how to suspend His own efficiency, so as to
permit His creatures to perform their own acts. He willed that His church
should be proved and purged by persecutions, and indeed by the act of Saul,
a man zealous for the law, who, from inconsiderate and preposterous love
towards his own religion, wished that the sect of the Nazarenes, so called
should be extirpated. That this might be effected through him, He suffered
him to be some time in ignorance, without which, as he was then constituted,
he would not have persecuted the church. For he says that he "did it
ignorantly" (1 Tim. i. 13). In the case of Julian the apostate, a most foul
persecutor of the church, God did not correct his willful and obstinate
hatred of Christ and his church. For when he was convinced of the truth of
the Christian doctrine, he could have persecuted it only through willful
malice. God’s procedure, in not correcting that hatred, was deserved by him,
who, willingly and of his own fault, had apostatized from Christ. God
purposed that Peter, presuming too much on himself, should come to a
knowledge of himself, and He suffered him to deny his Master, from fear of
death, not affording him such support of His Spirit, as to move him to dare
to profess Christ openly, despising the fear of death. David, being freed
from his enemies, and having conquered many neighbouring kings and nations,
began to guard his steps with too little care, and heedlessly gave himself
up to negligence, especially because he had Joab, a distinguished general
and skilled in military duties, in whom, on account of consanguinity, he
could trust; from this it happened that he fell into that shameful adultery
with the wife of Uriah. But God permitted him to fall into that negligence,
and on that occasion to commit sin, that he might be more diligently
watchful over himself, mourn on account of his own sin for an example to
others, afford a distinguished specimen and example of humility and
repentance, and rise more gloriously from his sin. It would be tedious to
remark the same thing in each kind of sin; but let these suffice, as
exhibiting the means and mode of forming a correct judgment in reference to
permission. But though the whole complex matter, which is made up of act and
transgression, may be permitted by God, through a suspension of all divine
acts, by the use of which, on the part of God, the act, either as an act or
as sin, would have been prevented, yet it is useful to consider, distinctly,
in what respect that permission may be given by God, and what efficiencies,
and of what kind, He suspends, that He may not hinder the commission or
omission of an act prescribed or forbidden. For in this the divine goodness,
wisdom and power, and even justice is seen as distinctly as possible, and it
is most clearly proved how God, in all his own action, restraint and
permission, is free from blame, and without sin, and by no means to be
considered the author of sin. In showing which, it is so much the more
evident how easily they may fall into absurdity and blasphemy, who refer,
indeed, to a providence, acting, restraining, permitting, but not with
sufficient distinctness, accuracy, and diligence, bringing together and
comparing them, and distinguishing each from the others.
The individual causes of permission, in its variety and in that of the
permitted acts, and of sins, are, at the same time, various and manifold,
and not generally explicable, which can, perhaps, in some way, be
demonstrated by those, who have their senses exercised in divine things, and
are accustomed to consider them with earnest study. Two general or universal
reasons can be presented for the fact that God permits events in general,
and why He permits any particular event. One is the freedom of the will,
which God bestowed on rational creatures, and which He designed as the
mistress and the free source of their actions. The other is the declaration
of the divine glory, which is of such a character as not only to effect and
prevent that which can be effected and prevented, for his own glory, but
also so to reduce to order the acts of rational creatures which are
permitted, and which frequently deviate from the order, prescribed to them,
that from it the praise of the divine goodness, mercy, patience, wisdom,
justice and power may shine forth and be revealed. To which pertains that,
which is beautifully said by Augustine, "God has judged that it belongs to
His own omnipotent goodness to bring good out of evil rather than not to
permit evil to exist."
The creature is likewise to be considered, to whom is granted the permission
of an act of commission or of omission, which can not, without sin, be
committed or omitted; namely, as to his character at the time when that act
is permitted to him, whether, as only created, and remaining in his primeval
integrity, or as fallen from that state; again, whether made a partaker of
grace, or invited to a participation of grace; whether brought to that
state, or resisting grace, or not sufficiently solicitous to receive it, and
to continue in it, and the like. For God can deny to any creature,
considered as such, action, motion, efficiency, concurrence, either general
or special, of nature or of grace, of providence or predestination—though I
do not dare to make a confident assertion in reference to the act of
Predestination—which act and concurrence, which motion and efficiency He
could not, without injustice, deny to the same creature considered in a
different relation. But a permission of sin depends, as we have before seen,
on a suspension of the divine act, motion, efficiency, &c.
He, however, who wishes to discuss fully and thoroughly the subject of
permission must, of necessity, treat of the general providence of God, and
of that special providence, which preserves, governs, rules, effects,
prevents and permits. For, as permission is opposed to prevention, by the
mode either of privation or of contradiction, so it is opposed to efficiency
by negation; and it is the nature of permission to have, antecedent to
itself, various acts of God concerning the same creature, to which
permission is granted, and concerning that act which is permitted. If these
acts of God are not accurately explained, it can not be understood what that
efficiency is, in the suspension of which, permission properly and
immediately consists. This, also, is the reason that many, when they hear
any thing concerning permission, immediately, in their own minds, conceive
of inactive quiet, and abstinence from all effort on the part of providence;
others, considering the power and efficacy of that providence, which is
present in and presides over all things and acts, either reject the idea of
permission, or acknowledge it only in word, in the mean time, so explaining
it as to resolve it into a certain act of God, and into the efficiency of
providence. But these errors are both to be avoided, lest we should take
away, from the divine providence, acts which belong to it, or should
attribute to it things foreign to it, and unworthy of His justice. In
reference to the remarks, already made, some one will object that I
attribute to permission not only the illegality and the irregularity of the
act, but also the act itself; and thus remove from the operation of the
divine will and efficiency, not only the illegality of the act, but the act
itself. He will say that, in this, he perceives a double error; first,
because I attribute sin, simply and taken in any respect, to permission, and
remove it from the divine efficiency and will; when it ought, in a certain
respect, to be attributed to the divine efficiency and will; secondly,
because I take away, from the efficiency and the will of God, the act which
is the first and supreme cause of all being. Let us examine a little more
closely both objections. We explain the former by the sentiments of the
objector himself. In sin there are three respects; for there is, first,
guilt; second, punishment; third, the cause of other sins. Indeed God is
not, they say, the cause of sin in respect to its guilt, but to its
punishment, and to its being the cause of other sins. They affirm that God
is, without controversy, the cause of punishment, because that is an act of
justice, by which sin, deviating from the law of the prescriptive justice of
God, is brought under the rule of divine punitive justice. That sin is of
God, as it is the cause of other sins, they, also, prove from the acts of
blinding, hardening, giving over to a reprobate mind, which are acts of God
and are causes of sins. I answer; -- to the first, that the objection is not
valid against all sins. For the first sin, committed by a creature, can not
be the punishment of another sin. There are also many sins which are not, in
fact, the causes of other sins; for God may so administer and dispense the
fall and the sins of His creatures, as that they may result in good, that is
a greater odium against sin, and a more diligent solicitude and anxiety to
guard their own steps. Therefore many sins, contrary to this objection, come
to partake of an opposite character, by the permission of God, and in no
respect by His efficiency. It will be said, in reply, that there are,
nevertheless, many sins which must be considered in those three respects: of
these at least, it may be proper to say, that in the last two respects they
have God, as their cause and author. I answer secondly, that there is no act
or sin, which has, at the same time, the relation of guilt, of punishment,
and of the cause of another sin, if these things may be correctly and
strictly considered. I confess that this is usually said, and is common with
many who treat of this subject.
I will prove my assertion, first by argument, then by presenting examples of
blinding and hardening. That no act at the same time, sin and punishment, is
certain, since sin is voluntary, punishment is involuntary; sin is action,
punishment is passion; by punishment sin is brought into subjection, but sin
is not brought into subjection by sin; but by punishment, I say, differing
from sin or guilt, not in relation only, but in the thing and subject which
is the act. When this is said by learned men, a reason ought to be assigned
for this opinion. I acknowledge it; but let us consider the sense in which
this is said and understood by them. They say that sin is the punishment of
sin, because, on account of previous sin, God permits the sinner to commit
another sin, and, indeed, suspends some of His own acts, and performs
others, in which case the creature will sin of his own wickedness, and will
commit other sins, on account of which he deserves greater punishment and
condemnation, and thus, as sin deserves greater punishment, it is said to be
the punishment of sin by a metonymy of cause and effect. In this sense they
understand their own declaration, or it can not be sustained. But that no
sin is, at the same time, guilt and the cause of another sin, is also true,
if it may be rightly understood; that is, a proximate and immediate cause.
It is, indeed, the meritorious cause of another sin, that is, it deserves
that God should afterwards suspend some act, and perform other acts, which
being performed, he will, of his own wickedness, as said before, commit some
sin; it is also the preparatory cause of the perpetration of other sins: for
by sin the conscience is wounded, desire for prayer, and confidence in it
are destroyed, a habit of sinning is prepared, a power over the sinner is
granted to Satan, from which an easy lapse into other sins readily follows;
yet it is not the proximate and immediate cause of another sin. "It is
nevertheless a cause," some may say, "though remote and meritorious." What
then? By this very distinction the whole force of the objection is
destroyed. By it, God is made the cause of some acts, the creature will, of
His own wickedness, deservedly add another sin to the former, and God is
absolved from the charge of being the cause of sin, which deserved that He
should perform those acts of sin, as it is the cause of another sin. For the
action of the Deity intervenes between the sin, which is the cause of
another sin, and that consequent sin. In that objection, however, it was
inferred that God is the cause of sin, in that He is the occasion of the
second sin. That error arises from the confusion and the inaccurate
consideration of those acts. Sin, in the relation of guilt, is first in
order, then follows demerit or conviction to punishment, from the justice of
God; which is the act of God, who punishes that sin by merited desertion,
and blindness. But "blindness," you say, "is sin or guilt, and the
punishment of previous sin, and the cause of subsequent sin, and God is the
cause of blindness." The truth of what has been previously said may be
demonstrated in this example. That blindness, judicially produced by God, is
correctly said to be the punishment of previous sin, and can, if rightly
understood, be said to be the cause of consequent sins, that is, by a
removal of restraining grace, and by the performance of some acts, from
which it will follow that the creature, thus blinded and left, will, of his
own wickedness, commit sin. But that blindness is not sin or guilt. A
distinction is to be made between the blindness as the act of God to which
man is judicially subjected, and the blindness of man himself by which he
renders his own mind hard and obstinate against God, which is the act of
man, produced by wickedness and obstinate pertinacity. These acts indeed
concur, but do not coincide, nor are they one single action, made up of the
efficiency of those concurrent actions, which together make up one total
cause of that act, which is called blindness. Learned men often speak in
such a manner, I grant, but not with sufficient distinctness; and perhaps in
a sense which agrees with my explanation, and is not contrary to it. For
they use the term blindness, in a complex and indistinct manner, for the act
and its result, or the work and its effect, which is, thereby, produced in
the person made blind, which may be called passive blindness, produced by
that active blindness. Of blindness, thus confusedly and indistinctly
considered, it may be said that it is sin, the punishment of sin, and the
cause of sin, but this is not at variance with my opinion, for I deny that
God is the cause of that blindness, so far as it is sin and guilt. Active
blindness—as we now term it, by way of distinction—which is produced by a
man, making himself blind, is sin, for it is a great crime to harden one’s
own mind against God. Active blindness, which proceeds from God, is the
punishment of previous sin, by which the sinner has merited to himself
desertion, and privation of grace. The active blindness, which is from man,
and that, which is from God, concur to the same effect, which is passive
blindness, which is, properly, punishment. Finally, the active blindness of
man, blinding himself, and that of God, blinding man, is the cause of the
accumulation of other sins with those previously committed, by the blinded
sinner, but in the mode of which I have spoken. I answer, that if it is true
that one and the same act is sin or guilt, the punishment of sin, and the
cause of subsequent sin, then it can not be true that God is its cause,
according to the last two relations, and not according to the first, for a
twofold reason. First, this distinction of relation can not effect that God
should be the cause of one thing, and not of another, in fact, joined to it,
unless in that mode, which will be hereafter explained, which they exclude
from this subject, who say that blindness, produced by God, is sin, and the
cause of sin. These respects are useful to a mind, intelligent and able to
discriminate between things most intimately connected, which constitutes
actually and numerically, one thing, but considered in different relations,
they can not have place in actual efficiency, the limit of which is real
existence. God inflicts punishment on a person who is a sinner, and His
creature; the act of infliction does not distinguish the creature from the
sinner, but the mind of Him, who punishes, makes the distinction, for it
knows how to punish the creature, not as such, but as sinful. This error is
frequently committed, that relations are carried further than their nature
may permit. Secondly, because of those three relations, order, nature, and
causality, the former is that in which sin is considered as guilt, the
latter two are those in which it is considered as punishment, and the cause
of consequent sin. God is the first cause of all effects, which He produces
with or by His creatures; but, in this case, He will be a subsequent cause,
for He will produce, in the relation of subsequent respects, an act, which
the creature produces in the relation of prior respect, which is absurd, and
inverts the order of causality and efficiency, which exists between first
and second causes. There may, indeed, be supposed to exist a concurrence,
which we shall hereafter explain; but they, who say that the blindness,
inflicted by the Deity, is the cause of consequent sins, and at the same
time a sin, deny that this concurrence has any place here. These things,
indeed, I have thought, ought to be explained, somewhat fully, on account of
the difficulty of the subject itself, and of preconceived opinions.
Let us proceed to the second objection, which we thus set forth, according
to the meaning of its authors. "In sin there are two things, the act and its
illegality, or violation of law. As an act, it is positive; as a violation
of law, it is privative: the latter has the will of the creature for its
cause; the former must necessarily be referred back to the first cause, and,
in this relation, God is the cause of that act which, in respect to man, or
as it proceeds from man, is sin. Therefore it is wrong to remove the act,
which is not performed by a man without sin, from the divine will and
efficiency, and attribute it to the divine permission, since that act, as
such, belongs to efficiency, but as it violates law, it belongs to the
divine permission. I reply, first, that it can not be said truly, and
universally of all sin, that in it there are these two things, namely, the
act and the violation. For, sometimes, it is the act itself which is
prohibited, and sometimes, not the act itself, but some circumstance in
reference to the act. Thus the eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge
of good and evil was prohibited, not any circumstance connected with it;
and, therefore, the act of eating, itself, was undue, unlawful and
inordinate; it was, indeed, in itself a deviation from the rule, that is,
from the law which forbade the eating. That act, of and in itself, apart
from the law, is a natural act and has, in itself, no inordinacy. But after
the enactment of a law which prohibits eating, that act, can not be
considered as good, agreeably to its natural relations, as there is added to
it the fact of inordinacy, on account of which it ought to be omitted; for
it is then to be omitted, of itself and on its own account, because it is
forbidden by the divine law, and because to eat is to sin, the whole
inordinacy consisting in the fact that the act of eating, referred to, has a
place in the number and series of human actions, which place it ought not,
on any account, to have, and the number of which ought not to increase, but
it ought to be wholly omitted, and to be kept under restraint, and to be
never carried into effect.
The simile of a lame horse, which very many adduce to illustrate this
matter, is not applicable to an act, which is prohibited by law. For in
lameness there is the gait, and there is the limping or irregular gait; and
a defect is added to the gait or motion on account of weakness or injury of
a leg, which defect, though it may not, in fact be separated from the gait
itself, can, nevertheless, be readily distinguished from it; and hence it
may occur that the same horse, after the cure has been effected, can walk
properly, and so lameness will be separated from his gait. But in the eating
of the forbidden fruit, it was not the eating and the defect of eating,
which was forbidden, but the eating itself, wholly and solely, had the
relation of sin, because it was committed contrary to the law. That simile
would be applicable in sin, which is committed against a law which
prescribes the act itself, but prohibits some circumstance of the act; which
sin consists in the fact that an act, good, according to, and prescribed by
the law, is performed in a manner, which is not right, as when alms are
given to a poor man, from ambition and pride, that he, who bestows them, may
appear unto men to be liberal and a lover of the poor, and even religious.
That act is good and may be illustrated by the gait, but the defect in it is
like the lameness produced by disease or injury, and causes the act to limp,
and to be displeasing to God, yet it is not to be omitted, but to be
performed, only in a due and right manner, all defectiveness being avoided
and omitted, which, rightly and in fact, can and ought to be separated from
it. I acknowledge that the question or objection is not satisfied by that
answer; for some one may affirm, that, "eating is nevertheless, a positive
act, and, therefore, has an existence, though forbidden, and since all
existence has God as its cause, God also is the cause of that act of eating;
and so, also, of other positive acts, though they may be committed against a
prohibitory law; and consequently, sin, as an act can not be removed from
the efficiency of God."
I reply, that I, by no means, take from the efficiency of God an act, which
is not perpetrated by the creature without sin; indeed, I openly confess
that God is the cause of all acts, which are perpetrated by His creatures,
but I desire this only that the efficiency of God should be so explained as
not to derogate any thing from the freedom of the creature, and not to
transfer the fault of his sin to God; that is, to show that God may, indeed,
be the effector of the act, but only the permitter of the sin; and that God
may be at once the effector and permitter of one and the same act. This
subject is of most difficult explanation, yet we may make some effort
towards its elucidation.
I remark, then, that God is, either mediately or immediately, the cause of
an act which proceeds from a creature. He is the mediate cause, when He
exerts an influence upon the cause and moves it to cause the act. He is the
immediate cause, when He exerts an influence on the act and, with the
creature, is the whole cause of that act. When God moves the creature to
cause anything, since the creature, as the second and subordinate cause, is
determined by the first moving cause to a particular act, which has its form
from the influence and motion of the Deity, that act, whatever may be its
character, can not be imputed, as a fault to the creature; but if the act
can be called sin, God is necessarily the cause and the author of that sin.
But since the latter idea can never be true, it is certain that the
explanation can not be found in that mode of the mediate action of the
Deity, how God is the cause of the act, which is not performed by man
without sin, and the permitter of the sin. When God is the immediate cause
of an act, which proceeds from a creature, then the second cause, if it is
free, and we are now treating of free agents has it in its own power either
to exert its influence in the act, or suspend that influence so that the act
may not take place, and to exert its influence so that one act, rather than
another, may be performed. Hence it follows, that, when a second cause has
freely exerted its influence to produce all act, and when, by its particular
influence, it has determined the general influence of God to this particular
act, and has disposed the form of the act, the second cause is responsible,
and the act may be deservedly called "sin" in respect to the second cause;
but God is free from responsibility, and, in respect to Him, the act can not
be called sin.
The concurrence and influence of the Deity bestows nothing upon the free
will of the creature, by which he may be either inclined, or assisted, or
strengthened to act, and it does not in the first act, but in the second,
dispose the will, and therefore it presupposes, in the will, whatever is
necessary for acting, even without the exception of the concurrence of the
Deity itself. Though the will of the free creature may not, in reality, have
that concurrence, except when he puts forth activity, yet he has it in his
own power before he performs that which is prepared for, and imposed upon
him. If this is not so, the will can not be said to have the act in its own
power, or in its proximate capability; nor can the cause of that act be
called moral but natural only, and therefore necessary, to which sin can, by
no means, be attributed.
In this way that difficulty is solved, and it is shown how God can be the
cause of an act, which can not be performed by the creature without sin, so
that neither He may be the author of sin, nor the creature be free from sin;
that He, indeed, may be only the permitter of sin, but the creature may be
the proper cause of sin. For God leaves to the choice of a free second cause
the disposition of its own influence to effect any act, and when the second
cause is in the very movement and instant of exerting its influence, God,
freely and of His own choice, joins His influence and universal concurrence
to the influence of the creature, knowing that, without His influence, the
act neither could nor would be produced. Nor is it right that God should
deny His concurrence and influence to the creature, even if He sees that the
influence of the creature, exerted to effect an act, which he is just ready
to perform, is joined to sin, and is committed contrary to His law. For it
is right that the act, which He left to the freedom of man, when the law had
not yet been enacted by which that act was afterwards forbidden, should be
left to the freedom of the same creature, after the enactment of the law. A
law would be imposed, in vain, on an act, for the performance of which God
should determine to deny His own concurrence. In that case, it could not be
performed by the creature, and therefore no necessity would exist that its
performance should be forbidden to the creature by a law. Besides God, in
His legislation, designed to test the obedience of His creature; but this He
could not do, if He determined to deny, to the creature, His concurrence to
an act, forbidden by law; for apart from that concurrence, the creature can
not perform that act. Why should God, in reference to an act, to which, as
naturally good, determined not to deny His concurrence, deny that same
concurrence, when the act has been made morally evil by the enactment of
law; when He declares and testifies in His own legislation, that He wills
that the creatures should abstain from that act, in that it is morally evil,
and not in that it is an act, in its natural relations. But He wills that
the creature should abstain from the act, as evil, when He imposes upon him
a prohibitory law, to which he is bound to yield obedience. When, however,
He determines to deny His concurrence, He wills that, in its natural
relations, it shall not be performed by the creature. For the former is a
kind of moral hindrance, the latter is a natural hindrance; the former, by
the enactment of law; the latter, by the denial of concurrence; -- by the
enactment of law, in view of which that act can not be committed without
sin, and by denial of concurrence, in view of which the act can not be
committed at all. If the latter impediment, that of the denial of
concurrence, exists, there is no necessity that the other, that of the
enactment of law, should be interposed.
It is apparent, from this explanation, that the creature, committing sin,
commits it in the full freedom of his will, both as to its exercise, and as
to the form of the action, to which two things the whole freedom of the will
is limited. Freedom, as to its exercise, is that by which the will can put
forth, and suspend volition and action. Freedom, as to the form of action is
that, by which, it wills and performs this rather than that action. We will
show that freedom, in both respects, exists, in another manner, in the act
of sin, which the creature performs with the general concurrence of God. In
the act of sin, its existence and its essence are to be considered. The
existence of the act depends on the freedom of the will, as to its exercise.
That its essence should be of this rather than of that character—that it
should be rather a forbidden act than one not forbidden, against this
precept rather than against that, depends on the freedom of the will as to
the form of action. That the act should exist, the creature effects by its
own free influence, by which it wills to do rather than not to do, though
not without the influence of the divine concurrence, uniting itself freely
to the influence of the creature at its very first moment and instant. But
that the act should be of one character rather than of another, the second
cause effects, freely determining its own act to a certain direction, to
this rather—than to that—that it should be one thing rather than another. If
any one says that, on this supposition, the divine concurrence is suspended
on the influence of the creature, I reply, that this does not follow from my
statements. Though God may not concur unless the creature wills to exert his
influence, yet the exertion of that influence depends purely, on his own
freedom; for he can omit that exertion.
It may be clear from this, how God is both the permitter of sin, and the
effector of an act, without which the creature can not commit sin; the
permitter of sin, in that He leaves to the creature the free disposition of
His own influence; the effector of an act, in that He joins His own
concurrence to the effort of the creature, without which the act could not
be, at all, performed by the creature.
If any one takes exception to this distinction, on account either of the
difficulty of the subject or of the defect of my explanation, and so
contends that efficiency in sin is in some respect to be ascribed to God,
because He is the effector of that act, I wish that he would consider that
God can, on the same principle, be called the permitter of the act, because
He is the permitter of the sin, and, indeed, far more justly, since, in His
own prohibition, He declares that He is unwilling that the act—already
permitted, not only to the freedom and the ability of the creature, but also
to its right and power—should be performed by the creature; by which
prohibition, that act is removed from the divine efficiency, only so far as
that ought to avail to deter the will of the creature from performing that
act; and, on the other hand, the efficiency of that act is, so much the
more, to be ascribed to the freedom of the will, as it can be understood to
have, more vehemently willed that which is forbidden by the divine law. But,
in whatever way that subject may be explained, it is carefully to be
observed, both that God be not made the author of sin, and that the act
itself be not taken away from the efficiency of God; that is, that the whole
act, both as an act merely, and as sin, may be rightly made subject to the
providence of God—as an act to efficient providence, as a sin to permissive
providence. If, however, there shall still be an inclination in the other
direction, there will be less error, if the act is taken away from the
divine efficiency, as an act, than if sin is attributed to the efficiency of
God, as a sin. For it is better to take away an act from the Deity, which
belongs to Him, than to attribute to Him an evil act, which does not belong
to Him; so that a greater injury is charged on God, if He is said to be the
cause of sin, than if He is regarded as an unconcerned spectator of an act.
_________________________________________________________________
ALLEGATION 4
"WE TEACH THAT THE GREATEST PART OF THE HUMAN RACE ARE LEFT WITHOUT CHRIST
AND WITHOUT ANY SAVING GRACE."
The meaning of this allegation, is that God, by His own eternal and
immutable decree, has determined, of His mere will to elect some, but to
reprobate others, and those the more numerous. Since the elect can not be
brought unto salvation, as having become sinners in Adam, unless
satisfaction to the justice of God, and expiation for sin should have been
made, therefore, God determined to give his own Son to them, as Mediator,
Reconciler, and Redeemer, who should assume human nature, for them only,
should die for their sins only, should reconcile them only to the Father,
should meritoriously obtain the Holy Spirit and eternal redemption for them
only, should offer, according to His purpose, grace to them only, should
call them, only, to faith, and should bestow, by an internal vocation, faith
on them, only, &c., to the exclusion, from all these things, of those whom
He reprobated, so that there should be to them no hope of salvation in
Christ, because God had willed from eternity that Christ should not be made
man for them, or die for them, apart from any consideration of their
unbelief; and when He arranged that the gospel should be preached also to
them, it was not done for their benefit, but because the elect were
intermingled with them, who, by that preaching, were according to the decree
of God, to be led to faith and salvation. You should, indeed, have answered
whether you admitted that allegation as made truly against your doctrine, or
whether you think your doctrine to be not amenable to it. You seem to admit
that this is truly your sentiment. It ought, indeed, to be admitted by you,
if you wish to be consistent with yourself, and to speak in harmony with
your doctrine.
You answer, then, that what is charged against your doctrine in that
allegation, is not a crime, but let us see how you show and prove this.
First, you say that "it is not hard that they should be left without
Christ," because "they might at the first, in Adam, have received saving
grace, righteousness, and a life of blessedness, together with the ability
to persevere in the same, if they had only willed it." I affirm that very
many persons are absolutely left without Christ, who never were, and never
will be partakers of the saving grace of Christ. For the grace, bestowed on
Adam and on all his posterity in him, was not the grace of Christ, which was
not, at that time, necessary. But "God could," you say, "without injustice,
at that time, have condemned all, and not have bestowed, on a single
individual, grace through Christ. Who denies it? The point in dispute is
not—whether God, when man, with all his posterity, sinned of his own fault:
and became obnoxious to eternal death, was obligated to give His own Son to
the world as a mediator—but whether it can be truly said that, when God
willed that His own Son should become a man and die for sins, He willed it
with this distinction, that he should assume, for a certain few only, the
human nature which he had in common with all men; that he should suffer for
only a few the death which could be the price for all the sins of all men,
and for the first sin, which all committed alike in Adam; whether God
purposed to proceed according to the rigor of His justice, and to the
strictness of the law, and the condition made requisite in the law, with the
largest part of the human race, but according to His mercy and grace with a
few, according to the gospel and the righteousness of faith, and the
condition proposed in the gospel; whether He proposed to impute, even to a
certain few, the sin which they had personally committed in Adam, without
any hope of remission. This, I assert, is the question: you reply
affirmatively to this question, and, therefore, confess that the allegation
is made, with truth, against your doctrine, nor can you escape by the plea,
that "it is not wonderful that they should be left without Christ, since
they had rejected the grace offered in Adam." Your answer has reference to
the justice of the act, and the question is concerning the act itself; your
answer has reference to the cause, and the question is concerning the
existence of the thing, the cause of which you present. That your answer may
not, to some, seem too horrible, you present, secondly, another answer,
namely, "Christ may be said to have died for all," but you subjoin an
explanation of this kind, which perverts the interpretation, and absolutely
nullifies your apparent and verbal confession. For you add that "he did not
die for all and for each equally in reference to God, in the same sense for
the lost and for the elect, or efficiently on the part of God." Let us
linger here, and weigh well what you say. The Scripture declares explicitly,
and in plain terms, that Christ died even for those who are lost, (Rom. xiv.
15; 2 Pet. ii. 1). Not equally, you say, in respect to God. But what is the
meaning of the phrase "in respect to God"? Is it the same as "according to
the decree of God?" Indeed, Christ, "by the grace of God tasted death for
every man" (Heb. ii. 9). By the command of God, Christ laid down his life
"for the life of the world" (John vi. 51), and "for the sheep" (John x. 15).
He can not, indeed, be said to have died for any man, except by the decree
and the command of the Father. You will say that you do not now refer to the
decree, by which God, the Father, imposed upon His Son the office and duty
of expiating sins by his own death; but to the decree, by which He
determined to save the elect through Christ. But I assert that the latter
decree is, in its nature, subsequent to the death of Christ, and to the
merit obtained by that death.
You add then, that "he died not equally for the reprobate" (you ought to use
that word, and not the word "lost") "and for the elect." You consider these
things in the wrong order. For the death of Christ, in the order of causes,
precedes the decree of election and reprobation, from which arises the
difference between the elect and the reprobate. The election was made in
Christ, dead, raised again, and having meritoriously obtained grace and
glory. Therefore, Christ also died for all, without any distinction of elect
and reprobate. For that two-fold relation of men is subsequent to the death
of Christ, pertaining to the application of the death and the resurrection
of Christ, and of the blessings obtained by them. The phrase, "Christ died
for the elect," does not signify that some were elected before Christ
received the command from God to offer his life, as the price of redemption
for the life of the world, or before Christ was considered as having died,
(for how could that be, since Christ is the head of all the elect, in whom
their election is sure?), but that the death of Christ secures for the elect
only, the blessing which is bestowed through an application of Christ and
his benefits.
Hence, also, the phrase used by the school-men, is to be understood thus,
that "Christ died for all men sufficiently, but, for the elect and believers
only, he died efficaciously." Your phrase, "efficiently on the part of God,"
is, in my judgment, irrelevant. What is the meaning of the statement—"Christ
died efficiently, on the part of God. for the elect, and not for the
reprobate"? This phraseology can not be used in any correct sense. I know
that you wished to give the idea that the efficacy of Christ’s death is
applied to some and not to others. If you mean this, you ought to speak so
that this might be understood to be your meaning. If your affirmation and
that of the school-men, be rigidly examined, it will be seen that they can
not be used without injury to the death of Christ and its merit. For they
attribute sufficiency to the death of Christ, but deprive it of efficacy,
when, indeed, the death of Christ is a sufficient price for the life of the
world, and was efficacious for abolishing sin and satisfying God. We do not
speak, you say, of the efficacy of his death, but of that of its
application. The contrary, however, is clearly manifest; for you deprive of
efficacy that to which you attribute sufficiency—and you attribute
sufficiency to the death of Christ. If this, also, is examined rigidly, it
will be seen that you do not even attribute sufficiency to the death of
Christ. For how shall that be a sufficient price which is no price? That is
not a price, which is not offered, not paid, not reckoned. But Christ did
not offer himself, except for a few only, namely, the elect. Certainly, my
friend, those are words and evasions, sought for the purpose of avoiding the
stroke of truth.
You, then, bring some passages of Scripture to prove your proposition.
"Christ says to the reprobate, ‘I never knew you,’ therefore, he never
acknowledged them for his own." What then? Did he, therefore, not die for
them? That certainly, is an inconclusive argument. For it is necessary that,
by his own death, he should redeem unto himself those whom he was to have
for his own: but those whom he has not as his own, he did not know as his
own, or acknowledge for his own. But, as he acknowledges some for his own,
it is not sufficient that he should die for them, and, by the right of
redemption, prepare them for himself, but also should make them his own in
fact, by an efficacious application of blessings. Hence, it is apparent that
there are, here, the fallacies of ignoratio elenchi and causa non causa. The
other argument which you adduce is not more valid. "If all and each are
efficaciously redeemed, all and each are also reconciled to God; -- But all
are not reconciled, nor do all receive the remission of their sins; --
Therefore, not all and each are efficaciously redeemed." What if I should
say that I concede all this, if it is only correctly understood, and that
your conclusion does not belong to the question? You confound the result
with the action and passion, from which it exists. For the offering of
Christ in death, is the action of Christ, by which he obtained redemption.
You then confound the obtainment of redemption with its application: for to
be efficaciously redeemed, means to be a partaker of the redemption, made
and obtained by the death of Christ. You confound, also, reconciliation made
with God by the death and sacrifice of Christ, with the application of the
same, which are plainly different things. For "God was, in Christ,
reconciling the world unto himself, and hath committed unto us the word of
reconciliation" (‘2 Corinthians v. 19). We are said to have been "reconciled
to God, when we were enemies" (Rom. v. 10), which cannot be understood of
the application of reconciliation. But your statement—"remission of sins and
satisfaction belong together," is not, in all respects true. For
satisfaction precedes, as consisting in the death and obedience of Christ,
but remission of sins consists in the application of that satisfaction by
faith in Christ, which may possibly, not actually follow the satisfaction
which has been rendered. Christ, indeed, obtained eternal redemption and the
right to remit sins, but sin is not remitted except to those who really
believe in Christ. The remark of Prosper is entirely in accordance with
these statements. For, by the word redemption, he understands the act both
in its accomplishment and in its application. This your second argument,
therefore, aside from the purpose, and, on account of confusedness and
equivocation, proves nothing.
Your third argument is also inconclusive. For, even if the antecedent is
granted, the consequent does not follow. It is true that "Christ gave
himself, that he might obtain, from the Father, the right of sanctifying
those who should believe in him," and these are thus immediately joined.
But, as he obtained the right, he also, in fact, used that right, by his
Spirit and the application and sprinkling of his own blood, sanctifying to
himself a peculiar people, and redeeming and freeing them from their own
depraved condition, which right pertains to the application of the benefits,
obtained for us by the death of Christ. But it does not, thence, follow
that, because all do not, in fact, become partakers of that sanctification,
therefore, Christ did not give himself for them as the price of redemption;
for the action of Christ is confounded with its result, and the application
of benefits with their obtainment.
The fourth argument labours under the same fault—that of confusedness. It is
true that "the redemption, which has been accomplished, and, therefore,
sonship, are destined for those who believe in Christ; "but it is necessary
that the act should precede, by which Christ must obtain for us redemption
and sonship, which act, in the order of causes, precedes the entire purpose
of God in reference to the application of the redemption. In the fifth
argument, you commit the same fallacy. For the point in dispute, is, "Did
Christ die for all without any distinction of elect and reprobate?" and you
present, as an argument, the assertion—"his death and the benefits of his
death are not applied to all without distinction." You say that "we may
grant that they are, on the part of God, freed from condemnation; yet they
are not so far the recipients of grace as that sin no longer reigns in
them." I reply that if you grant the former, the latter must also be
conceded. For these two benefits, obtained for us by the death and
resurrection of Christ—freedom from the condemnation of sin, and from its
dominion—are conjoined. One can not be bestowed without the other, on any
person.
You, lastly, produce some testimonies from the old writers, but they all, it
rightly explained, agree with these things which we have said. For Ambrose
plainly speaks of the advantage resulting from the application of Christ’s
passion, when he says "he did not descend for thee, he did not suffer for
thee," that is, "not for thy benefit." Whence, also, I pray, does faith come
to us? Is it not from the gift of the Spirit which Christ has merited for
us? Therefore, the passion and the descent of Christ must have preceded our
faith, and, therefore, they can not be limited by that faith. But faith is
the instrument of that application. Augustine, also, treats of "deliverance"
not as obtained, but as applied. Thus, also, Bernard, Haimo, and Thomas
Aquinas. If any of the fathers or school-men seem, at any time, to speak
differently, their words must be so explained as not to impinge the truth
revealed to us in the Scripture.
Let us now look at some of the objections to your doctrine which you notice.
The first is this—"The Scriptures assert that Christ redeemed the world."
Why did you not use the word suffer for rather than the word redeem, so as
to avoid ambiguity; especially, when the question has reference not to the
application of Christ’s passion, but to that passion itself, and the death
of Christ. But let us consider the objection, as it is presented by
yourself. I say that a distinction is to be made between redemption obtained
and redemption applied, and I affirm that it was obtained for the whole
world, and for all and each of mankind; but that it was applied only to
believers, and to the elect. First, I show that if it was not obtained for
all, faith in Christ is, by no right, required of all, and if it was not
obtained for all, no one can be rightly blamed, on account of rejecting the
offer of redemption, for he rejects that which does not belong to him, and
he does it with propriety. If Christ did not die for all, then he can not be
the judge of all. The latter idea is conceded, on both sides. But I say
that, in the remark of Augustine, the subject discussed is the application
of reconciliation, and actual salvation.
The second objection is—God "will have all men to be saved, and to come unto
the knowledge of the truth." But you do not subjoin the conclusion. It may,
indeed, be deduced from the antecedents. But it is of much importance, how
that conclusion is formed. For one concludes, "therefore all men
universally, will be saved, and will come to the knowledge of the truth. For
who hath resisted his will?" Another infers "then there is no
predestination, according to which God wills that some should believe and be
saved, and that some, being alien from the faith, should be condemned, and
this, also, from His decree." A third deduces this conclusion:
"Therefore, there can be no will of God by which He absolutely and without
reference to sin in man, wills that any should be condemned and not come to
the knowledge of the truth." The first conclusion is not legitimate. For
they are not always saved, whom God wills to be saved. The second, also, can
not be deduced from the text. But of the third, I think that it can be said
with truth that it can and must be deduced from those words. I give a plain
and perspicuous reason. No one can be condemned for rejecting the truth
unless he has been called to it, either in his own person, or in the person
of his parents, grand-parents, great grand-parents, &c. No one is called to
it, if God does not will that he should come to it; and all men who shall be
condemned, will be condemned because "light has come into the world, and men
loved darkness rather than light" (John iii. 19).
Let us consider your reply. You present this in a four-fold manner. The
first is this: "The word all does not embrace all the descendants of Adam,
but is used in reference to men in the last age of the world." This, indeed,
is truly said, the circumstance of this passage being considered, which
treats of the amplitude of the grace exhibited, in the New Testament, in
Christ; but the truth of the same words extends itself even further. For
that is the perpetual will of God, and had its beginning in the first
promise of the blessed Seed, made in paradise. That God did indeed suffer
the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, does not contravene this
declaration. For they were alienated from the covenant of God, and deprived
of the promises by their own fault—by their own fault, committed either in
themselves or their ancestors. It ought, then, to have been conceded by you
that God willed, through all ages, that all men, individually, should come
to the knowledge of the truth and be saved, so far as they were embraced in
the divine covenant, not, indeed, when they had in themselves, or their
parents, departed from it.
Your second answer is—"God willed that all men should be saved who are
saved," which, indeed, does open violence to the phraseology, and holds up
to ridicule the apostle, who if that explanation is correct, presents so
foolish an argument. The design of the apostle is to exhort that "prayers
should be made for all men, and for all that are in authority." This reason
is "this is good and acceptable in the sight of God, who will have all men
to be saved, &c." It is here apparent that the word all is used, in the same
sense, in the statement of the reason, as in the exhortation. Otherwise, the
connection of the parts is destroyed, and there are four terms in the
syllogism. But if it is intended, in the statement of the reason, to refer
to all who will be saved, then it must be taken in the same sense in the
exhortation also, and then the exhortation of the apostle must be understood
in this sense: "I exhort that prayers and supplications be made for all who
are to be saved, for God wills that all, who are to be saved, shall be
saved." What is doing violence to the meaning of the apostle, if this is
not? "But Augustine so explains it: "What then? We do not rest in his
authority." Also, we prove this by a collation of a similar passage: "This I
deny. For the passage in 1 Corinthians xv. 22, "in Christ shall all be made
alive," is not similar. For the emphasis may, here, be placed on the words
"in Christ," and then it will read thus: "all, who are made alive, will be
made alive in Christ, and no one out of Christ." The emphasis, indeed,
belongs on those words, as is apparent from the contrast of the other
member, "as in Adam all die." But in the passage, in the first epistle to
Timothy, there is nothing similar to this. For it says, "God wills that all
men should be saved," in which that repetition and reduplication can not
have any place. Does not the Scripture teach that we must pray for all, even
for those who are not to be partakers of salvation? So far, at least, as it
is not evident to us whether they have or have not sinned unto death; for
those of the former class, and them only, prayer is not to be made.
Your third answer is that "the phrase means not single individuals of
classes, but classes of single individuals;" as if the apostle had said "God
wills that some of all classes, states and conditions of men should be
saved." This answer you defend from the diverse use of the word all, which
is taken, at one time distinctively, at another collectively, which is,
indeed, true, although you have interchanged the distributive and collective
use of the word. For all the animals were, in a distributive sense, in
Noah’s ark, and all men, in a collective sense. Even if the use of that word
is two-fold, it does not thence follow that it is used in one and not in the
other sense, for it can be used in either. In this passage, however, it is
used not for classes of single individuals, but for single individuals of
classes; for the will of God goes out towards single individuals of classes,
or to single human beings. For he wills that single men should come to the
knowledge of the truth and be saved, that is, all and each, rich and poor,
noble and ignoble, male and female, &c. As the knowledge of the truth and
salvation belong to single human beings, and is, in fact, prepared, by
predestination, for the salvation of single individuals, not for classes,
and is denied, by reprobation, to single individuals, not to classes, so,
also, in the more general providence of God, antecedent, in the order of
nature, to the decree of predestination and reprobation, the divine will has
reference to single individuals of classes, not to classes of single
individuals. For providence, having reference to classes of single
individuals, pertains to the preservation of the species, but that, which
refers to single individuals of classes, pertains to the preservation of
individuals. But that providence which ministers salvation and the means
necessary for salvation, pertains to the preservation and salvation of
individuals. Besides, if this passage is to be understood to refer to
classes, then the apostle would not have said "for all in authority," but
"for some, at least, in eminent positions," but he openly says "that prayers
should be made for single individuals in that relation." Nor is there any
necessity of any other acceptation of that word, for there is no need of
that plea to avoid this consequence, "therefore, all and each are saved."
For the salvation of all would not follow from the fact that God wills that
any one should be saved, by his will, approving and desiring the salvation
of all and of each, but it would follow, if He, by an efficacious volition,
saves all and each. To this effect, also, is the distinction made by
Damascenus, which we will examine at somewhat greater extent.
Your fourth answer is, "Paul here speaks according to the judgment of
charity, not according to the judgment of secret and infallible certainty."
This is really absurd, unless you refer to the charity of God. For Paul here
treats of the will of God to which he attributes this volition, that He
wills the salvation of all men; not of His will according to which He
earnestly desires the salvation of all. But it is, in the mean time, true
that God does not will this infallibly or certainly, so that it can not, or
at least will not happen otherwise. This, however, is not said by those, who
use this passage to sustain a positive contrary to your sentiment. It is
settled, then, that from this passage it is a fair inference that "God can
not be said, without reference to sin in men, to will that any should err
from the truth, or should not come to the truth, and should be condemned."
We may now consider the distinction, made by Damascenus, in which He regards
the will of God, as antecedent and consequent. It is of special importance
to observe, when the antecedent and consequent wills are spoken of
relatively, in what relation they receive those appellations. This relation
is that of the will to the will, or rather that of the divine volition, to
the divine volition, the former as antecedent, the latter as consequent—for
God puts forth one volition before another, in the order of nature, though
not of time—or it is that of the divine volition to the preceding or
subsequent volition or act of the creature. In respect to the latter, the
divine will is called antecedent; in respect to the former, consequent. But
these two relations do not greatly differ, though I think that the relation
to the volition and act of the creature, either subsequent to or preceding
the divine volition, was the cause of the distinction. If we consider the
order of volitions, which God wills previous to any act or volition of the
creature, we shall see, in that order, that there are some antecedent, some
consequent volitions, yet all previous to any act and volition of the
creature. And, since that volition, which exists of some cause in us, may be
called consequent, it is certain that the distinction was understood by
Damascenus, its first author, in the sense that it was in relation to the
act or volition of the creature.
The will of God, then, may be called antecedent, by which He wills anything
in relation to the creature (our discussion, a rational creature) previous
to any act of the creature whatever, or to any particular act of it. Thus He
willed that all men and each of them should be saved. The consequent will of
God is that, by which He wills any thing in reference to a rational creature
after any act or after many acts of the creature. Thus He wills that they,
who believe and persevere in faith, shall be saved, but that those, who are
unbelieving and impenitent, shall remain under condemnation. By His
antecedent will, He willed to confirm and establish the throne of Saul
forever; by His consequent will, He willed to remove him from the kingdom,
and to substitute in his place a man better than he. By his antecedent will
Christ willed to gather the Jews as a hen gathers her chickens; by his
consequent will, he willed to scatter them among all nations.
You, indeed, approve this distinction, but do not approve the example of
antecedent will, presented by Damascenus himself. Let us examine the
reasons, in view of which you form this decision.
First you say, "It would follow from this that there is in the Deity
weakness and limited power." I deny this sequence; for the divine power is
not the instrument of the divine inclination, or desire, or velleity, but of
free volition, following the last decision of the divine wisdom, though God
may use His power to obtain what He desires within proper limits. Nor is it
true that, if one desires or seriously wills any thing, he will effect the
same in any way whatever, but he will do it in those ways, in which it is
suitable that he should effect it. A father may desire and seriously propose
that his son should obey him, but he does not violently compel him to
obedience, for it would not be obedience. A father seriously wills that his
son should abstain from intoxication, yet he does not confine him in a
chamber, where he can not become intoxicated. A father seriously wills to
give the paternal inheritance to his son; and by a consequent volition,
namely, one that follows the contumacious and obstinate wickedness of the
son, wills to disinherit him, nor yet does he do all things, within the
scope of his power, that his son may not sin. For, it was possible for the
father to keep his son bound and lettered with chains, that he might not be
able to sin. But it was as suitable that the father should not use that mode
of restraint, as it was to will the patrimony to his son.
The illustration taken from the merchant desiring to save his goods, yet
throwing them into the sea is well adapted to its purpose. God seriously
wills that all men should be saved, but compelled by the pertinacious and
incorrigible wickedness of some, He wills that they should suffer the loss
of salvation—that they should be condemned. If you say that the analogy
fails, because God could correct their wickedness, but the merchant can not
control the winds and the waves, I reply that it may, indeed, be possible to
absolute omnipotence, but it is not suitable that God should in that way
correct the wickedness of His creatures. Therefore God wills their
condemnation because He does not will that His own righteousness should
perish.
They, who object that this will may be called conditional, do not say all
which might be said, yet they say something. Not all, because this
inclination by which God desires the salvation of all men and of each, is
simple, natural, and unconditional in God. Yet they say something, since it
is true that God wills the salvation of all men, on the condition that they
believe, for no will can be attributed to God, by which He may will that any
man shall be saved in a sense, such that salvation will, certainly and
infallibly, come to him, unless he is considered as a believer, and as
persevering in faith even to the end. Since, however, that conditional
volition may be changed into an absolute one, in this manner—God wills that
all believers should be saved, and that unbelievers should be condemned,
which, being absolute, is always fulfilled, this volition may be said not to
pertain to this distinction of the will. For, in that volition, He wills
nothing to His creature but He wills that these two things, faith and
salvation, unbelief and condemnation, should indissolubly cohere. Yet, if it
seems proper for any one to consider this an example of antecedent volition,
I will not contradict him, yet the application is only by a volition,
consequent on the act of faith and perseverance, of unbelief and
impenitence.
Your conclusion that "the will of God must be in suspense until the
condition is fulfilled, and that the first cause is dependent on second
causes," is not valid. For, concerning the former part, I remark that
inclination in God is natural towards His own creature, whether the man
believes or not. For that inclination does not depend on faith, and
uncertainty can not be attributed to the will of Him who, in His infinite
wisdom; has all things present to himself, and certainly foreknows all
future events, even those most contingent. Nor is the first cause,
consequently, dependent on second causes, when any effect of the first cause
is placed, in the order of nature, after an effect of the second cause, as
that effect, consequent in order, belongs to the mere will of the first
cause. It is absurd to say that the condemnation of those, who perish,
depends on themselves, even if they would not perish unless by their own
demerit. For they willed to merit perdition, and not to perish, that is,
they willed to sin and not to be punished. Therefore that punishment depends
on the mere and free will of God, yet it can inflict it only on sinners, the
operation of power being suspended by justice, agreeably to which that power
ought to be exercised. It is no more a valid conclusion that, by this
distinction, the free choice of faith or unbelief is attributed to men. For
it is in entire harmony with that condition that no one has faith except by
the gift of God, though there can be no doubt that man has the free choice
not to believe.
You say, secondly—"this conditional will of God is inactive because it
belongs to infinite power, and because He can do whatever He will." But it
is not suitable that He should use His infinite power to effect that, to
which He is borne by natural desire, and it is useful for man, that this
will of God should be presented to him as conditional, indeed, rather than
as absolute, as was previously said; for it seems as an argument to persuade
him to believe. For if he wishes to be saved he must believe, because God
has appointed that men shall be saved only through faith.
Your third reason, referring to angels, can be made doubtful by the relation
of the antecedent, and even if this is conceded, the consequent does not
follow. For the relation of angels and of men is not the same. I am, indeed,
fully of the opinion that it is most true that God, by antecedent volition,
willed that all and each of the angels should be saved, but only in a due
mode and order. Three divine volitions in reference to angels may be laid
down in order: the salvation of angels, the obedience of angels, the
condemnation of angels. God wills the first from love for His creatures; the
second from love for righteousness and the obedience due to Him from His
creatures, and, indeed, in such a sense, that He more strongly wills that
the second should be rendered to Himself, than the first to His creatures;
the third He wills from the same love for justice, whose injury He can not
leave unpunished, since punishment is the sole mode of correcting disorder.
Your statements, under your fourth reason, are correct, "and God might will
that all sinful men as such should be condemned," if He had not from love
towards men determined to lay their sins on His Son, to this end that all
who should believe in him, being freed from their sins, should obtain the
reward of righteousness. It may indeed be said that God willed that all
sinners, as such, should be condemned; but not all sinners are, in fact,
condemned, because believers, though they have sinned, are considered not as
sinners, but as righteous in Christ.
Fifthly, you say that "the antecedent will of God is absolute." What then? I
do not wish to hinder you from regarding the antecedent will in your own
way, different from the sentiment of Damascenus. You should, however,
consider that you are not then arguing against him. But who has ever defined
absolute will—"that which can not be resisted"? Absolute will is that which
is unconditional. For example, God willed absolutely that Adam should not
eat of the forbidden tree; yet he did eat of that tree. The will, which can
not be resisted, is called efficacious. It is not allowable to arrange
things defined, and their definitions, according to our own choice. "But,"
you may say, "it is not possible to resist the antecedent will." I deny it.
You assert, as proof, that "the will, referred to in Romans 9, is antecedent
will, and that it can not be resisted." It is for you to prove that
assertion. The very statement declares, since the subject, in that passage,
is the will of God, by which He hardens, and has mercy, which are divine
effects, following acts of the creature which are sinful, called sin, that
the will, here spoken of, is consequent not antecedent.
Another method, which you use to prove the same thing, is equally weak. For,
it is not true that "God, simply and absolutely, wills that some should
believe and persevere, and others be deserted, either not believing or not
persevering." He does not will to desert them, unless they desert
themselves; and He is even gracious to those, who do not think of Him. The
argument from the event is futile. For some things occur by the will and the
efficiency of God, some by His permission. Therefore it can not be concluded
from any event that God willed it. But it has been previously shown how an
event may take place, not because God may be unwilling to prevent it; though
it would not happen, if God should will efficaciously to prevent it.
Therefore that conclusion can not be thus deduced. It is, indeed, true that
the reason can not be given why God should afford to one nation the means of
salvation, and not to another, why he should give faith to one man, and not
to another, which facts may not be resolved into his will. Yet it is not
thence concluded, and it is not true, that the will, in that case, is
antecedent, even though it precedes all causes in men.
Sixthly, you say that the foundation being destroyed, the edifice falls. But
the foundation of that opinion in reference to the antecedent will, which
desires the salvation of all men and of each, is the passage in 1 Timothy
ch. 2, which has been already discussed by us, and that is incorrectly
understood by Damascenus. I reply, first; -- Not only that passage, but many
others, most clearly sustain that distinction of the will into antecedent
and consequent. "How often would I have gathered you together," is an
example of antecedent, and "your house is left unto you desolate" of
consequent will (Matt. xxiii. 37-38). "And sent forth his servants to call
them that were bidden to the wedding," is a case of antecedent will, "they
which were bidden were not worthy" and were destroyed, of consequent will.
He, also, was invited, according to antecedent will, who, being afterwards
found, not having on a wedding garment, was cast out, according to
consequent will (Matt. xxii. 3, 7, 8, 12 and 13). According to antecedent
will, the lord commanded his servants to reckon their talents, and to use
them for gain for their master; by consequent will, the talent, which he had
received, was taken from the wicked and slothful servant (Matt. 25). By
antecedent will, the word of God was first offered to the Jews; by
consequent will, the same word was taken from them and sent to others (Acts
13). The same distinction is proved by a consideration of the attributes of
God; for since God is good and just, He can not will eternal death to His
own creature, made in His image, without reference to sin; He can not but
will eternal salvation to His creature. The immutability of God necessarily
requires the same thing. For since His providence has given to all His
creatures means, necessary and sufficient, by which they can attain their
designed end, but the designed end of man, made in the image of God, is
eternal life, it hence follows that all men are loved by God unto eternal
life by antecedent will; nor can God, without a change of His own
arrangement, deny eternal life unto men, without reference to sin; which
denial, being consequent on the act of man, pertains to consequent will.
The views of Augustine are not opposed to Damascenus. Augustine, indeed,
denies that this passage refers to efficacious will; but Damascenus makes no
such assertion; he even concedes the very same thing with Augustine; -- "God
does not will efficaciously to save all and each of mankind." The second
interpretation of Augustine is rejected by us on sure grounds. Nor is
Prosper opposed to Damascenus. For he, who says that "God wills antecedently
that all men should be saved," does not deny that He can, by a consequent
will, pass by many men, to whom He does not impart the grace of vocation.
Thomas Aquinas, also, is, no more than the others, opposed to Damascenus,
for he, in commenting on this passage, speaks of efficacious and of
consequent will; and elsewhere he approves of the distinction of Damascenes,
and makes use of it, in explaining the passage, which is in controversy.
Hugo clearly agrees with Damascenus, if his views are suitably explained.
The third objection is this: "Whatever any one is bound to believe is true;
-- But every one is bound to believe that he has been efficaciously redeemed
by Christ; -- Therefore, it is true that every one has been efficaciously
redeemed by the death of Christ; and, therefore, even the reprobate have
been redeemed, since they also are bound to believe this." Since this
objection is of great importance, and alone sufficient, if it is true, it is
necessary that we should examine it with diligence, and at the same time
your answer to it. The truth of the Major is manifest, for truth is the
foundation of faith, nor can one be, in any way, bound to believe what is
false. But you make a distinction in reference to truth and say, that "what
is true, is either: true, as to the intention of God, who obligates us to
believe, or as to the event." But that distinction is of no importance. I
affirm that what is true, according to the intention of God, must be
believed according to that intention. What is true, according to the event,
must be believed according to the event; and the intention of God can not
obligate any one to believe any thing to be true according to the event,
which is not true according to the event. In general, it is true that we are
bound to believe that which is true in that mode in which it is true, not in
any other mode; otherwise, we should be bound to believe what is false. You
see, then, that there is no need of that distinction in the Major; indeed it
is most clearly evident that you, lest you should say nothing, wished, by
that minute distinction, to avoid this effective blow.
Let us consider the Minor. Its phraseology is bad, because the efficacy of
redemption pertains to its application, which is made through faith.
Therefore faith is prior to efficacious application, and the object of faith
is prior to faith itself. We may correct it, and it will read thus, "But
every one is bound to believe in Christ, the saviour, that he died for his
sake, and obtained for him reconciliation and redemption before God." This
is, indeed, most true. For they can not be condemned, for want of faith, who
were not bound to believe this. But here also you use a distinction, but one
which is irrelevant and ridiculous—pardon my freedom of speech—and you do
great injustice to yourself, and your own genius, when you endeavour to
disguise the plain truth, by so puerile distinctions. You say that the elect
are obligated to believe, so that, by faith, they may be made partakers of
election, the reprobate are obligated to believe, so that, by neglecting to
do so, they may be without excuse, even in the intention of God. But what is
the difference whether one is bound to believe to this or that end, provided
he is only bound to believe. From which obligation to believe, the truth of
that which any one is bound to believe may afterwards be inferred. The
expression -"that they may be made partakers of election," is absurd. It
should be corrected thus—"that they may be made partakers of the blessings
prepared for them in election," or, if we wish to confine ourselves to the
limits of the objection, -- "that they may, in fact, be made partakers of
the redemption prepared for them by Christ." But the reprobate are also
bound to believe for the same reason. If it be said that they, absolutely,
can not be made partakers, I will say that, for this very reason, the
reprobate are not obligated to believe. For the end of the exercise of faith
is the application of redemption, and of all the blessings, obtained for us
by the merit of Christ. The end of the command and the requirement of faith
is that the application may be possible. But how absurd is the declaration
that the reprobate are under obligation to believe, so that they may, by not
believing, be rendered inexcusable. Unite, if you can, these things, so
inconsistent, and widely distant as heaven and earth. This, however, has
been before referred to. You proceed with your distinctions, and say—"one
command has reference to obedience; another, to trial." But what relation
has this to the present matter? For whether God commands, with the purpose
that man should, in fact, obey, or with the purpose, only, of testing his
obedience in the effort to execute the command, the man is always obligated
to perform what God commands, as is apparent in the offering of Isaac by
Abraham. Nor has this command, in the relation of that, any analogy, with
what you subjoin, -- "God does not sport with men, even if He, by the
preaching of the word, calls those whom He does not purpose to save." Indeed
we have already said enough in reference to those and similar evasions. I
will say, in a word, -- that no one can confess that he is guilty for
rejecting a promise made verbally, if the mind of the promiser has
determined that the promise does not belong to the person addressed; or
rather if he, who verbally promises, has, by a fixed decree, determined that
the promise may not and can not belong to the other person.
You present an objection, as an adversary to yourself, thus -"but you will
say that it could not belong to him." Not only may that objection be urged,
but also another—"How do you confute that statement, so that it may not
follow from it that he is without blame, who could not receive the salvation
offered to him?" You will say that such inability is voluntary, and born
with us, and therefore undeserving pardon. You err here, and confound
inability to keep the law, propagated in us from Adam, with inability to
believe in Christ, and to accept the grace of the gospel, offered us in the
word. By what deed have we brought this inability upon ourselves? Not by a
deed preceding that promise; then it was by a deed following it, that is, by
a rejection of the promise of the gospel; which rejection also can not be
imputed to us as a fault, if we were unable to receive it at the time when
the promise was first presented to us. The answer, then, amounts to nothing,
because the two kinds of inability are confounded, in which is the fallacy
of ignoratia elenchi, also that of equivocal use of terms.
You reply, in the second place, that "what any one is obligated to believe
is true, unless he may have placed before himself an obstacle by not
believing." Is this correct? Can any one place before himself an obstacle,
by his own unbelief, that what he is bound to believe may not be true?
Absurd. One can, by his own unbelief, place before himself an obstacle, so
as not to be able afterwards to believe, that is, to deserve hardening in
unbelief on account of rejecting the truth offered to him. One can, also, by
his own unbelief, deserve that God should change that good will, by which He
offered His Son as the redeemer, into wrath, by which He may will to punish
him without remission or pardon.
Thirdly you reply that "the argument twice depends on assertion, in both
parts." But who compelled you to so reduce that argument into an illogical
syllogism, when it might have been put in a legitimate form and mode, in
this way, "That which every one is bound to believe, is true; -- That Christ
is his redeemer, who, by his own death, meritoriously obtained the divine
grace, and the pardon of his sins, is what every one, called in the gospel,
is bound to believe; --
Therefore it is true, that Christ is the redeemer of all, who are called by
the gospel and commanded to believe. But among them are many reprobate
persons. Therefore it is true that Christ is the redeemer of many reprobate
persons. If we consider vocation to be that by which any one is called,
either in himself or in his parents, then all men, universally, are or have
been partakers of that vocation, and therefore all have been redeemed by
Christ." But the form, also, in which you have put it is the same in effect,
though you have so arranged the words, that they seem to have a different
meaning. I see that you wrote those things with a hurried pen, without an
examination of the syllogism as you have proposed it.
The fourth objection, from the fathers, is valid against you, nor do you
reply in accordance with the terms of the sentiment hostile to you. The
amount of the objection is this, "Christ died for all sufficiently, both as
to the common nature of the human race, and as to the common cause and
sufficient price of redemption." You have introduced efficacy into the
argument or objection, while they, who make this objection against you, know
that there is the clearest distinction between the death of Christ itself
and its application. You say, "and thus far in reference to the extent and
efficacy of Christ’s death," when the discussion has been hitherto in
reference not to its efficacy, but to its sufficiency, and its oblation and
the universality of that oblation. You, now, proceed to treat of the
amplitude of grace, but what you present does not much affect the point at
issue. The question is not, whether all and each of the human race are, in
fact, regenerated and renewed, but whether God has reprobated any man,
without respect to sin as a meritorious cause; or whether He has determined
absolutely to deny to any man the grace of remission and of the renewal of
the Holy Spirit without reference to unworthiness, in that he has made
himself unworthy of that grace—unworthiness, not resulting from original
sin, but from the rejection and contempt of that offered grace. The
distinction of sufficient and efficacious grace might have been well adapted
to this subject, as we have also previously demonstrated. Yet there is one
thing of which I may admonish you. You seem to me not correctly to deprive,
of supernatural grace, the image of God, consisting of righteousness and
holiness. For though the former gift was bestowed on man at his creation and
at the same time with nature itself, for so I now consider it, yet it is
supernatural, and surpasses the nature of man itself, as I prove from the
act of regeneration, which belongs to supernatural grace. For, since there
is need of regeneration for the recovery of that righteousness and holiness,
which regeneration is a supernatural act, it is necessary that the same
should, originally, have been bestowed on man, by a supernatural action. I
wish, also, to know what those supernatural things are which man is said to
have lost in the fall, his natural qualities having become corrupt. Thus
far, in reference to these things.
I think, indeed, that it is sufficiently evident from what we have thus far
discussed that the view of Predestination which you have presented can not
be proved by the Scriptures; that it can not be defended against strong
objections; that it can not be acquitted of manifold absurdity. It ought
then to be abandoned by you, and another should be sought from the
Scriptures, which may harmonize with them, and may be able to sustain
without injury the onset of assailant objections.
_________________________________________________________________
AN EXAMINATION OF THE TREATISE OF WILLIAM PERKINS CONCERNING THE ORDER AND MODE
OF PREDESTINATION
PART 2 CONCERNING PREDESTINATION
In the first part of our treatise, we have examined, most learned Perkins,
your sentiment concerning Predestination, and have proved that it is, by no
means, consistent with the Holy Scriptures. Another labour now remains to
us, to consider how you refute the opinion which you say is different from
yours.
You, briefly, set forth that opinion, diligently gathered from the writings
of others, consisting of four parts—
First, "God created all and each of mankind in Adam unto eternal life."
Secondly, "He foresaw the fall."
Thirdly, "Since He is good by nature, He seriously wills that all men, after
the fall, should be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; and
therefore He wills to bestow, on all men, all the aids both of nature and of
grace that they might be saved, but indefinitely, that is if they should
believe. This will of God" (they say) "is predestination, and is the same
with that embraced in the gospel. The rule of this will is—‘He that
believeth shall be saved, but he, that believeth not, shall be damned.’"
Fourthly, "Election is according to foreknowledge of future faith—to fail of
which is possible, wholly, as some, or finally, as others claim, -- and
Reprobation is according to foreknowledge of unbelief or contempt of the
gospel."
I can not speak, with certainty, in reference to the statement of that
theory, whether it agrees with the views of its authors or not, because you
are silent concerning the authors from whom you have taken it: yet, with
your permission, I may say that it does not seem to me to have been staged
by you with sufficient correctness. Omitting the first two propositions, I
think that, in enunciating the third, you make a frivolous statement, which
will, I believe, be scarcely admitted by those, whose sentiment you profess
to present. For what is the meaning of this—"God wills that all men should
come to the knowledge of the truth, but indefinitely, if they should
believe"? Is not faith itself the knowledge of the truth? Therefore the
enunciation is deceptive and ridiculous—"God wills that all men should come
to the knowledge of the truth, but indefinitely, if they should come to the
knowledge of the truth, or he wills that all men should come to faith, if
they should believe." The next sentence is of a similar character, -- "God
wills to bestow, on all men, all the aids both of nature and of grace, that
they may be saved, but indefinitely, if they should believe," when faith
itself holds a distinguished place, among the aids of grace by which
salvation is obtained. From the passage of the gospel, which is quoted, "He
that believeth shall be saved," &c., it is apparent that they, whose
sentiment you present, would, in this third proposition, have stated not
that which you say, but this, "God determined to save, from the fallen human
race, only those who should believe in His Son, and to condemn unbelievers."
The fourth proposition is not, I think, expressed sufficiently in accordance
with the views of those authors. For, if I am not mistaken, their sentiment
is this, --
"Election to salvation is according to foreknowledge of future faith, which
God has determined to bestow of His own grace upon them by the ordinary
means ordained by Himself. But Reprobation is according to foreknowledge of
unbelief or contempt of the gospel, the fault of which remains, entirely, in
the reprobate themselves." I admit that there may be need of some
explanation of that sentiment, but you do not seem to have explained it
correctly. You should have considered not one view only, adverse to your own
view, but the others, also, which are opposed to it, and you should have
refuted all of them, that, in this way, it might be evident that no view,
other than yours, is true.
We may, now, consider in what way you refute that theory. You enumerate very
many errors which, you think, result from it, which we will examine in
order.
The first error; -- This either is not an error, or can not be deduced from
that theory. It is not an error, if its hypothesis be correctly understood.
For it is universally true that "God wills that all men should be saved, if
they believe, and be condemned if they do not believe." That is, God has
made a decree for electing only believers, and for condemning unbelievers.
"But this," you say "is an error because it makes Election universal, and
from it universal Reprobation is inferred, that is, by the added condition."
But that sentiment makes neither Election nor Reprobation universal, which
can not be done, but it establishes the particular Election of believers,
and the particular Reprobation of unbelievers. Innumerable passages of
Scripture present this Election and Reprobation. "He that believeth on the
Son hath everlasting life," &c. (John iii. 36). "If ye believe not that I am
he, ye shall die in your sins" (John viii. 24). "To him give all the
prophets witness, &c." (Acts x. 43). "Seeing that ye put it from you, &c."
(Acts xiii. 46). "He, that hath the Son, hath life; and he, that hath not
the Son of God, hath not life." (1 John v. 12). That Election and
Reprobation is, therefore, evidently proved by many passages of Scripture.
It does not follow, from this, that; "God always acts in the same manner
towards all men." For though He may seriously will the conversion and
salvation of all men, yet He does not equally effect the conversion and
salvation of all. "What nation is there so great, who hath God so nigh unto
them, &c." (Deut. iv. 7.) "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a special
people unto Himself, &c." (Deut. vii. 6). "He hath not dealt so with any
nation" (Psalm cxlvii. 20). "It is given unto you to know the mysteries of
the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xiii. 11). "Who, in times past, suffered all
nations to walk in their own ways" (Acts xiv. 16).
But you have not distinguished, as you ought to have done, between the
decree of God, by which He determined to save those who should believe in
His Son, and to condemn
unbelievers, and that by which He arranged with Himself in reference to the
dispensation of means, ordained by Him to faith and conversion. For those
decrees "I will to give life to him who believes," and "I will to give faith
to this man" are distinct. Faith, in the former, holds the place of subject,
in the latter, that of attribute. If you had made this distinction, you
would not have laid the burden of such an absurdity on that theory.
The second error; -- I remark that the highest and absolute design of the
counsels of God "is not regarded by the authors of that theory to be the
communication of the divine goodness in true happiness, to be made to all
men." For they say that God destined salvation for believers alone; and,
though He may not impart his goodness, and life eternal to a large number of
persons, as unbelievers, yet they do not say this "without reference to the
divine purpose." For they assert that one part of the divine purpose is
that, by which He determined to deny eternal life to unbelievers. Therefore
this is alleged in vain against that opinion. "But" you say "the ultimate
design of the counsels of God either has an uncertain event, or is proposed
in vain,"—which ideas coincide, and should not have been expressed
distinctly—if "the theory is received." Its supporters will deny that
conclusion. For the ultimate design of the divine counsels is not the life
of one and the death of another, but the illustration of the goodness,
justice, wisdom and power of God, which He always secures. Yet allow that
the eternal life of these, and the death of those is the ultimate design of
those counsels: it will not follow that it has an uncertain event, or is
proposed in vain, if the former is bestowed upon no one, apart from the
condition of faith, and the latter awaits no one, apart from unbelief. For
God by His own prescience, knows who, of His grace, will believe, and who,
of their own fault, will remain in unbelief. I wish that you would consider,
that certainty of an event results properly from the prescience of God, but
its necessity results from the omnipotent and irresistible action of God;
which may, indeed, be the foundation of the prescience of some events, but
not of this event, because He has determined to save believers by grace;
that is, by a mild and gentle suasion, convenient or adapted to their
free-will, not by an omnipotent action or motion, which would be subject
neither to their will, nor to their ability either of resistance or of will.
Much less does the damnation of some proceed from an irresistible necessity,
imposed by the Deity.
The third error; -- You ought, here, first to have explained what is meant
when it is said that "the will of God depends on the will of man." It may be
that you extend that phrase further than is proper. It is, indeed, certain
that the will of God, since He is entirely independent, -- or rather His
volition—can not depend on the will of man, if that phrase be correctly
understood, as signifying "to receive its law or rule from the volition of
man." On the other hand, it is certain that God does will some things, which
He would not will, if a certain human volition did not precede. He willed
that Saul should be removed from the throne; He would not have willed it, if
Saul had not willed to be disobedient to God. God willed that the Sodomites
and their neighbours should be destroyed; He would not have willed it, if
they had not willed to persevere obstinately in their sins. God willed to
give His own Son as the price of redemption for sinners;
He would not have willed it, if men had remained in obedience to the divine
command. God willed to condemn Judas; He would not have willed it unless
Judas had willed to persist in His own wickedness.
It is not true, indeed, that "the will of God depends on the will of man."
Man would, if he could, effect that the volition of God should not follow
his own antecedent volition -- that punishment should not follow sin. Indeed
God is purely the author of His own volition. For He has determined in His
own free-will to follow a volition of His creature, by His own volition of
one kind and not of another; the faith of His creature by the remission of
sins and the gift of eternal life; the unbelief of the same, by eternal
damnation. This is the meaning of that opinion, which you undertake to
refute, and you therefore, with impropriety charge this absurdity upon it.
You, however, make an allegation of much greater weight, against this
sentiment, that "by it the creature is raised to the throne of God, the
Omnipotent Creator." How do you sustain that allegation? "It is claimed" you
say "that God wills that all men should be saved through Christ, and that
many of them are not saved because they, of themselves, refuse." But, good
sir, does that doctrine say that "God wills that all men should be saved
through Christ, whether they will or not? It does, indeed, assert that "God
wills that they should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth"
which last can not be done, apart from their free-will. For no one can, if
he is reluctant or unwilling, come to the knowledge of the truth, that is to
faith. If God should will, absolutely and apart from any condition, that all
men should be saved, and yet some should not be saved because they refused,
then it would follow that the divine will was overcome by the human will,
and the creature was raised to the throne of the Creator. But as God wills
that His own volition, joined, in due order and mode, with the volition of
man, should precede salvation, it is not wonderful that a man, who should
deny his own assent unto God; should be excluded from salvation, by that
same determination and purpose of the divine will. "But God" you say
"ordains and disposes the action of the second cause; the divine will is not
ordained by the will of the creature." Who denies these statements? That is
not the doctrine which you here oppose. Therefore, here also, you attempt,
in vain, to overthrow it by this absurdity.
You add another absurdity, as consequent on this opinion. "If that sentiment
is true, then men elect themselves, by accepting the grace of God, which is
offered to them, by the common aid of grace, and are reprobated by
themselves, by rejecting offered grace." Let us examine this. Even if a man
should, by accepting common grace, through the aid of common grace, make
himself worthy of Election, and another, by rejecting the same, should make
himself worthy of Reprobation, it would not follow that Election and
Reprobation belong to the man, but to God, who judges and rewards worthiness
and unworthiness. It is also entirely true, in reference to Reprobation,
that man is the meritorious cause of his own damnation, and therefore of
Reprobation which is the purpose of damnation. Wherefore he may be called
the maker of his own damnation, in reference to its demerit; although God
can, if He will, remit to him this demerit. But the relation of Election is
different; for it is merely gratuitous, not only unmerited, but even
contrary to the demerit of man. Whether the grace, which is offered to man,
may be also received by him by the aid of grace, which is common to him with
others who reject the same grace, or by grace peculiar to him, is perhaps in
controversy. I do not, indeed, see that the sentiment, which you have
presented, has given any prejudgment concerning that matter. It is a strange
assertion that "God would not be extolled, if men should obtain his blessing
merely by the aid of common grace." Who has deserved that a blessing should
be offered to him? Who has deserved that grace of any kind should be
bestowed on him to the obtainment of that blessing? Do not all these things
pertain to gratuitous divine favour? If so, is not God to be extolled, on
account of them, with perpetual praises by those, who, having been made
partakers of that grace, have received the blessing of God? Of what
importance to this matter is it, whether he may have obtained the offered
blessing by the aid of common or of peculiar grace, if the former, as well
as the latter, has obtained the free assent of man, and it has been
foreknown by God that it certainly would obtain it? You will say that, if he
has apprehended the offered grace by the aid of peculiar grace, it is, then,
evident that God has manifested greater love towards him than towards
another to whom He has applied only common grace, and has denied peculiar
grace. I admit it, and perhaps the theory, which you oppose, will not deny
it. But it will assert that peculiar grace is to be so explained as to be
consistent with free-will, and that common grace is to be so described, that
a man may be held worthy of condemnation by its rejection, and that God may
be shown to be free from injustice.
The fourth error; -- The knowledge of God, as it has relation to his
creatures, may be regarded in two modes. In one, as God knows that He can
make those creatures, and at the same time that they can be made in this or
in that mode, that they may not only exist, but may also be able to serve
this or that purpose. This knowledge, in the Deity, is natural and precedes
the act or the free determination of the will, by which God has determined
in Himself to make the same creatures at such a time. In the other mode, as
God knows that those creatures will exist at one time or another; and,
regarded in this light, it depends on the determination of the divine will.
This knowledge can be referred to the acts of the creatures themselves,
which God has determined either to effect or to permit. Knowledge,
considered in the former mode, refers to all acts in general, which can be
performed by the creatures, whether God is efficient in them, or only
permits them. From this, follows the decree to effect these and those acts,
and to permit them, which decree is followed by the knowledge, by which God
foreknows that those acts will occur, at any particular time. This latter
knowledge, which is rightly called prescience, is not, properly, the cause
of things or acts. But the former knowledge, with the will, is the cause of
things and acts. For it shows the mode of operating, and directs the will.
The will, however, impels it to execution. It is, therefore, certain that
there is no determinate or definite prescience in reference to culpable
evil, unless it has been preceded by a decree to permit sin.
For without this, sin will not exist. Prescience has also
reference to things future and certainly future; otherwise,
either it is not prescience or it is uncertain. These things are rightly
said by you, and the order, which you have made in prescience and decree, is
correct; but it is not contrary to the hypothesis of the doctrine, which you
oppose, but so consistent with it, that it can not be defended without this
order. For it states that God, from eternity, knew that it was possible that
man, assisted by divine grace, should either receive or reject Christ; also,
that God has decreed, either to permit a man to reject Christ, or to
co-operate with him that he may accept Christ by faith, then, that God
foreknows that one will apprehend Christ by faith, and that another will
reject him by unbelief. From this follows the execution of that decree, by
which he determined to justify and save believers, and to condemn
unbelievers, which is an actual justification of the former, and a
condemnation of the latter. It is, therefore, apparent that you improperly
allege such absurdity against that doctrine. Your statement that "God
permits evil, always, with respect to or on account of a conjoined good,"
deserves notice. Those words can be understood to mean that God would
permit, an evil on account of a good, conjoined with the evil, which
sentiment can not be tolerated. For the good, which comes out of evil, is
not conjoined with the evil, but is wonderfully brought out of evil, as its
occasion, by the wisdom, goodness and omnipotence of God. For He knows how
to bring light out of darkness. The knowledge, also, by which God knows that
he can use evil to a good end, is also the cause of the permission of evil.
For, as Augustine well says, "God, in His goodness, never permits evil
unless, in His omnipotence, He can bring good out of the evil."
The fifth error; -- Here three things must be properly distinguished. The
acts and sufferings of Christ, the fruits and results of those acts and
suffering, and the communication and application of those fruits, Christ, by
the sacrifice of his own body, by his obedience and passion, reconciled us
unto God, and obtained for us eternal redemption, without any respect or
distinction of elect and reprobate, of believers and unbelievers; as that
distinction is, in the order of nature, subsequent. That reconciliation and
redemption is applied to us, when we, having faith in the word of
reconciliation, believe in Christ, and in him are justified, or regarded as
righteous, and are, in fact, made partakers of redemption. Hence it appears,
according to that theory, "that not many of those, to whom reconciliation
and redemption is, in fact, applied, by faith, are lost." Therefore, it will
not follow, from this, that "sin, Satan, the world, death, hell, are more
powerful than Christ the Redeemer. For, they could not, in the first place,
prevent Christ from offering himself to the Father in sacrifice, obeying the
Father, and suffering death; and, in the second place, that he should not
thereby obtain reconciliation and eternal redemption before God. In
reference to the application of these blessings, it is true that sin, Satan,
the world, and the flesh, prevent many from believing in Christ, and being
made partakers of them. Yet God is not overcome by these, both because it
has seemed good to God not to use His omnipotent and irresistible power to
cause men to believe, and because God has determined that no one shall be a
partaker of those blessings, who does not believe in Christ. It is not true
that "God is mutable, according to this hypothesis." For the theory does not
state that God, absolutely and simply, wills to save all men, but
conditionally: and according to His own prescience, He has determined to
condemn, eternally, those who will not incline themselves to this counsel.
This is also, finally, performed in fact without any charge. It is not
sufficient to charge absurdity on any doctrine; it must be proved, by fair
inference, to be a consequence of that doctrine.
The sixth error; -- I am very certain, from the Scriptures, "that saving
grace is" not "universal" in the sense that it can be said to have been
bestowed on all and each of mankind in all ages. But you ought to have said
that "saving grace is stated to be universal" by that doctrine. You neglect
to do that, and are much engaged in proving something else. I do not,
indeed, object to this, but the other thing was equally necessary to reach
the object, which you had proposed to yourself. But also, at this point,
there are some things deserving consideration. You do not, with sufficient
accuracy, regard the distinction between "the ability to believe, if one
wills," and "the ability to will to believe." For each of these, the latter,
as well as the former, must, and indeed does pertain to those, who will
continue in unbelief. For unless they have the ability to believe, and,
indeed, the ability to will to believe, they can not rightly be punished for
their unbelief. Besides one includes the other, for no one can believe,
unless he can will to believe. No one believes, without the exercise of his
will. But the actual exercise of the will to believe is a different thing
from the ability to will to believe; the latter belongs to all men, the
former to the regenerate only, or rather to those enlightened by the grace
of the Holy Spirit. Hence, you see that you ought to make corrections in
many particulars, and that in place of "the ability to will to believe,"
should be substituted "the will to believe," which is most closely connected
with the act of faith, while the other is removed to the greatest distance
from actual faith. The distinction between the ability, the will, and the
act, is here especially necessary: but not only is it to be suitably
explained, but also the causes are to be referred to, by which it may be
given to men to be able to will, and to act. In your third argument, in
which you prove the speciality of grace, you use the disjunctive correctly
in your expression, "who had not the knowledge of faith, or did not retain
it." There is a greater emphasis, in that disjunctive, than one would,
perhaps, at first, think. For, if they did not "retain it," they lost it by
their own fault; they rejected it, and are, therefore, to be punished for
the rejection of the gospel. If they are to be punished for this, they were
destined to punishment, on this account. For the cause of the decree is not
different from that of its execution. You present an objection to your own
doctrine, deduced from the usual saying of the school-men, "A man can not be
excused for a deficiency of supernatural knowledge, from the fact that he
could, and indeed would, receive it from God, if he would do so according to
his own ability, and since he does not do this, he is held guilty of that
deficiency. You reply to this objection, but not in a suitable manner. For
it is not a sufficient distinction that "grace is given either of merit or
of promise:" nor, indeed, does it agree with the contrary or opposite parts.
For God can give this, without either merit (I should have preferred the
word debt), or promise, but of unpromised grace, since He does and gives
many things of grace, which He has not promised. Let us look at that
promise, which was made immediately after the fall; it was made, neither of
debt, nor of promise, but of grace preceding the promise. For God gives life
"to him that worketh," of promise and of debt (Rom. iv, 3, 4). But consider
whether a promise is not contained in that declaration of Christ, "Unto
every one which hath shall be given," by which God pledges himself to
illuminate, with supernatural grace, him who makes a right use of natural
grace, or at least uses it with as little wrong as is possible for him.
The argument, from idiots and infants, is wholly puerile. For who dares to
deny that many idiots and infants are saved? Yet this, indeed, does not
happen to them, apart from saving grace. Some remark is to be made in
reference to the passages which you cite, though it may, perhaps, be
irrelevant. In Romans ix. 16, where it is said "not of him that willeth, nor
of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy," the word
"righteousness" is understood. For the discussion in that place is in
reference to those, to whom righteousness is properly imputed, not to them
that work, but to them that believe, that is, righteousness is obtained not
by him that willeth or that runneth, but by him to whom "God showeth mercy,"
namely, to the believer. Matt. xiii. 11, proves that grace is not given
equally and in the same measure to all, and, indeed, that the knowledge of
"the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven" is not divinely bestowed on all. In
the other passages, the things which are opposed, do not belong in this
relation. "The Spirit breathes not upon all, but on whom he wills" (John
iii. 8). What if He wills to breathe upon all? From the statement, "he
breathes where he wills," it does not follow that he does not breathe on any
one, unless it is proved that he does not will to breathe upon him. So,
also, "The Son revealeth the Father to whom he will" (Luke i. 29). What if
he will to reveal himself to all? Not all believe, but those who are drawn"
(John vi. 44). But, what if all are drawn? You see that those things are not
rightly placed in opposition, though it may be true that the Spirit does not
breathe upon all; that Christ does not reveal the Father to all; that all
are not drawn by the Father.
I wish, also, that your remarks in reference to the disparagement of
efficacious grace, had been more extended. First, indeed, the nature of
grace itself, and its agreement with the free-will of man, then its
efficacy, and the cause of that efficacy, ought to have been more fully
explained. For I consider nothing more necessary to the full investigation
of this subject. Augustine, because he saw this, treats, in very many
places, of the agreement of grace and of free-will, and of the distinction
between sufficient and efficacious grace. I remark here, in a word, that by
efficacious grace is meant, not that grace is necessarily received and can
not be rejected, which certainly is received, and not rejected, by all, to
whom it is applied. I add that it is not to the disparagement of grace, that
the wickedness and perversity of most men is so great that they do not
suffer themselves to be converted by it unto God. The author of grace
determined not to compel men, by his grace, to yield assent, but to
influence them by a mild and gentle suasion, which influence, not only, does
not take away the free consent of the free-will, but even establishes it.
Why is this strange, since God, as you admit, does not choose to repress the
perverse will, that is, otherwise than by the application of grace, which
they reject in their perversity. I do not oppose those things which you
present from the fathers, for I think that most of them can be reconciled
with the theory which you here design to confute.
You also present certain objections, which can be made
against you, and in favour of that doctrine, and you attempt
to confute them. The first is this, "the promise, in
reference to the Seed of the woman, was made to all the
posterity of Adam, and to each of the human race, in Adam himself." This,
indeed, is true, nor do those things, which are stated by you, avail to
destroy its truth. For the idea that the promise pertained to all men,
considered in Adam, is not at variance with the idea that the Jews were
alone the people of God. These ideas are reconciled by the fact that the
people of other nations were alienated from the promise by their own fault
or that of their parents, as may be seen from the whole tenor of the Holy
Scriptures.
The second and third objections are made by those who do not think that
historical faith in Christ is necessary to salvation. Your refutation of
these pleases me, and those objections are of no moment. You also meet, with
a sufficient reply, the objection from the fathers. But that objection is
not presented, oppositely to the views of those, whom, in this treatise, you
oppose. For they admit that the grace, by which any one is enabled to will
to be converted, and to will really to believe in Christ, is not common to
all men, which idea they do not regard as opposed to their own sentiment
concerning the election of believers, and the reprobation of unbelievers.
The seventh error; -- Should I say that this dogma is falsely charged upon
that doctrine, you will be at a loss, and indeed will not be able to prove
your assertion. For they acknowledge that the rule of predestination is "the
will and the decree of God." This declaration—"Believers shall be saved, and
unbelievers shall be condemned"—was made apart from any prescience of faith
or unbelief, by God, of His own mere will, and they say that in it is
comprehended the definition of Predestination and Reprobation. But when the
Predestination of certain individuals is discussed, then they premise the
foreknowledge of faith and of unbelief, not as the law and rule, but as
properly antecedent. To which view, the passage in Ephesians 1, is not
opposed. For believers are "predestinated according to the purpose of Him
who worketh all things after the counsel of His own will." The purpose,
according to which Predestination is declared to have been made, is that of
adopting believers in Christ to sonship and eternal life, as is apparent
from many passages of Scripture, where that purpose is discussed (Rom. 8 and
9). From this, it is also evident that your first argument against those who
hold that opinion, amounts to nothing.
In the second place, you assert, that "divine Election is rule of giving or
withholding faith. Therefore Election does not pertain to believers, but
faith rather pertains to the elect, or is from the gift of Election." You
will allow me to deny this, and to ask for the proof, while I plead the
cause of those, whose sentiment you here oppose. Election is made in Christ.
But no one is in Christ, except he is a believer. Therefore no one is
elected in Christ, unless he is a believer. The passage in Romans xi. 5,
does not serve to prove that thesis. For the point, there discussed, is not
the election of grace, according to which faith is given to some, but that,
according to which, righteousness is imputed to believers. This may be most
easily, proved from the context, and will be manifest to any one, who will
more diligently inspect and examine it. For the people, "which God foreknew,
(verse 2d,) that is which He foreknew according to His grace, is the people,
which believed, not that which followed after righteousness by the works of
the law (Rom. ix. 31). This people God "hath not cast away." For thus is to
be understood the fifth verse, "there is a remnant according to the election
of grace," that is, they, only, are to be esteemed as the remnant of the
people of God, who believe in Christ, as they alone are embraced in the
election of grace, the children of the flesh, who followed after
righteousness by the law, being excluded. That, which follows, teaches the
same thing, "if by grace, then it is no more of works." What is that which
is "by grace "? Is it election to faith? By no means; but it is election to
righteousness, or righteousness itself. For it is said to be "by grace" not
"by works." For it is not, here, inquired whether faith, but whether
righteousness belongs to any one by works. Consider also the next verse
"What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for, but the
election hath obtained, and the rest were blinded." What is that which
Israel had sought for, and had not obtained? Not faith, but righteousness.
See the end of the 9th and the beginning of the 10th chapters. They rejected
faith in Christ, and endeavoured to obtain righteousness, by the works of
the law, and this is the reason that they did not attain "to the law of
righteousness." It is the same thing, also, which the elect are said to have
obtained, not faith, but righteousness.
You will ask—"Is not faith, then, given according to Election?" I answer
faith is not given according to that election, which is there discussed by
the apostle, and therefore that passage does not conduce to your purpose.
But, is there, then, a two-fold Election on the part of God? Certainly, if
that is Election, by which God chooses to righteousness and life, that must
be different, by which He chooses some to faith, if indeed he does choose
some to faith: which, indeed, I will not now discuss, because it is my
purpose only to answer your arguments.
Your third argument is equally weak, for prescience of faith and of unbelief
has the same extent as predestination. In the first place, unbelief is a
negative idea, that is, want of faith, and it was foreseen by God, when He
decreed unto damnation. Secondly, the infants of believers are considered in
their believing parents, and are not to be separated from the people of
believers.
Your fourth argument is answered in the same way as the second. Faith is not
the effect of that election, by which some are elected to righteousness and
life. But it is this election to which they refer, in the examination of
whose doctrine you are now engaged. The passage, in Ephesians 1, regards
faith, as presupposed to predestination. For no one, but a believer, is
predestinated to adoption through Christ - - "as many as received him, to
them gave he power to become the sons of God." The passages, adduced from
the fathers, sustain the idea that faith is the effect of election, but,
without doubt, that election is referred to, by which God makes a
distinction among men in the dispensation of means, by which faith is
attained, which will perhaps not be denied by those, with whom you are now
engaged, if it may only be correctly explained according to the Scriptures.
The fifth argument amounts to this: -- "Election is not according to the
foresight of faith, since the cause of the divine foresight of faith in one,
and not in another, is the mere will of God, who purposes to give faith to
one, and not to another." Your opponents would reply that faith is, in such
a sense, of the mere will of God, that it does not use an omnipotent and
irresistible influence in producing faith in men, but a mild suasion and one
adapted to incline the will of man, according to the mode of the human will:
therefore the whole cause of the faith of one, and the unbelief of another,
is the will of God, and the free choice of man.
To the sixth argument, he, who acknowledges that faith can be wholly lost,
will reply that the rule or rather the antecedent condition of election is
not faith, but final perseverance in faith: of that election, I mean, by
which God chose to salvation and eternal life.
The eighth error; -- That true and saving faith may be, totally and finally,
lost, I should not at once dare to say: though many of the fathers
frequently seem to affirm this. Yet the arguments, by which you prove that
it can be, neither wholly nor finally, lost, are to be considered. Your
first proof is deduced from Matt. xvi. 18 -- "upon this rock I will build,"
&c., and you argue in favour of your doctrine in a three-fold manner from
that passage. Your first proof is equivocal on account of the double meaning
of the word faith. For it means either the confession of faith made by Peter
concerning Christ, or trust resting in that confession and doctrine of
faith. Faith, understood in the former sense, is the rock, which remains
unshaken and immovable, and is the foundation of the church; but faith,
understood in the latter sense, is inspired in the members of the church, by
the spirit and the word, by which they are built upon the rock as their
foundation. Therefore the word faith is used in the antecedent in a sense,
different from that, in which it is used in the consequent.
Your second proof is this; -- "They, who have been built on the rock do not
wholly fall from it; -- But those, who truly believe, are built upon the
rock; -- Therefore, they do not utterly fall from it." Answer. The Major of
this proposition is not contained in the words of Christ, for he says not
that "those built on the rock shall not fall from the rock," but "the gates
of hell shall not prevail against it (the rock, or the church)." It is one
thing that the gates of hell should not prevail against the rock, but
another that those who are built upon the rock shall not fall from it. A
stone, built upon a foundation, may give way, and fall from it, while the
foundation itself remains firm. If Christ referred to the Church, I say,
even then, that to assert that those who are built upon the rock shall not
fall from it, is not the same as to declare that the gates of hell shall not
prevail against the church. For the act of falling pertains to the free will
of the person who falls; but if the gates of hell should prevail against the
church, this would occur on account of the weakness of the rock on which the
church is founded. The Minor does not repeat the same idea as was contained
in the Major. For, in the Minor, it is stated that believers are built, not
having been built, completely, on the rock, on account of the continuation
and confirmation of the work of building, which must, necessarily, continue
while they are in this world. But while that continuation and confirmation
lasts, believers do not seem to be out of danger of falling. For as any
person may be unwilling to be built upon the rock, so it is possible that
the same man, if he begins to be built, should fall, by resisting the
continuation and confirmation of the building. But, it is not probable that
Christ wished to signify, by those words, that believers could not fall, as
such an assertion would not be advantageous. Since it is necessary that they
should have their own strength in the rock, and therefore, that they should
always bear upon and cling to the rock, they will give less earnest heed, in
temptations, to adhere firmly to the rock, if they are taught that they can
not fall from it. It may be sufficient to animate them, if they know that no
force or skill can throw them from the rock, unless they willingly desert
their station.
As to your third proof, even if it should be evident that Christ declared,
that the gates of hell should not prevail against the church, yet it would
not follow that no one could fall away from the faith. If any one should
fall, nevertheless the church remaineth unshaken against the gates of hell.
The defection of an individual, as was before said, is not caused by the
power of hell, but by the will of him, who falls, in reference to the
inflexibility of whose will the Scripture says nothing; the use of argument,
presenting such consolation, would not be useful for the confirmation of the
faithful. In reference to the sentiments of the fathers, you doubtless know
that almost all antiquity is of the opinion, that believers can fall away
and perish. But the passages, which you present from the fathers, either
treat of faith in the abstract, which is unshaken and immutable, or
concerning predestinated believers, on whom God has determined to bestow
perseverance, who are always to be distinguished, according to the opinion
of the fathers, and especially of Augustine, from those who are faithful and
just, according to present righteousness.
Your second argument proves nothing, for, though it is true that he that
asketh may be confirmed against temptations, and may not fall away, yet it
is possible that he may not ask, and thus may not receive that strength, so
that defection may follow. Hence arises the constant necessity of prayer,
which does not exist, if one obtains that assistance from God, without daily
prayers, nor is it, here, declared that believers may not intermit the duty
of prayer, which must necessarily be presupposed to that conclusion, which
you wish to deduce from prayer.
That "Christ undertakes to confess the elect" (Matt. x. 32) is true. But
"elect" and "believers" are not convertible terms according to the view of
the fathers, unless perseverance be added to faith. Nor is it declared, by
Christ, in Matt. xxiv. 24, that the elect can not depart from Christ, but
that they can not be deceived, by which is meant that though the power of
deception is great, yet it is not so great as to seduce the elect: which
serves as a consolation to the elect against the power and artifices of
false Christ’s, and false prophets.
Your third argument can be invalidated in many ways. First, "entire
defection from true faith would require a second engrafting, if indeed he,
who falls away, shall be saved." It is not absolutely necessary that he, who
falls away, should be again engrafted; indeed some will say, from Hebrews 6
and 10, that one, who wholly falls away from the true faith, can not be
restored by repentance. Secondly, There is no absurdity in saying that they
may be engrafted a second time, because in Romans xi. 23, it is said of
branches, which had been cut or broken off, that "God is able to graft them
in again." If you say that the same individuals are not referred to here, I
will ask the proof of that assertion. Thirdly, It does not follow from the
second engrafting that "a repetition of baptism would be necessary" because
baptism, once applied to an individual, is to him a perpetual pledge of
grace and salvation, as often as he returns to Christ: and the remission of
sins, committed even after baptism, is given without a repetition of
baptism. Hence, if it be conceded that "baptism is not to be repeated," as
they, with whom you now contend, willingly admit, yet it does not follow
that believers can not wholly fall away, either because those, who wholly
fall away, may not be entirely restored, or because, if they are restored,
they do not need to be baptized a second time. It does not seem that your
fourth argument, from 1 John iii. 9, can be easily answered. Yet Augustine
affirms that, here, they only are referred to who are called according to
the divine purpose and are regenerated according to the decree of the divine
predestination. If you say that it is here said of all, who are born of God,
that they do not sin, and that the seed of God remains in them, I will reply
that the word "remain" signifies inhabitation, but not a continuance of
inhabitation, and that so long as the seed of God is in a person, he does
not sin unto death, but it is possible that the seed itself should, by his
own fault and negligence, be removed from his heart, and as his first
creation in the image of God was lost, so the second communication of it may
be lost. I admit, however, that this argument is the strongest of those
which have been hitherto referred to.
To the fifth, I reply, that the seed of the word of God is immortal in
itself, but it can be removed from the hearts of those, who have received it
(Matt. xiii. 19, etc).
The Sixth argument. So long as the members abide in Christ as the branches
in the vine, so long they can not indeed perish, as the vivifying power of
Christ dwells in them. But if they do not bear fruit, they shall be cut off
(John xv. 2). It is possible that the branches, even while abiding in the
vine, may not bear fruit, not from defect of the root or of the vine, but of
the branches themselves. Romans 6, is also an exhortation of the apostle to
believers, that they should not live any longer in sin, because they, in
Christ, are dead to sin. This admonition to Christians would be in vain, if
it were not possible that they should live in sin, even after their
liberation from its dominion. It is to be considered that the mortification
of the flesh is to be effected through the whole life, and that sin is not,
in a single moment, to be so extinguished in believers that they may not at
some time bear the worst fruit, provoking the wrath of God, and deserving
the destruction of the individual. But, if a person commit sins, deserving
the divine wrath, and destruction, and God remits them, only on condition of
contrition and serious repentance, it follows that those, who thus sin, can
be cut off, and indeed finally, if they do not return to God. That they
should return, is not made necessary by the efficacy of their engraftment
into Christ, although that return will certainly occur in those, whom God
has determined, by the immutable decree of His own predestination, to make
heirs of salvation.
The Seventh argument. "All who are members of Christ attain the stature of a
perfect man." This is true, if they do not depart from Christ. This they can
do, but it is not included in the internal and essential definition of
members, that they should not be able to recede and fall away from their
head. It is declared, in John 15, that the branches which do not bear fruit
are taken away; and in Romans 11, some branches are said to have been broken
off on account of unbelief.
You, then inquire, as if you had fully proved that faith can not be wholly
lost, -- "What is the reason that faith may not utterly fail?" and reply—"It
is not from the nature of faith, but from the gift of grace, which confirms
that which is promised to believers." You, here, incorrectly contrast faith
itself, and confirming grace, when you ought to contrast a man, endued with
faith, on one hand, and the gift of grace on the other. The reason that
faith can not wholly perish, or rather that the believer can not wholly lose
his faith, is found, either in the believer himself, or in grace, which
confirms or preserves faith, that the believer may not lose it. It is not in
the believer himself, for he, as a human being obnoxious to error and fall,
can lose his faith. But if God has determined that he should not lose his
faith, it will be preserved through the grace by which He strengthens him,
that he may not fall. "Simon, I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail
not" (Luke xxii. 32). The faith, then, of Peter could have failed, if we
consider his strength. But Christ, by his intercession, obtained for him
that grace, by which its preservation was secured. The covenant of God, of
which mention is made in Jer. xxxii. 40, does not contain in itself an
impossibility of departure from God, but a promise of the gift of His fear,
by which, so long as it shall continue in their hearts, they shall be
restrained from departing from God. But the Scripture nowhere teaches that
it is not possible to shake off that gift of fear, nor is it profitable that
promises of such a character, should be made to those in covenant with God.
It is sufficient that they should be sustained, by the promises, against all
temptations of the world, the flesh, sin and Satan, and that they may be
made strong against all their enemies, if they will only be faithful to
themselves and to the grace of God.
You add another question: "How far can believers lose grace and the Holy
Spirit?" You reply that this question can be solved by a two-fold
distinction, both in believers and in grace. In the distinction, which you
make among believers, those, whom you mention first, do not at all deserve
to be called believers; for hearing and understanding the word, if
approbation of the same is not added, do not constitute a believer. They,
who occupy the second order, are called believers in an equivocal sense. For
true faith can not but produce fruit, convenient to its own nature,
confidence in Him, love towards Him, fear of Him, who is its object. You
distinguish believers of the second and third order in such a manner as to
make the latter those who "apprehend Christ the redeemer by a living faith
unto salvation" which you deny in reference to the former; in the mean time
conceding to both not only an approbation of evangelical truth, heard and
understood, but also the production of certain fruits, when you ought,
indeed, to have considered the declaration of Christ; "without me ye can do
nothing; as the branch can not bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the
vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me" (John xv. 4, 5).
Can any one indeed abide in Christ, unless he apprehends him as a redeemer,
by a living faith unto salvation. Therefore that whole distinction among
believers is futile, since the last class only ought to receive this name.
If you can prove that these can not fall away and perish, you fully
accomplish your purpose. The other classes can not be said to lose grace and
the Holy Spirit, but rather to reject grace and to resist the Holy Spirit,
if they do not make further progress; though the hearing, understanding and
approbation of the word may tend to this that they should, apprehend Christ
Jesus as their Redeemer, by a living faith unto salvation.
Let us now come to your distinction of grace, and see how you from this
distinction meet the question above presented. You say that "Grace is of a
two-fold character. Primary grace is the gratuitous favour of God, embracing
his own in Christ unto eternal life." Be it so. You also say that "some fall
from this grace, in a certain manner, that is, according to some effects of
that grace of which they must be destitute and the contrary of which they
must experience, when they commit any grievous sin; not according to that
grace, when God always preserves His paternal feelings towards them, and
does not change His purpose concerning their adoption, and the bestowment on
them of eternal life." But these things need more diligent consideration.
The effect of grievous sin committed against the conscience is the wrath of
God, the sting of conscience, and eternal damnation. But the wrath of God
can not be consistent with His grace in reference to the same thing, at the
same time, and in respect to the same person, so that he should, in
reference to him with whom He is angry, in that very wrath, yet will eternal
life. He can will to bestow on him certain effects of grace, by which he can
be brought back to a sound mind, and, again to bestow on him, thus restored,
that grace of God unto eternal life. An accusing conscience—one really
accusing, can not be consistent with grace and the gratuitous favour of God
unto eternal life. For, in that case, the conscience would not really
accuse. God does not will to bestow eternal life on one, whom His own
conscience testifies, and truly, to be unworthy of eternal life; unless
repentance shall intervene, which, of the gracious mercy of God, removes
unworthiness. God does not will to bestow eternal life on him who has, by
his sin, merited eternal damnation, and has not yet repented, while he is in
that state. Therefore he truly falls from that grace which is designed to
embrace him unto everlasting life. But, since God knows that such a man
wills; by those means, which He has determined to use for his restoration,
rise from the death of sin, he can not be said to wholly fall from the
Divine grace. But a distinction is to be made here in relation to the
various blessings which God wills to bestow on such. He wills eternal life
only to the believing and penitent. He wills the means of faith and
conversion to sinners not yet converted, not yet believers. And it does not
seem to be a correct statement that "God regards sin, but not sinners with
hatred," since the sin and the sinner are equally odious to God. He hates
the sinner on account of his sin, of which he is the author, and which,
except by him, would not be perpetrated.
In the description of that primary grace, there is that, which weakens the
answer itself. "It is the favour by which God embraces in Christ his own. He
embraces no one in Christ, unless he is in Christ. But no one is in Christ,
except by faith in Christ, which is the necessary means of our union with
Christ. If any one falls from faith, he falls from that union, and,
consequently, from the favour of God by which he was previously embraced in
Christ. From which it is also apparent, that in this explanation there is a
petitio principii. For the question is this, "Can believers fall from this
primary grace, that is, from the favour of God, by which he embraces them in
Christ?" It is certain that they can not, while they continue to be
believers, because so long they are in Christ. But if they fall from faith,
they also fall from that primary grace. Hence the question remains—"Can
believers fall from faith?" But you concede that believers, do fall, so far
as themselves are concerned. I conclude, then, that God does not remain in
them, and that neither the right of eternal life, nor filiation belongs to
them, according to the declaration, "as many as received him, &c." (John i.
12). Hence, if you had wished to make your statements consistent, it was
necessary to deny that believers fall from faith, or, if you concede this,
to concede, at the same time, that they can fall from the favour of God by
which He embraces them in Christ unto eternal life. But, as I said, this
whole subject may be elucidated, if the grace of God is suitably
distinguished from its various effects.
Let the passages of Scripture, which you cite, be examined. "Neither shall
any man pluck them out of my hand" (John x. 28). Who will deny this? But
some say—"The sheep can not be taken out of the hands of the shepherd, but
can, of their own accord, depart from him." You affirm that "this is a weak
statement." By what argument? "Because when they fall, they are taken by the
Devil." Truly indeed, they are taken, when they fall, and it is not
possible, that it should be done in any other way. For unless the sheep are
in the hands of the shepherd, they can not be safe against Satan. But the
question is—Does not the act of departure and defection in its nature,
precede their seizure by Satan? If this be so, your answer is vain and
futile. You argue again in this manner, "’If ye continue in my word, ye are
my disciples indeed,’ (John viii. 31), therefore, he who continues to be one
of the flock, and does not fall, is truly one of the flock." Answer.—In the
first place, there is ambiguity in the word continue. It signifies either
present observance of Christ’s word, or continuous observance, without
defection from that word. Present observance, if it is sincere, makes one a
disciple of Christ, or rather proves that one is a true disciple of Christ,
otherwise one can never be truly called a disciple of Christ, unless when he
has passed the limit of this life, when defection will be no longer to be
feared, which is absurd. In the second place, I affirm that in the phrase
"my disciples indeed" there is a two-fold sense; it signifies either that
one, who at any time falls away from the word of Christ, was never a
disciple indeed, though he may, at some time, have kept his word in
sincerity; or that one, who at any time has kept the word of Christ and then
obtained the name of disciple, if he yet falls away, is afterwards unworthy
of the name of disciple. Therefore, if the relation of his present state is
considered, He is "a disciple indeed;" if the relation of his subsequent
state, he is not a disciple indeed, or does not deserve that name, because
he, at some time, deserts it, unless one may say that no one has ever
sincerely observed the word of Christ, who falls from it. This assertion
needs proof. The passage in Romans 8, "Who shall separate us from the love
of God?" is wholly irrelevant. For it is the consolation by which believers
are strengthened against all present and assailing evils. None of these can
at all effect that God should cease to love those, whom He has begun to love
in Christ. Romans xi. 29 is not better adapted to your purpose. For though
"the gifts of God are without repentance" yet one can reject the gifts of
God, which he receives. Your quotation from (2 Tim. ii. 19,) "The Lord
knoweth them that are His," does not favour your design. The Lord knoweth
His own, even if some believers do fall away from faith. For it can be said
that God has never known them as His own, by the knowledge, which is the
handmaid of Predestination now under consideration. The distinction of
Augustine may be applied here;-" some are children according to present
justification, some according to the foreknowledge and predestination of
God."
Secondary grace, you say, is either imputed or inherent. The phrase imputed
grace does not sound well in my ears. I have heretofore thought that grace
is not imputed, but imputes, as in Romans iv. 4, "the reward is not reckoned
of grace, but of debt." Righteousness is said, in the same chapter, to be
imputed of grace, without works. But, passing by this, let us examine the
subject. The question proposed was—"How far may believers lose grace and the
Holy Spirit?" You answer—in respect to imputed grace, which consists in
justification, a part of which is the remission of sins—"The remission of
sins is not granted in vain." Be it so. But believers may, after remission
of some sins has been obtained, commit sin and grievously backslide. If,
then, they should not repent of that act, will they obtain remission? You
answer in the negative. I conclude from this, that they can lose that grace
of the remission of their sins. But you reply—"It can not be that they
should not repent." I know that this is asserted, but I desire the proof—not
that the elect indeed, can not depart hence without final repentance, but
that they, who have once been believers, can not die in final impenitence.
When you shall have proved this, it will not be necessary to recur to this
distinction of grace, for then you would be permitted to say that the
believer never finally loses his faith and dies in impenitence.
You make a distinction in inherent grace, as "faith" and "the consequent
gift of faith." In faith you consider "the act and the habit of faith." From
this distinction, you answer the proposed question, thus—"Faith, considered
in respect to habit and ability, can not be lost, on account of confirming
grace, (though it can per se be lost,) but faith, in respect to any
particular act, can be lost." First, I ask proof of your assertion. "Faith,
in respect to habit, can not be lost, on account of confirming grace." I
also inquire—"Is that act of faith, in respect to which faith can be lost,
necessary or not, that any one may apprehend Christ? If it is, then a man
can fall from grace, if he loses, as you say, the act of apprehension of
Christ, or, rather, if he does not apprehend Christ by that act. If it is
not necessary, then, it was indeed, of no importance to have considered that
act, when the loss of grace was under discussion.
You attempt to prove, both by the example of David and by the opinions of
the fathers, that the habit of faith and love can not be lost. The example
of David proves nothing. For, should it be conceded that David, when he was
guilty of adultery and murder, had not lost the Holy Spirit, it does not
follow from this that the Holy Spirit can not be lost. For another might sin
even more grievously, and thus lose the Holy Spirit. If, however, I should
say that David had lost the Holy Spirit when he committed that adultery and
murder, what would you answer, You might reply that it is evident that it
was not so from the 51st Psalm. That Psalm, I reply, was composed by David
after he had repented of those crimes, having been admonished by Nathan.
God, at that time, according to the declaration of Nathan, restored the Holy
Spirit to David (2 Sam. xii. 13). In reference to the assertions of the
fathers, I consider that the case of Peter is not to the prejudice of the
opinion, which states that faith can be destroyed. For Peter sinned through
infirmity, which weakens faith, but does not destroy it. I pass over
Gratiaus. It would be proper to discuss, at some length, the sentiment of
Augustine, if it had been proposed to present it fully. If, however, any one
wishes to know what was the opinion of Augustine concerning this matter, let
him look at the following passages: "De Predestinatione Sanctorum" (lib 1,
cap. 14), and "De Bono Perseverantiae" (lib. 2, cap. 13, 16, 19, 22, 23).
Let some passages be added from Prosper, who holds and every where defends
the opinions of Augustine, e.g. Ad cap. Gall. respons. vii, Ad objectiones
Vincentinas, respons. 16; De vocatione Gentium, lib. 2, cap. 8, 9, and 28.
From these passages, it will, in my judgment, be apparent that Augustine
thought that some believers, some justified and regenerate persons, some, on
whom had been bestowed faith, hope and love, can fall away and be lost, and
indeed will fall away and be lost, the predestinate alone being excepted.
You quote some objections to the foregoing explanation. The first objection
is this: "Sin and the grace of the Holy Spirit can not subsist together."
You reply, that "this is true of reigning sin, or sin with the full consent
of the will." But you deny that the regenerate sin with the full or entire
consent of the will. I answer, first, that "reigning sin" is not the same as
that which has the full consent of the will. For the former belongs,
generically to quality or habit, the latter pertains generically to action,
and by the latter is prepared a way for the former. From this, it is clearly
manifest that reigning sin can not subsist with the grace of the Holy
Spirit. It is also true that sin does not reign in the regenerate. For,
before this can take place, it is necessary that they should reject the
grace of the Holy Spirit, which mortifies sin and restrains its power. We
must, then, examine the other mode of sin, and see whether some of the
regenerate may sin or not with the full consent of the will. You deny this,
and deduce the reason for your denial from the beginning and successive
steps of temptation. You consider the beginning of temptation to be
concupiscence or native corruption, and you say that "it exists alone in the
unregenerate man, who is entirely carnal. That, in the renewed man, there
is, at the same time, flesh and Spirit, but in various degrees, so that he
is partly carnal, partly spiritual;" from which you conclude that
"concupiscence can subsist with the grace of the Holy Spirit, but not
reign." I reply that though I have but little objection to that conclusion,
yet I can not altogether approve those things which precede. For some of
them are not true, and the statement is imperfect.
It is not true that "an unregenerate man is wholly carnal," that is, that
there is in him only the flesh. For by what name shall that truth be called
which the wicked are said to "hold in unrighteousness" (Rom. i. 18)? What is
that conscience which accuses and excuses (Rom. ii. 15)? What is the
knowledge of the law by which they are convinced of their sins (Rom. iii.
20)? All these things can not be comprehended under the term flesh. For they
are blessings, and are adverse to the flesh. Yet I admit that the Holy
Spirit does not dwell in the unrenewed man. The statement is imperfect,
because it omits the explanation of the proportion, which exists between the
flesh and the Spirit in the renewed man, as the Spirit predominates in the
regenerate person, and because, from the predominating element, he receives
the name of spiritual man, so that he can not come under the term carnal.
But observe, moreover, that your conclusion has reference to concupiscence,
which is a quality, while the question related to actual sin, namely—"Can
actual sin consist with the grace of the Holy Spirit?" You refer to "five
steps, of temptation." You concede that the first step may pertain to the
regenerate, also the second, and it is, indeed, true. But it can never be
proved that Paul, for such a reason, "complained of his own captivity,
because he could delight in sorrowful meditation in reference to the
commission of sin." For he is treating there, of sin already committed. "The
evil which I would not, that I do."
The third step, which is "the consent of the will to the perpetration of
sin," you attribute also to the regenerate, "but a more remiss consent,
according to which they will, in such a sense, that they are even unwilling
to commit sin," and you think that this can be proved from the example of
Paul in Romans 7. I wish you to consider, here, how these things harmonize
together, that, in reference to one and the same act, the will or volition
may be two-fold, and, indeed, contrary to itself, even at the very moment
when the act is performed. Before the act, while the mind is yet in doubt,
and the flesh is lusting against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the
flesh, this might be affirmed: but, when the flesh carries out its
concupiscence into action, that is, does that which it has lusted against
the Spirit, then, indeed, the Spirit has ceased to lust. The position must
then be assumed, that the renewed man commits sin from the concupiscence of
the flesh, the Spirit in vain lusting against it, that is, the flesh is
stronger than the Spirit, and the desire of the Spirit is overcome by the
flesh, contrary to the declaration of Scripture—"greater is he that is in
you, than he that is in the world" (1 John iv. 4), and contrary to the
condition of the regenerate, in whom the Spirit predominates over the flesh,
nor does it occur that the flesh should conquer, unless when the Spirit is
quiet, and intermits the contest.
"But the Scripture affirms (Rom. 7) that the renewed man would do good, yet
does it not, and would not do evil, yet does it." I answer. in that passage,
reference is made not to a regenerate person, but to a man under the law.
But, even, if this point be conceded, I affirm that it is not possible that
there should be volition and nolition, at the same time, concerning the same
act; hence, that volition, which is followed by an act, is a pure and
efficacious volition; the other is not so much volition as velleity, which
is produced, not by the Holy Spirit striving against the flesh, but by the
conscience, or the law of the mind, existing in man, which ceases not to
struggle against the flesh, until it is seared, and deprived of all feeling.
That struggle of the conscience does not effect that the man should not sin
with his full consent, but rather aggravates the sin, and declares how
vehement is the consent of the will to a sin, presented by the concupiscence
of the flesh, when not even the conscience, exclaiming against it, has not
power to restrain the will from that consent.
It is, then, an injurious and most dangerous opinion, which holds that the
renewed man does not sin with full consent, when he feels the sting of
conscience, opposing the sin which the will is about to perpetrate. As this
happens to all, who are affected by any sense of right and wrong, it will be
very easy for them to persuade themselves that, as they do not sin with the
full consent of the will, they have a certain indication of their own
regeneration. Therefore, if the full consent of the will to sin can not
consist with the grace of the Holy Spirit, it is certain that the regenerate
sometimes lose the grace of the Holy Spirit, because they sin with the full
consent of the will, when they sin against the conscience.
You consider the fourth step to be "the carrying out of an evil work into an
act." This is correct, but the distinction which you make, can not be proved
from the Scriptures. When the regenerate person commits sin, he commits it
being overcome by the concupiscence of the flesh, while the Spirit of
regeneration is quiescent, and not testifying against the sin, unless before
the sin, when the consent of the will has not yet been gained by the suasion
of concupiscence, and after the sin when the Spirit has begun to revive. But
the "testifying," of which you speak is nothing else than the act of the
conscience accusing the person both before and after the commission of sin.
The whole man, then, sins, but "not according to that principle by which he
is renewed." This was unnecessarily added; for who would ever call this in
question? This, also, can be said of a man placed under the law, as he does
not sin according to the law of his mind, that is, of his conscience
approving the law, but only according to the flesh. Hence, you see that the
distinction in this case, ought to have been of another character. Nor does
it seem necessary to concede, "that an action, performed by a regenerate
person, may be less sinful than if performed by him in whom sin reigns."
For the fault and sinfulness of an action is to be judged from the strong
consent of the will to the sin. But he is borne more vehemently towards sin,
who rejects the act of the Holy Spirit striving in the contrary direction,
and follows the concupiscence of the flesh, than he, who, opposing the
concupiscence of the flesh by his conscience alone, at length yields. Thus
the sin of David, committing adultery and murder was far more heinous than
that of a heathen man committing the same sins; the inhabitants of Bethsaida
and Chorazin sinned more grievously than the citizens of Tyre and Sidon,
because the former, committing their sins, resisted more influences, adapted
to restrain from the commission of sin, than the latter. You say that the
last step is "when a sin, confirmed by frequent repetition, becomes a
habit." That step or degree was called, you remark, by the Greeks to<
ajpotelei~n But you will allow me to deny that the Greeks used that word, in
that sense. For your fourth step was equivalent to ajpotelei~v the same as
to commit sin. But this last step is a degree, not so much in sin, as in
sinners, of whom some advance further than others. You deny that this step
can happen to the regenerate.
This needs proof. In all those distinctions, there is a continual assumption
of the point to be proved. For they, who say that the regenerate can lose
the grace of the Holy Spirit, say, also, that the regenerate may not only
sin, but may persevere in sin, and contract the habit of sin.
The second objection, which you adduce, is this: "Adam, being yet pure, fell
wholly, therefore, much more may they fall, who, having been born and
renewed after the fall of Adam, have believed." The force of the argument
depends on the parity or equality of the conditions of the parties; that of
Adam, in respect to which he was created in righteousness and true holiness;
and that, of his descendants, in respect to which they have been renewed in
righteousness and true holiness. You attempt to solve the difficulty by
showing the dissimilarity of the cases. But the dissimilarity, which exists
between the two conditions, does not effect that the regenerate may not be
able, altogether, to fall away. Nor, indeed, is this affirmed, in the
passage, which you cite from Augustine. For, though the regenerate may have
the will to do according to their ability, of which gift Adam was destitute,
according to the sentiment of Augustine, yet it does not follow that they
can not repudiate and willingly reject this gift. You were permitted to add
other things, in which the condition of believers in Christ differs from the
original state of Adam in righteousness. Among other things, this is
peculiar, that the latter state had not the promise of the remission of
sins, if it should happen that Adam should ever once commit sin; but that of
believers is rendered more blessed by the promise—"their sins will I
remember no more" (Heb. viii. 12). Hence it is that the faith of God is not
made "without effect," even if those in covenant with him do sin (Rom. iii.
3). For the covenant is one of grace and faith, not of righteousness and
works. Yet make whatever differences you please between the two states, it
will be always necessary to admit that perseverance, voluntary, free, and
liable to change, was necessary to salvation in both states. Man does not
persevere, either in the former or the latter state, unless freely and
willingly. This is so far true "that God does not take away even from those,
who are about to persevere, that liability to change, by which they may
possibly not choose to persevere," as is affirmed in the treatise "De
vocatione Gentium, lib. 2, cap. 28." You refer to a third objection, "This
member of a harlot is not a member of Christ—But the believer, who is a
member of Christ, can become the member of a harlot; -- Therefore, the
believer may cease to be a member of Christ." You reply to this objection by
making distinctions in the term member. But those distinctions are
unnecessary. First, the subject of discussion is a member not in appearance,
but in truth. An apparent member is, in an equivocal sense, a member, and
therefore, does not belong to the definition; and there would be four terms
to the syllogism. Nor is the subject of discussion a member, which is such
in its destination, for we know that all men, who are in destination members
of Christ, are, universally, members of Satan, before they are in fact
brought to Christ, and united to him. Since, therefore, members, which are
really such, are referred to in the objection, to what purpose are these
niceties of distinction sought? "In reference to those who are really
members," you say, "some are living, others are half dead. But both are
members, according to election." If this be so, you attain your object; for
who is so foolish as to say that the elect may finally be lost? But they
whom you consider your opponents, will deny that all true members of Christ
are such by predestination. They will affirm that some are such according to
their present state, their righteousness and present engraftment in Christ.
Let us however, consider your answer, in the supposition of the truth of
that distinction. You assert that "a true and actual member, and one that
remains such cannot be a member of a harlot." That, indeed, is not strange.
For it is an identical proposition, and, therefore, amounts to nothing. The
member of Christ, that remains such, is not a member of a harlot, but this
does not answer the question—Will a living member of Christ always remain
alive? It was affirmed in the objection that a living member of Christ may
become a member of a harlot, and may, therefore, not remain a member of
Christ. The point, to be proved, is again assumed in your answer to that
argument. But you say that "the half dead may, as far as they are concerned,
at any time, lose the Holy Spirit." But, from what state do they become half
dead? Is it not from being wholly alive? You would not indeed say that any
one is half dead, at the time, when he is engrafted in Christ. You see that
such an assertion is absurd. The state of the case, according to those who
argue against you, is like this. At the beginning of faith in Christ and of
conversion to God, the believer becomes a living member of Christ. If he
perseveres in the faith of Christ and maintains a good conscience, he
remains a living member. But if he becomes indolent, has no care for
himself, gives place to sin, he becomes, by degrees half-dead: and
proceeding in this way he at length wholly dies, and ceases to be a member
of Christ. You ought to have refuted these statements, which, so far from
refuting, you rather confirm by your distinctions. You have indeed treated
this subject, with less care than its dignity, and your learning deserved.
The ninth error; -- That, which is so styled by you, is erroneously charged
on the sentiment adverse to you: for they do not say this, nor can it, in
any way, be deduced from their sentiment. This is their opinion. "A man, by
his own freewill, receives the grace, which is divinely offered to him,
whatever it may be." For as grace preserves, so the free-will is preserved,
and the free will of man is the subject of grace. Hence it is necessary that
the free-will should concur with the grace, which is bestowed, to its
preservation, yet assisted by subsequent grace, and it always remains in the
power of the free-will to reject the grace bestowed, and to refuse
subsequent grace; because grace is not the omnipotent action of God, which
can not be resisted by the free-will of man. And since the state of the case
is such, those same persons think that a man can reject grace and fall away.
From which you see that you have undertaken a futile task, when you refute
the error which you charge on that sentiment. Yet we may consider, also,
those same things: perhaps an opportunity will be afforded to note
something, which will not be unworthy of knowledge. "This sentiment," you
affirm, "attributes a free will, flexible in every direction, of grace, to
all men." Do you deny that the free will is "flexible in all directions"—I
add, even without grace? It is flexible by its own nature: and as it is
addicted to evil in its sinful state, so it is capable of good, which
capability grace does not bestow upon it; for it is in it by nature. But it
is, in fact, only turned to good by grace, which is like a mold, forming the
ability and capacity of the material into an act, though it may be, of
itself, sufficiently evil. Augustine (de predestin Sanctorum, cap. 5) says,
"It belongs to the nature of man to be able to have faith and love, but it
pertains to the grace of believers to actually have them." But you may be
dissatisfied that this is said "to exist in all men," but that
dissatisfaction is without cause. Their meaning is not that grace is
bestowed on all men, by which their free will may be actually inclined to
good; but that in all there exists a will which may be flexible in every
direction by the aid of grace. But they teach, you say, that "it is in the
will of man to apply itself to the grace which is bestowed by the aid of
universal grace, or to reject the same by the inability of corrupt nature."
What do you desire at this point? You will answer "that for the phrase
‘universal grace’ should be substituted ‘particular grace.’" But who has
ever said that "a man can apply himself to particular grace by the force of
universal grace"? I think that no one can be so foolish: for the man is led
to the use of particular grace, offered to him, by the free-will, assisted
by particular grace. The expression, "to reject the same by the inability,"
&c., is ineptly used; for inability does not reject; a passive non-reception
pertains to it, while it is the province of depravity to reject. When,
therefore, you have introduced, according to your own judgment, the phrase
"universal grace," you fight against your own shadow. For it is evident that
"the ability to believe is not carried out into action, unless by the aid of
other subsequent grace, which we call particular or special, since it does
not happen to all and to each of mankind.
The passages of Scripture, which you adduce, do not answer your purpose. For
the former two are adapted to prove that the faithful do not fall away from
Christ; and let it be remembered that, according to Augustine and the author
of the book, "De vocatione Gentium," that perseverance pertains only to
believers, who are predestinated to life. The passages from Augustine show
that the grace, prepared for the predestinate, will certainly incline their
hearts, and will not be rejected by them because God uses such persuasions
with them, as He knows to be suitable to them, and adapted to persuade them.
This he calls efficacious grace, and always distinguishes it from efficient
grace. You, however, in quoting Augustine, with sufficient superciliousness,
repudiate that distinction. But what arguments do you use? You say that no
grace is sufficient for conversion, which is not efficacious. I deny it, and
nature itself exclaims against your assertion, while she distinguishes
sufficiency from efficacy. God is sufficient for the creation of many
worlds, yet He does not efficaciously perform it. Christ is sufficient for
the salvation of all men, yet he does not efficaciously accomplish it. But
you perhaps understand by efficacious cause that which can effect any thing,
and so make it identical with efficient cause. But they who distinguish
between sufficient and efficacious define the latter as that, which really
produces the effect.
You do not prove that which you intend, when you say that "man has not
free-will in spiritual things." Granted. But if grace may restore the
freedom of the will, is it not then in the exercise of free-will, that he
either can do sufficiently, or really does efficaciously? Nor is it to the
purpose to say that "we are dead" (Col. iii. 3), and that "our sufficiency
is of God" (2 Cor. iii. 5). This is not denied by those, who speak of
sufficient grace. Nor does that three-fold inability do away with sufficient
grace. They, who make the distinction, say that sufficient grace is able to
remove that three-fold inability, and to effect that a man should receive
offered grace, should use it when received, and should preserve it.
You endeavour to prove, in the next place, as the necessary consequence of
"the five-fold nature of grace, preeminent, preparative, operative,
co-operative, and persevering," that no single grace can be sufficient,
because "no one of those five kinds of grace is alone sufficient for
salvation, since all joined together are necessary." It is not a sound
conclusion, that there is no sufficient grace because no one of those five
kinds of grace is sufficient alone. The reasoning here is from a particular
case to a general conclusion, and therefore is not valid; there is here also
the fallacy of Composition. But the first two kinds of grace, namely,
prevenient and preparative, are either sufficient or efficacious. For God
precedes (by His grace) sufficiently and efficaciously; He also prepares
sufficiently and efficaciously. It may be questioned, also, whether the same
can not be said of operative and co-operative grace. Yet let us concede that
those terms properly pertain to efficacious grace. Nevertheless they who
defend the use of the phrase "sufficient," will say that these latter kinds
of grace are prepared for and offered to all those, who have suffered
themselves to be moved by prevenient and preparative grace, which is
sufficient in its character, in the direction intended by that grace; and
afterwards the gift of perseverance is also bestowed. Hence you have not, by
that argument, disproved sufficient grace so far as it is distinguished from
efficacious grace. But we will not examine the definitions of that five-fold
grace, because this does not pertain to the scope of this discussion. You
also endeavour to refute the same distinction by a simile. But in it there
is a great want of analogy. For an inert mass is moved, naturally and
necessarily, by the application of forces, which exceed the force of its
gravity; but we, as human beings, are moved according to the mode of
freedom, which God has bestowed on the will, from which it is called
free-will. At this point, the similitude, which Cardinal Contarenus uses in
reference to predestination, and the opposite of your simile, may be not
ineptly mentioned. He supposes a two-fold gravity in a stone, one natural,
the other adscititious. The strength which is sufficient to raise a stone,
tending downwards by natural gravity alone, will not be sufficient, if that
adscititious gravity shall be added, and the efficiency of sufficient
strength will be hindered by the adscititious gravity. We see this clearly
in athletes, engaged in wrestling. One endeavours to raise the other from
the earth, and to prostrate him, thus raised up. Either of them would be
able in a moment to effect this in reference to his antagonist, if the
latter should only offer the resistance of the native weight of his body,
but because he does not wish to be raised, he depresses himself and his
adversary as much as he can, by using the strength of his nerves and bones,
which far exceeds the weight of his body alone. So there is, in man, by
derivation from the first sin of the first man, a weight, which is, or may
be called, native. There is, in addition to this, another produced in each
person by his own wickedness, which does not so much exist in him, as is
present with him, serving as a hindrance that the power of that grace, which
is sufficient to overcome the natural tendency, may not effect that which,
without the interposition of that impediment, it would effect. Nor is the
flexibility of our will, nor our power of choice taken away by the
concurrence of those five gifts, but, by that concurrence, it is effected
that the will, which by its own nature is flexible in every direction, and
the choice, which is able to elect freely between two different things,
should incline certainly and infallibly in that direction, towards which the
motion of the five-fold grace impels it. Hence, also, I wish that instead of
"inflexible inclination," you had said "certain and infallible inclination."
For, if we do not say that the mind of a man may possibly be inclined in
another direction, even at the time when it is inclined in a given direction
by efficacious grace, it follows that the will of man acts not according to
the mode of liberty, but according to the mode of nature, and thus not the
free-will, but the nature of man, will be saved. But the free-will, at least
as to its exercise, will be, in that case, destroyed by grace, while it
belongs to grace not to take away, but to correct nature itself, wherein it
has become corrupt.
Nor is what is said concerning the promised Spirit opposed to these views.
For the "Spirit, who effects that, in fact, we may walk," does not take away
the freedom of the will and of human choice, but he acts upon the flee-will,
in such a manner, as he knows will be suitable and adapted to it, that it
may be, certainly and infallibly, inclined. I wish that the same thing may
be understood of the phrase, "the Father draweth." Those things, which
follow, have not the effect of weakening this doctrine. For, by the
supposition of "efficacious grace acting in those, concerning whom God,
certainly and infallibly, wills their conversion and salvation," the
existence of sufficient grace is not denied: nor indeed is that, which you
infer, included in that supposition, namely, that they, who are truly
believers, can not but persevere. We may be permitted to infer from it the
certain, but not the necessary existence of an effect. Ignorance of this
distinction is the cause of your idea that you must deny sufficient grace.
Next follows the explanation of some passages of Scripture, which they who
hold to sufficient grace are accustomed to use in proof of it. You seem to
have selected them from Bellarmine, who presents them, in the same order, as
you use. We will consider your refutation.
The first passage is from Isaiah 5. Bellarmine deduces from that passage a
two-fold argument in proof of sufficient grace. The first is like this, when
put in a syllogistic form: "He, who did all things for his vineyard which
were necessary that it might be able to bear fruit, used sufficient culture
for its productiveness; -- But God, &c.; - - Therefore, &c." The truth of
the Major is plain from its very terms. It consists in a definition, and is
itself a definition. For sufficient culture is that in which all things
necessary for fruitfulness are used." The truth of the Minor is contained in
the text. For he, who has done all things which he might do for
fruitfulness, has used all necessary means.
God could not, with justice, speak in such terms if He had not used all
necessary means. Therefore the conclusion is a correct one. You reply by
making a two-fold distinction in sufficiency, and in the nature of the
vineyard; the sufficiency of external means, and that of internal grace;
also of a good and bad vineyard. In the first part of this reply, you
concede what is proved in the passage under consideration. For, if the
external means are of such a character, that men would be sufficiently
invited and led by them unto salvation, unless their minds were so perverse
and depraved, as you say, then it follows that those means would have been
sufficient. For is it necessary, in order that sufficiency, by those means,
may be attributed to grace, that internal grace, certainly changing the bad
vine into a good one, should be added. Indeed it can be said that so much
internal grace, as would be sufficient for a change of heart, was not
wanting, or at least would not have been wanting, if they had not, in their
perversity, rejected the external means. The distinction between the good
and the bad vineyard is of no importance in this place. For this is the very
thing, concerning which God complains that His vineyard was so perverse that
it would not respond to the sufficient culture which had been bestowed upon
it.
The second argument of Bellarmine is like this. If God had not bestowed on
that vineyard all things necessary for the production of grapes, then He
would have said absurdly that He "looked that it should bring forth
grapes;"—But He said, well and justly, that He "looked that it should bring
forth grapes;"—Therefore he had bestowed on it all things necessary for the
production of grapes. The truth of the Major is certain. For God knew that a
vineyard could not produce fruit, which was destitute of any of the means
necessary for fructification, and if He knew this, He knew, also, that it
would be futile, nay, foolish to look for grapes from a vineyard, which
could not bear grapes. The Minor is contained in the text. Therefore the
conclusion is valid, that sufficient grace was not wanting to the vineyard.
It is worth the while to consider what is the meaning of that divine looking
for or expectation, and how it may be correctly attributed to the Deity. An
expectation, by which an act is looked for from any one, depends on a proper
knowledge of the sufficiency, necessary for the performance of the act,
which either exists in Him or is present with Him, on whom the act is
incumbent, else, the expectation would be unreasonable. No one looks for
figs from thistles, or roses from a thorn-bush. This divine expectation,
therefore, if we do not wish to call it unreasonable, which would be
blasphemy, depends on the same knowledge. Nor does the fact that, in the
infinity of His knowledge, God knows that no effect will follow, from the
sufficiency of those forces, to prevent us from attributing that expectation
to Him. For that knowledge does not at all interfere with the sufficiency of
causes on which depends the justness and reasonableness of the expectation.
It is, indeed, true that the divine knowledge effects that God can not be
deceived. But he, who looks for fruit in vain, and to whose expectation the
event does not correspond, is deceived. From this, it is easy to infer that
expectation is attributed to God only by anthropopathy. But, if even this be
conceded, it will nevertheless follow from the consideration that
expectation is attributed, with this appropriate qualification, to the
Deity, that sufficient strength was present with the individual from whom
something was expected. But if, in that expectation, we consider not only
the knowledge referred to, but also the highest desire, with which, he, to
whom expectation is attributed, demands the production of fruits, in that
respect expectation is most properly attributed to God. For he desires
nothing so much from men; in nothing is He equally delighted. This also is
most plainly expressed in that parable. Let us now return from this
digression.
To that second argument you make no reply, but propose another case which
you think will be more easily managed. But let us examine this, also, with
your answer. The case is this: "If he did not bestow grace to bear fruit,
which could not be had, except by His gift, then God had no just cause of
expostulating with the Jews." The reply consists in a denial of the
consequence, for the denial of which, a three-fold reason is assigned. The
first is this; "as He did not owe that grace, He was under obligation to no
one." Secondly, "because they rejected it when offered to them in their
parents." Thirdly, "because they did not, after having rejected it, seek it
anew, or have any care concerning it." Indeed to one, who carefully
considers the matter, the reason is a single one, though consisting of three
parts. For the reason assigned that God could rightly expostulate with
those, who do not bear fruit in this, that "they had grace sufficient for
this purpose but rejected it." To confirm and strengthen this reason, it is
added that God would not be obligated to give grace a second time, and that,
even should He be obligated, He would not deny it to those desiring it, but
He would not give it to those not desiring it, and not having any care
whatever concerning that grace. That reason for just expostulation is to be
examined, and even so much more diligently, as it is more frequently used.
It is asked, then, "Could God rightly expostulate with them because they do
not bear good fruit, who have rejected the grace received in their first
parents, which is necessary for the production of those fruits, or rather
who have lost it, by a judicial removal of it, on the part of God?"
For the discussion of this question, it is necessary to consider, first,
"whether God could demand fruit from those who have, as a punishment from
God, lost the grace necessary for that production, which was received in
their first parents," that is, who are destitute of necessary grace, though
by their own demerit. From this will readily follow the answer of the
question "whether He can justly expostulate with such persons, if they do
not produce fruit. We remark, then, -- every divine demand, by which He
requires any thing from a creature, is prescribed by law. But a law consists
of two parts, command and sanction. The command, by which an act is
prescribed or forbidden, ought not to exceed the strength of him, on whom
the command is laid. The sanction contains a promise of reward to the
obedient, a denunciation of punishment against the transgressor. Hence it is
evident that the demand of the law is two-fold, of obedience and of
punishment. That of obedience is prior and absolute; that of punishment is
subsequent, and has no place except when obedience is not yielded. Hence,
also, there is a two-fold satisfaction of the law; one, in which the
obedience, prescribed by the law, is rendered; the other, in which the
punishment, required by the law is inflicted. He, who satisfies the claim of
the law in one way, is free from its demands, in the other. He, therefore,
who pays the penalty laid down in the law, is entirely free from obligation
to render obedience. This is true, universally, of every kind of punishment.
If the punishment of disobedience comprehends within itself a privation of
that grace, without which the law can not be obeyed, then, indeed, by a
two-fold right, he seems to be entirely free from obligation to obedience,
both because he has suffered due punishment, and because he is deprived of
that strength without which the law can not be obeyed, and deprived,
punitively, by God Himself, the enacter of the law, which fact is of much
importance. For thus is excluded that argument, which some present, saying,
that the servant is bound to render obedience or servitude, even if he has
cut off his own hands, without which he can not render it. The case is not
analogous. For the fault and sin of the servant consists in the fact that he
has cut off his hands, but in the other case, God himself the lawgiver,
takes away the strength, because it has not been used by him, who had
received, according to the declaration, "to him that hath shall be given,
&c." That servant, indeed, deserved punishment by that crime, and if he
should suffer it, his master could not afterwards demand from him service
which he could not render without hands. Therefore it seems necessary to
conclude that God can not demand fruit from those, whom he has deprived,
though on account of their own demerit, if the strength necessary for
producing fruit. Let us take the illustration of a tree. The tree, which
does not bear fruit, deserves to die, but when that punishment has been
inflicted upon it, no one can, by any right demand fruit from it. Hence,
therefore it follows secondly "God can not justly expostulate with those,
who do not bear fruit if they are destitute of grace necessary for this,
even by the punishment of God. It is of no consequence that God is not
obligated to restore grace to them. For as He is not obligated to bestow
grace, so He can not demand the act of obedience; and, if He wills to demand
an act, He is obligated to restore that grace, without which the act can not
be performed. Thus also it is not to the purpose that they do not seek the
grace, which they have lost. For thus they twice deserve not to receive
grace, both because they have lost it, of their own fault, and because they
do not seek it when lost. On this very account, God has not the right to
demand an act, not susceptible of performance. These things are in reply to
your answer to the case proposed.
The second passage is in (Matt. xxiii. 37). "How often would I have gathered
thy children together, and ye would not." From this passage Bellarmine, to
prove that there is sufficient grace, thus argues, "If Christ did not desire
that the Jews should be able to will, then he could not, justly complain
that they would not. But he did justly complain that they would not.
Therefore he desired that they might be able to will." This reasoning is
based on the supposition that no one can justly complain of any person that
he has not performed an act, for the performance of which he had not
sufficient strength.
Your reply to that argument is two-fold. The former part, which refers to
the distinction of the will into that of good-pleasure, and that of sign or
revelation has nothing whatever to do with the subject of the argument. For
Bellarmine does not say that Christ wished to gather them according to his
good-pleasure, but he openly denies it, and affirms that he can sustain that
position from the passage itself. For a gathering, which is made according
to the will of good-pleasure is not only sufficient but also efficacious.
Let the gathering together here referred to, be according to the will, which
is styled that of sign or revelation, and from it follows that, which is
deduced by Bellarmine. For, in no mode of the will, does he wish to gather
them unless he assists or is ready to assist, that they also, whom he wishes
to gather, may be able to will; and thus it is a false assertion, that "God
can, by the will of sign, will to gather the Jews together, though He may
not aid them to be able to will." For the necessary consequences or effect
of this will is sufficient aid, by which also the Jews themselves might be
able to will. It is a contradiction in terms, though indirectly, to assert
that "He wills to gather, and wills not to give sufficient aid by which the
Jews may be able to will to be gathered, who can not, except by their own
will, be gathered." You add, to this reply, that which has also been said in
reference to the first argument, and its repetition is unnecessary. The
latter part of your reply is, "Christ does not here speak as God, but as the
minister of the circumcision." Granted. Then he wished to gather them
together as the minister of the circumcision, and as a minister who had
power to baptize with the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in that declaration of his
will he showed that he either had given or was ready to give sufficient
grace to them, without which they could not be gathered together. But in the
passage in Isaiah 5, God Himself speaks, who is able efficaciously to soften
and convert hearts, and says—"What could have been done more to my
vineyard?" Who would reply, according to the meaning of your answer, "Thou
mightest have softened their hearts and have converted them and it was
suitable that thou shouldst do this. For thou art God, and speakest there as
God." Therefore that distinction is absurd and not adapted to solve that
objection. We see indeed on how weak foundations, that opinion rests, which
can not present other answers to meet those arguments.
The third argument is from the 7th chapter of the acts, 51st verse. "Ye do
always resist the Holy Ghost." From this passage Bellarmine argues in a
two-fold manner. First, --
"Those, in whom good desires are not inspired, can not be said to resist the
Holy Spirit, -- But the Jews are said to have resisted; Therefore good
desires were inspired in them, by which they could have been converted."
Secondly—"They, who can not but resist, can not be justly accused on account
of their resistance; -- But the Jews were justly accused by Stephen; --
Therefore they were able to resist." From these two syllogisms can be
deduced as a consequence, -- "They had grace sufficient to enable them not
to resist and even to yield to the Holy Spirit." The latter argument is the
stronger. Though something may be said against the former, yet a small
addition may give to it also strength to withstand any opposition.
Let us examine your reply. It seems to us, not at all pertinent, and in part
very ridiculous. For Bellarmine concedes that this is not said of "the
efficacious operation of the Spirit." For he clearly distinguishes between
sufficient and efficacious grace or operation. Indeed he does this very
thing by quoting passages to show that there must be a division of special
grace into sufficient and efficacious. "But this passage," (Acts vii. 51),
you say "refers to the external ministration of the prophets." True; but
that ministration was one, by which the Spirit chose to work; otherwise the
man, who opposed that ministration, could not be said to resist the Holy
Ghost. These things are co-ordinate and conjoined so far that the Spirit
wills to work at least sufficiently through that ministration. The
interpretation of Peter Lombardus is truly worthy of the parent of the
Scholastic Theology, and unworthy of an introduction to the light by you,
without stern reprehension. I do not add a refutation of it, because its
perversity appears, on its very front, to those who examine it. The fourth
passage, which you have made third in order, is from the 3d chapter of Rev.
20th verse. "I stand at the door and knock." On this Bellarmine remarks—"He,
who knocks at a door, knowing with certainty that there is no one within,
who can open, he knocks in vain, and indeed is a foolish person. Far from us
be such an idea in reference to the Deity. Therefore when God knocks, it is
certain that the man can open, and consequently he has sufficient grace."
Your answer does not touch this argument of Bellarmine, for he does not wish
to infer the universality of grace but that there is such a thing as
sufficient grace, and this you do not, in your answer, contradict. Whether,
indeed, that sufficient grace is universal, that is, is bestowed on all and
each of mankind universally, is discussed, in another place, by Bellarmine,
whose defense, indeed, I have not undertaken, and I am not desirous to do
so, yet it is necessary to love the truth, by whatever person it may be
spoken.
The tenth error; -- This, in your estimation, is that "the hypothesis, which
you oppose, is at variance with itself." This is indeed a valid mode of
confutation. But how do you prove the liability of that theory to the charge
of self-contradiction? You very injuriously charge it with the opinion that
"God determined to bestow all natural and gracious aids upon all men." Who
can hold such an opinion, when he acknowledges that there is an "efficacious
grace which God does not impart to all?" Indeed you are not consistent with
yourself in the statement of their doctrine. For you say that it affirms
that "God bestows all aids upon all men," and afterwards say that it asserts
that "God does grant to all not actual perseverance, but the ability to
persevere or to will to persevere." Is not the gift of actual perseverance
one among all aids? How shall both these assertions be made without
contradiction? Correct your error, and when you have corrected it, you will
see that you ought to have made the remark "without which no one actually
obtains salvation," as explanatory of efficacious grace. Yet God is not
wanting to those to whom He gives the grace, by which they can be saved,
though He may not give the grace by which they will actually be saved. Those
words "by persevering, to obtain salvation," should have been arranged thus
"to persevere and obtain salvation." You erroneously confound act with
ability and efficacy with sufficiency.
The eleventh error; -- In this, you allege against this doctrine that "it
introduces heresies long condemned," namely, those of the Pelagians. This
assertion you indeed afterwards seem to soften down, because the Pelagians
attribute the faculty of doing well either wholly to nature, or only in part
to grace, while the doctrine attributes it wholly to grace. You, however,
find fault with it because "it makes grace universal, and thus involves
itself in yet greater difficulty." Something has been heretofore said on
this point. Yet of what weight is your refutation? For what if any one
should say that all men universally, have the power of believing and
obtaining salvation, if they will, and that this very power is bestowed,
divinely, upon the nature of mankind, by what argument will you disprove the
assertion? It does not follow, from this statement, that nature and grace
have an equally wide extent. For the ability to believe pertains to nature,
actual belief is of grace. So with the ability to will, and actual volition,
"It is God, which worketh in you, &c." (Phil. ii. 13). "Unto you it is given
to believe, &c." (Phil. i. 29). You seem to do injury to the truth, when you
say that it is a Pelagian idea that "a man can, by the opposition of his
will, resist grace." There is no page in Scripture, where this is denied. Is
a man a mere log that, by pure necessity of nature, he must yield to grace?
If this is not true, then a man consents freely, and therefore has the
ability not to consent, that is, to resist. Otherwise to what purpose are
threats and promises? The opinion that "a man has ability in the exercise of
the will, to yield to the grace of God, when explained to refer to remote
ability, and which may, otherwise, be called capacity to receive active and
immediate ability, by which any one can will to yield to grace," is not
Pelagian. Would that they, who, at this day, hold the dogma of
Predestination, might prove that it does not introduce, by fair inference,
the idea of fatal necessity. You say also that the Papists formerly held
these views. The fact that a similar crime is charged on both does not prove
a similarity in other respects. It is possible that they, when you oppose,
may differ from the Papists, and that the latter defend a doctrine which is
obnoxious to your objections.
The twelfth error; -- You affirm that "this doctrine is in harmony with the
Papish view of predestination. If that should be conceded, is the doctrine
therefore false? You, indeed, present a statement of it, but do not refute
it. You think that it is so absurd that it may be sufficient to have
presented it—that the statement itself will be a sufficient refutation. But,
if some one should undertake to defend that doctrine, how would you refute
it? We may make the attempt, "God foresaw from eternity the natures and the
sins of men; this foresight preceded the decree by which he gave Christ to
be the saviour of the world." I should say—
"The foresight of most sins," for He did not foresee the sin of the
crucifixion of Christ, until after that decree was made. You have given a
careless statement of that doctrine, as you have not made that necessary
distinction. Then God decreed "to give, for the sake of Christ, sufficient
grace, by which men might be saved." To all? The Papists do not assert this.
Then, "He predestinated to life those who, He foresaw, would finish their
life in the state of grace, which was prepared for them by the
predestination of God;" this is indeed not very far from the doctrine of
Augustine.
Your theory is "God did not reveal Christ for all and each of mankind." This
theorem is not of much service to you in proving the speciality of
predestination and of grace, since those, with whom you contend, even on the
supposition of its truth, meet you with a two-fold argument. First, -- the
reason that God did not reveal Christ to all and to each of mankind was the
fact that their parents rejected the word of the gospel; -- on which account
He permitted both the parents and their posterity to go on in their own
ways, and this, for so long a time, as the divine justice and their sins
seemed to demand.
The second argument is, that, in the mean time, while they were destitute of
the knowledge of Christ, God "left not himself without witness" (Acts xiv.
17) but even then revealed to them some truth concerning His power and
goodness, and the law also, which He kept inscribed on their minds. If they
had made a right use of those blessings, even according to their own
conscience, He would have bestowed upon them greater grace, according to
that declaration, "to him that hath shall be given." But by abusing, or not
using, those blessings, they made themselves unworthy even of the mercy of
God, and therefore were without excuse, and not having the law they were
condemned, their own thoughts accusing them (Rom. ii. 14, 15). But that God
concealed the promise of the Messiah from any man, before that, rejection
can not be proved from the Scriptures. Indeed, the contrary can be proved
from those things which are narrated of Adam and his posterity, and of Noah
and his children in the Scriptures. The defection from the right way
gradually progressed, and God is not bound at any particular time to send a
new revelation to men, who do not rightly use the revelation which they
already have.
From this, it is manifest what judgment must be passed on those
consectaries.
To the first; -- The reason that the promise of the blessed seed was not
revealed to all men is both the fault of their parents in rejecting it, and
of themselves in holding the truth, which they now have, in unrighteousness.
To the second; -- The answer is the same.
To the third; -- All men are called by some vocation, namely, by that
witness of God, by which they may be led to feel after God that they may
find him (Acts xxvii. 27); and by that truth, which they hold in
unrighteousness, that is, whose effect, in themselves, they hinder; and by
that inscription of the law on their hearts, according to which their
thoughts accuse one another. But this vocation, although it is not saving in
the sense that salvation can be obtained immediately from it, yet it may be
said to be antecedently saving, as Christ is offered for them; and salvation
will, of the divine mercy, follow that vocation, if it is rightly used. To
the fourth; -- It is stated that "no one has said that the prescience of
faith or unbelief is the rule of predestination," and this charge is futile.
But that some may be condemned, by the law alone, is most true, and on
account of their impenitence, though not on account of their rejection of
Christ.
_________________________________________________________________
Indexes
_________________________________________________________________
Index of Scripture References
Genesis
[1]1 [2]1:31 [3]2:16 [4]2:17 [5]2:17 [6]5:3 [7]5:3 [8]9:6
[9]14:15 [10]14:16 [11]18:25 [12]18:25 [13]18:25 [14]20:3
[15]31:29 [16]37 [17]37 [18]37:18
Exodus
[19]5 [20]6 [21]22:28 [22]26:6 [23]32:33 [24]32:33 [25]32:33
[26]33:19
Numbers
[27]13 [28]14:4 [29]23:19
Deuteronomy
[30]4:7 [31]7:6
Judges
[32]8:6 [33]16:19 [34]16:20
1 Samuel
[35]2:25 [36]2:30 [37]3:37 [38]13:9-14 [39]15:8 [40]15:9-22
[41]22:4 [42]23 [43]23:12 [44]24:6 [45]24:6
2 Samuel
[46]7:5 [47]12:13 [48]16:10 [49]24
1 Kings
[50]19:3 [51]21
2 Kings
[52]1 [53]3:23-27 [54]19:35 [55]19:36
2 Chronicles
[56]24:21 [57]26:18
Nehemiah
[58]4:15
Job
[59]1 [60]1 [61]1 [62]1:12 [63]2 [64]2 [65]4:18
Psalms
[66]1:6 [67]5:4 [68]5:4 [69]5:4 [70]11:7 [71]15:3 [72]15:3
[73]33:11 [74]47:20 [75]80:11-12 [76]81:13 [77]118
Proverbs
[78]8:31
Ecclesiastes
[79]7:27 [80]7:29
Isaiah
[81]5 [82]5 [83]5:4 [84]5:4 [85]5:4 [86]6 [87]6:10 [88]7:12
[89]40:17 [90]40:22 [91]55:11 [92]59:2 [93]59:2
Jeremiah
[94]32:40 [95]34:22
Ezekiel
[96]18:4 [97]18:23
Hosea
[98]1:6
Amos
[99]3:6
Malachi
[100]3:6
Matthew
[101]1:2 [102]1:21 [103]1:21 [104]7:17 [105]10:32 [106]11:25
[107]11:26 [108]11:28 [109]11:28 [110]12 [111]13:11 [112]13:11
[113]13:19 [114]16:18 [115]22:2-8 [116]22:3 [117]22:7 [118]22:14
[119]23:37 [120]23:37 [121]23:37-38 [122]24:24 [123]25 [124]25
[125]25 [126]25 [127]25 [128]25:12 [129]25:29 [130]25:34
[131]26:24 [132]26:39 [133]30
Mark
[134]14:21 [135]14:56
Luke
[136]1:29 [137]2:14 [138]7:30 [139]7:30 [140]7:30 [141]7:30
[142]12:32 [143]22:32 [144]22:53
John
[145]1:3 [146]1:4 [147]1:12 [148]1:12 [149]1:12 [150]1:29
[151]1:29 [152]1:29 [153]1:29 [154]2:10 [155]3:8 [156]3:16
[157]3:16 [158]3:18 [159]3:19 [160]3:36 [161]3:36 [162]4:42
[163]6:44 [164]6:51 [165]6:51 [166]7:37 [167]7:38 [168]8
[169]8:24 [170]8:31 [171]8:34-36 [172]8:44 [173]10:15 [174]10:28
[175]12:39-40 [176]15 [177]15:2 [178]15:4 [179]15:5 [180]16:13
[181]17:9 [182]17:9 [183]19:12 [184]19:33 [185]19:36
Acts
[186]2:23 [187]2:38 [188]2:39 [189]4:28 [190]4:28 [191]4:28
[192]7 [193]7:51 [194]10:43 [195]12:2 [196]13 [197]13:46
[198]13:46 [199]13:46 [200]13:46 [201]14:16 [202]14:17
[203]15:18 [204]23:10 [205]25:12 [206]27:27 [207]28:26 [208]28:27
Romans
[209]1:18 [210]2:4 [211]2:14 [212]2:15 [213]2:15 [214]3:3
[215]3:8 [216]3:20 [217]4:4 [218]4:4 [219]4:5 [220]4:5
[221]4:16 [222]4:25 [223]5 [224]5:6-8 [225]5:10 [226]6
[227]6:3 [228]6:4 [229]7 [230]7 [231]8 [232]8 [233]8 [234]8
[235]8 [236]8 [237]8 [238]8:1 [239]8:3 [240]8:17 [241]8:20
[242]8:20 [243]8:29 [244]8:29 [245]8:29 [246]8:29 [247]8:39
[248]9 [249]9 [250]9 [251]9 [252]9 [253]9 [254]9 [255]9
[256]9 [257]9 [258]9 [259]9:7-11 [260]9:11 [261]9:11
[262]9:11-13 [263]9:15 [264]9:16 [265]9:18 [266]9:20 [267]9:21
[268]9:21 [269]9:22 [270]9:22 [271]9:22 [272]9:22 [273]9:31
[274]10:5 [275]10:6 [276]10:9 [277]11 [278]11:5 [279]11:23
[280]11:29 [281]12:3 [282]14:15
1 Corinthians
[283]1:21 [284]1:24 [285]2 [286]2:8 [287]2:14 [288]3:7
[289]4:7 [290]5:19 [291]6:12 [292]13:9 [293]15 [294]15:19
[295]15:22 [296]15:24 [297]15:28 [298]15:44 [299]15:45
2 Corinthians
[300]3:5 [301]3:8 [302]5:19 [303]5:19 [304]5:19 [305]5:19
[306]5:19 [307]5:21 [308]5:21
Galatians
[309]2:20 [310]3:9 [311]3:9 [312]3:10 [313]3:10
Ephesians
[314]1 [315]1 [316]1 [317]1 [318]1 [319]1 [320]1 [321]1
[322]1 [323]1 [324]1 [325]1 [326]1 [327]1:3-6 [328]1:4
[329]1:4 [330]1:4 [331]1:4 [332]1:4 [333]1:5 [334]1:5
[335]1:5-6 [336]1:10 [337]1:10 [338]1:10 [339]1:11 [340]1:11
[341]1:22 [342]2:3 [343]2:3 [344]2:3 [345]4 [346]4 [347]4:24
[348]5:25
Philippians
[349]1:29 [350]2:13
Colossians
[351]1 [352]3 [353]3 [354]3:3 [355]3:10 [356]3:10
2 Thessalonians
[357]1:6 [358]1:7
1 Timothy
[359]1:13 [360]2 [361]2:5 [362]2:5 [363]2:5 [364]2:6 [365]4:8
[366]4:10 [367]5:21 [368]5:21 [369]14:10
2 Timothy
[370]2:13 [371]2:19
Titus
[372]3:4
Philemon
[373]1:2
Hebrews
[374]1:2 [375]1:14 [376]2:9 [377]2:9 [378]2:9 [379]2:9
[380]2:14 [381]2:14 [382]2:14 [383]2:16 [384]5:1 [385]5:1
[386]5:1 [387]5:1 [388]5:5 [389]6 [390]6:10 [391]6:10
[392]7:10 [393]8:6 [394]8:12 [395]9:12 [396]9:13 [397]9:14
[398]9:22 [399]11:6 [400]12:24
James
[401]1:17
1 Peter
[402]1:18 [403]1:18-20 [404]1:19 [405]2:7 [406]2:8 [407]3:17
2 Peter
[408]1 [409]2:1 [410]3:9
1 John
[411]2:2 [412]3:4 [413]3:8 [414]3:8 [415]3:9 [416]4:4
[417]4:14 [418]5:12
Revelation
[419]3:4 [420]5:9 [421]5:9 [422]5:10 [423]14:3 [424]14:4 [425]20
_________________________________________________________________
This document is from the Christian Classics Ethereal
Library at Calvin College, http://www.ccel.org,
generated on demand from ThML source.
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